S. Brough. 1804

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

Benjamin Haworth.

ANCIENT GREECE
ILLYRICUM
MACEDONIA
EMATHIA
EORDÆA
ELYMIOTIS
PELAGONIA
ORESTIS
ATINTANIA
CHAONIA
EPIRUS
MOLOSSIS
PERRHEBIA
ESTIOTIS
THESSALY
THESSALIOTIS
PHOCIS
DORIS
ETOLIA
ACHAIA
ARCADIA
ARGOLICUS SINUS
SARONICUS SINUS
ATTICA
BOEOTIA
LOCRI
EUBOEA
ARGIA
LACONIA
ELIS
CEPHALLENIA
CORCYRA
LEUCADIA prius Neritus
THERMAICUS SINUS
STRYMONICUS SIN.
CHALCIDICE
AMPHAXITIS
CROSSÆA
Apollonia
Edessa
Amphipolis
Thessalonica
Pellæa
Berœa
Alorus
Methone
Pydna postea Citrum
Egonis Pr.
Antigonea
Potidæa deinde Cassandria
Pallene
Toronaicus Sinus
Canastræum Pr.
Ampelos Pr.
Derris Pr.
Singiticus Sinus
Athos M
Thysus
Stagira
Panormus
Olophyxus
Acro-Athon
Stagira
Chalcis
Cissus
Ænia
Aulon
Byllis
Oricum
Ceraunia
Palæste
Phœnice
Cerauni
Aoi
Stena
Ilion
Panormus
Othronos Iæ vel Calypsus
Phalacrum Pr.
Malthace I
Ericusa
Cassiope
Butiro
Pelodes
Cæstria
Pandosia
Cichyrus
Pass Aron
Gomphi
Tricca
Metropolis
Phila
Heracleum
Penus Fl
Ossa M
Melibœa
Pelion
Sepias Pr.
Myrmex Scop.
Peparethus I
Halonesus
Icus I.
Scopelus I.
Sciathus
Pheacum I.
Corcyra
Leucimna Pr.
Chimerum Pr
Paxus I.
Leucas
Leucata Pr. et Apollinis Tempi
Ithaca
Œmadæ
Same
Oxiæ Iæ
Palæa
Cyllene
Peneus Fl
Chelonites Pr.
Zacynthus
Pheia Pr.
Alpheus Fl
Olympia Pisa
Scillunus
Amarus Fl
Samicum
Triphylia
Cyparissa
Prote I
Erana
Sphacteria vel Sphagia I.
Coryphasium
Ægaleus
Methonæ
Œnussæ I.
Theganusa I
Acritas Pr.
Tænarum Pr.
Cythera
Malea Pr.
Platanistus Pr.
Epidaurus
Limera
Minoa
Epi-Delium
Cranae I
Sparta
Larax
Hermione
Hydrea
Bucephalum Pr.
Scyllæum Pr
Sunium Pr et Minervæ Tem.
Ægina
Salamis
Epidaurus
Thoricus
Macris vel Helence I.
Ceos
Gerœstum Pr.
Marathon
Brauron
Chalcis
Eretria
Thebæ
Thespiæ
Platæ
Opuntius Sinus
Phalasia Pr.
Budorus Fl
Cava Eubœæ
Cherstonesus
Caphareum Pr.
Sicyon
Corinthus
Megara
Eleusis
Thyrea
Tanos Fl
Pyrasiæ
Sparta
Lacedæmon
Mycenæ
Argos
Tiryns
Epidaurus
Lycirna
Mantinea
Tegea
Megalopolis
Lasion
Olympia
Pylus
Messene
Pheræ
Thalamæ
Cranae I
Œtylo
Cænepolis
Cythera
Greek Stadia
100 200 300 400
Roman Miles
10 20 30 40 50
37 38 39 40 41 42
T. Kitchin Sculp.

THE

GENERAL HISTORY

OF

POLYBIUS.

TRANSLATED from the GREEK

By Mr. HAMPTON.

VOLUME the SECOND.

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ERRATUM.

Page 421, line 15, *for* at Cyprus, *read* from Cyprus.

THE

GENERAL HISTORY

OF

POLYBIUS.

BOOK the SIXTH.

EXTRACT the FIRST*.

The origin, and natural revolutions, of civil government. An analyſis of the government of Rome.

CHAP. I.

* * * WITH regard indeed to thoſe ſtates of Greece, which have been often raiſed to a high degree of ſtrength and power, and again as frequently have ſuffered an intire reverſe of fortune, it would be no hard taſk, either to treat of the

* It is altogether uncertain at what time, and by whoſe labour or direction, theſe Extracts, from the ſixth to the ſeventeenth Book, were ſelected from the Hiſtory. Caſaubon indeed judges it to have been the work of Marcus Brutus: upon the authority, as I ſuppoſe, of Plutarch and of Suidas. The firſt of theſe, ſpeaking of the behaviour of Brutus on the day before the battle of Pharſalia, ſays; "that, when dinner was ended in the camp, while others either went to ſleep, or were diſquieting their minds with apprehenſions concerning the approaching battle, he employed himſelf in writing till the evening, compoſing an Epitome of Polybius." The words of Suidas are theſe: "Brutus wrote ſome Letters; and an Epitome of the books of Polybius the Hiſtorian." But an Epitome, that is an Abridgement, is a work of a very different kind. The abridger of a Hiſtory preſerves the ſubſtance of it intire; omitting ſuch parts only as ſeem to be ſuperfluous, or of ſmall importance. He relates events in regular order, and in the due courſe of ſucceſſion. He forms a chain, of ſmaller length indeed,

events that have happened among them in paſt times, or to ſpeak with ſome aſſurance concerning thoſe that muſt here-

but compoſed of intermediate and dependent links. He employs alſo his own ſtile and language: or, if he adopts thoſe of his author, it is commonly with ſome degree of variation which renders them his own. Even in compiling what are called the heads of a Hiſtory, ſome connection and conſiſtency are ſtill required; and ſuch order of the parts, as may carry with it the appearance of an intire body. But in theſe Extracts no ſeries of hiſtory is preſerved. They are all ſingle and ſeparated portions: ſeparated from the body of the work; and not joined even by the ſmalleſt connection one with another. That they remain alſo in the very words in which they were originally written, is evident not only from the language throughout, which is ſo peculiar as to exclude all doubt, but more particularly from a ſingle circumſtance, which in this caſe is certain and deciſive. Almoſt every one of theſe ſelected portions has in the firſt ſentence one of thoſe connecting particles which ſhew that another period had gone before. Theſe particles, which add nothing to the ſenſe, which bear a manifeſt relation to ſome former ſentence, and which, by being retained, ſerve only to render the beginning of each paſſage imperfect and abrupt, are alone ſufficient to demonſtrate, that the Extracts, as they were ſelected arbitrarily, and with no reference to any certain plan, were copied alſo with the moſt minute exactneſs, and without diminution or addition. If this then be the work deſigned by Plutarch and by Suidas, it muſt at leaſt be acknowledged that they have ſpoken of it in very improper terms.

But Brutus compoſed abridgements likewiſe of the books of Fannius, and of Cælius Antipater, two Roman hiſtorians: and Cicero mentions each of theſe works under the ſame title of an Epitome. In one of his letters he ſays; "that he had copied his account of a certain fact, which Atticus had controverted with him, from Brutus's Epitome of the books of Fannius; and that, as Atticus had refuted him by demonſtration, he would now refute Atticus by the authority of Brutus and of Fannius." In another letter he deſires, "that Atticus would ſend him Brutus's Epitome of the books of Cælius." And were theſe abridgements alſo barely a tranſcript of ſeparate and unconnected paſſages? It is ſcarcely to be conceived, that Brutus, if he ever had employed himſelf in a labour of this kind for the ſake of his own improvement, would have ſuffered ſuch collections to be publiſhed with his name, and be diſperſed among his friends: or that Cicero particularly ſhould have been diſpoſed to ſee or to conſult a volume of mere Extracts, when the intire Hiſtories, both of Fannius and Cælius, muſt undoubtedly have had a place in his library.

It ſeems then that the opinion, which aſcribes the choice of theſe Extracts to Brutus, not only is deſtitute of every kind of proof, but wants even the ſupport of probability. Other conjectures might perhaps as eaſily be offered. But nothing is more vain or trifling, than to form conjectures, when the truth itſelf, if it could be known with certainty, would be but of little value. By what perſon ſoever the choice was made, it is manifeſt that it was made with very good judgement; and that the paſſages all were copied with the moſt ſcrupulous fidelity. In this ſtate they now remain: not to be conſidered as a Hiſtory; but as genuine and authentick materials for a hiſtory of the times to which they belong. Or

rather

after happen. For it is eaſy to recount tranſactions that are known; and obvious likewiſe, from an attentive view of former accidents, to derive a foreſight of the future. But with regard to the republick of the Romans, as the preſent condition of the government, on account of that variety of parts of which it is compoſed, cannot be explained without great labour; ſo, on the other hand, the want of being ſufficiently acquainted, both with the general inſtitutions, and particular conduct, that have prevailed among this people in former times, renders it not leſs difficult to pronounce concerning their future fortune. It will be neceſſary therefore to employ the cloſeſt pains, in order to obtain a diſtinct and comprehenſive knowledge of the advantages that are peculiar to the conſtitution of this ſtate.

Among thoſe then, who have treated of theſe matters in the way of ſcience, the greateſt part have diſtinguiſhed civil government into three ſeveral kinds; Royalty, Ariſtocracy, and Democracy. But it may very reaſonably be demanded of theſe writers, whether they ſpeak of theſe as the only kinds, or ſimply as the beſt. In either caſe indeed they muſt be charged with error. For firſt, that kind of government is undoubtedly to be eſteemed the beſt, which is compoſed of all the three now mentioned. The proof of this is evident, from experience and from fact, as well as reaſon. Such, for example, was the ſyſtem, firſt invented by Lycurgus, and eſtabliſhed by him in Sparta. Nor is it true, on the other hand, that theſe are the only kinds. For many are the examples of monarchical and tyrannical governments, which are greatly different from royalty; though they appear indeed to bear ſome kind of reſemblance to it: which gives occaſion to

rather they are to be regarded as ſo many diſtinct and ſeparate leſſons of political, military, and moral inſtruction. In this view they will be found to be truly valuable: and the queſtion, at what time, or by whom they were ſelected, like moſt other queſtions which are merely critical, is a matter of curioſity, rather than of uſe.

all monarchs, to cover themſelves, as well as they are able, under this diſguiſe, and falſely to aſſume the regal name. There are likewiſe many oligarchical ſtates, which ſeem to approach nearly in their form to ariſtocracies; though theſe are in truth very widely diſtant from them. The ſame obſervation may be made, with reſpect alſo to democracies. The following illuſtration will ſerve more clearly to explain my meaning.

It is not every government, which is conducted by a ſingle ſovereign, that is immediately to be termed a royalty: but that alone, which was at firſt beſtowed by the conſent of thoſe who are governed; and which is adminiſtered according to right reaſon, rather than by force and terror. In the ſame manner, neither is every ſtate to be called an ariſtocracy, which places the ſupreme direction of affairs in the hands of a few: but that only, in which thoſe who are moſt diſtinguiſhed by their prudence and integrity are appointed by free choice to govern. Nor laſtly is that to be eſteemed a democracy, in which the whole multitude uſurp the liberty of purſuing their own counſels and deſigns without controul. But when we ſee a people, who, from the ancient manners of their country, are accuſtomed to pay due worſhip to the gods, to revere their parents, to ſhew reſpect to the aged, and to obey the laws; when, in the aſſemblies of citizens like theſe, the reſolutions of the greater part are made the rule of government; then we behold the form of a juſt democracy.

There are therefore ſix different kinds of government: three, which are in the mouths of all men, and which have now been mentioned; and three more, that are allied to theſe by nature; Monarchy, Oligarchy, and the Government of the multitude. Of all theſe, the firſt in order is monarchy; which is eſtabliſhed by the bare work of nature, without any preparation or deſign. From monarchy ariſes royalty; when art has been applied, to correct the vices of the former. And when

when royalty has degenerated into it's congenial evil, which is tyranny; the deſtruction of the latter gives birth to ariſtocracy. This again being changed, according to the natural order of things, into oligarchy; the ſubjects, rouſed to vengeance by oppreſſion, reſiſt the injuſtice of their governours, and eſtabliſh a democracy. And in the laſt place, when the people themſelves become haughty and untractable, and reject all law; to democracy ſucceeds, in the courſe of time, the government of the multitude.

That this deduction is agreeable to truth, will be clear to every one, who conſiders with attention the commencement and firſt riſe, as well as the changes, which nature has appropriated to each particular kind of government. And indeed there is no other way, but by obſerving what was the natural birth of every ſtate, to judge with certainty concerning the progreſs of it towards perfection, and from thence to decline and ruin; and to diſcern, at what time, in what manner, and into what different form it will at laſt be changed. Above all others, the Roman government may beſt be illuſtrated by ſuch a method of inquiry: becauſe this ſtate, both in it's firſt eſtabliſhment, and ſubſequent increaſe, diſplays a cloſe conformity with the ſettled laws, and regular courſe of nature.

I am not ignorant indeed, that Plato, and ſome other philoſophers, have already treated with the greateſt accuracy of the ſeveral forms of government, and their alternate revolutions. But as there are but few, that are able to comprehend the length of their diſcourſes, and the variety of matter which they contain; I ſhall endeavour rather to give a ſummary account of thoſe more obvious principles, which are adapted both to common apprehenſion, and to the purpoſes of civil hiſtory. And in caſe that any obſcurity or defect ſhould be found in the general view, the particular detail, which I ſhall afterwards ſubjoin, will afford ample compenſation, by removing every difficulty.

What

What then are the commencements, and what the original riſe, of political ſocieties? When a deluge, a peſtilential diſeaſe, a famine, or any other ſimilar cauſe, has brought deſtruction upon the human race; as tradition aſſures us it has happened in former times, and as it is probable it will again hereafter happen; and when all arts and inſtitutions are extinguiſhed alſo in the ſame calamity; from the few, that are left alive, another progeny of men ſprings up: who, being conſcious of their natural weakneſs, and attracted, like all other animals, to an union with their own kind, aſſociate themſelves together in a body. At this time therefore, it is manifeſt, that he who is ſuperior both in ſtrength and courage muſt govern and conduct the reſt. For that this is indeed the genuine work of nature, is moſt clearly ſeen in the examples of the ſeveral kinds of animals, which are led by natural inſtinct only, unimproved by reaſon. Such are cocks, bulls, and boars, as well as other kinds: among all which, thoſe that are confeſſedly the firſt in ſtrength are placed at the head of all the herd. Such therefore is the original ſtate of men: when they aſſemble together in a manner not unlike to that of other animals; and are led by thoſe, that are the braveſt and moſt powerful. And this ſtate may properly be called a monarchy: in which the authority of thoſe that govern is meaſured by their ſtrength. But afterwards, when in theſe ſocieties a common education and mutual intercourſe have produced new ſentiments and habits, then firſt commences royalty; then firſt ariſe in the human mind the notions of honourable and baſe, of juſt and unjuſt. Theſe ſentiments, and this change of government, are formed in the following manner.

From the union of the two ſexes, to which all are naturally inclined, children are born. When any of theſe therefore, being arrived at perfect age, inſtead of yielding ſuitable returns, of gratitude and of aſſiſtance, to thoſe by whom

they have been bred, on the contrary attempt to injure them, either by words or actions; it is manifeſt, that thoſe who behold the wrong, after having alſo ſeen the ſufferings and the anxious care that were ſuſtained by the parents in the nouriſhment and education of theſe children, muſt be greatly offended and diſpleaſed at ſuch proceeding. For man, who among all the various kinds of animals is alone endowed with the faculty of reaſon, cannot, like the reſt, paſs over ſuch actions with indifference: but will make reflection on what he ſees; and, comparing likewiſe the future with the preſent, will not fail to expreſs his indignation at this injurious treatment; to which, as he foreſees, he alſo may at ſome time be expoſed. Thus again, when any one, who has been ſuccoured by another in the time of danger, inſtead of ſhewing the like kindneſs to his benefactor, endeavours at any time to deſtroy or hurt him; it is certain, that all men muſt be ſhocked by ſuch ingratitude; through ſympathy with the reſentment of their neighbour; and from an apprehenſion alſo, that the caſe may be their own. And from hence ariſes, in the mind of every man, a certain ſenſe of the nature and force of duty, in which conſiſts both the beginning and the end of juſtice. In the ſame manner likewiſe, the man, who in the defence of others is ſeen to throw himſelf the foremoſt into every danger, and even to ſuſtain the fury of the fierceſt animals, never fails to obtain the loudeſt acclamations of applauſe and veneration from all the multitude; while he, who ſhews a different conduct, is purſued with cenſure and reproach. And thus it is, that the people begin to diſcern the nature of things honourable or baſe, and in what conſiſts the difference between them; and to perceive, that the former, on account of the advantage that attends them, are fit to be admired and imitated, and the latter to be deteſted and avoided. When he therefore, who poſſeſſes the greateſt power, and is placed at the head of all the reſt, is found always

ways to comply with the general ſentiments, in ſupporting fortitude and merit, and in diſtributing to every one impartial juſtice; the people, no longer dreading his ſuperior force, but paying a willing obedience to his wiſdom, ſubmit themſelves to his authority, and with one conſent maintain him in his government againſt all invaders, even to extreme old age. And thus the monarch by inſenſible degrees becomes a king; when reaſon takes the rule, in the place of ſtrength and violence. Such are the firſt perceptions among mankind of juſtice and injuſtice, of baſe and honourable; and ſuch the origin and riſe of genuine royalty. For the people not only confirm theſe leaders in the poſſeſſion of the power to which they have been raiſed, but preſerve it to their children likewiſe: being perſuaded, that thoſe, who have received their birth and education from virtuous parents, cannot but reſemble them in manners. And if at any time they are diſpleaſed at the conduct of theſe deſcendants, they then chooſe other magiſtrates and kings. But having been taught to diſcern by paſt experience the difference between external faculties and the endowments of the mind, they now appoint to the ſupreme command, not thoſe that excell in bodily ſtrength and vigour, but thoſe who are diſtinguiſhed by their wiſdom and ſuperior reaſon.

In ancient times then, thoſe, who had been once judged worthy to be inveſted with the regal dignity, continued, during the remainder of their lives, in the undiſturbed poſſeſſion and exerciſe of government: fortifying all the advantageous poſts; incloſing their towns with walls; and obtaining ſuch an increaſe of territory as was neceſſary for the ſecurity, or the plentiful ſubſiſtance, of their ſubjects. And as they aſſumed no great diſtinction either in their dreſs or table, but lived a life that was conformable in every point to that of the other citizens, they raiſed againſt themſelves no envy, nor afforded any matter of offence. But their deſcendants, having received

received the ſovereignty in the courſe of hereditary ſucceſſion, and finding, that all things already were obtained that were convenient for defence, and that the abundance of all neceſſaries exceeded the demands of nature, were ſoon hurried, by the wantonneſs of eaſe and plenty, into an open gratification of every paſſion. They then began to be perſuaded, that it was neceſſary that kings ſhould be diſtinguiſhed from their ſubjects by more ſplendid habits, and be ſerved with more coſtly and luxurious tables; and purſued alſo with full career the indulgence of their amours, however lawleſs, without admitting any contradiction or controul. The firſt of theſe diſorders ſoon excited envy and offence, and the latter, wrath and unrelenting hatred. And from hence, the royalty being now converted into tyranny, the diſſolution of it was begun, by machinations formed againſt the perſons of the ſovereigns. Theſe conſpiracies were at firſt contrived, not by men of obſcure or low condition, but by thoſe of nobleſt birth, and who were the moſt diſtinguiſhed by their courage and exalted ſpirit: for ſuch are at all times moſt impatient of the inſolence of princes. But the people, being not leſs offended alſo and enraged, having once obtained ſuch leaders, readily joined their forces in the ſame attempt. And thus, the form of royalty and monarchy being utterly deſtroyed, an ariſtocracy grew up, and was eſtabliſhed in it's place.

For the people, moved with preſent gratitude towards thoſe who had delivered them from tyranny, reſolved to inveſt them with the government, and ſubmitted themſelves to their guidance and dominion. And theſe, being on their part alſo not leſs ſatisfied with the honour that was beſtowed upon them, regarded the good of the community as the only rule of their adminiſtration; and employed their whole care and pains, to promote the happineſs of individuals, as well as to advance the common intereſts of all. But when again the children of theſe governours were raiſed, in the courſe of ſucceſſion like-

wiſe, to the ſame authority; unpractiſed, as they had always been, in hardſhip or misfortune; and unexperienced alſo in that equality and liberty, upon which the government was founded; having been nurtured from their birth in the pre-eminence and honours of their parents; they began, ſome of them to accumulate inordinate wealth by fraud and violence; while others, allowing a full indulgence to their paſſions, abandoned themſelves without reſtraint to riot and intemperance, adulteries and rapes. And thus, the ariſtocracy being now changed into an oligarchy, the paſſions of the multitude were once more inflamed; and the ſame deſtruction followed, that had before fallen upon the kings, when they had degenerated into tyrants. For no ſooner was there found a ſingle citizen, who, being encouraged by the general diſcontent and hatred that ſuch a conduct had occaſioned, was bold enough, either by words or actions, to attempt any thing againſt the governours, than the people with one conſent were ready to concur in the deſign. And when they had killed or driven into baniſhment their oppreſſors, not daring to eſtabliſh royalty, on account of the miſconduct of the former kings, and being deterred alſo, by the miſchiefs which they ſtill more lately had experienced, from yielding the ſovereignty to any certain number, they were then forced to have recourſe to the ſingle expedient that was left untried, and to place in themſelves alone their confidence of ſafety. And having aſſumed into their own hands the conduct and the truſt of government, they thus framed a democracy upon the ruins of the oligarchy.

During ſome time afterwards, and while any of thoſe remained alive, who had beheld the miſeries that flowed from the former unequal government, the people were all well pleaſed to maintain this popular ſtate; and thought that nothing was more valuable than equality and liberty. But after the courſe of one or two ſucceſſions, as new men ſprang up, even

even theſe enjoyments, being now become familiar to them, began, through long uſe and habit, to be leſſened in their eſteem, and to give place to the deſire of preeminence and power. Above all the reſt, thoſe who had acquired the greateſt wealth, being eager likewiſe to poſſeſs the ſovereign rule, and not able to obtain it by their own ſtrength and virtue, endeavoured to draw the people to their ſide; ſcattering among them with profuſion all their riches, and employing every method of corruption; till by degrees they had taught them to fix their whole attention upon the gifts by which they were ſuſtained, and rendered their avidity ſubſervient to the views of their own wild ambition. And thus the frame of the democracy was diſſolved; and gave place to the rule of violence and force. For when once the people are accuſtomed to be fed without any coſt or labour, and to derive all the means of their ſubſiſtence from the wealth of other citizens; if at this time ſome bold and enterpriſing leader ſhould ariſe, whoſe poverty has ſhut him out from all the honours of the ſtate, then commences the Government of the multitude: who run together in tumultuous aſſemblies, and are hurried into every kind of violence; aſſaſſinations, baniſhments, and diviſions of lands: till, being reduced at laſt to a ſtate of ſavage anarchy, they once more find a maſter and a monarch, and ſubmit themſelves to arbitrary ſway.

Such is the circle, in which political ſocieties are revolved; and ſuch the natural order, in which the ſeveral kinds of government are varied, till they are at laſt brought back to that original form, from which the progreſs was begun. With the help of being acquainted with theſe principles, though it may not perhaps be eaſy to foretell the exact time of every alteration that may happen in a ſtate, yet, if our ſentiments are free from prejudice and paſſion, we ſhall very rarely be deceived in judging of the degree, either of exaltation or decline, in which it actually ſubſiſts, or in declaring the form,

into which it muſt at laſt be changed. With regard eſpecially to the commonwealth of Rome, this view of things cannot fail to lead us into the knowledge both of the original conſtitution, and the gradual progreſs of it towards perfection, as well as of the future revolution alſo that awaits it. For as this government, above all others, received, as we have already obſerved, both it's firſt eſtabliſhment, and ſubſequent increaſe, from the ſettled laws of nature; it is reaſonable to believe, that it will follow the ſame laws likewiſe, in being changed hereafter into a contrary form. But this will be more diſtinctly ſeen in the following parts of this diſcourſe. I ſhall now give a ſhort account of the frame of government that was eſtabliſhed by Lycurgus. Such a digreſſion will not be foreign to my deſign.

This legiſlator then, having conſidered with himſelf, that, according to the neceſſary and eſtabliſhed courſe of all things, the ſeveral accidents and changes, that have now been mentioned, were inevitable, formed this concluſion: that every ſimple, and ſingle, kind of government was inſecure; on account of it's proneneſs to degenerate into that more vicious kind, which was moſt nearly allied to it by nature. For as ruſt is the inbred bane of iron, and worms of wood; and as theſe ſubſtances, even though they ſhould eſcape all external violence, at laſt fall a prey to the evils that are as it were congenial with them; in the ſame manner likewiſe, every ſingle kind of government breeds within itſelf ſome certain vice, which is attached by nature to it's very form, and which ſoon cauſes it's deſtruction. Thus royalty degenerates into tyranny; ariſtocracy into oligarchy; and democracy into ſavage violence. Nor is it poſſible, as we have already ſhewn, but that, in the courſe of time, theſe converſions muſt be thus produced. Lycurgus therefore, foreſeeing this neceſſity, inſtead of adopting either of the ſingle forms of government, collected what was excellent in them all; and ſo joined together the principles that

that were peculiar to each ſeveral form, that no one of them might be extended beyond proper bounds, and ſlide into the evil to which it was inclined by nature: but that each ſeparate power, being ſtill counteracted by the reſt, might be retained in due poſition, and the whole government be preſerved in equal balance; as a veſſel, when impelled to either ſide by the wind, is kept ſteady by a contrary force. Thus the dread of the people, to whom a certain ſhare was allotted in the government, reſtrained the exceſſes and abuſe of royalty. The people, on the other hand, were maintained in a due ſubmiſſion to the kings, by their apprehenſion of the power of the ſenate. For the members of the ſenate, being all ſelected from the beſt among the citizens, were always ready to ſupport the cauſe of juſtice; and, by throwing their own weight into the ſcale, when either ſide was in danger of being oppreſſed by the other, to give ſuch ſtrength to the weakeſt party, as the conſtitution of the ſtate required. By theſe means, the Lacedæmonians preſerved their liberty intire, for a much longer time than any other people. And thus it was that Lycurgus, having been taught by reaſon to foreſee a certain train of cauſes and events, was able to give a laſting ſtrength to his eſtabliſhment. The Romans on the other hand, though they arrived indeed at the ſame perfection in the conſtitution of their ſtate, were not led to it by foreſight or by reaſon. But, during the courſe of many conteſts and diſorders in which they were engaged, having been careful always to adopt, upon every change, ſuch improvements as the occaſion itſelf ſuggeſted to them, they at laſt obtained the ſame end likewiſe, as that which Lycurgus had propoſed; and completed the moſt beautiful frame of government, of all that are in our times known.

Let me only add, that a good judge of hiſtory will not form his opinion of a writer from any thing that is omitted by him, but from that which he relates. If indeed any falſe-

hood

hood ſhould be found in the things which he relates, it may be reaſonable to impute the omiſſion of the reſt to ignorance. But if, on the other hand, all that he relates be true, it ought then to be acknowledged, that his ſilence with regard to ſome particular things is not the effect of ignorance, but of judgement and deſign.

CHAP. II.

THE three kinds of government, of which we have been ſpeaking, were all found united in the commonwealth of Rome. And ſo even was the balance between them all, and ſo regular the adminiſtration that reſulted from their union, that it was no eaſy thing, even for the Romans themſelves, to determine with aſſurance, whether the intire ſtate was to be eſteemed an ariſtocracy, a democracy, or a monarchy. For if they turned their view upon the power of the Conſuls, the government appeared to be purely monarchical and regal. If again the authority of the ſenate was conſidered, it then ſeemed to wear the form of ariſtocracy. And laſtly, if regard was had to the ſhare which the people poſſeſſed in the adminiſtration of affairs, it could then ſcarcely fail to be denominated a popular ſtate. The ſeveral powers, that were appropriated to each of theſe diſtinct branches of the conſtitution at the time of which we are ſpeaking, and which, with very little variation, are even ſtill preſerved, are theſe which follow.

The Conſuls, while they remain in Rome, before they lead out the armies into the field, are the maſters of all publick affairs. For all the other magiſtrates, the Tribunes alone excepted, are ſubject to them, and bound to obey their commands. They introduce embaſſadors into the ſenate. They propoſe alſo to the ſenate the ſubjects of debate; and direct all

all the forms that are obſerved in making the decrees. Nor is it leſs a part of their office likewiſe, to attend to thoſe affairs that are tranſacted by the people: to call together general aſſemblies; to report to them the reſolutions of the ſenate; and to ratify whatever is determined by the greater number. In all the preparations that are made for war, as well as in the whole adminiſtration in the field, they poſſeſs an almoſt abſolute authority. For to them it belongs, to impoſe upon the allies whatever ſervices they judge expedient; to appoint the military tribunes; to enroll the legions, and make the neceſſary levies; and to inflict puniſhments, in the field, upon all that are ſubject to their command. Add to this, that they have the power likewiſe to expend whatever ſums they may think convenient from the publick treaſure; being attended for that purpoſe by a Quæſtor, who is always ready to receive and execute their orders. When any one therefore directs his view to this part of the conſtitution, it is very reaſonable for him to conclude, that the government is no other than a ſimple royalty. Let me only obſerve, that if in ſome of theſe particular points, or in thoſe that will be hereafter mentioned, any change ſhould be either now remarked, or ſhould happen at ſome future time, ſuch an alteration will not deſtroy the general principles of this diſcourſe.

To the Senate belongs, in the firſt place, the ſole care and management of the publick money. For all the returns that are brought into the treaſury, as well as all the payments that are iſſued from it, are directed by their orders. Nor is it allowed to the Quæſtors to apply any part of the revenue to particular occaſions as they ariſe, without a decree of the ſenate; thoſe ſums alone excepted, which are expended in the ſervice of the Conſuls. And even thoſe more general, as well as greateſt diſburſements, which are employed, at the return of every five years, in building and repairing the publick edifices, are aſſigned to the Cenſors for that purpoſe, by the expreſs

preſs permiſſion of the ſenate. To the ſenate alſo is referred the cognizance of all the crimes, committed in any part of Italy, that demand a publick examination and inquiry: ſuch as treaſons, conſpiracies, poiſonings, and aſſaſſinations. Add to this, that when any controverſies ariſe, either between private men, or any of the cities of Italy, it is the part of the ſenate to adjuſt all diſputes; to cenſure thoſe that are deſerving of blame; and to yield aſſiſtance to thoſe, who ſtand in need of protection and defence. When any embaſſies are ſent out of Italy; either to reconcile contending ſtates; to offer exhortations and advice; or even, as it ſometimes happens, to impoſe commands; to propoſe conditions of a treaty; or to make a denunciation of war; the care and conduct of all theſe tranſactions is intruſted wholly to the ſenate. When any embaſſadors alſo arrive at Rome, it is the ſenate likewiſe that determines, in what manner they ſhall be received and treated, and what anſwer ſhall be given to their demands. In all theſe things, that have now been mentioned, the people has no ſhare. To thoſe therefore, who come to reſide in Rome during the abſence of the Conſuls, the government appears to be purely ariſtocratical. Many of the Greeks eſpecially, and of the foreign princes, are eaſily led into this perſuaſion: when they perceive that almoſt all the affairs, which they are forced to negociate with the Romans, are determined by the ſenate.

And now it may well be aſked, what part is left to the People in this government: ſince the ſenate, on the one hand, is veſted with the ſovereign power, in the ſeveral inſtances that have been here enumerated, and more eſpecially in all things that concern the management and diſpoſal of the publick treaſure; and ſince the Conſuls, on the other hand, are intruſted with the abſolute direction of the preparations that are made for war, and exerciſe an uncontrouled authority in the field. There is however a part ſtill allotted to the people; and

and indeed the moſt important part. For firſt, the people are the ſole diſpenſers of rewards and puniſhments; which are the only bands, by which ſtates and kingdoms, and in a word all human ſocieties, are held together. For when the difference between theſe is overlooked, or when they are diſtributed without due diſtinction, nothing but diſorder can enſue. Nor is it poſſible indeed, that government ſhould be maintained, if the wicked ſtand in equal eſtimation with the good. The People then, when any offences demand ſuch puniſhment, frequently condemn the citizens to the payment of a fine; thoſe eſpecially, who have been inveſted with the dignities of the ſtate. To the people alone belongs the right to ſentence any one to die. Upon this occaſion, they have a cuſtom which deſerves to be mentioned with applauſe. The perſon accuſed is allowed to withdraw himſelf in open view, and embrace a voluntary baniſhment, if only a ſingle tribe remains, that has not yet given judgement; and is ſuffered to retire in ſafety to Prænesſte, Tibur, Naples, or any other of the confederate cities. The publick magiſtracies are allotted alſo by the people to thoſe who are eſteemed worthy of them: and theſe are the nobleſt rewards that any government can beſtow on virtue. To the people belongs the power of approving or rejecting laws: and, which is ſtill of greater importance, peace and war are likewiſe fixed by their deliberations. When any alliance is concluded, any war ended, or treaty made; to them the conditions are referred, and by them either annulled or ratified. And thus again, from a view of all theſe circumſtances, it might with reaſon be imagined, that the people had engroſſed the largeſt portion of the government, and that the ſtate was plainly a democracy.

Such are the parts of the adminiſtration, which are diſtinctly aſſigned to each of the three forms of government, that are united in the commonwealth of Rome. It now remains to be conſidered, in what manner each ſeveral form

is enabled to counteract the others, or to co-operate with them.

When the Conſuls, inveſted with the power that has been mentioned, lead the armies into the field, though they ſeem indeed to hold ſuch abſolute authority as is ſufficient for all purpoſes, yet are they in truth ſo dependent both on the ſenate and the people, that without their aſſiſtance they are by no means able to accompliſh any deſign. It is well known that armies demand a continual ſupply of neceſſaries. But neither corn, nor habits, nor even the military ſtipends, can at any time be tranſmitted to the legions, unleſs by an expreſs order of the ſenate. Any oppoſition therefore, or delay, on the part of this aſſembly, is ſufficient always to defeat the enterprizes of the Generals. It is the ſenate likewiſe, that either compels the Conſuls to leave their deſigns imperfect, or enables them to complete the projects which they have formed; by ſending a ſucceſſor into each of their ſeveral provinces, upon the expiration of the annual term, or by continuing them in the ſame command. The ſenate alſo has the power to aggrandize and amplify the victories that are gained, or on the contrary to depreciate and debaſe them. For that which is called among the Romans a Triumph, in which a ſenſible repreſentation of the actions of the Generals is expoſed in ſolemn proceſſion to the view of all the citizens, can neither be exhibited with due pomp and ſplendour, nor indeed be in any manner celebrated, unleſs the conſent of the ſenate be firſt obtained, together with the ſums that are requiſite for the expence. Nor is it leſs neceſſary on the other hand, that the Conſuls, how far ſoever they may happen to be removed from Rome, ſhould be careful to preſerve the good affections of the people. For the people, as we have already mentioned, annulls, or ratifies, all treaties. But that which is of greateſt moment is, that the Conſuls, at the time of laying down their office, are bound alſo to ſubmit their paſt adminiſtration to the

the judgement of the people. And thus theſe magiſtrates can at no time think themſelves ſecure, if they neglect to gain the approbation both of the ſenate, and the people.

In the ſame manner the ſenate alſo, though inveſted with ſo great authority, is bound to yield a certain attention to the people, and to act in concert with them, in all affairs that are of great and general importance. With regard eſpecially to thoſe offences that are committed againſt the ſtate, and which demand a capital puniſhment, no inquiry can be perfected, nor any judgement carried into execution, unleſs the people confirm what the ſenate has before decreed. Nor are the things, which more immediately regard the ſenate itſelf, leſs ſubject to the ſame controul. For if a law ſhould at any time be propoſed, to leſſen the received authority of the ſenators; to detract from their honours and preeminence; or even to deprive them of a part of their poſſeſſions; it belongs wholly to the people to eſtabliſh or reject it. And even ſtill more; the interpoſition of a ſingle Tribune is ſufficient, not only to ſuſpend the deliberations of the ſenate, but to prevent them alſo from holding any meeting or aſſembly. Now the peculiar office of the Tribunes is, to declare thoſe ſentiments that are moſt pleaſing to the people: and principally to promote their intereſts and deſigns. And thus the ſenate, on account of all theſe reaſons, is forced to cultivate the favour, and gratify the inclinations, of the people.

The people again, on their part, are held in a dependance on the ſenate, and are obliged to pay a certain deference, both to the particular members, and to the general body. In every part of Italy there are works of various kinds, which are let to farm by the Cenſors; ſuch as the building, or repairing, of the publick edifices, which are almoſt innumerable; the care of rivers, harbours, gardens, mines, and lands; every thing, in a word, that falls beneath the dominion of the Romans. In all theſe things, the people are the undertakers:

takers: inſomuch that there are ſcarcely any to be found, that are not in ſome degree involved, either in the contracts, or in the management of the works. For ſome take the farms of the Cenſors at a certain price: others become partners with the firſt. Some again engage themſelves as ſureties for the farmers: and others, in ſupport alſo of theſe ſureties, pledge their own fortunes to the ſtate. Now the ſupreme direction of all theſe affairs is placed wholly in the ſenate. The ſenate has the power to allot a longer time; to lighten the conditions of the agreement, in caſe that any accident has intervened; or even to releaſe the contractors from their bargain, if the terms ſhould be found impracticable. There are alſo many other circumſtances, in which thoſe that are engaged in any of theſe publick works may be either greatly injured, or greatly benefited, by the ſenate; ſince to this body, as we have already obſerved, all things that belong to theſe tranſactions are conſtantly referred. But there is ſtill another advantage, of much greater moment. For from this order likewiſe judges are ſelected, in almoſt every accuſation of conſiderable weight, whether it be of a publick, or private, nature. The people therefore, being by theſe means held under due ſubjection and reſtraint, and doubtful of obtaining that protection, which they foreſee that they may at ſome time want, are always cautious of exciting any oppoſition to the meaſures of the ſenate. Nor are they, on the other hand, leſs ready to pay obedience to the orders of the Conſuls; through the dread of that ſupreme authority, to which the citizens in general, as well as each particular man, are obnoxious in the field.

Thus, while each of theſe ſeparate parts is enabled either to aſſiſt or obſtruct the reſt, the government, by the apt contexture of them all in the general frame, is ſo well ſecured againſt every accident, that it ſeems ſcarcely poſſible to invent a more perfect ſyſtem. For when the dread of any common danger, that threatens from abroad, conſtrains all the orders

of

of the ſtate to unite together, and co-operate with joint aſſiſtance; ſuch is the ſtrength of the republick, that as, on the one hand, no meaſures that are neceſſary are neglected, while all men fix their thoughts upon the preſent exigency; ſo neither is it poſſible on the other hand, that their deſigns ſhould at any time be fruſtrated through the want of due celerity, becauſe all in general, as well as every citizen in particular, employ their utmoſt efforts, to carry what has been determined into execution. Thus the government, by the very form and peculiar nature of it's conſtitution, is equally enabled to reſiſt all attacks, and to accompliſh every purpoſe. And when again all apprehenſions of foreign enemies are paſt, and the Romans, being now ſettled in tranquillity, and enjoying at their leiſure all the fruits of victory, begin to yield to the ſeduction of eaſe and plenty, and, as it happens uſually in ſuch conjunctures, become haughty and ungovernable; then chiefly we may obſerve, in what manner the ſame conſtitution likewiſe finds in itſelf a remedy againſt the impending danger. For whenever either of the ſeparate parts of the republick attempts to exceed it's proper limits, excites contention and diſpute, and ſtruggles to obtain a greater ſhare of power, than that which is aſſigned to it by the laws; it is manifeſt, that ſince no one ſingle part, as we have ſhewn in this diſcourſe, is in itſelf ſupreme or abſolute, but that on the contrary the powers which are aſſigned to each are ſtill ſubject to reciprocal controul, the part, which thus aſpires, muſt ſoon be reduced again within it's own juſt bounds, and not be ſuffered to inſult or depreſs the reſt. And thus the ſeveral orders, of which the ſtate is framed, are forced always to maintain their due poſition: being partly counterworked in their deſigns; and partly alſo reſtrained from making any attempt, by the dread of falling under that authority to which they are expoſed.

EX-

EXTRACT the SECOND.

The military inſtitutions of the Romans.

CHAP. I.

AS ſoon as the Conſuls are declared, the military Tribunes are next appointed. Of theſe, fourteen are taken from the citizens who have carried arms in five campaigns; and ten more, from thoſe who have completed ten. For every citizen, before he arrives at the age of forty-ſix, is obliged to ſerve either ten years in the cavalry, or ſixteen in the infantry: thoſe alone excepted, who are placed by the Cenſors below the rate of four hundred drachmæ; and who are all reſerved for the ſervice of the ſea. In the caſe of any preſſing danger, the time of continuing in the infantry is extended to twenty years. No citizen is permitted by the laws to ſue for any magiſtracy, before he has completed the ſervice of ten campaigns.

When the enrolments are to be made, the Conſuls give notice before to the people of a certain day, upon which all the Romans, that are of ſufficient age, are required to attend. This is done every year. And when the day arrives, and the men all appear at Rome, and are aſſembled afterwards in the Capitol, the Tribunes of the youngeſt order divide themſelves, as they are appointed either by the Conſuls or the people, into four ſeparate bodies. For this diviſion correſponds with the firſt and general diſtribution of all the forces into four ſeparate legions. Of theſe Tribunes therefore, the four firſt named are aſſigned to the firſt legion; the three next, to the ſecond; the following four, to the third; and the three, laſt appointed, to the fourth. Of the

Tribunes of the oldeſt order, the two that are firſt named are placed in the firſt legion; the three ſecond, in the ſecond; the two that follow, in the third; and the remaining three, in the fourth. By this diſtribution and diviſion, an equal number of commanders is allotted to each legion. When this is done, the Tribunes of each legion, having taken their ſeats apart, draw out the tribes one by one by lot; and calling to them that upon which the lot firſt falls, they ſelect from it four young men, as nearly equal as is poſſible both in age and ſtature. And when theſe are brought forward from the reſt, the Tribunes of the firſt legion firſt chooſe one; then thoſe of the ſecond, a ſecond; thoſe of the third take the third; and thoſe of the fourth, the laſt. After theſe, four more are made to approach. And now, the Tribunes of the ſecond legion firſt make their choice; then thoſe of the reſt in order; and, laſt of all, the Tribunes of the firſt. In the ſame manner again, from the next four that follow, the Tribunes of the third legion chooſe the firſt; and thoſe of the ſecond, the laſt. And thus, by obſerving the ſame method of rotation to the end, it happens that the legions, with reſpect to the men of which they are compoſed, are all alike and equal. The number allotted to each legion is four thouſand and two hundred; and ſometimes five thouſand, when any great and unuſual danger is foreſeen. After theſe had been thus ſelected, it was anciently the cuſtom to chooſe the cavalry; and to add two hundred horſemen to each four thouſand of the infantry. But in the preſent times, the citizens, of whom the cavalry is compoſed, are firſt enrolled; having been before appointed by the Cenſors, according to the rate of their revenue: and three hundred are aſſigned to every legion.

When the enrolments are in this manner finiſhed, the Tribunes, having aſſembled together in ſeparate bodies the ſoldiers of their reſpective legions, chooſe out a man that

ſeems

ſeems moſt proper for the purpoſe, and make him ſwear in the following words: "that he will be obedient to his commanders, and execute all the orders that he ſhall receive from them, to the utmoſt of his power." The reſt of the ſoldiers of the legion, advancing one by one, ſwear alſo, that they will perform what the firſt has ſworn. About the ſame time likewiſe, the Conſuls ſend notice to the magiſtrates of the allied cities of Italy, from which they deſign to draw any forces, what number of troops are wanted, and at what time and place they are required to join the Roman army. The cities, having raiſed their levies in the ſame manner that has now been mentioned, and adminiſtered to them the ſame oath, ſend them away, attended by a paymaſter and a General.

At Rome the Tribunes, after the ceremony of the oath is finiſhed, command all the legions to return without arms upon a certain day, and then diſmiſs them. And when they are met together again at the appointed time, thoſe that are the youngeſt, and of the loweſt condition, are ſet apart for the light-armed troops. From the next above theſe in age are ſelected the Haſtati: from thoſe that are in full ſtrength and vigour, the Principes: and the oldeſt of all that are enrolled are the Triarii. For every legion is compoſed of all theſe different bodies: different in name, in age, and in the manner in which they are armed. This diviſion is ſo adjuſted, that the Triarii amount to ſix hundred men: the Principes are twelve hundred: the Haſtati an equal number: and all the reſt, light-armed. If a legion conſiſts of more than four thouſand men, the ſeveral bodies are increaſed in due proportion; except only, that the number of the Triarii always remains the ſame.

The youngeſt of theſe troops are armed with a ſword, light javelins, and a buckler. The buckler is both ſtrongly made, and of a ſize ſufficient for ſecurity. For it is of a circular

circular form, and has three feet in the diameter. They wear likewiſe upon their heads ſome ſimple ſort of covering; ſuch as the ſkin of a wolf, or ſomething of a ſimilar kind: which ſerves both for their defence, and to point out alſo to the commanders thoſe particular ſoldiers, that are diſtinguiſhed either by their bravery, or their want of courage, in the time of action. The wood of the javelin is of the length of two cubits, and of the thickneſs of a finger. The iron part is a ſpan in length: and is drawn out to ſuch ſlender fineneſs towards the point, that it never fails to be bent in the very firſt diſcharge, ſo that the enemy cannot throw it back again. Otherwiſe it would be a common javelin.

The next in age, who are called the Haſtati, are ordered to furniſh themſelves with a complete ſuit of armour. This, among the Romans, conſiſts in the firſt place of a ſhield of a convex ſurface; the breadth of which is two feet and a half; and the length four feet, or four feet and a palm in thoſe of the largeſt ſize. It is compoſed of two planks, glued together, and covered firſt with linen, and afterwards with calve-ſkin. The extreme edges of it, both above and below, are guarded with plates of iron: as well to ſecure it againſt the ſtrokes of ſwords, as that it may be reſted alſo upon the ground without receiving any injury. To the ſurface is fitted likewiſe a ſhell of iron; which ſerves to turn aſide the more violent ſtrokes of ſtones, or ſpears, or any other ponderous weapon. After the ſhield, comes the ſword; which is carried upon the right thigh, and is called the Spaniſh ſword. It is formed, not only to puſh with at the point; but to make a falling ſtroke with either edge, and with ſingular effect; for the blade is remarkably ſtrong and firm. To theſe arms are added two piles, or javelins; a helmet made of braſs; and boots for the legs. The piles are of two ſorts; the one large, the other ſlender. Of the former, thoſe that are round have the breadth of a palm in their diameter; and

thoſe that are ſquare the breadth of a palm likewiſe in a ſide. The more ſlender, which are carried with the other, reſemble a common javelin of a moderate ſize. In both ſorts, the wooden part is of the length of about three cubits. The iron, which is of the ſame length likewiſe, and turned outwards at the point, in the form of a double hook, is faſtened to the wood with ſo great care and foreſight, being carried upwards to the very middle of it, and transfixed with many cloſe ſet rivets, that it is ſooner broken in uſe than looſened; though, in the part in which it is joined to the wood, it is not leſs than a finger and a half in thickneſs. Upon the helmet is worn an ornament of three upright feathers, either red or black, of about a cubit in height; which, being fixed upon the very top of the head, and added to their other arms, makes the troops ſeem to be of double ſize, and gives them an appearance which is both beautiful and terrible. Beſide theſe arms, the ſoldiers in general place alſo upon their breaſts a ſquare plate of braſs, of the meaſure of a ſpan on either ſide, which is called the guard of the heart. But all thoſe, who are rated at more than ten thouſand drachmæ, cover their breaſts with a coat of mail. The Principes, and the Triarii, are armed in the ſame manner likewiſe as the Haſtati; except only that the Triarii carry pikes inſtead of javelins.

From each of theſe ſeveral ſorts of ſoldiers, the youngeſt alone excepted, ten men of diſtinguiſhed merit are firſt ſelected; and after theſe, ten more. Theſe are all called commanders of companies: and he that is firſt choſen has a ſeat in the military Council. After theſe, twenty more are appointed to conduct the rear; and are choſen by the former twenty. The ſoldiers of each different order, the light troops excepted, are then divided into ten ſeparate parts; to each of which are aſſigned four officers, of thoſe who have been thus ſelected; two to lead the van, and two to take the

the care of the rear. The light-armed troops are diſtributed in juſt proportion among them all. Each ſeparate part is called a company, a band, or an enſign: and the leaders, captains of companies or centurions. Laſt of all, two of the braveſt and moſt vigorous among the ſoldiers are appointed by the captains to carry the ſtandards in each company. It is not without good reaſon that two captains are aſſigned to every company. For as it always is uncertain, what will be the conduct of an officer, or to what accidents he may be expoſed; and as in the affairs of war there is no room for pretext or excuſe; this method is contrived, that the company may not upon any occaſion be deſtitute of a leader. When the captains therefore both are preſent, he that was firſt choſen leads the right, and the other the left of the company. And when either of them is abſent, he that remains takes the conduct of the whole. In the choice of theſe captains, not thoſe that are the boldeſt and moſt enterpriſing are eſteemed the beſt; but thoſe rather, who are ſteady and ſedate; prudent in conduct, and ſkilful in command. Nor is it ſo much required, that they ſhould be at all times eager to begin the combat, and throw themſelves precipitately into action; as that, when they are preſſed, or even conquered by a ſuperior force, they ſhould ſtill maintain their ground, and rather die than deſert their ſtation.

The Cavalry is divided alſo into ten parts or troops. In each of theſe, three captains firſt are choſen; who afterwards appoint three other officers to conduct the rear. The firſt of the captains commands the whole troop. The other two hold the rank and office of Decurions: and all of them are called by that name. In the abſence of the firſt captain, the next in order takes the intire command. The manner in which theſe troops are armed is at this time the ſame as that of the Greeks. But anciently it was very different. For firſt, they wore no armour upon their bodies; but were covered, in the

time of action, with only an under garment. In this method, they were able indeed to deſcend from their horſes, or leap up again upon them, with greater quickneſs and facility: but, as they were almoſt naked, they were too much expoſed to danger in all cloſe engagements. The ſpears alſo that were in uſe among them in former times were in a double reſpect very unfit for ſervice. Firſt, as they were of a ſlender make, and always trembled in the hand, it not only was extremely difficult to direct them with exactneſs towards the deſtined mark; but very frequently, even before their points had reached the enemy, the greateſt part of them were ſhaken into pieces by the bare motion of the horſes. Add to this, that theſe ſpears, not being armed with iron at the loweſt end, were formed to ſtrike only with the point, and, when they were broken by this ſtroke, were afterwards incapable of any farther uſe. Their buckler was made of the hide of an ox, and in form was not unlike to thoſe globular diſhes which are uſed in ſacrifices. But this was alſo of too infirm a texture for defence: and, as it was at firſt not very capable of ſervice, it afterwards became wholly uſeleſs, when the ſubſtance of it had been ſoftened and relaxed by rain. The Romans therefore, having obſerved theſe defects, ſoon changed their weapons for the armour of the Greeks. For the Grecian ſpear, which is firm and ſtable, not only ſerves to make the firſt ſtroke with the point in juſt direction and with ſure effect; but, with the help of the iron at the oppoſite end, may, when turned, be employed againſt the enemy with equal ſteadineſs and force. In the ſame manner alſo the Grecian ſhields, being ſtrong in texture, and capable of being held in a fixed poſition, are alike ſerviceable both for attack and for defence. Theſe advantages were ſoon perceived, and the arms adopted by the cavalry. For the Romans, above all other people, are excellent in admitting foreign cuſtoms that are preferable to their own.

As ſoon as this partition of the troops is finiſhed, and the neceſſary orders given by the Tribunes concerning their arms, they are then commanded to return to their reſpective habitations, till the day arrives, upon which they are bound by oath to aſſemble together in a certain place appointed by the Conſuls. Each of the Conſuls uſually appoints a different place for the aſſembling of his own army: for to each of them are allotted ſeparately two Roman legions, together with an equal part of the allies. No pretence of accident is at any time allowed to thoſe that are enrolled; nor any excuſe admitted, in oppoſition to their oath, to diſcharge them from appearing on the day preſcribed: unleſs ſome auſpices ſhould intervene, or ſome diſaſter happen, which renders their attendance abſolutely impracticable. When they are all met together, the diſtribution of the allies, who are aſſembled alſo with the Romans, is regulated by twelve officers, called Prefects and appointed by the Conſuls, in the following manner. They firſt chooſe out from all the allies a body of the braveſt and moſt ſkilful ſoldiers, both cavalry and infantry, to ſerve near the perſon, and under the immediate orders, of the Conſuls. Theſe are called the extraordinary, or ſelected troops. The whole infantry of the allies is uſually the ſame in number with that of the Romans; but the cavalry three times as many. Among theſe, about a third part of the cavalry, and a fifth part of the infantry, are ſet apart as extraordinaries. The reſt are then divided by the Prefects into two equal bodies; one of which is called the right, and the other the left wing. When all things are thus prepared, the Tribunes direct both the Romans and the allies to incamp.

As the method of this incampment is uniform and ſimple, at all times and in every place the ſame, I ſhall here endeavour to ſet before the reader a clear deſcription of the order that is obſerved in the Roman armies, both in their marches and incampments; and of the manner alſo in which they are

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drawn up in battle. For no man ſurely, who is not utterly averſe to all great and laudable purſuits, can be unwilling to attend to ſuch inquiries; in which his ſearch will be rewarded with a kind of knowledge not unworthy of the pains.

CHAP. II.

THIS then is the manner in which the Romans form their camp. As ſoon as the ground is choſen for the purpoſe, that part of it which is judged to be the moſt convenient, both for the diſpatch of orders, and for diſcerning every thing that is tranſacted, is firſt marked out for the place of the Conſular tent. In this place, an enſign is planted in the ground, and round it is meaſured a quadrangular figure, every ſide of which is diſtant from the enſign a hundred feet; ſo that the whole contents of it are equal to the ſpace of four acres. On one ſide of this figure, the ſide that appears to be the moſt commodious for water and for forage, the Roman legions are diſpoſed in the following order. In every legion there are ſix Tribunes, as we have already mentioned; and two legions are aſſigned to each of the Conſuls. With each Conſul therefore, twelve Tribunes always are incamped. Their tents are ranged in one right line, which is parallel to that ſide of the quadrangular ſpace that has been choſen, and diſtant from it fifty feet. The ground between is occupied by their horſes, their beaſts of burthen, and other baggage. Theſe tents are ſo diſpoſed, that the back of them is turned towards the Conſular ground; while the oppoſite ſide looks down upon the external aſpect of the camp, which we ſhall hereafter therefore call the front. They are ſet at equal diſtances each from the other; and ſo extended, that the line, upon which they ſtand, traverſes the whole breadth of the ſpace that is occupied by the legions.

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A hundred feet are then meaſured downwards, from the front of the tents of the Tribunes: and at the extremity of this diſtance a line is drawn, which runs parallel to theſe tents. From this line forwards, the legions are incamped in the following manner. The line being firſt divided into two equal parts, from the point of the diviſion another right line is drawn; on either ſide of which, and at an equal diſtance from it, is placed the cavalry of the two legions; oppoſite the one to the other; and ſeparated from each other by a ſpace of fifty feet. The diſpoſition of the tents, both of the cavalry, and of the infantry, is the ſame. For every company, as well as every troop, occupies a ſquare piece of ground, the front of which is turned towards the open ſpaces, and contains in length a hundred feet. The depth of it is uſually ſo adjuſted as to be equal to the length; except in the incampment of the Triarii, and the allies. When the legions are compoſed of any greater number, both the length and depth of this ground are increaſed in due proportion. The cavalry, being thus placed towards the middle of the tents of the Tribunes, forms a kind of ſtreet, which runs down tranſverſely from the right line before mentioned, and the ſpace that lies before thoſe tents. All the other ſpaces bear alſo the reſemblance of regular ſtreets; the ſides of which are formed by the troops and companies, which are ranged lengthways through the camp.

Behind the cavalry, and in the ſame form likewiſe, are placed the Triarii of both legions: a company being joined cloſe to every troop; but looking a contrary way; and containing in depth only one half of its length. For the Triarii uſually amount to no more than half of the number of the other bodies. But as the depth of the companies is thus diminiſhed, the ground upon which they are ranged is rendered equal in length to that which is occupied by the reſt.

2. Oppoſite

Oppoſite to the Triarii of the two legions, and at the diſtance of fifty feet on either ſide, the Principes are incamped; with their faces turned towards the open ſpaces. By this poſition, two more ſtreets are formed; which take their beginning alſo at the ſame right line, or ſpace of a hundred feet that lies before the tents of the Tribunes; and are ended on the oppoſite ſide, which we before called the front of all the camp. Next to the Principes are lodged the Haſtati; being placed cloſe behind the former, but looking alſo a contrary way. As each of the different bodies, of which a legion is compoſed, is divided into ten companies, from hence it happens, that the ſeveral intervals, or ſtreets, are all of an equal length, and are alike terminated by that ſide of the camp which is the front; towards which alſo the laſt of all the companies are always turned.

At the diſtance of fifty feet from the Haſtati, and oppoſite alſo to them, is lodged the cavalry of the allies; beginning from the ſame right line; and extended likewiſe, as the other bodies, down to the front of the camp. The whole infantry of the allies, as we have already mentioned, before the extraordinaries are ſelected, is equal to that of the legions: and the cavalry, after a third part has been taken from it to ſerve as extraordinaries, is double in number to the Roman cavalry. The depth therefore of the ground, upon which theſe troops are placed, is enlarged in ſuch proportion, that they cover always the ſame ſpace in length with that which is occupied by the Romans. The ſeveral ſtreets, which are five in number, being thus completely formed, the infantry of the allies, to whoſe companies a depth of ground is alſo aſſigned in proportion to their number, is in the ſame manner ranged cloſe behind the cavalry, but looking a contrary way. For their faces are turned towards the intrenchment, and look down upon both ſides of the camp.

In every company, the foremoſt tents on either ſide are occupied by the Centurions. In this diſpoſition both of the infantry and cavalry, the ſixth company and the ſixth troop are ſeparated from the fifth by a diſtance of fifty feet. By this diviſion another ſtreet is formed, which traverſes all the reſt, and paſſes through the middle of the camp, in a line parallel to the tents of the Tribunes. This ſtreet, on account of the poſition of it below five companies, is called the Quintan.

The ſpace, that falls behind the tents of the Tribunes, and which lies cloſe on either hand to the Conſular ground, is allotted, one ſide of it for the Forum, and the other for the place of the Quæſtor and the military ſtores. Behind the laſt of the tents of the Tribunes on either ſide, and in a line, which, falling upon thoſe tents, forms that kind of figure which is called the Forceps, the extraordinary cavalry is lodged, together with the volunteers that accompany the Conſul: being all of them extended along the two ſides of the camp; with their faces turned towards the place of the Quæſtor on the one ſide, and to the Forum on the other. And as they are in this manner placed near the Conſul in the camp, ſo likewiſe in the marches, and in a word upon all occaſions that ariſe, they are bound to obſerve with particular attention both the Quæſtor and the Conſul; and to be at all times ready to receive their orders. Cloſe behind this cavalry, but with their faces turned towards the intrenchment, the infantry, which is ſelected alſo for the ſame ſervice, is incamped.

Above theſe troops is left an open ſpace, of a hundred feet in breadth, and parallel to the tents of the Tribunes, which paſſes along the Forum, the Conſular ground, and the place of the Quæſtor; and is continued through the whole extent of the camp. On the upper ſide of it is placed the extraordinary cavalry of the allies; looking down upon the Forum, the place of the Quæſtor, and the Conſular ground. Between the

middle of their tents, and oppoſite to the Conſular ground, is left another open ſpace, of the breadth of fifty feet; which divides the former at right angles, and leads towards the hindmoſt part of the camp. Cloſe again behind this cavalry, the extraordinary infantry of the allies is lodged; with their faces turned towards the intrenchment, and to the rear of all the camp. The ground, that remains unoccupied on either ſide, is reſerved for ſtrangers; or for ſuch of the allies as are brought by any temporary occaſion to the army. When the arrangement is thus completed, the intire camp forms the figure of an equilateral ſquare: and with reſpect to the ſeveral parts, the ſeparation of them into ſtreets, together with the order in which all things are diſpoſed, renders the appearance not unlike to a city.

The intrenchment is diſtant from the tents, on every ſide, two hundred feet. The ground, that lies between, is ſubſervient to many valuable purpoſes. It renders the entrance of the legions into the camp, as well as their egreſs from it, both eaſy and commodious. For as the ſeveral companies advance into this open ſpace according to the direction of their reſpective ſtreets, they never meet together in the way, nor are expoſed to the danger of being thrown down and trampled upon each by the other. In this place likewiſe the cattle, and all the ſpoil that is taken from the enemy, is kept in ſafety during the night. But the greateſt advantage is, that in the caſe of an attack by night, neither fire, nor ſcarcely any weapon, can reach the troops; and that even thoſe few javelins, that happen to fall among them, are rendered ineffectual by the diſtance, as well as by the tents that cover them on every ſide.

From this detail of the numbers, both of the infantry and cavalry, of which an army is at any time compoſed; whether four thouſand, or five thouſand men, be allotted to each legion; from the deſcription of the depth and length of the ground

ground upon which the companies are lodged; and from the account of the meaſure and reſpective diſtances of the ſtreets and open ſpaces; it will be eaſy to conceive the extent and whole circumference of the camp. When the allies that firſt join the army, or thoſe that are brought by any occaſion to the camp, exceed the uſual number, the ground that lies on one ſide of the Conſular tent, together with that which was before mentioned, is aſſigned to the latter; the Forum and the place of the Quæſtor being thrown together for this purpoſe as the neceſſity requires. And with regard to the former, the numbers that are redundant are diſpoſed in another ſeparate ſtreet, behind the Roman legions, on both ſides of the camp. When the four legions, and both the Conſuls, are aſſembled together within one intrenchment, in order to underſtand the manner of their incampment, nothing more is neceſſary than to conceive two armies, lodged in the form that has been now deſcribed, turned one towards the other, and joined together in the part that is aſſigned to the extraordinaries of either army; who are placed as we have already mentioned, in the rear of all the camp, with their faces turned towards the intrenchment. In this poſition, the camp forms the figure of an oblong ſquare. The ground, upon which it ſtands, is double in extent to that of the former camp; and the circumference of it larger by one half. Such is the method which is conſtantly obſerved, when both Conſuls are incamped together within the ſame intrenchment. And when they form ſeparate camps, the only difference is, that the Forum, the place of the Quæſtor, and the Conſular tents, are placed in the middle, between both the armies.

CHAP. III.

AS ſoon as the incampment is completed, the Tribunes having aſſembled together all the perſons, both free men and ſlaves, that are in the army, adminiſter to every one of them apart the following oath: "That they will not ſteal any thing from the camp; and, even if they find any thing, that they will bring it to the Tribunes." Two companies are then ſelected from the Principes and the Haſtati of each legion; to whoſe care is aſſigned the ground that lies before the tents of the Tribunes. For as the Romans uſually paſs the whole time of day in this open ſpace, they employ great care to keep it continually cleanſed and ſprinkled. Of the remaining eighteen companies, three are allotted to every Tribune. For in every legion there are twenty companies of Principes and Haſtati, as we have already mentioned, and ſix Tribunes. The ſervice, which theſe three companies are obliged to perform in turn for the Tribune to whom they are reſpectively aſſigned, is to fix his tent, to make the ground around it plain and level, and to cover his baggage, if it be neceſſary, with a fence. It is their duty likewiſe to place a double guard near him for his ſecurity. This guard conſiſts of four ſoldiers, two of whom are ſtationed before the tent, and two behind it, near to the horſes. As three companies are thus allotted to every Tribune, and as each company, without including the Triarii and the light-armed troops, who are both exempted from this duty, contains more than a hundred men, this ſervice, falling to each company in turn upon every fourth day only, becomes very light and eaſy: and, while it miniſters in all things that are neceſſary to the convenience of the Tribunes, renders their office likewiſe more illuſtrious, and brings reſpect to their authority.

The

The Triarii are diſcharged from bearing any part in this attendance. But each of their companies is obliged to furniſh every day a guard to the troop of cavalry that lies cloſe behind it. The duty of this guard, among other functions, is principally to obſerve the horſes: that they may not at any time be rendered unfit for ſervice, by being intangled in the bands that hold them; or, by breaking away, and falling in among other horſes, create tumult and diſorder in the camp. One company alone, which is ſelected in turn from the whole body of theſe troops, is ſtationed round the tent of the Conſul; as well to ſecure his perſon againſt all ſurprize, as for the ſake of adding ſplendour alſo to his dignity.

The intrenchment is made by the allies, on thoſe two ſides, near to which their two wings are incamped. The two other ſides are left to the Romans; to each legion, one. Each ſide is divided into certain portions, according to the number of the companies; and a centurion aſſigned, to overlook the work in every portion. The whole ſide is afterwards examined and approved by two of the Tribunes; whoſe office it is to attend to every thing that is done in the camp. For the Tribunes, dividing among themſelves the time of the campaign, and preſiding, two in turn, during two months of the ſix, have the ſupreme direction of every kind of neceſſary work and ſervice, that falls within the time of their command. The ſame duty is performed, in the ſame manner likewiſe, among the allies, by the officers who are called Prefects.

As ſoon as daylight appears, the leaders of the cavalry, and the centurions, attend all together at the tents of the Tribunes; and the Tribunes at that of the Conſul. The neceſſary orders are then delivered by the Conſul to the Tribunes; by the Tribunes to the centurions and the leaders of the cavalry; and by theſe, as the proper time for each arrives, to the reſt of the army.

The

The delivery of the ſignal for the night is ſecured in the following manner. Every tenth cohort, both of infantry and cavalry, is lodged at the extreme end of thoſe lines which form the ſeparate ſtreets. From each of theſe a ſoldier is ſelected, who is diſcharged from all the duties of the guard. This ſoldier, every day about the time of the ſetting of the ſun, goes to the tent of the Tribune, and receives from him the ſignal; which is a flat tablet of wood with ſome word inſcribed upon it: and, having returned back again to his own company, he then delivers the tablet with the ſignal, in the preſence of ſome witneſſes, to the leader of the cohort that is lodged next to his own. From him again, it paſſes to the following cohort; and, in the ſame manner, through all the reſt in order, till it arrives at the firſt cohorts, which lie neareſt to the tents of the Tribunes; and from thence it is carried back again to the Tribunes, while it is yet day. If all the tablets that were delivered are brought back, the Tribune then perceives that the ſignal has paſſed through all the camp. But if any one be wanting, he immediately examines into the fact; and, having diſcerned by the inſcriptions in what quarter the tablet has been ſtopped, inflicts a ſuitable puniſhment upon thoſe that have been the cauſe of the neglect.

The guards for the night are thus diſpoſed. One intire company is always ſtationed round the Conſular tent. The tents of the Tribunes, and the cavalry, are guarded by ſoldiers taken from each company, in the manner that has before been mentioned. Each ſeparate company appoints a guard likewiſe for itſelf from it's own body. The other guards are diſpoſed as the Conſul directs. But the uſual cuſtom is, to allot three ſoldiers to the Quæſtor; and two to each of the members of the Council. The external ſides of the camp are guarded by the light-armed forces; who are diſtributed every day along the whole intrenchment. From the ſame body,

ten men are alſo ſtationed before every gate that leads into the camp.

Among thoſe that are appointed for the watch, one ſoldier from each guard, the ſame whoſe duty it is to take the firſt watch, is carried in the evening to the Tribune, by one of the conductors of the rear of every company. The Tribune, having given to all of them ſome ſmall tablets of wood, inſcribed with a certain character, and appropriated to each particular guard, diſmiſſes them to their reſpective ſtations.

The care of making the rounds is intruſted to the cavalry. The captain of the firſt troop in each of the legions is bound to ſend his orders in the morning to one of the conductors of the rear; commanding him to appoint, before the time of dinner, four ſoldiers of the troop to go the rounds; and to ſend notice alſo afterwards, in the evening, to the leader of the ſecond troop, that it is his turn to inſpect the watch on the following day. The leader of the ſecond troop gives notice, in like manner, for the third day; and the ſame method is obſerved through all the reſt. The four ſoldiers, who are thus ſelected from the firſt troop by the conductor of the rear, having determined among themſelves each particular watch by lot, go afterwards to the tent of the Tribune, and receive from thence in writing an account of the ſeveral poſts, and of the number of the guards, which they are required to viſit. They then take their ſtation near to the firſt company of the Triarii For the leader of this company has the care of marking the time of every watch by the ſound of a trumpet. And when the ſignal is made, he, to whoſe inſpection the firſt watch was allotted, taking with him ſome of his friends as witneſſes, goes round to all the poſts that are recited in his orders, and viſits all the guards: not thoſe alone that are ſtationed round the intrenchment, and before the gates, but thoſe alſo that are placed in every ſingle company and in every troop. If he finds the centinels awake, and fixed in their

their ſeveral ſtations, he receives from them the wooden tablets. But if he diſcovers, that any one is ſleeping, or has left his poſt, he deſires thoſe that are preſent to bear teſtimony to the fact, and then retires. The ſame method is obſerved in all the following watches. The care of ſounding the trumpet, by which notice is given in the ſame moment both to the centinels, and the inſpectors of the watch, is left, as we have ſaid to the captains of the firſt company of the Triarii, who perform this duty alternately, day by day.

As ſoon as morning appears, thoſe, who have made the rounds, carry the tablets to the Tribune. If they bring the full number back, they are ſuffered to depart without any queſtion. But if the number be leſs than that of the guards, the inſcriptions are immediately examined, in order to diſcover from what particular guard the tablet has not been returned. When this is known, the centurion is ordered to attend, and to bring with him the ſoldiers that were appointed for that guard; that they may be queſtioned face to face with him who made the rounds. If the fault be in the guard, he that made the rounds appeals at once to the teſtimony of his friends who were preſent. Such evidence always is demanded from him: and in caſe that he is not able to bring this proof, the whole blame reſts upon himſelf. The Council is then aſſembled; the cauſe is judged by the Tribune; and the guilty perſon ſentenced to be baſtonaded. This puniſhment is inflicted in the following manner.

The Tribune, taking a ſtick into his hand, gently touches the criminal; and, immediately afterwards, all the ſoldiers of the legion attack him with ſticks and ſtones; ſo that the greateſt part of thoſe that are thus condemned are deſtroyed immediately in the camp. If any one eſcapes, yet he is not ſaved. For all return into his country is ſhut againſt him: nor would any of his friends or kindred ever dare to receive him into their houſes. Thoſe therefore, who have once fallen into

into this misfortune, are loſt without reſource. The conductor of the rear, and the leader of the troop, if ever they neglect to give the neceſſary notice in due time, the firſt to the inſpectors of the watch, and the ſecond to the leader of the ſucceeding troop, are ſubject alſo to this puniſhment. From the dread of a diſcipline ſo ſevere, and which leaves no place for mercy, every thing that belongs to the guards of the night is performed with the exacteſt diligence and care.

The ſoldiers are ſubject to the controul of the Tribunes, as theſe are to that of the Conſuls. The Tribunes have the power of impoſing fines, and demanding ſureties, and of puniſhing with ſtripes. The ſame authority is exerciſed by the Prefects among the allies.

The puniſhment of the baſtonade is inflicted alſo upon thoſe who ſteal any thing in the camp; thoſe who bear falſe teſtimony; who in their youth abuſe their bodies; and who have been three times convicted of one fault. Theſe offences are puniſhed as crimes. There are others, that are regarded as the effects of cowardice, and diſgraceful to the military character. When a ſoldier for example, with a view of obtaining a reward, makes a report to the Tribunes of ſome brave action which he has not performed. When any one, through fear, deſerts his ſtation; or throws away his arms in the time of an engagement. From hence it happens, that many, through the dread of the allotted puniſhment, when they are attacked by much greater numbers, will even encounter manifeſt deſtruction, rather than deſert that poſt which they have been ordered to maintain. Others again, when they have loſt their ſhield, or ſword, or any other part of their arms in the time of action, throw themſelves precipitately into the very midſt of the enemy; hoping either to recover what they have loſt, or to avoid by death the reproaches of their fellow-ſoldiers, and the diſgrace that is ready to receive them.

If it happens, that many are at one time guilty of the ſame fault, and that whole companies retire before the enemy, and deſert their ſtation; inſtead of puniſhing all of them with death, an expedient is employed which is both uſeful and full of terror. The Tribune, aſſembling together all the ſoldiers of the legion, commands the criminals to be brought forwards: and, having ſharply reproached them with their cowardice, he then draws out by lot, either five, or eight, or twenty men, according to the number of thoſe that have offended. For the proportion is uſually ſo adjuſted, that every tenth man is reſerved for puniſhment. Thoſe, who are thus ſeparated from the reſt by lot, are baſtonaded without remiſſion in the manner before deſcribed. The others are ſentenced to be fed with barley inſtead of wheat; and are lodged without the intrenchment, expoſed to inſults from the enemy. As the danger therefore, and the dread of death, hangs equally over all the guilty, becauſe no one can foreſee upon whom the lot will fall; and as the ſhame and infamy, of receiving barley only for their ſupport, is extended alſo alike to all; this inſtitution is perfectly well contrived, both for impreſſing preſent terror, and for the prevention of future faults.

The method, by which the young men are animated to brave all danger, is alſo admirable. When an action has paſſed, in which any of the ſoldiers have ſhewn ſignal proofs of courage, the Conſul, aſſembling the troops together, commands thoſe to approach, who have diſtinguiſhed themſelves by any eminent exploit. And having firſt beſtowed on every one of them apart the commendation that is due to this particular inſtance of their valour, and recounted likewiſe all their former actions that have ever merited applauſe, he then diſtributes among them the following rewards. To him who has wounded an enemy, a javelin. To him who has killed an an enemy, and ſtripped him of his armour, if he be a ſoldier in the infantry, a goblet; if in the cavalry, furniture for his horſe:

horſe: though, in former times, this laſt was preſented only with a javelin. Theſe rewards however are not beſtowed upon the ſoldiers, who in a general battle, or in the attack of a city, wound or ſpoil an enemy; but upon thoſe alone, who in ſeparate ſkirmiſhes, and when any occaſion offers, in which no neceſſity requires them to engage in ſingle conteſt, throw themſelves voluntarily into danger, and with deſign provoke the combat. When a city is taken by ſtorm, thoſe who mount firſt upon the walls are honoured with a golden crown. Thoſe alſo who have ſaved the lives of any of the citizens, or the allies, by covering them from the enemy in the time of battle, receive preſents from the Conſul, and are crowned likewiſe by the perſons themſelves who have been thus preſerved; and who, if they refuſe this office, are compelled by the judgement of the Tribunes to perform it. Add to this, that thoſe who are thus ſaved are bound, during the remainder of their lives, to reverence their preſerver as a father, and to render to him all the duties which they would pay to him who gave them birth. Nor are the effects of theſe rewards, in raiſing a ſpirit of emulation and of courage, confined to thoſe alone who are preſent in the army, but extended likewiſe to all the citizens at home. For thoſe who have obtained theſe preſents, beſide the honour which they acquire among their fellow-ſoldiers, and the reputati n which immediately attends them in their country, are diſtinguiſhed after their return, by wearing in all ſolemn proceſſions ſuch ornaments as are permitted only to be worn by thoſe who have received them from the Conſuls as the rewards of their valour. They hang up likewiſe in the moſt conſpicuous parts of their houſes the ſpoils which they have taken, as a monument and evidence of their exploits. Since ſuch therefore is the attention and the care, with which the Romans diſtribute rewards and puniſhments in their armies, it is not

to be thought ſtrange, that the wars in which they engage are always ended with glory and ſucceſs.

The military ſtipends are thus regulated. The pay of a ſoldier in the infantry is two oboli by the day; and double to the Centurions. The pay of the cavalry is a drachma. The allowance of corn, to each man in the infantry, conſiſts of about two third parts of an Attic buſhel of wheat by the month. In the cavalry, it is ſeven buſhels of barley, and two of wheat. To the infantry of the allies, the ſame quantity is diſtributed as to that of the Romans; but their cavalry receives only one buſhel and a third of wheat, and five of barley. The whole of this allowance is given without reſerve to the allies. But the Roman ſoldiers are obliged to purchaſe their corn and cloths, together with the arms which they occaſionally want, at a certain ſtated price, which is deducted by the Quæſtor from their pay.

In breaking up the camp, the following order is obſerved. When the firſt ſignal is made, the ſoldiers all take down the tents, and collect the baggage. No tent however is at any time either ſet up or taken down, until thoſe of the Conſul and the Tribunes are firſt ſet up, or firſt removed. Upon the ſecond ſignal, the baggage is placed upon the beaſts of burthen; and at the third, the foremoſt of the troops begin their march, and the whole camp is put in motion. In the van are uſually placed the extraordinaries; and after theſe, the right wing of the allies, which is followed by the baggage of both theſe bodies. Next to theſe, marches the firſt of the Roman legions, with its baggage alſo behind it. The ſecond legion follows; having behind it likewiſe both its own baggage, and the baggage of the allies, who are in the rear; for the rear of all the march is cloſed with the left wing of the allies. The cavalry marches ſometimes in the rear of the reſpective bodies, to which it belongs; and ſometimes on the flanks of the beaſts that are loaded with the baggage; keeping them together in due order, and covering

vering them from inſult. When any attack is expected to be made upon the rear, the extraordinaries of the allies, inſtead of leading the van, are poſted in the rear. In all the other parts, the diſpoſition remains the ſame. Of the two legions, and the two wings of the allies, thoſe that are on one day foremoſt in the march, on the following day are placed behind; that, by thus changing their rank alternately, all the troops may obtain the ſame advantage in their turn, of arriving firſt at water and at forage. There is alſo another diſpoſition, which is uſed when any immediate danger threatens, and the march is made through an open country. At ſuch times, the Haſtati, the Principes, and the Triarii, are ranged in three parallel lines, each behind the other, with the baggage of the Haſtati in the front. Behind the Haſtati is placed the baggage of the Principes, who are followed likewiſe by that of the Triarii; ſo that the baggage, and the ſeveral bodies, are mingled in alternate order. The march being thus diſpoſed, the troops, as ſoon as any attack is made, turning either to the left or to the right, advance forwards from the baggage, towards that ſide upon which the enemy appears. And thus, in a moment of time, and by one ſingle movement, the whole army is formed at once in order of battle; except only that the Haſtati are perhaps obliged to make an evolution; and the beaſts of burthen alſo, with all thoſe that attend upon the baggage, being now thrown into the rear of all the troops, are covered by them from all danger.

At the end of a march, when the army arrives near the place of their incampment, a Tribune and ſome Centurions, who are appointed always for this purpoſe, advance before the reſt. And having ſurveyed the whole ground upon which the incampment is to be made, they firſt determine the place of the conſular tent, and on which ſide of it the legions may moſt commodiouſly be lodged. When this is done,

done, they meaſure out the ſpace that is allotted for the Conſul; and then draw a line, for the place of the tents of the Tribunes; and parallel to it another line, below which the legions are to be incamped. In the ſame manner alſo, the ſeveral portions of the ground, which lies on the other ſide of the conſular tent, and which we have already particularly deſcribed, are aſcertained by lines. And as the diſtances are fixed, and well known by uſe, the admeaſurement of the whole is eaſy, and ſoon completed. Four enſigns are then planted in the ground: the firſt in the place in which the tent of the Conſul is to be ſet up; the ſecond, on that ſide of the conſular ground which has been choſen for the front of the camp; the third in the middle of the line that is deſigned for the tents of the Tribunes; and the laſt upon the other parallel line, below which the legions are to be incamped. Theſe enſigns are all of a purple colour; that of the Conſul excepted, which is white. The portions on the other ſide of the conſular ground are ſometimes marked by ſimple pikes fixed in the ground, and ſometimes by enſigns of ſome different colour. Laſt of all, the ſeveral ſtreets are drawn out by meaſure, and pikes alſo planted, to denote the limits of each particular ſtreet. The neceſſary effect of this method is, that when the troops, upon their march, approach ſo near as to diſcover the place of their incampment, they are able to diſcern at once all the different parts of the camp; being taught by the enſign of the conſul to point out and diſtinguiſh all the reſt. And as they all occupy the ſame place always in the camp, ſo that each man knows in what particular ſtreet, and in what part alſo of the ſtreet he is going to be lodged, their entrance very much reſembles that of a body of ſoldiers into their own native city. For as theſe, already knowing, both in general and in particular, the quarters of the city in which their habitations ſtand, turn aſide immediately from the gates, and arrive at their

ſeveral houſes without miſtake; juſt ſo it happens in the Roman camp. It is to this facility indeed that the Romans chiefly attend upon ſuch occaſions; and, for the ſake of obtaining it, purſue ſo contrary a method to that of the Greeks. For the Greeks, when they incamp, conſider principally the natural ſtrength of the place that is choſen, and accommodate their diſpoſition to it: being partly ſtudious to avoid the labour of throwing up an intrenchment; and partly perſuaded alſo, that fortifications raiſed by art are always leſs ſecure than thoſe that are made by nature. In compliance therefore with what the nature of the ground demands, they not only are obliged to give every kind of figure to their camp, but to vary alſo the poſition of the ſeveral parts, as the place for each is favourable or improper. And from hence it happens, that the ſoldier never knows with certainty, either his own place in the camp, or that of the body to which he belongs. But the Romans willingly ſubmit to the taſk of making an intrenchment, and to other painful works; for the ſake of the advantage that is found, in employing a method which is never changed, and which renders all the parts of the camp familiar to the army.

Such then in general are the inſtitutions of the Romans, which belong to the eſtabliſhment of their armies, and more eſpecially to the manner of their incampment.

EXTRACT the THIRD.

Some peculiar excellencies in the Roman government and manners, illuſtrated by a compariſon of them with thoſe of other ſtates.

CHAP. I.

THE ſtates, which almoſt all writers have tranſmitted to us with applauſe, are thoſe of Lacedæmon, Mantinea, Crete, and Carthage. To theſe ſome have alſo added the governments of Thebes and Athens. With regard to the firſt, it may be allowed perhaps that they merit ſome diſtinction. But the republicks of Thebes and Athens very little deſerve, in my opinion, to be made the ſubject of any particular diſcourſe: becauſe they neither roſe by natural ſteps to greatneſs; nor remained for any long continuance in a proſperous ſtate; nor ſunk again by a gradual decline. But having owed all their exaltation merely to ſome favourable ſeaſons, and borrowed a kind of tranſient ſplendour from the times, in that very moment which ſaw them flouriſh, and which ſeemed to promiſe a laſting confirmation of their power, they were thrown back again by fortune into a contrary ſtate. Thus the Thebans, having applied to their own advantage the imprudent conduct of the Lacedæmonians, and the hatred in which they were held by their allies, acquired indeed, through the ability of one or two of their citizens who diſcerned theſe circumſtances, the reputation of ſuperiority among the Greeks. But that the ſucceſs, which they at this time gained, aroſe not from the conſtitution of their government, but from the ſkill of thoſe who governed, the ill fortune that followed cloſe behind rendered clear and inconteſtable. For as the power of Thebes

Thebes grew up and flouriſhed with the lives of Epaminondas and Pelopidas, and, when they died, was immediately diſſolved; there needs no farther proof, that the ſplendour, which then accrued to the republick, was derived wholly from the virtue of theſe citizens, and not from any excellence in the ſtate. The ſame obſervation may be applied as juſtly to the commonwealth of Athens: which flouriſhed indeed at many other particular ſeaſons; but having been raiſed by the able conduct of Themiſtocles to the greateſt height of glory, within a ſhort time afterwards was ſunk again in weakneſs and diſgrace. The cauſe of this ſudden change was no other than the irregular conſtitution of the government. For the Athenian ſtate may very aptly be compared to a ſhip, in which there is no perſon that commands. In ſuch a veſſel, when the mariners, either through the dread of enemies, or the impending dangers of a ſtorm, are compelled to act together in concert, and attend to the orders of the pilot, all things that are neceſſary are performed by them with diligence and ſkill. But no ſooner are theſe apprehenſions paſt, than they begin to reject all controul, and engage in mutual conteſts, ſuch as the diverſity of their ſentiments inſpires. And while ſome among them are earneſt for continuing their courſe, and others not leſs urgent with the pilot to caſt anchor; while the firſt unfurl the ſails, and the latter interpoſe with violence, and command them to be furled; this ſpirit of contention and ſeditious obſtinacy not only affords a ſhameful ſpectacle to thoſe that behold it at a diſtance, but renders the ſafety likewiſe of all who are embarked in the veſſel ſo precarious, that very frequently, when they have eſcaped the dangers of the greateſt ſeas and moſt dreadful tempeſts, they are at laſt wrecked even in the harbour, and when they have juſt gained the land. In the ſame manner the Athenian ſtate, after having been conducted, by the virtue of the governours and the people, through all the difficulties of the moſt threaten-

ing ſeaſons, has often unaccountably been overſet, in times of perfect ſafety and tranquillity. There is no need therefore to ſay more concerning this republick, or that of Thebes; in both of which the multitude diſpoſes all things, as the impulſe of their own peculiar paſſions prompts them: the people, in the one, being naturally precipitate and eager above the reſt of men; and in the other, trained up to habits of force and violence.

Let us paſs on then to the government of Crete; and conſider, upon what grounds it is, that the moſt ſenſible of the ancient writers, ſuch as Ephorus, Xenophon, Calliſthenes, and Plato, have ventured to affirm; firſt, that the frame of this republick very much reſembles, or rather is the ſame with that of Sparta; and ſecondly, that the conſtitution itſelf is ſuch as deſerves to be applauded. In my judgement, their opinion with reſpect to both theſe points is very diſtant from the truth. Whether it be or not, the following obſervations may enable us to determine. And firſt, concerning the little reſemblance that is to be found between theſe two ſtates.

There are three things mentioned by theſe writers, as diſtinguiſhing the Spartan government. The firſt is the equality of poſſeſſions in land; of which no one is permitted to obtain a greater portion than another: the whole lands, that belong to the community, being divided in equal ſhares among all the citizens. The ſecond is the neglect of wealth, that prevails among this people. That even the uſe of money is unknown among them: and that, by conſequence, the very root of that contention, which ſprings from the poſſeſſion of leſs and more, is utterly deſtroyed. In the laſt place, as they affirm, the kings of Lacedæmon enjoy a perpetual and hereditary ſovereignty; and the ſenators, with whoſe participation, and by whoſe advice, the intire adminiſtration of affairs is regulated, hold their dignity during life. Now in all theſe points the government of Crete is contrary to that of Sparta. For the

the Cretans are permitted, by their laws, to poſſeſs, without any bounds, as large a property in land as they are able to obtain. The eſtimation alſo of money is ſo great among them, that it is not only neceſſary, but even highly honourable to acquire it. And indeed the deſire of amaſſing wealth, and the habit of increaſing it, are ſo deeply implanted in the very manners of this people, that they alone of all mankind think nothing ſordid or diſhonourable that is joined with gain. Laſtly, in this iſland, all the publick offices are renewed every year; and are conſtituted in a manner purely democratical. I have often therefore been led to wonder, that ſtates, which differ ſo eſſentially, ſhould be thus joined together by theſe writers, as if they were of a ſimilar kind and nature. But it is not only to be imputed to them, that they have barely overlooked this difference. For when they have employed great pains to ſhew, that Lycurgus alone, of all mankind, diſcerned the means that were moſt proper to give ſtability to government; that, as every ſtate can only be maintained by bravery in war, and union among the citizens, this legiſlator, when he took away from his republick the deſire of riches, removed alſo with it all civil tumult and diſſenſion, and that the Lacedæmonians, being thus freed from theſe domeſtick evils, lived together in perfect concord, and preſerved ſuch order in their government, as was not to be found in any of the ſtates of Greece; when they have diſcourſed, I ſay, at large, on all theſe circumſtances, and ſeen alſo on the other hand, that the natural luſt of wealth, which prevails among the Cretans, gives birth continually both to private conteſts, and to publick diſſenſions and diviſions; produces murthers and inteſtine wars; yet ſtill, as if a difference ſo acknowledged were of ſmall importance, they boldly venture to affirm, that there is a cloſe reſemblance between the two republicks. And indeed Ephorus, when he treats of either of them, employs indiſcriminately the ſame expreſſions, the proper names alone

excepted; ſo that, unleſs we attend to theſe, it is not poſſible to diſtinguiſh, which of the two is deſigned by his diſcourſe. Such then is the difference between the government of Crete and that of Sparta. I ſhall now endeavour to ſhew, that the firſt is neither worthy of applauſe, nor imitation.

There are two things, which are eſſential parts in every government, and according to which the principles and conſtitution of the ſtate itſelf, will be found to deſerve either praiſe or cenſure. Theſe are, the manners and the laws. The manners and the laws, that are moſt worthy to be approved, are thoſe which form the lives of individuals to ſanctity and moderation, and the general temper of the whole community to mildneſs and to juſtice: and thoſe which produce contrary effects are fit to be rejected. When we perceive therefore, that the laws and manners of a ſtate are ſuch as tend to promote the exerciſe of honeſty and virtue, as it is very reaſonable for us to conclude, that the ſtate itſelf is virtuous, and the members of it free from all reproach; ſo, on the other hand, when an immoderate deſire of gain governs the life of every private citizen, and the publick tranſactions of the ſtate are contrary to juſtice, we may ſafely venture to declare, that the laws of this community are bad, the manners of the people corrupt and vicious, and the whole government contemptible. Now if we conſider the character and conduct of the Cretans, it is certain, that ſcarcely an example can be found of any nation, in which the private manners of the citizens are more replete with artifice and fraud, or where the publick enterprizes are more unjuſt. As this republick therefore neither bears any reſemblance to that of Sparta, nor deſerves in any manner to be approved or imitated, we ſhall here reject it, as unworthy of our notice in that compariſon which we propoſe.

Nor is it reaſonable to expect, that we ſhould allow any place in this inquiry to the commonwealth of Plato; how much ſoever it may have been celebrated by ſome philoſo-

phers. For as in the conteſts between artiſts, or combatants in the publick games, no perſons are admitted, who have not firſt been trained in proper diſcipline, and prepared by exerciſe; ſo neither can this republick hope to be received into any competition concerning excellence, till it has firſt ſhewn its ſtrength in ſome real action. To compare it, ſuch as it has hitherto remained, with the republicks of Sparta, Rome, and Carthage, would be no leſs abſurd, than to compare a ſtatue with a breathing and living man. For though the beauty of the work might deſerve perhaps the higheſt commendation, yet the compariſon of an inaminate form with an animated being would very juſtly appear defective and incongruous to every eye. Leaving therefore this republick and that of Crete, let us return again to the government of Sparta.

When I conſider the laws that were invented by Lycurgus, as tending to promote union among the citizens, to ſecure the Laconian territory from all danger, and to maintain his people in the undiſturbed enjoyment of their liberty, they appear to have been ſo wiſely framed, and adapted with ſuch true foreſight to all theſe purpoſes, that I am almoſt tempted to regard them, rather as the work of ſome divinity, than the effort of any human mind. In eſtabliſhing an equality of poſſeſſions, and in reſtraining all the citizens to the conſtant uſe of one ſimple and common diet, he choſe the means that were moſt effectual, to render the Lacedæmonians moderate in their deſires, and to baniſh all contention from the ſtate. By accuſtoming them to painful labours, and dangerous exerciſes, he formed them to be brave and daring. And where temperance and fortitude meet together, in any man, or in any community of men, it is ſcarcely poſſible that thoſe, who are habituated to the practice of theſe virtues, ſhould ever be diſturbed by inteſtine evils, or be ſubdued by external force. Lycurgus therefore, having thus raiſed the frame of his republick upon theſe two principles, ſecured all Laconia againſt the

the dread of any hoſtile attempts, and eſtabliſhed the liberty of Sparta upon ſuch ſtrong foundations, that it ſubſiſted during many ages. But it appears to me that this Legiſlator, both in the frame of his particular laws, and in the general conſtitution of the government, wholly overlooked one great precaution: the precaution that was neceſſary to reſtrain his people from invading the territory of their neighbours, from aſpiring to an extended ſovereignty, or raiſing themſelves in any manner to be the arbiters of all affairs. As the particular members of the ſtate were accuſtomed by his inſtitutions to live in the ſimpleſt and moſt frugal manner, and to remain ſatisfied with their own poſſeſſions, it was alſo no leſs requiſite, either to infuſe into the whole community the ſame willing ſpirit of contentedneſs and moderation, or to force them through neceſſity to adopt it. But Lycurgus, while he freed his citizens from jealouſy and envious competition in their private manners, and in the adminiſtration of their own particular government, at the ſame time allowed full ſcope to their ambitious projects againſt the reſt of Greece, and ſuffered them to become moſt eager and aſpiring, in the purſuit both of wealth and power. For who is ignorant, that the Lacedæmonians, the firſt almoſt of all the Greeks, were led by the deſire of gain to invade the territory of their neighbours, and declared war againſt the Meſſenians, with deſign to reduce them into ſlavery? Who has not heard, that, when they had inveſted Meſſene with their forces, they perſiſted in the attempt with ſo great obſtinacy, that they bound themſelves by an oath, never to raiſe the ſiege till the city ſhould be taken? Nor is it leſs notorious to all mankind, that, with a view of eſtabliſhing their own dominion over the Grecian ſtates, they ſubmitted to obey the orders even of a people whom they had conquered. For after having bravely maintained the cauſe of the common liberty of all the Greeks, and ſubdued the Perſians who brought an army to invade it; after having defeated, and forced them

to

to return; they baſely yielded to them many cities, by the peace that was concluded by Antalcidas; that they might obtain in return the treaſure that was neceſſary, for acquiring to themſelves the ſovereignty of Greece. Upon this occaſion it was that they firſt perceived in what part their government was defective. For as long as they confined their views of conqueſt to the neighbouring ſtates, and to the limits of Peloponneſus, they were able to draw from Laconia itſelf ſuch ſupplies as were ſufficient for the accompliſhment of their deſigns: as all things that were neceſſary were collected within their reach; and as the diſtance was commodious for their return back again to their country, and for tranſporting all their ſtores. But when they attempted to maintain fleets upon the ſea, and to ſend their armies beyond the bounds of Peloponneſus; it very ſoon was ſeen, that neither their iron money, nor the exchange of their own natural commodities, that was permitted by Lycurgus, was capable of ſupplying all their wants: but that money of a common currency, and ſtores drawn from foreign countries, were neceſſary to ſupport ſuch enterprizes. They were forced therefore to ſupplicate aſſiſtance from the court of Perſia; to impoſe a tribute upon the iſlands; and to exact contributions from all the Greeks: being fully aſſured, that while they adhered to the inſtitutions of Lycurgus, they could never hope to obtain the ſupreme command in Greece, nor be able even in any manner to contend for ſuperiority with other ſtates. But to what purpoſe is this digreſſion? It is to ſhew by the evidence of facts, that the laws of Lycurgus were perfectly well contrived, for maintaining his people in the undiſturbed poſſeſſion of their own proper territory, and for preſerving their liberty inviolable: and that, where men propoſe to themſelves theſe advantages as the ſole objects of political inſtitutions, it muſt be acknowledged, that there neither is, nor ever was, any ſyſtem or frame of government, more eligible than that of Sparta. But

if a people on the other hand ſhould deſire to enlarge their views, and eſteem it more great and glorious to hold many in ſubjection, to extend their empire over various countries, and to draw the ſubmiſſion of all mankind towards them; it muſt then alſo be confeſſed, that the Lacedæmonian conſtitution is defective; and that the Roman government is framed with greater ſtrength, for the accompliſhment of ſuch deſigns. The truth of this remark is manifeſt from that which happened in the two republicks. For the Lacedæmonians no ſooner endeavoured to obtain the ſovereignty of Greece, than they brought their own liberty into danger. But the Romans, having once ſubdued to their dominion all the parts of Italy, reduced, within a ſhort time afterwards, the whole world beneath their yoke: being greatly aſſiſted in the execution of this vaſt attempt, by the plenty of all neceſſary ſtores, and the facility with which they were continually ſupplied.

CHAP. II.

THE government of Carthage ſeems alſo to have been originally well contrived, with regard to thoſe general forms that have been mentioned. For there were kings in this government; together with a ſenate, which was veſted with ariſtocratical authority. The people likewiſe enjoyed the exerciſe of certain powers that were appropriated to them. In a word, the intire frame of the republick very much reſembled thoſe of Rome and Sparta. But at the time of the war of Annibal, the Carthaginian conſtitution was worſe in its condition than the Roman. For as nature has aſſigned to every body, every government, and every action, three ſucceſſive periods; the firſt, of growth; the ſecond, of perfection; and that which follows, of decay; and as the period of perfection is the time in which they ſeverally diſplay their greateſt

greateſt ſtrength; from hence aroſe the difference that was then found between the two republicks. For the government of Carthage having reached the higheſt point of vigour and perfection much ſooner than that of Rome, had now declined from it in the ſame proportion: whereas the Romans, at this very time, had juſt raiſed their conſtitution to the moſt flouriſhing and perfect ſtate. The effect of this difference was, that among the Carthaginians the people poſſeſſed the greateſt ſway in all deliberations, but the ſenate among the Romans. And as, in the one republick, all meaſures were determined by the multitude; and, in the other, by the moſt eminent citizens; of ſo great force was this advantage in the conduct of affairs, that the Romans, though brought by repeated loſſes into the greateſt danger, became, through the wiſdom of their counſels, ſuperior to the Carthaginians in the war.

If we deſcend to a more particular compariſon, we ſhall find, that, with reſpect to military ſcience for example, the Carthaginians, in the management and conduct of a naval war, are more ſkilful than the Romans. For the Carthaginians have derived this knowledge from their anceſtors through a long courſe of ages; and are more exerciſed in maritime affairs than any other people. But the Romans, on the other hand, are far ſuperior in all things that belong to the eſtabliſhment and diſcipline of armies. For this diſcipline, which is regarded by them as the chief and conſtant object of their care, is utterly neglected by the Carthaginians; except only that they beſtow ſome little attention upon their cavalry. The reaſon of this difference is, that the Carthaginians employ foreign mercenaries; and that on the contrary the Roman armies are compoſed of citizens, and of the people of the country. Now in this reſpect, the government of Rome is greatly preferable to that of Carthage. For while the Carthaginians intruſt the preſervation of their liberty to the care of venal troops; the Romans place all their

confidence in their own bravery, and in the aſſiſtance of their allies. From hence it happens, that the Romans, though at firſt defeated, are always able to renew the war; and that the Carthaginian armies never are repaired without great difficulty. Add to this, that the Romans, fighting for their country and their children, never ſuffer their ardour to be ſlackened; but perſiſt with the ſame ſteady ſpirit, till they become ſuperior to their enemies. From hence it happens likewiſe, that even in actions upon the ſea, the Romans, though inferior to the Carthaginians, as we have already obſerved, in naval knowledge and experience, very frequently obtain ſucceſs, through the mere bravery of their forces. For though in all ſuch conteſts a ſkill in maritime affairs muſt be allowed to be of the greateſt uſe; yet, on the other hand, the valour of the troops that are engaged is often no leſs effectual to draw the victory to their ſide.

Now the people of Italy are by nature ſuperior to the Carthaginians and the Africans, both in bodily ſtrength, and in courage. Add to this, that they have among them certain inſtitutions, by which the young men are greatly animated to perform acts of bravery. It will be ſufficient to mention one of theſe, as a proof of the attention that is ſhewn by the Roman government, to infuſe ſuch a ſpirit into the citizens, as ſhall lead them to encounter every kind of danger, for the ſake of obtaining reputation in their country. When any illuſtrious perſon dies, he is carried in proceſſion, with the reſt of the funeral pomp, to the Roſtra in the Forum: ſometimes placed conſpicuous in an upright poſture; and ſometimes, though leſs frequently, reclined. And while the people are all ſtanding round, his ſon, if he has left one of ſufficient age, and who is then at Rome, or, if otherwiſe, ſome perſon of his kindred, aſcends the Roſtra, and extols the virtues of the deceaſed, and the great deeds that were performed by him in his life. By this diſcourſe, which recalls

calls his paſt actions to remembrance, and places them in open view before all the multitude, not thoſe alone who were ſharers in his victories, but even the reſt who bore no part in his exploits, are moved to ſuch ſympathy of ſorrow, that the accident ſeems rather to be a publick misfortune, than a private loſs. He is then buried with the uſual rites; and afterwards an image, which both in features and complexion expreſſes an exact reſemblance of his face, is ſet up in the moſt conſpicuous part of the houſe, incloſed in a ſhrine of wood. Upon ſolemn feſtivals, theſe images are uncovered, and adorned with the greateſt care. And, when any other perſon of the ſame family dies, they are carried alſo in the funeral proceſſion, with a body added to the buſt, that the repreſentation may be juſt even with regard to ſize. They are dreſſed likewiſe in the habits, that belong to the ranks, which they ſeverally filled when they were alive. If they were Conſuls or Prætors, in a gown bordered with purple: if Cenſors, in a purple robe: and if they triumphed, or obtained any ſimilar honour, in a veſt embroidered with gold. Thus apparelled, they are drawn along in chariots; preceded by the rods and axes, and other enſigns of their former dignity. And when they arrive at the Forum, they are all ſeated upon chairs of ivory; and there exhibit the nobleſt object that can be offered to a youthful mind, warmed with the love of virtue and of glory. For who can behold without emotion the forms of ſo many illuſtrious men, thus living, as it were, and breathing together in his preſence? Or what ſpectacle can be conceived more great and ſtriking? The perſon alſo that is appointed to harangue, when he has exhauſted all the praiſes of the deceaſed, turns his diſcourſe to the reſt, whoſe images are before him; and, beginning with the moſt ancient of them, recounts the fortunes and the exploits of every one in turn. By this method, which renews continually the remembrance

of men celebrated for their virtue, the fame of every great and noble action becomes immortal; and the glory of thoſe, by whoſe ſervices their country has been benefited, is rendered familiar to the people, and delivered down to future times. But the chief advantage is, that by the hope of obtaining this honourable fame, which is reſerved for virtue, the young men are animated to ſuſtain all danger, in the cauſe of the common ſafety. For from hence it has happened, that many among the Romans have voluntarily engaged in ſingle combat, in order to decide the fortune of an intire war. Many alſo have devoted themſelves to inevitable death: ſome of them in battle, to ſave the lives of other citizens; and ſome in time of peace, to reſcue the whole ſtate from deſtruction. Others again, who have been inveſted with the higheſt dignities, have, in defiance of all law and cuſtom, condemned their own ſons to die: ſhewing greater regard to the advantage of their country, than to the bonds of nature, and the cloſeſt ties of kindred. Very frequent are the examples of this kind, that are recorded in the Roman ſtory. I ſhall here mention one, as a ſignal inſtance, and proof of the truth of all that I have affirmed. Horatius ſurnamed Cocles, being engaged in combat with two enemies, at the fartheſt extremity of the bridge that led into Rome acroſs the Tiber, and perceiving that many others were advancing faſt to their aſſiſtance, was apprehenſive that they would force their way together into the city. Turning himſelf therefore to his companions that were behind him, he called to them aloud, that they ſhould immediately retire, and break the bridge. While they were employed in this work, Horatius, though covered over with wounds, ſtill maintained his poſt, and ſtopped the progreſs of the enemies; who were ſtruck with his firmneſs and intrepid courage, even more than with the ſtrength of his reſiſtance. And when the bridge was broken, and the city

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ſecured from inſult, he threw himſelf into the river with his armour, and there loſt his life as he had deſigned: having preferred the ſafety of his country, and the future fame that was ſure to follow ſuch an action, to his own preſent exiſtence, and to the time that remained for him to live. Such is the ſpirit, and ſuch the emulation of atchieving glorious actions, which the Roman inſtitutions are fitted to infuſe into the minds of youth.

In all things that regard the acquiſition of wealth, the manners alſo and the cuſtoms of the Romans are greatly preferable to thoſe of the Carthaginians. Among the latter, nothing is reputed infamous, that is joined with gain. But among the former, nothing is held more baſe, than to be corrupted by gifts, or to covet an increaſe of wealth by means that are unjuſt. For as much as they eſteem the poſſeſſion of honeſt riches to be fair and honourable, ſo much, on the other hand, all thoſe that are amaſſed by unlawful arts, are viewed by them with horror and reproach. The truth of this fact is clearly ſeen in the following inſtance. Among the Carthaginians, money is openly employed, to obtain the dignities of the ſtate: but all ſuch proceeding is a capital crime in Rome. As the rewards therefore that are propoſed to virtue in the two republicks are ſo different, it cannot but happen, that the attention of the citizens to form their minds to virtuous actions muſt be alſo different.

But among all the uſeful inſtitutions, that demonſtrate the ſuperior excellence of the Roman government, the moſt conſiderable perhaps is the opinion which the people are taught to hold concerning the Gods: and that, which other men regard as an object of diſgrace, appears in my judgement to be the very thing by which this republick chiefly is ſuſtained. I mean, Superſtition: which is impreſſed with all its terrors; and influences both the private actions of the citizens, and the publick adminiſtration alſo of the ſtate, in a degree that can

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ſcarcely be exceeded. This may appear aſtoniſhing to many. To me it is evident, that this contrivance was at firſt adopted for the ſake of the multitude. For if it were poſſible that a ſtate could be compoſed of wiſe men only, there would be no need perhaps of any ſuch invention. But as the people univerſally are fickle and inconſtant, filled with irregular deſires, precipitate in their paſſions, and prone to violence; there is no way left to reſtrain them, but by the dread of things unſeen, and by the pageantry of terrifying fiction. The ancients therefore acted not abſurdly, nor without good reaſon, when they inculcated the notions concerning the Gods, and the belief of infernal puniſhments; but much more thoſe of the preſent age are to be charged with raſhneſs and abſurdity, in endeavouring to extirpate theſe opinions. For, not to mention other effects that flow from ſuch an inſtitution; if, among the Greeks for example, a ſingle talent only be intruſted to thoſe who have the management of any of the publick money; though they give ten written ſureties, with as many ſeals, and twice as many witneſſes, they are unable to diſcharge the truſt repoſed in them with integrity. But the Romans, on the other hand, who in the courſe of their magiſtracies, and in embaſſies, diſburſe the greateſt ſums, are prevailed on by the ſingle obligation of an oath, to perform their duty with inviolable honeſty. And as, in other ſtates, a man is rarely to be found, whoſe hands are pure from publick robbery; ſo, among the Romans, it is no leſs rare, to diſcover one that is tainted with this crime.

But all things are ſubject to decay and change. This is a truth ſo evident, and ſo demonſtrated by the perpetual and the neceſſary courſe of nature, that it needs no other proof. Now there are two ways by which every kind of government is deſtroyed: either by ſome accident that happens from without; or ſome evil that ariſes within itſelf. What the firſt will be, it is not always eaſy to foreſee: but the latter is cer-

tain and determinate. We have already ſhewn, what are the original, and what the ſecondary, forms of government; and in what manner alſo they are reciprocally converted each into the other. Whoever therefore is able to connect the beginning with the end in this inquiry, will be able alſo to declare with ſome aſſurance, what will be the future fortune of the Roman government. At leaſt in my judgement nothing is more eaſy. For when a ſtate, after having paſſed with ſafety through many and great dangers, arrives at the higheſt degree of power, and poſſeſſes an intire and undiſputed ſovereignty; it is manifeſt, that the long continuance of proſperity muſt give birth to coſtly and luxurious manners, and that the minds of men will be heated with ambitious conteſts, and become too eager and aſpiring in the purſuit of dignities. And as theſe evils are continually increaſed, the deſire of power and rule, and the imagined ignominy of remaining in a ſubject ſtate, will firſt begin to work the ruin of the republick: arrogance and luxury will afterwards advance it: and in the end, the change will be completed by the people: when the avarice of ſome is found to injure and oppreſs them; and the ambition of others ſwells their vanity, and poiſons them with flattering hopes. For then, being inflamed with rage, and following only the dictates of their paſſions, they no longer will ſubmit to any controul; or be contented with an equal ſhare of the adminiſtration, in conjunction with their rulers: but will draw to themſelves the intire ſovereignty, and ſupreme direction of all affairs. When this is done, the government will aſſume indeed the faireſt of all names, that of a free and popular ſtate; but will in truth be the greateſt of all evils, the Government of the multitude.

As we have thus ſufficiently explained the conſtitution and the growth of the Roman government; have marked the cauſes of that greatneſs in which it now ſubſiſts; and ſhewn by compariſon, in what view it may be judged inferior, and

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in what ſuperior, to other ſtates; we ſhall here cloſe this diſcourſe. But as every ſkilful artiſt offers ſome piece of work to publick view, as a proof of his abilities; in the ſame manner we alſo, taking ſome part of hiſtory, that is connected with the times from which we were led into this digreſſion, and making a ſhort recital of one ſingle action, ſhall endeavour to demonſtrate by fact as well as words, what was the ſtrength, and how great the vigour, which at that time were diſplayed by this republick.

When Annibal, after the battle of Cannæ, had taken priſoners eight thouſand of the Romans, who were left to guard the camp; he permitted them to ſend a deputation to Rome, to treat of their ranſom and redemption. Ten perſons, the moſt illuſtrious that were among them, were appointed for this purpoſe: and the General, having firſt commanded them to ſwear, that they would return to him again, ſuffered them to depart. But one of the number, as ſoon as they had paſſed the intrenchment, having ſaid that he had forgotten ſomething, went back into the camp, took what he had left, and then continued his journey with the reſt; perſuading himſelf, that by this return he had diſcharged his promiſe, and ſatisfied the obligation of the oath. When they arrived at Rome, they earneſtly intreated the ſenate not to envy them the ſafety that was offered; but to ſuffer them to be reſtored again to their ſeveral families, at the price of three minæ for each priſoner, which was the ſum that Annibal demanded: that they were not unworthy of this favour: that they neither had through cowardice deſerted their poſt in battle; nor done any thing that had brought diſhonour upon the Roman name: but that, having been left to guard the camp, they had been thrown by unavoidable neceſſity, after the deſtruction of all the reſt of the army, into the power of the enemy. The Romans were at this time weakened by repeated loſſes; were deſerted by almoſt every one of their allies,

lies; and ſeemed even to expect, that Rome itſelf would inſtantly be attacked; yet, when they had heard the deputies, they neither were deterred by adverſe fortune from attending to what was fit and right, nor neglected any of thoſe meaſures that were neceſſary to the publick ſafety. But perceiving, that the deſign of Annibal, in this proceeding, was both to acquire a large ſupply of money, and at the ſame time to check the ardour of his enemies in battle, by opening to their view the means of ſafety even though they ſhould be conquered, they were ſo far from yielding to this requeſt, that they ſhewed no regard either to the diſtreſſed condition of their fellow-citizens, or to the ſervices that might be expected from the priſoners: but reſolved to diſappoint the hopes, and fruſtrate the intentions of this General, by rejecting all terms of ranſom. They made a law alſo, by which it was declared, that the ſoldiers that were left muſt either conquer, or muſt die: and that no other hope of ſafety was reſerved for them, in caſe that they were conquered. After this determination, they diſmiſſed the nine deputies, who on account of their oath were willing to return; and taking the other, who had endeavoured to elude by ſophiſtry what he had ſworn, they ſent him back bound to the enemy: ſo that Annibal was much leſs filled with joy, from having vanquiſhed the Romans in the field, than he was ſtruck with terror and aſtoniſhment, at the firmneſs and the magnanimity that appeared in their deliberations.

THE

GENERAL HISTORY

OF

POLYBIUS.

BOOK the SEVENTH.

EXTRACT the FIRST.

Leontium in Sicily deſcribed.

THE city Leontium, conſidered in its general poſition, is turned towards the north. Through the middle of it runs a level valley, which contains the publick buildings allotted to the adminiſtration of government and of juſtice; and in a word, the whole that is called the Forum. The two ſides of the valley are incloſed by two hills, which are rough and broken along the whole extent. But the ſummit of theſe hills, above the brows, is flat and plain, and is covered with temples and with houſes. There are two gates to the city. One of them is in the ſouthern extremity of the valley, and conducts to Syracuſe. The other is on the oppoſite ſide, and leads to thoſe lands ſo famed for their fertility, and which are

called the Leontine fields. Below the hill that ſtands on the weſtern ſide of the valley, flows the river Liſſus: and on the ſame ſide likewiſe there is a row of houſes, built under the very precipice, and in a line parallel to the river. Between theſe houſes and the river lies the road which has been mentioned.

EXTRACT the SECOND.

The treaty that was concluded between Annibal, General of the Carthaginians, and Xenophanes, embaſſadour from Philip.

THE ſolemn treaty, which Annibal the General, Mago, Myrcan, Barmocar, and all the ſenators of Carthage that are with him, and all the Carthaginians that are in the army with him, have concluded with Xenophanes, the ſon of Cleomachus, the embaſſadour deputed by king Philip, the ſon of Demetrius, in his own name, and in the name of the Macedonians and heir allies.

In the preſence of Jupiter, Juno, and Apollo; in the preſence of the Deity of the Carthaginians, and of Hercules and Iolaus; in the preſence of Mars, Triton, and Neptune; in the preſence of all the Gods who are with us in the camp, and of the ſun, the moon, and the earth; in the preſence of the rivers, the lakes, and the waters; in the preſence of all the Gods who preſide over the ſtate of Carthage; in the preſence of all the Gods who preſide over the Macedonian empire, and the reſt of Greece; in the preſence of all the Gods, who direct the affairs of war, and who are preſent at this treaty; Annibal the General, and all the ſenators of Carthage that are with him, and all the Carthaginians that are in the army with him, have ſaid.

With the conſent of you and of us, this treaty of amity and concord ſhall connect us together, as friends, as kindred, and as brothers, upon the following conditions.

King

King Philip and the Macedonians, together with the reſt of the Greeks that are in alliance with them, ſhall protect the lords of Carthage; Annibal the General, and thoſe that are with him; the governours in every place in which the laws of Carthage are obſerved; the people of Utica, and all the cities and nations that are ſubject to the Carthaginian ſway, together with their armies and their allies; the cities likewiſe, and all the people with whom we are allied, in Italy, in Gaul, and in Liguria; and all thoſe that ſhall hereafter enter into an alliance with us in thoſe countries. The Carthaginians, on the other hand, the people of Utica, and all other cities and ſtates that are ſubject to the Carthaginians, with their allies and armies; the cities alſo and all the people of Italy, of Gaul, and of Liguria, that are at this time in alliance with us; and all others likewiſe that ſhall hereafter be received into our alliance in any of thoſe parts of Italy; ſhall protect and defend king Philip and the Macedonians, together with the reſt of the Greeks that are in alliance with them. We will not engage in any ill deſigns, or employ any kind of treachery, the one againſt the other. But with all alacrity and willingneſs, without any deceit or fraud, you, the Macedonians, ſhall declare yourſelves the enemies of thoſe that are enemies of the Carthaginians; thoſe kings alone excepted, and thoſe ports and cities, with which you are connected by any treaty. And we alſo, on the other hand, will be the enemies of thoſe that are enemies of king Philip; thoſe kings and cities, and nations alone excepted, to which we are already bound by treaty. You ſhall be partners alſo with us in the war, in which we are now engaged againſt the Romans; till the Gods give to you and to us a happy termination of it. You ſhall ſupply us with the aſſiſtance that is requiſite, and in the manner that ſhall be ſtipulated between us. And if the gods, refuſing ſucceſs to our endeavours

vours in the war againſt the Romans and their allies, ſhould diſpoſe us to enter into treaty with them; we ſhall inſiſt, that you alſo be included in the treaty, and that the peace be made upon theſe expreſſed conditions: that the Romans ſhall at no time make war againſt you: that they ſhall not remain maſters of the Corcyreans, nor of the people of Apollonia, Epidamnus, Pharos, and Dimalus; nor of the Parthinians, and the Atintanians: and that they ſhall reſtore alſo to Demetrius of Pharos all the perſons of his kindred, who are now detained in publick cuſtody at Rome. If the Romans ſhall afterwards make war either againſt you or us, we will mutually ſend ſuch aſſiſtance as ſhall be requiſite to either party. The ſame thing alſo will we perform, if any other power ſhall declare war againſt us; thoſe kings and cities, and ſtates alone excepted, with which we are allied by treaty. If at any time it ſhould be judged expedient to add to the preſent treaty, or to detract from it, it ſhall be done with mutual conſent.

EXTRACT the THIRD.

Demetrius of Pharos adviſes Philip to place a garriſon in Ithome. The different ſentiments of Aratus.

WHEN the entrails of the victims that had been ſacrificed were brought, as the cuſtom was, to Philip, he took them in his hands, and, inclining to one ſide, and ſhewing them to Aratus, aſked him, what he thought was ſignified by them: that he ſhould relinquiſh the citadel, or that he ſhould keep poſſeſſion of it? In the very inſtant, Demetrius ſeized the occaſion to reply. "If you have the ſoul of a diviner in you, ſaid he, you will relinquiſh it without delay. But if you have the ſpirit of a king who underſtands affairs, you will keep poſſeſſion of it: that you may not, if the preſent opportunity be loſt, wiſh in vain hereafter to obtain another. For it is only by holding both the horns, that you can hope to keep the bull in ſubjection to you." By the horns he deſigned to ſignify the two fortreſſes of Ithome and Acrocorinthus; and Peloponneſus by the bull. But Philip, turning to Aratus, ſaid, "And is this alſo your advice?" And when the other heſitated, he preſſed him to declare his ſentiments. Aratus then, after a ſhort ſilence, made this reply. "If you can retain poſſeſſion of this citadel, without breaking that faith by which you are bound to the Meſſenians, keep it. But if, by leaving a garriſon in this place, you relinquiſh that which ſtands in the ſtead of all citadels and garriſons, that which Antigonus tranſmitted to you, and which has hitherto preſerved your allies; I mean, good faith; conſider whether it will not now be better to draw away your

forces from Ithome, and, leaving there your faith, ſecure to yourſelf by that garriſon alone the fidelity of the Meſſenians, and of all the reſt of the allies." Philip, if he had followed his own natural inclination, would have been ready enough to have violated his faith; as we may judge from the ſubſequent actions of his life. But as he had been ſharply reproved not long before by the younger Aratus, for having ordered ſome citizens to be put to death; and as the elder Aratus at this time addreſſed him with great authority as well as freedom; and beſought him not to diſregard the advice that he had offered; he was prevailed on to deſiſt: and taking Aratus by the hand, "Let us return then, ſaid he, by the way by which we came."

EXTRACT the FOURTH.

Antiochus renders himſelf maſter of Sardes, by the contrivance of Lagoras of Crete.

ROUND the city of Sardes, ſharp ſkirmiſhes paſſed continually; and little battles both by night and by day, without any intermiſſion. For every method of ſurprize, and every art both of attack and of defence, were practiſed by both parties. To enter into a particular deſcription of all that was tranſacted, would be both uſeleſs, and altogether tedious. But when the ſiege had now continued to the ſecond year, it was at laſt ended by the contrivance of Lagoras, a Cretan. This man, who had gained a long experience in the affairs of war, had remarked that the ſtrongeſt places very frequently become the eaſieſt prey, through the too great ſecurity of the inhabitants: who repoſe ſuch confidence either on the natural ſtrength of their cities, or on the works by which they are covered, that they are altogether remiſs and negligent in guarding them. He knew likewiſe, that places are often taken by aſſault in the very parts that are the ſtrongeſt, and againſt which it was moſt improbable that an enemy would make any attempt. Agreeably to theſe ſentiments, having now conſidered that the ſtrength of Sardes was ſuch, that all men had deſpaired of being able to take it by aſſault, and hoped only that it might be at laſt ſubdued by famine; he was the more encouraged by this very reaſon to make the attempt; and turned his thoughts on every ſide, in order to find ſome fair occaſion of rendering himſelf maſter of the place. And having remarked that the wall which connected the citadel with the city was not guarded, he conceived the hope that in that very part he

ſhould be able to accompliſh his deſign. That this part was deſtitute of guards, he thus diſcovered. The wall was built upon a very lofty rock; and at the bottom of the precipice was a hollow valley, into which the carcaſes of the horſes and beaſts of burthen were thrown, that died within the city. In this valley large flocks of vulturs, and other birds of prey, were continually aſſembled. And as the birds, when they were ſatiated with food, conſtantly repoſed themſelves upon the top of the precipice, and upon the wall, Lagoras concluded from this circumſtance that the wall was certainly not guarded, but was at almoſt all times deſtitute of people. When he had formed this conjecture, he went himſelf by night, and carefully examined in what part he might make his approaches, and fix the ladders. And having found, on the ſide of one of the rocks, a place that was proper for the purpoſe, he then communicated his project to the king. Antiochus conceived great hopes, and intreated him to accompliſh the deſign. Lagoras on his part promiſed to employ his utmoſt power; but deſired that Theodotus the Ætolian, and Dionyſius, the captain of the guards, each of whom poſſeſſed all the ſtrength and courage which an enterprize of this kind required, might be aſſociated with him in the undertaking, and commanded to aſſiſt in the execution of it. To this the king immediately conſented; and theſe three together, having regulated their plan in ſecret, waited for a night, in the latter part of which there would be no moon. When ſuch a night was come, on the evening before the day in which the attempt was to be made, they choſe from the whole army fifteen men, the moſt diſtinguiſhed by their ſtrength and courage, to carry the ladders, and to ſhare with themſelves the danger of mounting the walls. After theſe, they took thirty more, who were directed to lie in ambuſcade at a certain diſtance; and, when the firſt ſhould have ſcaled the walls, and deſcended to the gate that was near, to

advance from their concealment, and to cut through the bars and hinges of the gate from without, while the reſt broke the locks and the bolts on the inſide. Behind theſe followed another body of two thouſand men; who were ordered to enter the city with the reſt, and to take poſſeſſion of the circus of the theatre, which commanded both the citadel and the city. And that no ſuſpicion of the truth might ariſe from making theſe detachments, a report was ſpread, that a body of Ætolians deſigned to throw themſelves through the valley before mentioned into the city; and that, as notice had been received of their deſign, theſe forces were prepared to oppoſe their entrance.

When all things were now ready, as ſoon as the moon had withdrawn her light, Lagoras and the reſt approached the precipices with their ladders, and concealed themſelves under the brow of the rock that hung over the valley. When day appeared, and the guards on this ſide had retired; while the king, according to his cuſtom, ſent one part of his troops to their reſpective poſts, and drew out the reſt in order of battle in the Hippodrome, the attempt remained for ſome time unnoticed. But no ſooner were two ladders raiſed, upon one of which Dionyſius firſt mounted, and Lagoras upon the other, than a great commotion and diſorder was ſpread through all the camp. For though neither the garriſon in the city, nor Achæus himſelf who was in the citadel, diſcerned the men that were attempting to ſcale the walls, becauſe they were covered by the brow of the rock; thoſe that were in the camp very clearly ſaw the whole of this bold and dangerous action. And while ſome were ſtruck with admiration at an attempt that appeared incredible; and others foreſaw, but were doubtful of the conſequence; they ſtood fixed in ſuſpenſe, and, with an anxiety mingled with joy, expected the event. The king, perceiving this commotion, and being willing to draw aſide the attention both of his own troops and

and of the beſieged from what was done, led out the army, and advanced towards the gate that was on the oppoſite ſide of the city, and was called the gate of Perſis. Achæus, perceiving from the citadel this motion of the enemy, ſo different from any which they had before been uſed to make, was thrown into great perplexity, and knew not what was their deſign. He ſent ſome forces however towards the gate. But as the road by which they deſcended from the citadel was narrow, and full of precipices, they arrived too late. Aribazus alſo, who commanded in the city, and who ſuſpected nothing of the real truth, led the garriſon to the ſame gate likewiſe, which Antiochus threatened to attack. And having ſtationed one part of his forces on the walls, he ordered the reſt to advance through the gate, to ſtop the enemy as they approached, and to engage them in battle. In the mean time Lagoras, Dionyſius, and Theodotus, having gained the ſummit of the rock, and deſcended from thence to the gate that was below, diſperſed thoſe that they met, and began to break the gate. The thirty alſo on the outſide at the ſame time advanced, and aſſiſted in breaking it. And when the gate was in this manner ſoon forced open, the two thouſand men, that had ſtood ready for that purpoſe, entered and took poſſeſſion of the circus. As ſoon as this was perceived, the forces, that had been ſtationed upon the walls, and thoſe that were ſent through the gate of Perſis by Aribazus, returned back again in haſte, to attack thoſe that had entered the city. But, as the gate was opened for their return, ſome of the troops of Antiochus entered together with them: and having thus made themſelves maſters of this gate likewiſe, they then ran to break the reſt of the gates that were near. Aribazus and all the garriſon, after a ſhort engagement with thoſe that were already within the city, fled haſtily into the citadel. Theodotus and Lagoras, remaining ſtill in their firſt ſtation, with great prudence attended to all that paſſed. The

reſt

reſt of the army, entering now on every ſide, were ſoon maſters of the place. And while one part killed all thoſe that they met, others ſet fire to the houſes, or diſperſed themſelves in ſearch of plunder, till the whole city was pillaged and deſtroyed. In this manner Antiochus became maſter of Sardes.

THE

THE GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS.

BOOK the EIGHTH.

EXTRACT the FIRST.

Men who truſt themſelves to others are to be cenſured or excuſed, according to different circumſtances. Examples of both caſes.

WHEN accidents of this kind happen, it would be dangerous to decide in general, that thoſe who are betrayed into ſuch misfortunes deſerve to be blamed; or, on the contrary, that they deſerve to be excuſed. For it frequently is ſeen, that, when men have employed all the caution that reaſon could ſuggeſt, they ſtill fall into the power of thoſe who ſcruple not to violate the eſtabliſhed laws of mankind. But if we attend, on the other hand, to the particular times and circumſtances of ſuch events, it is certain, that by theſe we may be enabled to judge without reſerve; and to declare ſome Gene-

Generals, among thoſe who have been thus deceived, to be worthy of cenſure, and others to be free from blame. The following examples will ſhew the truth of this remark.

Archidamus, one of the kings of Lacedæmon, ſuſpecting the ambition of Cleomenes, fled from Sparta. But being afterwards prevailed on to return, and put himſelf into the power of his enemy, he loſt both his kingdom and his life, and left not the leaſt excuſe for his imprudence to future times. For while the condition of things remained the ſame, and the ambition of Cleomenes had even acquired new ſtrength, how was it poſſible that he ſhould avoid this fate, if he threw himſelf again into the hands of thoſe, from whom he had eſcaped by flight, and with the greateſt difficulty? Pelopidas alſo of Thebes, who was well acquainted with the wicked diſpoſition of the tyrant Alexander, and who knew likewiſe that every tyrant conſiders thoſe who defend the cauſe of liberty as his greateſt enemies, when he not only had prevailed on Epaminondas to take arms in ſupport of the democratical government of Thebes, and of all Greece, but had himſelf led an army into Theſſaly, in order to ſubvert the monarchy of Alexander, ventured to go on a ſecond embaſſy to this very tyrant. By this imprudence, having moſt abſurdly repoſed a confidence in thoſe whom he had the greateſt reaſon to diſtruſt, he brought great loſs upon his country, and deſtroyed the reputation alſo which he had before acquired. A like misfortune happened to the Roman Conſul, Cnæus Cornelius; who, in oppoſition to all reaſon, delivered himſelf to the enemy, in the time of the war of Sicily. Many other examples alſo might be found of the ſame imprudence. And from theſe it may fairly be concluded, that whoever, without due conſideration and inquiry, throw themſelves into the power of their enemies, are very greatly to be blamed.

On

On the other hand, when men have before employed every neceſſary kind of caution, they cannot be thought to deſerve any cenſure. Never to place a confidence in any one, is abſolutely impracticable. It is ſufficient, if we take ſome proper pledges for our ſecurity, and act afterwards as reaſon ſhall require. The beſt pledges of ſafety, upon ſuch occaſions, are oaths; wives and children given as hoſtages; and, above all, the former life of the perſons whom we are inclined to truſt. If theſe are employed to betray and ruin us, the reproach muſt fall upon the authors of the treachery, and not upon thoſe who are deceived. The firſt ſtep therefore ſhould be, to gain aſſurances of ſuch a kind, that thoſe with whom we treat may be compelled by them to obſerve their faith. But, as theſe are not always to be obtained, the next courſe is to take every meaſure with ſuch prudence, that, if we fall afterwards into misfortunes, it may not be imputed to us as a fault. Many examples of this ſort might be drawn from former ages. But there is none more illuſtrious than that which is found in the very times of which we are writing, the example of Achæus. For this prince, after he had employed the moſt perfect foreſight that human wiſdom could ſuggeſt, and neglected no precaution that was neceſſary for his ſafety, fell into the power of his enemies. But ſo far was he from incurring any blame, that, on the contrary, his misfortune was pitied and excuſed; while the authors of it were condemned to bear the curſes, and the deteſtation of mankind.

EXTRACT the SECOND.

Reflections on the greatneſs of the deſigns of Rome and Carthage, and the perſevering obſtinacy of the two Republicks. The advantages of General Hiſtory.

IT will by no means be foreign to my firſt deſign, or to the general intention of this work, to deſire the reader to pauſe awhile, and to conſider the greatneſs of the actions of the Carthaginians and the Romans, and the ſtubborn conſtancy with which they ſeverally perſiſted in their enterprizes. For is it not aſtoniſhing, that, when they were engaged in ſo great a war in Italy, and in another not leſs important alſo in Spain, when the proſpect of ſucceſs in theſe two wars was to both equally uncertain, and the preſent danger alike terrible to both, as if theſe were not ſufficient, they at this very time ſhould maintain another, both in Sardinia and in Italy, and not only ſhould extend their views at once to all theſe wars, but ſhould be able alſo to complete the preparations, and furniſh the ſupplies that were neceſſary to all? But our admiration muſt ſtill increaſe, if we take a view of things in a more particular detail. The Romans had in Italy two complete armies, under the command of the two Conſuls. In Spain they had two more: one upon land, at the head of which was Cnæus Cornelius; and another upon the ſea, commanded by Publius. On the ſide of the Carthaginians likewiſe, the armies were the ſame. Beſide theſe, the Romans had alſo a fleet, that was ſtationed on the coaſts of Greece, to obſerve the motions of king Philip. At the ſame time Appius, with a hundred quinqueremes, and Marcus Claudius at the head of a land army, ſupported the war in Sicily;

while Amilcar did the ſame on the ſide of the Carthaginians.

From theſe facts very clearly will appear the truth of that which we have often taken occaſion to affirm in the former parts of this work: that it is not poſſible to obtain an intire view and knowledge of the whole of things from particular hiſtories. For how can the bare reading of what paſſed in Sicily only, or in Spain, be ſufficient to inſtruct us, either in the greatneſs of the things that were tranſacted, or more eſpecially, in what manner, and through what kind of government, that moſt aſtoniſhing event was perfected, which has happened in the preſent age, and of which there is no example in former times; that all the known parts of the earth have been reduced beneath the power of a ſingle ſtate. In what manner Syracuſe was taken by the Romans, and by what meaſures they gained poſſeſſion of Spain, may be known perhaps in ſome degree from particular hiſtories. But general hiſtory alone can ſhew, by what ſteps they arrived at the ſovereignty of the whole; what circumſtances counteracted them in their purſuit of that great deſign; and what again, at certain times, co-operated with them. There is therefore no other way by which we may be enabled to diſcern, either the greatneſs of the tranſactions themſelves, or the force of the Roman government. For when we read that the Romans attempted the conqueſt of Sicily only or of Spain, and maintained vaſt armies both upon land and ſea; ſuch projects, conſidered ſingly in themſelves, contain nothing very great or wonderful. But when it is ſeen, that not theſe enterprizes only, but many others likewiſe, were at the ſame time formed and executed by the ſame republick; and that this very people, even while they carried into execution theſe deſigns, were involved in various difficulties, and ſuſtained many dreadful battles, in their own proper country; it is then only that theſe tranſactions will appear in their juſt light;

that our admiration will indeed be raiſed; and that we ſhall obtain a full conception of all that we deſire to know. Let this then ſerve to ſhew the miſtake of thoſe, who think that ſeparate and particular relations will inſtruct them in the knowlege of general and univerſal hiſtory.

EXTRACT the THIRD.

The ſiege of Syracuſe. The Romans are forced to deſiſt from their attempt, by the wonderful inventions of Archimedes.

THE Conſul Appius, having taken upon himſelf the command of the land forces, and ſtationed the army round the Scythian porticoe, from whence the wall was continued along the ſhore even to the mole of the harbour, reſolved to make his approaches on that ſide. As the number of his artificers was very great, he prepared in five days only a ſufficient quantity of blinds and darts, with every thing beſides that was proper for the ſiege: and was perſuaded, that by this celerity he ſhould be able to attack the enemy, before they had made the neceſſary preparations for their defence. He had not at this time made due reflection upon the great ſkill of Archimedes; nor conſidered, that the mind of a ſingle man is on ſome occaſions far ſuperior to the force of many hands. But this truth was ſoon diſcovered to him by the event. For as Syracuſe was in itſelf a place of very great ſtrength; the wall that ſurrounded it being built upon lofty hills, whoſe tops, hanging over the plain, rendered all approach from without, except in certain parts, extremely difficult; ſo within the city likewiſe, and againſt all attempts that might be made on the ſide of the ſea, ſo great a quantity of inſtruments of defence had been contrived by the perſon juſt now mentioned, that the beſieged were at no time idle; but were ready, upon every new attack, to meet the motions, and repel the efforts of the enemy. Appius, however, advancing with his blinds and ladders, endeavoured to approach that part of the wall which was joined to the Hexapylum, on the eaſtern ſide of the city. At the ſame time

Marcellus directed his courſe towards Achradina, with a fleet of ſixty quinqueremes, all filled with ſoldiers, who were armed with bows, ſlings, and javelins, in order to drive the enemy from the walls. There were alſo eight other quinqueremes, from one ſide of which the benches of the rowers had been removed; from the right ſide of ſome, and from the left of others. Theſe veſſels, being joined two and two together, on the ſides from which the benches had been taken, were rowed by the oars on the oppoſite ſide, and carried to the walls certain machines called Sackbuts, the conſtruction and uſe of which may be thus deſcribed.

A ladder is made, which has four feet in breadth, and ſuch a length as may make it equal, when raiſed, to the height of the walls. On either ſide of it is a high breaſt-work, in the form of a baluſtrade. This ladder is laid at length upon the ſides in which the two veſſels are joined, but extending far beyond the prows; and at the top of the maſts of the veſſels are fixed pullies and ropes At the proper time, the ropes are faſtened to the top of the machine. And while ſome, ſtanding on the ſtern of the veſſels, draw the ladder upwards by the pullies, others, on the prow, at the ſame time aſſiſt in raiſing it with bars and levers. The veſſels being then rowed near to the ſhore, endeavours are uſed to fix the machine againſt the walls. At the top of the ladder is a little ſtage, guarded on three ſides with blinds, and containing four men upon it, who engage with thoſe upon the walls that endeavour to obſtruct the fixing of the machine. And when it is fixed, theſe men, being now raiſed above the top of the wall, throw down the blinds on either ſide, and advance to attack the battlements and towers. The reſt at the ſame time aſcend the ladder, without any fear that it ſhould fail; becauſe it is ſtrongly faſtened with ropes to the two veſſels. The name of Sackbut is beſtowed not improperly upon this machine. For when it is raiſed, the appearance of the ladder

and

and the veſſels, joined thus together, very much reſembles the figure of that inſtrument.

In this manner then, when all things now were ready, the Romans deſigned to attack the towers. But Archimedes had prepared machines, that were fitted to every diſtance. And while the veſſels were yet far removed from the walls, employing catapults and baliſtæ, that were of the largeſt ſize, and worked by the ſtrongeſt ſprings, he wounded the enemy with his darts and ſtones, and threw them into great diſorder. When the darts paſſed beyond them, he then uſed other machines, of a ſmaller ſize, and ſtill proportioned to the diſtance. By theſe means the Romans were ſo effectually repulſed, that it was not poſſible for them to approach. Marcellus therefore, perplexed with this reſiſtance, was forced to advance ſilently with his veſſels in the night. But when they came ſo near to the land as to be within the reach of darts, they were expoſed to new danger from another invention, which Archimedes had contrived. He had cauſed openings to be made in many parts of the wall, equal in height to the ſtature of a man, and to the palm of a hand in breadth. And having planted on the inſide archers, and little ſcorpions, he diſcharged a multitude of arrows through the openings, and diſabled the ſoldiers that were on board. In this manner, whether the Romans were at a great diſtance, or whether they were near, he not only rendered uſeleſs all their efforts, but deſtroyed alſo many of their men. When they attempted alſo to raiſe the ſackbuts, certain machines which he had raiſed along the whole wall on the inſide, and which were before concealed from view, ſuddenly appeared above the walls, and ſtretched their long beaks far beyond the battlements. Some of theſe machines carried maſſes of lead, and ſtones not leſs than ten talents in weight. And when the veſſels with the ſackbuts came near, the beaks, being firſt turned by ropes and pullies to the proper point, let fall their ſtones; which broke not only the ſack-

ſackbuts, but the veſſels likewiſe, and threw all thoſe that were on board into the greateſt danger. In the ſame manner alſo the reſt of the machines, as often as the enemy approached under the cover of their blinds, and had ſecured themſelves by that precaution againſt the darts that were diſcharged through the openings of the wall, let fall upon them ſtones of ſo large a ſize, that all the combatants upon the prow were forced to retire from their ſtation.

He invented likewiſe a hand of iron, hanging by a chain from the beak of a machine, which was uſed in the following manner. The perſon, who like a pilot guided the beak, having let fall the hand, and catched hold of the prow of any veſſel, drew down the oppoſite end of the machine that was on the inſide of the walls. And when the veſſel was thus raiſed erect upon its ſtern, the machine itſelf was held immoveable; but, the chain being ſuddenly looſened from the beak by the means of pullies, ſome of the veſſels were thrown upon their ſides; others turned with the bottom upwards; and the greateſt part, as the prows were plunged from a conſiderable height into the ſea, were filled with water, and all that were on board thrown into tumult and diſorder.

Marcellus was in no ſmall degree embarraſſed, when he found himſelf encountered in every attempt by ſuch reſiſtance. He perceived that all his efforts were defeated with loſs; and were even derided by the enemy. But, amidſt all the anxiety that he ſuffered, he could not help jeſting upon the inventions of Archimedes. This man, ſaid he, employs our ſhips as buckets to draw water: and boxing about our ſackbuts, as if they were unworthy to be aſſociated with him, drives them from his company with diſgrace. Such was the ſucceſs of the ſiege on the ſide of the ſea.

Appius alſo on his part, having met with the ſame obſtacles in his approaches, was in like manner forced to abandon his deſign. For while he was yet at a conſiderable diſtance, great

great numbers of his army were deſtroyed by the baliſtæ and the catapults. So wonderful was the quantity of ſtones and darts, and ſo aſtoniſhing the force with which they were thrown. The machines indeed were worthy of Hiero, who had furniſhed the expence; and of Archimedes who deſigned them, and by whoſe directions they were made. If the troops advanced nearer to the city, they either were ſtopped in their approach by the arrows that were diſcharged through the openings in the walls; or, if they attempted to force their way under the cover of their bucklers, were deſtroyed by ſtones and beams that were let fall upon their heads. Great miſchief alſo was occaſioned by thoſe hands of iron that have been mentioned; which lifted men with their armour into the air, and daſhed them againſt the ground. Appius therefore was at laſt conſtrained to return back again to his camp. And when he had held a conſultation with the Tribunes, it was with one conſent determined by them, that every other method ſhould be tried to obtain poſſeſſion of Syracuſe, but that they would no more attempt to take it by aſſault. Nor did they afterwards depart from this reſolution. For though they remained eight months before the city, and during that time invented various ſtratagems, and carried into execution many bold deſigns, they never had the courage to attack the place in the regular forms. So wonderful, and of ſuch importance upon ſome occaſions is the power of a ſingle man, and the force of ſcience properly employed. With ſo great armies both by land and ſea, the Romans could ſcarcely have failed to take the city, if one old man had been removed. But while he is preſent, they dare not even to make the attempt; in the manner at leaſt which Archimedes was able to oppoſe. Being perſuaded therefore, that, as the city was crouded with inhabitants, it might at laſt moſt eaſily be reduced by famine, they reſolved to have recourſe to this as their only hope; and to intercept by their fleet the proviſions that ſhould be brought

by ſea, while the army cut off all approach on the ſide of the land. And that the time employed in the ſiege, might not paſs wholly without action, but be attended with advantage in ſome other place, the Conſuls divided the army. And while Appius, with two parts of the forces, inveſted the city; Marcellus with the reſt, advancing through the country, waſted the lands of the Sicilians who had joined the Carthaginians in the war.

EXTRACT the FOURTH.

The death of Aratus who was poiſoned by the order of Philip.

THOUGH Philip attempted to waſte the territory of the Meſſenians, who were now his enemies, the miſchief which he occaſioned to them was very inconſiderable. But the ſame prince found better ſucceſs in carrying into execution the impious deſigns which he had contrived againſt the neareſt of his friends. For not long afterwards Aratus was poiſoned by his orders, with the aſſiſtance of Taurion who preſided over the affairs of Peloponneſus. This infamous action was not for ſome time diſcovered to the world. For the poiſon was not of that kind which procures immediate death; but was one of thoſe which weaken the habit of the body, and deſtroy life by ſlow degrees. Aratus himſelf was very ſenſible of the injury that he had received: and the manner in which the thing was made known was this. The old man, who had kept it ſecret from every one beſides, could not reſtrain himſelf from letting fall ſome words in the preſence of a favourite ſervant whoſe name was Cephalo. For when this domeſtick, who attended him with great fidelity during the courſe of his illneſs, had one day deſired his maſter to remark, that ſome of the ſpittle that hung upon the wall was mingled with blood: "Such, Cephalo, ſaid Aratus, is "the reward of the friendſhip which I have had for Philip." So great and excellent a thing is moderation: which diſpoſed the ſufferer, and not the author of the injury, to feel the greateſt ſhame; when he found that all the glorious actions which he had ſhared with Philip, in order to promote the ſervice of that prince, had been at laſt ſo baſely recompenſed.

Such was the end of this magiſtrate; who received after his death, not from his own country alone, but from the whole republick of the Achæans, all the honours that were due to a man, who had ſo often held the adminiſtration of their government, and performed ſuch ſignal ſervices for the ſtate. For they decreed ſacrifices to him, with the other honours that belong to heroes; and, in a word, omitted nothing that could ſerve to render his name immortal. If the dead therefore retain any ſenſe, it is probable that Aratus muſt now contemplate with a pleaſing ſatisfaction, not only the gratitude of the Achæans, but all the difficulties alſo and the dangers which himſelf encountered in his life.

EXTRACT the FIFTH.

The manner in which Philip took the citadel of Liſſus, and the city.

PHILIP had for a long time before revolved in his mind the deſign of rendering himſelf maſter of the city of Liſſus and the citadel. Beginning his march therefore with the army, and having after two days paſſed the defiles, he incamped upon the banks of the river Ardaxanus, at no great diſtance from the city. But when he ſaw that the whole circuit of the city, both on the ſide of the land, and on that alſo towards the ſea, was ſtrongly fortified both by nature and by art; and that the citadel, which ſtood near, was of ſo great height and ſtrength that it was ſcarcely poſſible that it ever ſhould be taken by aſſault; he laid aſide all hopes of being able to reduce the laſt, but judged the conqueſt of the city to be not abſolutely impracticable. Between Liſſus, and the foot of the mountain upon which the citadel was built, there was an open ſpace, which ſeemed very proper for his intended attack upon the city. The king therefore, after ſome ſlight ſkirmiſhing with the enemy upon this ground, contrived the following ſtratagem. Having allowed the army to repoſe themſelves during one whole day, and encouraged them as the occaſion required, he ſent away in the night the greateſt and moſt ſerviceable part of the light-armed troops, with orders that they ſhould conceal themſelves in certain vallies covered with wood, which were on the ſide of the country, at a little diſtance from the open ſpace that has been mentioned. On the following day, taking with him the Peltaſtæ, and the remaining part of the light-armed forces, and

beginning his march on the ſide towards the ſea, he advanced round the city to the ground upon which he before had ſkirmiſhed, as if his intention had been to make an attack from thence upon the place. The city was filled with people, who had thrown themſelves into it from all the neighbouring parts of Illyria, upon the firſt arrival of Philip in the country. But the citadel, becauſe it ſeemed ſufficiently ſecured by its own natural ſtrength, was defended by a very ſmall garriſon. As ſoon then as the Macedonians approached, the enemy, confident in their numbers as well as in the advantage of the ground, came out in crouds againſt them from the city. Philip, having ſtationed the Peltaſtæ in the plain, commanded the light-armed forces to advance towards the heights, and to engage with vigour. At firſt the conteſt was on both ſides equal. But after ſome time, theſe troops being preſſed by numbers, and diſordered by the difficulties of the ground, were forced to turn their backs, and retired towards the heavy forces. The beſieged purſue with eagerneſs, and attack the heavy forces in the plain. At the ſame time, the troops that were in the citadel, perceiving that Philip drew away his army in ſmall diviſions, and that ſome of the cohorts alone ſuſtained the fight, while others ſeemed to retreat, were perſuaded that he was preparing altogether to leave the field. Leaving therefore their poſt by ſtealth, as if the ſituation of the place was alone ſufficient to defend it, they deſcended in ſmall bodies, and through private roads, into the plain, expecting to obtain ſome ſhare in the plunder of thoſe that fled. In this moment, the troops that had been placed in ambuſcade in the vallies advanced unperceived, and attacked the enemy with vigour. At the ſame time likewiſe, the heavy forces returned back again to the charge. The Illyrians were ſoon thrown into diſorder. Thoſe that had advanced from Liſſus fled back again by different ways, and ſaved themſelves within the city. But the garriſon of the

citadel was intercepted by the forces that had riſen from the ambuſcade. Thus the event happened which was the leaſt expected: and Philip gained poſſeſſion of the citadel without any danger. On the following day, after many violent and terrible attacks, the city alſo was taken by the Macedonians. This ſudden and unexpected conqueſt ſtruck ſo great terror into all the neighbouring parts, that almoſt all the cities of Illyria ſubmitted themſelves voluntarily to the king. For when he had taken two places of ſuch uncommon ſtrength by aſſault, it ſeemed that there would be now no fortreſs able to withſtand his efforts, nor any hope of ſafety for thoſe that ſhould reſiſt his arms.

EXTRACT the SIXTH.

Achæus, who was beſieged in the citadel of Sardes by Antiochus, is delivered into the power of his enemies by the treachery of Bolis.

THERE was a man whoſe name was Bolis, a Cretan by birth, who had long lived in the court of Ptolemy, and held a military command. He had the reputation of poſſeſſing, together with a good underſtanding, a moſt enterpriſing courage; and was ſuppoſed to be inferior to none in the experience which he had gained in the affairs of war. Soſibius, having endeavoured in many conferences to obtain the confidence of this man, and to render him devoted to his intereſts, at laſt diſcloſed to him, that he could not at this time perform any ſervice more acceptable to the king, than by contriving ſome method to ſave Achæus. Bolis, when he had heard him, ſaid that he would conſider what he had propoſed, and then retired. And when he had examined the thing by himſelf, after two or three days he returned, and told Soſibius that he would undertake the buſineſs: that he had paſſed ſome time in Sardes, and was well acquainted with the place: and that Cambylus, who commanded a body of Cretans in the army of Antiochus, was not only his fellow-citizen, but his kinſman alſo, and his friend. Now Cambylus was ſtationed in one of the advanced poſts that were behind, the citadel of Sardes. For the ground on that ſide not being fortified with works, was defended only by a line of Cretans. Soſibius received this account with joy; and was perſuaded, either that Achæus was not to be reſcued from his preſent danger, or that Bolis alone could ſave him. And

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as the latter ſhewed on his part alſo the greateſt eagerneſs, the affair was ſoon determined. Some money was immediately furniſhed by Soſibius, that nothing might be wanting that was neceſſary to the deſign. He gave him an aſſurance likewiſe of much larger ſums, if the attempt ſhould be attended with ſucceſs. And, by exaggerating alſo in the ampleſt manner the rewards that might be expected both from Ptolemy and from Achæus, he raiſed the hopes of Bolis to the greateſt height.

The Cretan, impatient to begin the work, furniſhed himſelf with the proper inſtruments of credit, and ſailed away immediately to Rhodes, to find Nicomachus; whoſe affection for Achæus, and his fidelity towards him, were like thoſe of a father towards a ſon. From thence he went to Epheſus, and joined Melancomas. For theſe were the perſons whom Achæus had long employed, to tranſact his affairs abroad, both with Ptolemy, and all other ſtates. Bolis therefore, arriving firſt at Rhodes, and afterwards at Epheſus, communicated to theſe men the whole deſign. And finding them ready to lend all the aſſiſtance that he deſired, he then ſent Arianus, one of his own officers, to Cambylus, with orders to acquaint him, that Bolis had been ſent from Alexandria to raiſe ſome foreign mercenaries; but that having ſome buſineſs of great importance to communicate to Cambylus, he deſired that this General would appoint a certain place and time, in which they might meet together, without the knowledge of any other perſon. Arianus ſoon diſcharged his commiſſion, and was ſent back again by Cambylus; who conſented to all that was propoſed, and fixed the hour and the place in which he would meet Bolis in the night.

In the mean time Bolis, who was a true Cretan, verſatile in his nature, carefully examined the thing in all its circumſtances, and conſidered it on every ſide. At laſt however he joined Cambylus at the appointed place, and delivered a

letter to him. Upon this letter, they immediately held a conſultation that was worthy of two Cretans. For the object of their deliberation neither was the ſafety of the unhappy prince, nor the fidelity which they owed to thoſe who had employed them; but their own ſecurity alone, and their own advantage. With theſe baſe views, it was not long before they concurred in the ſame opinion: that they would firſt divide between themſelves the ten talents that had been given by Soſibius, and afterwards diſcloſe the whole matter to Antiochus: and that, when they had obtained ſome preſent money from the king, together with an aſſurance alſo of ſuch future rewards as might be ſuitable to ſo great a ſervice, they would engage, with his aſſiſtance, to deliver Achæus into his hands. When they had thus determined, Cambylus took upon himſelf the part of communicating the buſineſs to Antiochus. Bolis on the other hand engaged, that after ſome days he would ſend Arianus to Achæus, with letters from Nicomachus and Melancomas. But he left it to the care of Cambylus to take ſuch meaſures, that this officer might enter the citadel, and return back again with ſafety. At the ſame time it was concerted, that, if Achæus ſhould fall into the ſnare, and ſend back an anſwer to the letters, Bolis ſhould then join Cambylus, and aſſiſt in the execution of the deſign.

When they had in this manner regulated all their plan, they ſeparated; and each prepared himſelf to perform the part which he had undertaken. Cambylus took the firſt occaſion that was offered, and diſcloſed the project to the king. Antiochus, ſurpriſed by an aſſurance ſo unexpected and ſo pleaſing, was agitated by different paſſions. In one moment, tranſported with joy, he promiſed every thing that was required of him. In the next, being diffident of the ſucceſs, he demanded an account of every part and circumſtance of the deſign, and of the meaſures that were taken for carrying it into execution. At laſt, giving full credit to the whole, and being perſuaded

that the thing had happened by the ſpecial favour of the gods, he preſſed Cambylus with repeated earneſtneſs to accompliſh what he had begun. At the ſame time Bolis addreſſed himſelf in ſuch a manner to Nicomachus and Melancomas, that they entertained not the leaſt ſuſpicion with reſpect to his ſincerity. They gave letters therefore to Arianus, to be delivered to Achæus; and adviſed this prince to place an intire confidence in Bolis and Cambylus. The letters were written in a certain cypher, which they had always uſed: and were ſo compoſed, that, if they had fallen into any other hands, the contents would have remained unknown.

Arianus, having introduced himſelf into the citadel with the aſſiſtance of Cambylus, delivered the letters to Achæus; and, as he had been employed in the affair from the beginning, gave alſo a diſtinct and accurate account of all that had been done. Being cloſely examined concerning various matters, reſpecting Bolis and Soſibius, Nicomachus and Melancomas, and moſt eſpecially Cambylus, he anſwered every queſtion without any heſitation, and with an air of the moſt genuine truth. And this he was the better enabled to do, becauſe he was a ſtranger to the ſecret conſultations that had paſſed between Bolis and Cambylus. Achæus being ſatisfied with his anſwers, but chiefly becauſe he gave credit to what was written by Nicomachus and Melancomas, ſent back Arianus with an anſwer to the letters. And when the ſame thing had been many times repeated, he at laſt reſolved to embrace the meaſure which his friends adviſed: the rather indeed, becauſe he had now no other hopes of ſafety. He deſired therefore, that Bolis and Arianus might be ſent to him, in a night in which there would be no moon; and ſaid that he would deliver himſelf into their hands. His intention was, firſt to remove himſelf from the preſent danger; and, immediately after his eſcape, to take the route of Syria. For he had reaſon to be perſuaded, that his ſudden and unexpected

appearance among the Syrians, while Antiochus ſtill remained before the citadel of Sardes, would occaſion ſome commotion in the country; and be received with the greateſt joy by the people of Antiochia, Cœle-Syria, and Phœnice. Animated by theſe flattering hopes, he now expected with impatience the time in which Bolis ſhould arrive.

As ſoon as Melancomas had received theſe letters, he urged Bolis to depart; having firſt recommended the buſineſs to him again in the moſt preſſing words, and given him an aſſurance of great rewards, if the deſign ſhould be attended with ſucceſs. Bolis, having diſpatched Arianus to Cambylus with notice of his coming, met the latter in the night at an appointed place. They paſſed a whole day together, in adjuſting all the parts of their deſign; and then entered the camp by night. The manner in which they regulated their plan was this. If Achæus ſhould leave the citadel alone, or with only one companion, together with Bolis and Arianus, it was certain that no reſiſtance could be expected from him; and that it would be an eaſy thing for thoſe to whom he had intruſted himſelf to ſeize his perſon. But in caſe that he ſhould be attended by a greater number, it would then be a matter of ſome difficulty: eſpecially becauſe the intention was, to take him alive if it was poſſible, in order the more to gratify Antiochus. Upon this account it was determined, that, in bringing Achæus from the citadel, Arianus ſhould go the firſt, as being acquainted with the track by which he had often paſſed and returned: and that Bolis ſhould follow behind the reſt; that, as ſoon as they ſhould arrive at a certain place, where Cambylus had engaged to conceal ſome men in ambuſcade, he might then ſeize Achæus, and hold him faſt; leſt, in the tumult and the darkneſs of the night, he ſhould either ſave himſelf by flight into the adjoining woods, or throw himſelf in deſpair from the top of ſome precipice, and not fall alive, as they had deſigned, into the power of his enemies.

When

When all things were thus concerted, Cambylus, unattended by any perſon, conducted Bolis in the ſame night to Antiochus, who alſo was alone. The king received him with great marks of favour; confirmed the promiſes which he had made; and earneſtly intreated both of them to carry the project into execution without delay. They then returned back again to their own part of the camp: and when the morning approached, Bolis and Arianus went towards the citadel, and entered it before it was yet day.

Achæus received Bolis with eager tranſports of affection; and aſked many queſtions concerning every circumſtance and part of the deſign. And as he judged, both from his appearance and diſcourſe, that he was equal to the weight of ſuch an enterprize, he was filled with joy, from the proſpect of ſo near a ſafety. But this joy again was mingled with no ſmall anxiety and doubt, when he looked forwards to the greatneſs of the conſequences. In this uncertainty, as he had joined to an excellent underſtanding a long experience alſo in affairs, he reſolved not to repoſe an intire confidence in the integrity of Bolis. He told him therefore, that it was not poſſible for him at this time to follow him; but that he would ſend with him three or four of his friends: and, when theſe ſhould have joined Melancomas, he would then be ready himſelf to leave the citadel. Thus Achæus did all that was poſſible to be done: but conſidered not that he was practiſing the arts of a Cretan againſt a Cretan. For Bolis had attentively examined every circumſtance that could ariſe in the courſe of ſuch an undertaking.

When the night was come in which Achæus had promiſed to ſend out his friends, he ordered Bolis and Arianus to wait at the gate of the citadel, till they ſhould be joined by thoſe whom he had appointed to go with them. And being now ready to depart, he firſt communicated the deſign to his wife Laodice; who was ſo ſtruck with the ſurprize, that ſhe loſt her

her ſenſes. Achæus, having employed ſome time in ſoothing and calming her diſorder, and encouraged her to expect a happy ſucceſs, choſe four of his friends, and, cloathing them in plain habits, himſelf alſo taking a ſimple and vulgar dreſs, and appearing to be a perſon of mean condition, ſet forwards on his way towards the gate. He had ordered likewiſe, that one alone of theſe attendants ſhould anſwer all the queſtions that ſhould be aſked by Arianus, as well as aſk of him whatever might be neceſſary; and ſhould ſay that the others were barbarians. When they had joined the traitors, Arianus went the firſt, as being acquainted with the way: and Bolis, as it had been concerted, followed behind the reſt, but not without great perplexity and doubt. For though, as a Cretan, he was ready enough, upon any ill occaſion, to penetrate through the artifice of others, yet, in the darkneſs of the night, he neither knew which of the perſons was Achæus, nor whether he was indeed among them. But, as the path was rough and difficult, and many parts of the deſcent very ſlippery and full of danger; the pains which the reſt employed, ſometimes to ſupport Achæus in ſuch places, and ſometimes to wait his coming, not being able altogether to abſtain from that attention which they had been uſed to pay to their prince, ſoon diſcovered to the artful Cretan the perſon whom he deſired to know. When they came therefore to the place appointed by Cambylus, the ſignal being given by a whiſtle, thoſe that were in ambuſcade ſuddenly ſeized the four attendants, while Bolis himſelf graſped Achæus, whoſe hands were wrapped within his garment, and held him faſt; being apprehenſive, that, perceiving what had happened, he would otherwiſe deſtroy himſelf with his ſword, which he had brought with him. The reſt ſoon ſurrounded him on every ſide; and, making themſelves maſters of his perſon, conducted him, together with his friends, immediately to Antiochus.

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The king had long been in ſuſpenſe, and impatiently expected the event. Having diſmiſſed his company, he remained alone in his tent without going to reſt, attended by two or three guards. When he ſaw Cambylus enter, and place Achæus bound upon the ground, his aſtoniſhment took from him the power of ſpeech, ſo that he remained for a long time ſilent. At laſt he melted into tears: being ſtruck, as I ſuppoſe, with ſeeing in this ſignal inſtance, how difficult it is to guard againſt the prepoſterous accidents of fortune. For this Achæus, who was the ſon of Andromachus, the brother of Laodice the wife of Seleucus; who himſelf had married Laodice the daughter of king Mithridates; who was ſovereign of all the country on this ſide of mount Taurus; who in this very moment was thought, both by his own troops and by thoſe of his enemies, to be ſecure in a fortreſs of the greateſt ſtrength; this very Achæus is now ſeated bound upon the ground, and thrown into the power of his greateſt enemies; while every perſon is ignorant of the tranſaction, except thoſe alone who had accompliſhed it. On the morrow, when the courtiers, as the cuſtom was, came to the royal tent at break of day, and beheld Achæus; they were no leſs aſtoniſhed than the king had been, and could ſcarcely give credit to what they ſaw. The council was then aſſembled: and, after long deliberation concerning the puniſhment that ſhould be inflicted upon the unhappy prince, it was at laſt determined, that his hands and feet ſhould be firſt cut off, and afterwards his head: that the latter ſhould be ſewed up in the ſkin of an aſs; and the body be fixed upon a croſs. When this ſentence was executed, the whole army was ſo ſtrongly agitated by ſurprize and terror, that Laodice, who alone knew that her huſband was gone, conjectured what had happened to him, when ſhe beheld from the citadel the great commotion and diſorder that was ſpread through all the camp. Soon afterwards, a herald being ſent to inform her of the death of Achæus, and to command her to relinquiſh

linquiſh all affairs, and retire from the citadel; the garriſon at firſt anſwered only with loud lamentations and extravagant cries: not ſo much on account of the affection which they had born towards Achæus, as becauſe the event itſelf was moſt unexpected and aſtoniſhing. When their grief had ceaſed, they found themſelves involved in great perplexity. For Antiochus preſſed the citadel cloſely without any intermiſſion: being perſuaded that, as Achæus was now removed, the garriſon itſelf would moſt probably furniſh ſome occaſion, by which he might become maſter of the place. And this indeed ſoon happened. The ſoldiers fell into ſedition, and formed two parties; one of which joined themſelves to Ariobazus, while the other adhered to Laodice. And as each of theſe factions diſtruſted the other, they in a ſhort time ſurrendered both themſelves and the citadel to Antiochus.

In this manner died Achæus; vanquiſhed by the treachery of thoſe whom he had truſted, after he had employed every kind of caution that reaſon could ſuggeſt. His fate may afford two uſeful leſſons to poſterity. The firſt, that we ought not too eaſily to place a confidence in any perſon: and the other, that we never ſhould be much elated by proſperous fortune; but remember that, as men, we are ſubject to the power of every accident.

EXTRACT the SEVENTH.

Annibal takes Tarentum by ſurprize, and with the aſſiſtance of ſome of the citizens.

THE young men at firſt left the city in the night, as if they had deſigned to make an excurſion in ſearch of booty. But when they approached near to the Carthaginian camp, the reſt having concealed themſelves in an adjoining wood, Philemenus only and Nico advanced cloſe to the intrenchment. Being taken by the guards, and neither declaring who they were, nor from whence they came, but only that they had ſomething to communicate to the General, they were ſoon brought to Annibal; and when they ſaw him, they deſired that they might have ſome diſcourſe with him alone. To this requeſt he readily conſented. And when they were alone with him, having firſt endeavoured to excuſe their own conduct and that of their fellow-citizens, they then entered into a long and various accuſation of the Romans; that the deſign which they had formed, to deſert their party, might appear to have been ſuggeſted to them by juſt reaſons. Annibal received what they had ſaid with great marks of favour; applauded their reſolution; and then diſmiſſed them: commanding them after a ſhort time to return, and diſcourſe with him again upon the buſineſs; and that, for the preſent, as ſoon as they had gained a little diſtance from the camp, they ſhould boldly drive away the cattle that were within their reach, and the men that were with them: that he would give ſuch orders, that they might do it without any danger. His intention was, both to gain time for himſelf to examine more cloſely what had been propoſed; and to induce the Tarentines

alſo to believe, that the young men had left the city with no other deſign than to obtain ſome booty. The young men followed theſe directions. And as Annibal on the one hand was greatly pleaſed, that an occaſion had at laſt been offered to him of becoming maſter of the city; ſo Nico alſo and Philemenus were encouraged to perſiſt in their deſign with double ardour: not only becauſe they had opened a way to converſe with Annibal in full ſecurity, and had found him ready to embrace what they propoſed; but becauſe the quantity of the booty likewiſe which they carried back ſecured them againſt all ſuſpicion on the part of their own citizens. For ſuch was the abundance, that it ſerved both for ſacrifices and for feaſts. The Tarentines therefore not only entertained not any ſuſpicion: but many of them were deſirous alſo of bearing a part in theſe excurſions.

Not long afterwards they again went out of the city, and, having obſerved the ſame caution as before, concluded with Annibal a ſolemn treaty upon theſe conditions: that he ſhould leave the Tarentines in the full enjoyment of their liberty, and neither ſhould exact any tribute from them, nor impoſe upon them any law: and that, as ſoon as the city ſhould be taken, the Carthaginians ſhould be allowed to pillage the houſes that were occupied by the Romans. They received from him a ſignal likewiſe, by which they might obtain admiſſion from the guards, as often as they ſhould come to the camp. From this time therefore, they had frequent opportunities to ſee and converſe with Annibal: ſometimes leaving the city as if they were going in ſearch of booty, and ſometimes under the pretence of hunting.

When the meaſures were thus prepared, that were neceſſary to accompliſh the intended project, the reſt of the conſpirators, while they waited for the proper time of action, adviſed Philemenus to be aſſiduous in his hunting. For this young man had through all his life been ſo devoted to the diverſions of the field,

field, that the general opinion of him was, that he had almoſt no other paſſion. It was concerted therefore, that he ſhould endeavour to gain the favour both of Caius Livius who commanded in the city, and of the guards alſo that were ſtationed at a certain gate, which was below the gate called Temenis, by preſenting to them from time to time ſome part of the game which he ſhould take.

Philemenus, having taken upon himſelf this part of the deſign, brought back continually ſome game to the city; either ſuch as himſelf had taken, or what had been prepared for him by Annibal; and gave one part to the commander, and another part to the guards, that they might be ready to open to him the wicket of the gate. For he both left the city and returned, moſt uſually in the night: on pretence indeed of danger from the enemy; but in reality, becauſe this ſeaſon was moſt ſuitable to the deſign. When the guards then had been ſo long accuſtomed to this practice, that, as ſoon as Philemenus appeared andgave the ſignal by a whiſtle, they were ready without any delay to open the gate; the conſpirators, having received notice that the Roman governour deſigned on a certain day to give a feaſt to a large company in the Muſæum which was near to the citadel, reſolved, in concert with Annibal, to chooſe that day for carrying their project into execution. This General, who for ſome time before had feigned himſelf to be ſick, that his long continuance in one place might not ſeem ſtrange to the Romans, pretended now that his ſickneſs was worſe, and remained with the army at the diſtance of three days journey from Tarentum. But when the appointed time was come, he ſelected from all the cavalry and infantry about ten thouſand of the moſt active and braveſt ſoldiers, and, commanding them to take proviſions for four days, began his march with the greateſt haſte juſt before the break of day: having ordered a body of eighty Numidian Horſe to advance at the diſtance of thirty ſtadia

before the reſt; that the main body might not be diſcerned by any; but that all thoſe whom they ſhould meet might either be taken priſoners by them, or, flying into the city, diſcover only that the Numidians were making incurſions in the country. And when they were now diſtant from the city about a hundred and twenty ſtadia, he commanded the troops to reſt and to take their ſupper upon the banks of a river, where ſome precipices covered them from open view. He then called together the officers; and, not communicating to them the deſign, exhorted them only to acquit themſelves like men of courage, and to be aſſured that their bravery never would receive more ample rewards. In the next place he commanded them to keep the order of the march with the greateſt ſtrictneſs; and to puniſh every ſoldier with ſeverity that ſhould leave his rank. And laſtly, that they ſhould carefully attend to all his orders, and do nothing except what ſhould be commanded. With theſe orders, he diſmiſſed them; and, as ſoon as the evening approached, again began his march, deſigning to arrive at the foot of the walls about the time of midnight. He took Philemenus with him as a guide; and had prepared a wild boar, which was to be uſed in the execution of the deſign.

Livius had aſſembled his friends together in the Muſæum on that day, agreeably to the notice which the conſpirators had before received. About the time of ſun-ſet, when the feaſt was at the height, ſome meſſengers arrived with the news, that the Numidians were making incurſions in the country. The governour, not apprehending any thing beſides, and being diverted indeed by this very account from any ſuſpicion of the truth, gave orders to ſome officers, that, as ſoon as the day ſhould appear, they ſhould take one half of the cavalry, and endeavour to ſtop the ravages of the enemy.

When night was now come, Nico, Tragiſcus, and all the reſt that were engaged in the deſign, having collected themſelves together in the city, expected the return of Livius; which,

which, as the feaſt had been celebrated in the day, ſoon happened. The reſt of the young men then remained together in their place at a certain diſtance. But ſome of them advanced forwards to meet the company; and, aſſuming a diſſolute and ſportive air, began to mimick the geſtures of thoſe that were returning from the banquet. And when they had joined the governour, whoſe ſenſes were greatly diſordered by the wine, they gave a free ſcope to their mirth. They laughed with him; received, and retorted his jeſts; and, turning back with him, conducted him in that manner to his houſe: where with a mind diſſolved in joy, and free from every anxious and diſquieting thought, he ſoon ſunk into that deep ſleep, which drinking in the day is ſo ready to procure. Nico and Tragiſcus then returned back again to their companions: and, dividing themſelves into three bodies, took poſſeſſion of the avenues that led towards the Forum; that from thence they might be able to obſerve whatever ſhould happen either within or without the city. There were ſome alſo that were ſtationed near the houſe of the governour. For they well knew, that, if any ſuſpicion ſhould ariſe of their deſign, it would be firſt conveyed to Livius; and that every meaſure that could be taken to prevent the execution, muſt begin from him. But when the ſeveral companies of the evening had at laſt retired, and all the tumult of the city ceaſed; when the inhabitants were faſt in ſleep, and the night far advanced; the young men, finding that nothing had yet appeared to obſtruct their hopes, again united themſelves in one body, and prepared to begin their work.

The meaſures which they had concerted with the Carthaginians were theſe. That Annibal, having approached the city on the eaſtern ſide, and directing his march towards the gate called Temenis, ſhould kindle a fire upon a certain tomb, which by ſome was called the tomb of Hyacinthus, and by others of Apollo Hyacinthus: that Tragiſcus, on the other hand,

hand, as ſoon as he ſhould perceive this fire, ſhould anſwer by another within the city: and that Annibal, having then extinguiſhed the fire which he had made, ſhould advance ſlowly towards the gate. Agreeably to this plan, the young men, having traverſed the ſtreets of the city, came to the place of the tombs. For the eaſtern ſide of Tarentum is filled with ſepulchres of the dead; who, in obedience to an ancient oracle, are all buried, even to the preſent age, within the gates. The words of the oracle are ſaid to have been theſe. "That the fortune of Tarentum would be happier and more proſperous, in proportion to the numbers that ſhould inhabit it." The Tarentines therefore, in order to obtain a full accompliſhment of the prediction, from that time kept their dead alſo within the city. The young men then, arriving at this place, ſtood near the tomb of Pythionicus, and waited for the event. Annibal ſoon approached, and made the ſignal that had been concerted. Nico and Tragiſcus, filled with confidence, immediately anſwered by another fire. And when that of Annibal was again extinguiſhed, they then ran with the greateſt haſte towards the gate, that they might be able to kill the guards, before the Carthaginians ſhould arrive. For it had been concerted, that the troops ſhould advance leiſurely, and with a deliberate pace. The whole thing ſucceeded as they deſired. The guards were taken by ſurprize: and while one part of the conſpirators were employed in killing them, the reſt broke the bars; and, the gate being ſoon ſet open, Annibal alſo arrived in the very moment that was requiſite: having conducted his march with ſo great prudence, that no diſcovery had been made of it in the city. Making his entry therefore without any tumult or reſiſtance, as he had at firſt deſigned; and being perſuaded that the chief part of the work was already finiſhed, he advanced boldly from the lower ſide of the city through the ſtreet that led to the Forum: leaving only a body of two thouſand

thouſand of his cavalry without the gate; that they might be ready either to intercept any enemy that ſhould appear from without, or to ſerve in the caſe of any of thoſe ſudden accidents, which frequently ariſe in the courſe of ſuch enterprizes. When he came near to the Forum, he ordered the troops to halt, and waited for the arrival of Philemenus; not without ſome ſollicitude with reſpect to this part of the deſign. For when himſelf, after he had made the ſignal of the fire, began his march towards the gate called Temenis, he at the ſame time ſent Philemenus, with a wild boar, and a thouſand Africans, to another gate that was near: being deſirous to employ more means than one, and not to truſt the ſucceſs of the project to any ſingle meaſure.

After ſome time, Philemenus approached the walls, and made the accuſtomed ſignal by a whiſtle. The guard immediately deſcended to the gate. Philemenus called to him to open without delay; and ſaid that they carried a heavy load, having brought with them a wild boar. The guard, being pleaſed with what he heard, and hoping to receive, as at other times, ſome ſhare of the fortunate chace, haſtily opened the wicket of the gate. Philemenus then entered, carrying the foremoſt part of the barrow; and with him another, who appeared to be a peaſant, and wore the dreſs of a ſhepherd. Two others alſo followed, and ſupported the burthen behind. When the four had entered, they firſt killed the guard; who, not ſuſpecting any harm, was employed in viewing and in handling the boar. At the ſame time thirty Africans, who had advanced before the reſt, paſſed leiſurely through the wicket, and without any interruption. And while one part began to break the bars of the gate, others killed the reſt of the guards. The ſignal being then made, the whole body of the Africans that were without entered through the gate, and directed their march towards the Forum, as they had been before commanded.

When Annibal ſaw theſe troops approach, being overjoyed to find that the deſign had thus far been attended with ſucceſs, he made haſte to carry into execution what remained. Having divided the Gauls, who were in number about two thouſand, into three ſeparate bodies, he placed at the head of each two of the young men who had joined in the conſpiracy, together with two Carthaginian officers; and commanded them to take poſſeſſion of the moſt commodious avenues that led into the Forum. He ordered the young men to ſave from ſlaughter all the citizens that they ſhould meet; and to proclaim aloud, that the Tarentines ſhould remain in their place, and be aſſured of ſafety. But he commanded the Carthaginian and Gallic officers to kill every Roman that ſhould fall in their way. Immediately theſe bodies ſeparated; and marched by different ways to execute theſe orders.

As it now began to be known that the enemy had entered, the whole city was filled with clamour and confuſion. Livius, being informed of what had happened, and finding himſelf ſo much inebriated as to be incapable of acting, immediately with his domeſticks left his houſe; and having ordered the wicket of the gate that led to the harbour to be opened to him, went on board one of the veſſels that were at anchor there, and ſailed round to the citadel. About the ſame time Philemenus, having prepared ſome Roman trumpets, and ſome perſons who had learned to blow them, ordered them to be ſounded near the theatre. The Romans, in obedience to a ſignal to which they had been accuſtomed, immediately took arms; and, running towards the Forum, afforded the occaſion which their enemies deſired. For as they ſpread themſelves through the ſtreets without any order, they fell, ſome of them among the Carthaginians, and ſome among the Gauls, and were deſtroyed by them in very great numbers.

The day began now to appear, and the Tarentines, who had remained quiet in their houſes, were not able to underſtand

ſtand the truth of what had happened. For, as on the one hand they heard only the Roman trumpets, and ſaw no attempt made to plunder or inſult the city, they were ready to perſuade themſelves, that the Romans themſelves had occaſioned the diſorder. But when they perceived on the other hand, that many of the Roman ſoldiers were killed in the ſtreets; and that the Gauls were buſy in ſpoiling them, they then began to ſuſpect, that the Carthaginians had found means to enter the city. But when it was now clear day, and the Romans had retired into the citadel, in which there was a garriſon; Annibal, having drawn up all his forces in order of battle in the Forum, ordered proclamation to be made, that the Tarentines ſhould all meet together in the Forum likewiſe without arms. At the ſame time the young men who had joined in the conſpiracy ran through the city, crying liberty, and exhorting the citizens not to fear, but to conſider the Carthaginians as their deliverers and friends. When they heard theſe words, as many of the citizens as remained firm in the intereſts of the Romans fled alſo into the citadel. The reſt obeyed the order, and came to the Forum without arms. As ſoon as they were aſſembled, Annibal harangued them in a diſcourſe that was full of favour. And when the Tarentines on their part, having obtained ſo unexpected a deliverance, received all that he ſaid with loud and general applauſe, he then diſmiſſed them; commanding that each of them ſhould inſcribe the word TARENTINE upon the door of his houſe; and forbidding them, under pain of death, to make the ſame inſcription upon any houſe that belonged to a Roman. Having afterwards divided into ſeveral bands the troops that were moſt proper for this ſervice, he ſent them away to pillage all the houſes upon which they ſhould ſee no inſcription: and kept the reſt of his forces drawn up in order; that they might be ready to ſupport the firſt. The Carthaginians, having collected together in this pillage great quantities of plunder

of every kind, and obtained a booty that fully anſwered all their expectations, remained under their arms during that whole night.

On the following day, Annibal, after he had held a conſultation with the Tarentines, reſolved to ſeparate the city from the citadel by a wall; that the inhabitants might have nothing to dread from the ſallies of the Roman garriſon. He began therefore with firſt throwing up an intrenchment parallel to the wall and the ditch of the city. But as he well knew, that the enemy would employ all their power to obſtruct him in this deſign; and judging likewiſe, that nothing was more neceſſary with reſpect to the future time, than that he ſhould ſtrike a terror into the Romans, and inſpire the Tarentines with confidence; he held in readineſs ſome of the braveſt of his forces. As ſoon as the work was begun, the Romans ſallied out, and began the attack with great impetuoſity and courage. At firſt Annibal only ſkirmiſhed, in order to provoke ſtill more the ardour of the enemy. But when a ſufficient number of them had advanced beyond the ditch, he then gave the ſignal to his troops, and fell with fury upon the Romans. The fight was for ſome time ſharp and obſtinate; and ſuch as might be expected upon a narrow ground, and in a place that was incloſed with walls. But the Romans, being cloſely preſſed, were at laſt forced to fly. Many of them had fallen in the action: but the greateſt part, flying in diſorder, were puſhed into the ditch, and periſhed there. After this ſucceſs, Annibal continued the work of the intrenchment in full ſecurity; and was pleaſed to find that the event had fully anſwered all his expectations. For as the Romans were now forced to remain quiet behind their walls, and began to fear that the citadel, as well as themſelves, would be expoſed to danger; the Tarentines, on the other hand, were ſo filled with confidence, that they were perſuaded, that, without any aſſiſtance from the Carthaginians, they ſhould be

be able to defend themſelves againſt the Romans. When this work was finiſhed, at a little diſtance from the intrenchment, and on the ſide towards the city, he ordered a ditch to be made, parallel to the intrenchment and to the wall of the citadel; and, on the ſide of the ditch which was next to the city, a rampart; which was covered alſo on the top with a paliſade, and was itſelf almoſt as ſecure as a wall. At a moderate diſtance from this rampart, in a line with it, and on the ſide alſo that was next to the city, he ordered a wall likewiſe to be built, from the place called Sotira to the ſtreet that was named the Lower Street. With ſuch fortifications, the Tarentines wanted not the preſence of an army, to ſecure them againſt the inſults of the enemy. Annibal therefore, leaving only a ſufficient garriſon, with a neceſſary guard of cavalry, went and incamped at the diſtance of forty ſtadia from the city; upon the banks of a river which is ſometimes called Galeſus, but moſt commonly Eurotas, from the river of the ſame name which flows near to the city of Sparta. For there are many appellations of this kind, both in the city and through the whole territory of Tarentum, which the Tarentines, who are allowed to have ſprung from the Spartan ſtock, brought with them from the country from which they migrated.

By the great zeal and diligence of the Tarentines, who were aſſiſted alſo by the Carthaginians in the work, the building of the wall was in a ſhort time finiſhed. Annibal then reſolved to attempt to take the citadel. But when the neceſſary preparations were completed, the Romans, having received ſome ſuccours by the ſea from Metapontum, in ſome degree reſumed their courage; and, making a ſally in the night, deſtroyed all the machines and works. The Carthaginians therefore were forced to abandon that deſign. But as the wall was now finiſhed, Annibal aſſembled the Tarentines together, and told them, that the thing of greateſt importance in the preſent circumſtances was, that they ſhould

render themſelves maſters of the ſea: that, as the citadel commanded the entrance of the harbour, their veſſels, not being able to ſail out of the port, were altogether uſeleſs: that the Romans, on the other hand, would receive all neceſſaries by the ſea in full ſecurity: and that, as long as the enemy ſhould be poſſeſſed of this advantage, the liberty of the city muſt ſtill be expoſed to danger. But if the Romans, he ſaid, could be but once excluded from the means of receiving any ſupplies by the ſea, they would immediately have recourſe to a voluntary ſubmiſſion, and ſurrender the citadel. The Tarentines aſſented to this diſcourſe; but were not able to conceive by what way the thing now mentioned could be accompliſhed; unleſs perhaps by the arrival of a Carthaginian fleet. But this was not to be expected at the preſent time. They knew not therefore, nor were they able to conjecture, to what this diſcourſe of Annibal could lead. And when he farther told them, that it was manifeſtly in their own power, by themſelves alone, and without any aſſiſtance from the Carthaginians, to become maſters of the ſea, they were ſtill more ſurpriſed, and unable to comprehend his meaning.

But this General, having remarked that the ſtreet that was on the inſide of the wall, and which led from the harbour to the exterior ſea, might eaſily be accommodated to the purpoſe, had conceived the deſign of tranſporting the veſſels over this ground from the port to the ſouthern ſide of the city. As ſoon then as he diſcloſed this project, the Tarentines not only acknowledged that the thing was practicable, but expreſſed alſo the higheſt admiration, and were perſuaded that nothing was too difficult for the ſagacity and courage of this great commander. Immediately therefore they prepared ſome carriages with wheels; and applied themſelves with ſuch alacrity, and in ſo great numbers, to the execution of this deſign, that the work was accompliſhed almoſt as ſoon

as

as it was propoſed. The Tarentines then, when they had thus drawn their veſſels over the land into the open ſea, and cut off all ſupplies from the Romans, inveſted the citadel without any danger. Annibal, having left a ſufficient garriſon in the city, began his march back again with the army; and, arriving on the third day in his firſt camp, continued there during the remainder of the winter.

THE

GENERAL HISTORY

OF

POLYBIUS.

BOOK the NINTH.

EXTRACT the FIRST.

Different kinds of Hiſtory. The moſt uſeful is that which relates publick actions.

THESE then are the moſt remarkable tranſactions, that were included in the Olympiad before mentioned, and in the courſe of four years complete; which, as we have ſaid, is to be conſidered as the proper term of an Olympiad. Theſe tranſactions we ſhall endeavour to deſcribe in the two following books.

I am not ignorant indeed, that the manner in which I write this hiſtory has ſomething in it unpleaſing: and that the uniformity of the compoſition muſt render it ſuitable to the taſte and judgement of only one ſort of readers. For all other hiſtorians, or at leaſt the greateſt part of them, employ

together all the ſeveral branches of hiſtory, and by the means of that variety attract many different perſons to the reading of their works. Thus thoſe, for example, who ſeek only a preſent ſatisfaction, are gratified with an account of the origin and deſcent of families. Others again, more curious and inquiſitive, have a pleaſure in tracing the ſettlement of colonies, the foundation of cities, and the migrations of people, as they are found in the work of Ephorus: and the attention of the political reader is fixed by the recital of the publick actions of nations, cities, and kingdoms. With regard therefore to myſelf, as I have confined my labours ſimply to theſe actions, and excluded every other ſubject from my work, this hiſtory, as I have ſaid, is properly adapted only to one ſort of men, and has nothing in it that can allure the minds of the greateſt part of readers. The reaſons that induced me to chooſe this branch of hiſtory alone, and to reject the reſt, have been ſhewn at large in other parts of this work. It may not however be improper, for the ſake of impreſſing them again more ſtrongly upon the memory, to give a ſhort recapitulation of them in this place.

As theſe genealogies then, with all the fabulous ſtories that attend them, as the eſtabliſhments of colonies, the relations of people one to another, and the foundations of cities, have already been recounted by many writers, and in a very copious manner; the neceſſary conſequence muſt be, that whoever at this time reſumes theſe ſubjects, either muſt appropriate to himſelf the labours of another, which of all actions is the baſeſt; or, not claiming them as his own, muſt appear to be engaged in a very uſeleſs undertaking; ſince, by his own acknowledgement, he is only buſied in compiling an account of thoſe very matters, which have already been ſufficiently explained, and tranſmitted to poſterity by former writers. For this reaſon therefore, as well as for many others, I have rejected all ſuch ſubjects. With regard to actions, there

there are two reaſons likewiſe, that determined me to adopt them as the only ſubject of my work. Firſt, as actions happen in a continually new ſucceſſion, the relation of them alſo muſt be always new: nor is there any need, in compoſing a recital of late events, to go back to others that have already been recounted. In the next place, this kind of hiſtory, as it has been in all times the moſt inſtructive, is ſuch moſt eminently in the preſent age. For ſo great is the perfection to which all arts and ſciences have been raiſed, that thoſe who are acquainted with them may now examine every thing that happens by ſome certain rule. Upon theſe accounts then, I have confined myſelf, as I have ſaid, to the recital of actions only: and I am perſuaded, that thoſe who ſhall read my work with due attention, will be ready to bear the ſtrongeſt teſtimony to the truth of theſe reflections.

EXTRACT the SECOND.

Annibal, having in vain endeavoured to force the Romans to raiſe the ſiege of Capua, advances with the ſame deſign towards Rome, but is diſappointed in his expectation. A compariſon of Annibal with Epaminondas; and of the Lacedæmonians with the Romans.

ANNIBAL, having extended his army in a circle round the whole camp of Appius, at firſt endeavoured by light ſkirmiſhing to draw him out to an engagement. And when no anſwer was returned to this invitation, he then inveſted the camp as in a regular ſiege. The cavalry, advancing together in troops, threw their javelins with loud cries into the very camp: while the infantry, ranged alſo in juſt cohorts, attempted to tear away the paliſade of the intrenchment. The Romans however were not moved from their purpoſe even by theſe attacks: but oppoſed their light forces only to thoſe who came near to the intrenchment; while the heavy armed troops, drawn up in cohorts, and covering them from the javelins that were thrown, remained quiet in their ranks. Annibal therefore, being grieved to find, that he neither could throw himſelf into the city of Capua, nor draw the Romans to an engagement, was at laſt forced to have recourſe to other counſels, and to conſider with himſelf what meaſures were moſt proper to be taken.

The ſtate indeed in which things now appeared, might well fill the Carthaginians with perplexity, ſince it cannot but occaſion ſome embaraſſment even to thoſe who read only a relation of it. For is it not almoſt incredible, that the Romans, who had been ſo often defeated by the Carthaginians that they dared

dared not to engage them again in ſet battle, ſhould yet refuſe to retire, or to leave the field? Is it not aſtoniſhing, that thoſe very troops, who in former times had never left the ſides of the hills, ſhould now deſcend into the plains, and lay ſiege to the nobleſt city, in the moſt conſpicuous part of Italy; while their camp alſo was ſurrounded by thoſe very enemies, whom they had feared to look deliberately in the face? The Carthaginians on the other hand, who had gained victory after victory without any intermiſſion, were at this very time perplexed with no leſs difficulty than the vanquiſhed. In my judgement however, the conduct both of the one and of the other was founded ſimply upon this opinion which was common to them both: that the cavalry of Annibal was the only cauſe, to which the Carthaginians owed all their victories, and the Romans their defeats. Upon this account it was, that the latter, immediately after every action, had been accuſtomed to lead their armies along the ſides of the hills, in ſight indeed of the enemy, but in places where the cavalry was not able to act againſt them. And with reſpect particularly to all that now paſſed in the neighbourhood of Capua, the ſame perſuaſion very clearly explains the motives that determined either army. For the Romans, while they refuſed to draw out their forces to a battle, through dread of the cavalry of the enemy, at the ſame time remained with confidence in the poſt which they had taken: as being well aſſured, that this very cavalry, which had occaſioned their defeat in every ſet engagement, was not able to make any impreſſion upon their camp. The Carthaginians again conſidered, and with no leſs reaſon, that it would not be poſſible for them to keep their cavalry long together in a body. For the forage had been purpoſely deſtroyed by the Romans through all the country. Nor was it poſſible to bring from any great diſtance thoſe ſupplies of hay and of barley, which ſo large a number of horſes and beaſts of burthen would require. And if, on the other hand, they ſhould diſmiſs their

cavalry, and remain afterwards in their camp; they never could attack, without manifeſt hazard, an enemy who was ſtrongly intrenched, and againſt whom every engagement, not ſupported by their cavalry, muſt be attended with very doubtful ſucceſs. They were apprehenſive likewiſe, that ſome new forces might arrive; and, incamping cloſe behind them, might involve them in the greateſt difficulties by intercepting their ſupplies. Annibal therefore, having concluded from theſe reaſons, that it was not poſſible to draw the Romans from the ſiege by open force, reſolved to attempt it in a different way.

He conſidered with himſelf, that, if he could make a ſecret march, and appear ſuddenly in the neighbourhood of Rome, either ſome advantage might perhaps be gained againſt the city, before the inhabitants ſhould be recovered from the conſternation into which ſo unexpected an event would throw them; or, on the other hand, that Appius would be forced to raiſe the ſiege of Capua, and haſten to the aſſiſtance of his country; or ſending away one part at leaſt of his army for that purpoſe, would afford the opportunity of an eaſy victory, both againſt the forces that ſhould be ſo ſeparated from the reſt, and thoſe alſo that would be left behind. Having formed then this deſign, he engaged an African to paſs as a deſerter into the Roman camp, and from thence into the city, with letters which he had taken care to ſecure. For he had reaſon to fear, that the inhabitants, as ſoon as they ſhould perceive that he was gone, would deſpair of receiving any farther ſuccour, and ſurrender themſelves to the Romans. He contrived therefore, that theſe letters ſhould be delivered to them on the very day following his departure: that, being acquainted with his purpoſe, they might be encouraged ſtill to ſuſtain the ſiege.

At Rome, when the news arrived of what paſſed in the neighbourhood of Capua; and that Annibal had incamped cloſe to the Roman army, and even inveſted them in their camp; the minds of all men were raiſed in ſuſpenſe, and were filled with

with anxiety and dread. For it ſeemed that the very moment that would decide the war was now approaching. The citizens therefore in general, and every one particularly, were occupied with no other care, than to complete the preparations for that ſide, and to ſend all the neceſſary ſuccours.

The people of Capua, when they had received the letters from the hands of the African, and were informed of the deſign of Annibal, reſolved to wait the event, and ſuſtain the ſiege. In the mean time this General, on the fifth day after he had firſt incamped, having ordered the troops to take their ſupper, and leaving his fires lighted, decamped in the evening with ſo great ſecrecy, that the enemy knew not that he was was gone. With continual and forced marches, he paſſed through the territory of the Samnites; taking care always to ſend ſome troops before, to examine the country, and to occupy the proper poſts. And while the attention of the Romans was wholly fixed on the affairs of Capua, and the condition of the ſiege, he paſſed the river Anio before he was diſcovered, and, advancing ſtill nearer towards Rome, fixed his camp at the diſtance of no more than forty ſtadia from the city. The firſt news of this approach filled all Rome with terror and confuſion. For, beſide that the event was ſudden, it was moſt diſtant likewiſe from every expectation; becauſe Annibal never had approached ſo near before. Add to this, that an opinion alſo immediately prevailed, that he would not even now have ventured to approach, unleſs the legions that were employed in the ſiege of Capua had been firſt defeated. The men therefore made haſte to mount the walls, and to take all the advantageous poſts, that were without the city: while the women went round to the temples, offering ſupplications to the Gods, and ſweeping the pavements of the holy ſhrines with their hair. For ſuch is the cuſtom of this people, whenever their country is threatened with any great and unuſual danger.

Annibal

Annibal then, having incamped in the place that has been mentioned, had reſolved to make an attempt againſt the city on the following day; when an accident, as fortunate as unexpected, occaſioned the ſafety of Rome. The Conſuls, Cnæus Fulvius and Publius Sulpicius, who had before enrolled one legion, had ordered the ſoldiers to attend at Rome with their arms upon this very day, to take the military oath. At this very time likewiſe, they were employed in ſelecting and enrolling men for another legion. Thus a great body of troops was aſſembled as it were ſpontaneouſly in the moment that was requiſite. The Conſuls, placing themſelves with confidence at their head, went and incamped without the city; and by this meaſure gave an effectual check to the ardour of the Carthaginians. For Annibal had at firſt advanced, and was not without hopes that he ſhould be able to take the city by ſtorm. But when he ſaw that the Romans were drawn up in battle againſt him; and being informed alſo of the true ſtate of things by a priſoner that was taken, he deſiſted from the attempt: and leading his army through the country, ſet fire to the houſes, and plundered all that was within his reach. The booty that was gained even in the firſt excurſions was ſuch as exceeded all account: being drawn from a country, into which it never had been expected that an enemy would at any time come.

The Conſuls however were now ſo filled with confidence, that they had the boldneſs to incamp at the diſtance of ten ſtadia only from the Carthaginian army. But Annibal, having conſidered that his troops were loaded with an immenſe booty; that he had failed in his attempt againſt the city; and, above all, that the time was now elapſed, in which he had ſuppoſed that Appius, informed of the danger with which Rome was threatened, would either raiſe the ſiege of Capua, or, leaving there a ſmall part only of his forces, would haſten with the reſt to defend his country; and that in either

either caſe he ſhould meet him on his way with ſome advantage; reſolved to begin his march back again, and decamped early in the morning. But Publius, having before broken the bridges that were upon the river, ſo that the Carthaginians were obliged to ford the ſtream, preſſed cloſely upon the rear of the army in their paſſage, and threw them into no ſmall diſorder. The numbers indeed of the Carthaginian cavalry, and the readineſs of the Numidians in aſſiſting every part that was attacked, prevented the action from being in any manner general. The Romans however recovered again a great part of the plunder; and, having taken priſoners alſo about three hundred men, they then returned back to their camp. And being afterwards perſuaded, that fear alone had determined Annibal to make ſo precipitate a retreat, they followed cloſely after him, leading their army along the ſides of the hills.

The Carthaginian General, keeping in view his firſt deſign, for ſome time continued his march with the greateſt haſte. But, after five days, being informed that Appius had not left the ſiege, he halted, till the Romans who were following him were come near: and then falling ſuddenly upon their camp in the night, he killed great numbers of them, and forced the reſt to fly out of the camp. And when the morning was come, perceiving that they had retreated to a ſtrong eminence that was near, he reſolved not to attack them in that poſt: but continuing his route through Daunia and the Brutian diſtrict, appeared ſo unexpectedly in the neighbourhood of Rhegium, that he had almoſt made himſelf maſter of the city. For all that were found in the country upon his approach fell into his hands; and among them many of the inhabitants of Rhegium.

Is there any one now that can withhold his admiration, or refuſe the teſtimony that is due to the emulation and the courage, that were ſo ſignally diſplayed upon this occaſion

both by the Carthaginians and the Romans? The conduct of Epaminondas, in an action not unlike to that which we have now deſcribed, has received the applauſe of all mankind. This General, arriving at Tegea with his allies, perceived that the Lacedæmonians had drawn together all their forces, as well as thoſe of their allies, to Mantinea, with deſign to offer battle to the Theban army. Having ordered his troops therefore to take their ſupper at an early hour, he led them out in the beginning of the night, under the pretence of occupying certain poſts, that were moſt proper for the approaching battle. But when this perſuaſion was ſpread through all the army, he directed his march ſtrait to Sparta, and arrived moſt unexpectedly about the third hour of the night. Finding the place deſtitute of all defence, he penetrated as far as to the Forum, and made himſelf maſter of all the parts of the city that were on the ſide of the river. But this fortune ſoon was changed. For Ageſilaus having been informed of what had happened, by a deſerter who had gone in the night to Mantinea, immediately began his march, and arrived at Sparta with all his forces, in the very moment when the city was taken. Epaminondas therefore, being thus forced to abandon his deſign, ordered his troops to take their repaſt upon the banks of the Eurotas; and, having allowed alſo ſome time for reſt, he reſolved to march back again in haſte by the ſame way by which he had arrived: being perſuaded, that, as the whole Lacedæmonian army had come in haſte to protect their country, Mantinea in its turn was now left without defence. And this indeed was the truth. He therefore encouraged his troops; and, continuing his march all night with the greateſt haſte, arrived about the middle of the day in the neighbourhood of Mantinea, which had no force ſufficient to make reſiſtance. But it happened that the Athenians, who were deſirous to bear a part in the intended action againſt the Thebans, arrived at this very time, with deſign

ſign to join the Lacedæmonian army. And when the advanced guard of the Thebans had juſt reached the temple of Neptune, which ſtood at the diſtance of ſeven ſtadia only from Mantinea; in the ſame inſtant the Athenians, as if by concert, appeared upon the top of the hill that commanded the city. On the ſight of theſe ſuccours, the Mantineans were at laſt encouraged to mount the walls, and oppoſe the entrance of the Thebans. It is not without good reaſon therefore, that hiſtorians blame theſe accidents: and ſay of Epaminondas, that he performed every thing that was to be expected from a ſkilful General; and, while he ſhewed himſelf to be ſuperior to his enemies, was vanquiſhed only by ill fortune.

The ſame reflections may be made with reſpect to the conduct of Annibal in the preſent inſtance. For when it is conſidered, that this General firſt attempted to raiſe the ſiege of Capua, by incamping near to the enemy, and attacking them in many little combats; that, when this deſign had failed, he then marched, with the ſame intention, into the very neighbourhood of Rome; that, when accident alone had prevented the ſucceſs of this bold project, and forced him to return back again with his army, he ſtill kept his attention fixed upon his firſt deſign, and ſtood ready to take advantage of any motion that ſhould be made by the army that was employed in the ſiege; and laſtly, when it is remembered, that he did not even in the end deſiſt from his undertaking, till he had diſperſed the Romans with great ſlaughter, and almoſt taken the city of Rhegium by ſurprize; who can behold ſuch actions, and not beſtow upon this great commander the ſtrongeſt teſtimony of admiration and applauſe?

With regard to the Romans, they muſt be allowed indeed to have deſerved upon this occaſion even a higher degree of praiſe than the Lacedæmonians in the inſtance that has been

mentioned. For the Lacedæmonians, as ſoon as they knew that Sparta was attacked, marched away in haſte, and ſaved indeed their own city, but ſuffered Mantinea, as far as it depended upon themſelves alone, to be loſt. But the Romans preſerved their country; and yet drew not away their army from the walls of Capua: but remaining immoveable and fixed in their firſt purpoſe, continued to preſs the ſiege with the ſame confidence as before.

But let it not now be imagined, that my purpoſe in falling into this digreſſion was barely to extol the Carthaginians and the Romans. Their great actions have already been often celebrated in the courſe of this work. My deſign was rather, by diſplaying the conduct of the leaders in theſe two ſtates, to afford a leſſon to all thoſe who may hereafter be placed at the head of affairs in any country. That, when they call to their remembrance the fame of theſe commanders, and place their actions in full view before them, they may be led to emulate ſuch great examples: and be perſuaded, that many things which appear to be beyond meaſure daring and full of danger, are not leſs ſafe in the execution, than admirable in the attempt; and that the deſign itſelf, as well when fruſtrated as when attended with ſucceſs, will draw after it immortal honour, if it be conducted only with ability and ſkill. 2

EX-

EXTRACT the THIRD.

The ill policy of the Romans cenſured, in carrying into their own country the ornaments of the cities which they had conquered.

SUCH then was the reaſon that determined the Romans to remove into their own country the ornaments that have been mentioned, and not to leave any part behind. Whether this reſolution was right and agreeable to their intereſts, or the contrary, would afford room perhaps for much diſpute. It ſeems however, that the ſtrongeſt reaſons might be brought to ſhew, that they acted, and ſtill continue to act, very imprudently in this matter. If the cultivation indeed of arts like theſe had been the means of their firſt advancement to ſtrength and power, they might then with good reaſon have transferred into their own poſſeſſion ſuch ornaments as had been found effectual to promote the greatneſs of their country. But as in truth it was a kind of life that was deſtitute of all ſuperfluous wealth, and manners far removed from elegance and ſplendour, which enabled them to ſubdue continually thoſe very nations, which poſſeſſed the moſt, as well as the moſt beautiful, of theſe embelliſhments; how can it be doubted, but that they erred in judgement upon this occaſion? Nor are they to be blamed in this reſpect alone, that, when they were conquerours, they relinquiſhed their own manners, and adopted the ſpirit of the conquered in exchange. There is alſo a certain kind of envy, which never fails to accompany ſuch actions; and which of all things a powerful empire has the greateſt cauſe to dread. For when men behold a ſtate in poſſeſſion of the riches that belonged to others, inſtead of

applauding the good fortune, they view it, on the contrary, with ſecret jealouſy; and are at the ſame time moved by ſentiments of compaſſion towards thoſe who have been thus deſpoiled. And when in the farther progreſs of ſucceſs, the whole wealth of every foreign ſtate is drawn together to one city, and the people themſelves are invited as it were to take a view of that magnificence which ſo lately was their own; the evil then becomes greater than before. For the ſpectators, not actuated, as in the former inſtance, by compaſſion for the ſufferings of their neighbours, are now exaſperated by a ſenſe of their own loſſes: and begin to glow, not with envy alone, but with reſentment alſo againſt thoſe whom fortune has ſo favoured. For the remembrance of the calamities which men have felt will naturally excite their hatred againſt the authors of them. If the Romans indeed had only carried away the ſilver and the gold from the countries which they conquered, they would have deſerved no blame. For they could not in general have held the vanquiſhed in ſubjection, unleſs they had deprived them of that ſource of their ſtrength, and added it to their own. But with reſpect to the riches of a different kind, it would certainly have been far more prudent, to have ſuffered them to remain where they were found, together with the envy which they inſpire: and to have eſtabliſhed the glory of their own country, not by the vain ornaments of pictures and of ſtatues, but by a gravity of manners, and a magnanimity of conduct. But theſe reflections are ſufficient. They may ſerve perhaps as an inſtruction at leaſt to future conquerours; not to ſtrip the cities which they ſubdue; nor to think it poſſible, that the calamities of other nations can ever become the ornament of their own countries.

EXTRACT the FOURTH.

A digreſſion concerning the proper manner of conducting any enterprize. What things are neceſſary to be known by the commander of an army. The application and uſe of Aſtronomy and Geometry. Examples of Generals who failed in their attempts, from being unacquainted with the principles of thoſe ſciences. A cenſure of ſome common errors, ariſing from the ſame defect.

CHAP. I.

IN the affairs of war, much conſideration is indeed required, to guard againſt the accidents that may ariſe in the courſe of ſuch an undertaking. And yet in every project there is good reaſon to expect ſucceſs, if the means of carrying it into execution be conducted only with ſound ſenſe and judgement.

If we examine then the accounts of former wars, it will be very obvious to perceive, that thoſe actions, which are accompliſhed openly and by force alone, are much leſs frequent, than thoſe that are concerted with ſome ſtratagem, and upon ſome occaſion that is offered. From the ſame view likewiſe it will be no leſs evident, that, among theſe laſt, the number of thoſe that fail, is greater than of thoſe that are attended with ſucceſs. And that the want alſo of ſucceſs, upon ſuch occaſions, is almoſt always to be aſcribed to the ignorance or the negligence of the commanders, cannot reaſonably be doubted. I ſhall endeavour therefore to point out the proper method of conducting enterprizes of this ſort; not taking into the conſideration things that happen without foreſight or in-

tention, which deſerve the name of chance or accident rather than of actions, and which are in their nature too unſettled to be fixed by any rule; but confining myſelf wholly to thoſe actions which are undertaken with ſome certain purpoſe and deſign.

Every action then, of the kind here mentioned, muſt have a determinate point of time; a certain portion of time; and a certain place. It requires alſo ſecrecy; certain perſons, through whom, and by whom, it muſt be accompliſhed; and laſtly, a certain manner of carrying it into execution. When a commander has formed his meaſures right with reſpect to all theſe circumſtances, it is manifeſt that his attempt will be attended with ſucceſs. But, on the other hand, the neglect of any one of theſe will moſt aſſuredly defeat the whole deſign. For ſuch is the nature of all concerted enterprizes: a failure in any ſingle part, however inconſiderable, ſhall have force to overthrow them; while all the meaſures together ſcarcely are ſufficient to conduct an undertaking to its deſtined end. It is clearly therefore a matter of the laſt importance, not to leave any thing neglected upon ſuch occaſions.

Now, of all the precautions that have been mentioned, the firſt to which a commander ſhould attend, is that of obſerving ſecrecy. That neither the joy which ſprings from an unexpected proſpect of ſucceſs, nor yet the dread of a miſcarriage; that neither friendſhip nor affection may prevail upon him, to communicate his deſign to any perſons, except thoſe alone without whoſe aſſiſtance it cannot be carried into execution: and not even to theſe, till the time in which their ſervices are ſeverally required obliges him to diſcloſe it. Nor is it neceſſary only, that the tongue be ſilent; but much more, that the mind alſo make not any diſcovery. For it has often happened, that men, who have carefully reſtrained themſelves from ſpeaking, have ſometimes

times by their countenance alone, and ſometimes by their actions, very clearly manifeſted their deſigns. A ſecond thing to be conſidered are the different routes, either by day or by night, and the manner of performing them, both upon land and ſea. The third, and indeed the greateſt object is, to know the differences of the times that depend upon the heavens; and to be able to accommodate them to the execution of any deſign. Nor is the manner of executing any enterprize to be regarded as a point of ſmall importance. For this alone has often made things practicable which appeared to be impoſſible; and rendered others impracticable, which were eaſy to be performed. In the laſt place, great attention ſhould be paid to ſignals and counterſignals; as well as to the choice of the perſons, through whoſe means, and with whoſe aſſiſtance, the undertaking is to be accompliſhed.

The knowledge, that is requiſite in the things now mentioned, is to be acquired partly by experience, partly by inquiry, and partly by the rules of ſcience. With reſpect to the ſeveral routes; the place that is the object of the march; the nature of that place; and the perſons fit to be employed in the execution of the enterprize; it is beſt indeed, when a commander is himſelf acquainted with theſe things from his own proper knowledge. But if it be otherwiſe, his duty then is, to uſe the greateſt care in his inquiries: not truſting raſhly to any information that is offered; nor following any guides, without leaving behind him ſome pledges of their fidelity. In theſe things then, and in others ſimilar to theſe, a General may obtain ſufficient light, by conſulting that experience which is gained in armies; by employing his own induſtry; and by making the neceſſary inquiries. But there are others that demand ſkill and knowledge, and ſome acquaintance with the rules of theoretical ſcience, eſpecially with thoſe of Aſtronomy and Geometry. For, without having recourſe

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to the more difficult branches of theſe two ſciences, there are certain parts of them, which, though they require but little labour, are of the greateſt uſe upon ſuch occaſions, and ſerve principally to promote the ſucceſs of all ſuch enterprizes as have here been mentioned.

Among the things that are to be learned in this method, one of the moſt neceſſary is the inveſtigation of the theory of the days and nights. If indeed the days and the nights were at all times equal, there would be no need of ſtudy, in order to acquire a knowledge which would in that caſe be common and obvious to all. But ſince they are different, not only each from the other, but alſo from themſelves, it is plainly a matter of great importance, to know the laws by which they are ſeverally diminiſhed or increaſed. For, unleſs he be acquainted with theſe differences, how ſhall a commander be able to meaſure with exactneſs the time of a concerted march, either by night or by day? How can he be aſſured, without this knowledge, that he ſhall not either arrive too early, or too late? It happens alſo upon ſuch occaſions, and indeed upon ſuch alone, that the firſt of theſe miſtakes is more dangerous than the other. For he who arrives too late, is only forced to abandon his deſign. Perceiving his error, while he is yet at a diſtance, he may return back again with ſafety. But he who comes before the appointed time, being diſcovered by the enemy upon his approach, not only fails in the intended enterprize, but is in danger alſo of ſuffering an intire defeat. It is time indeed, which principally governs in all human actions; and moſt particularly in the affairs of war. A commander therefore ſhould be perfectly acquainted with the time of the ſummer and the winter ſolſtice; the equinoxes; and the different degrees of the diminution or increaſe of the nights and days, as they fall between the equinoctial points. For this is the only method that can enable him to adjuſt his motions to the courſe of time, either by land or ſea. Nor

Nor is it leſs neceſſary that a commander ſhould alſo know diſtinctly the ſeveral portions of the day and of the night; in order to determine the proper hour of riſing, and of putting the troops in march. For without beginning well, it is not poſſible to obtain a happy end. Now the time of day may eaſily be known: by the ſhadow from the ſun; by the courſe which the ſun takes; and by the different degrees of his elevation above the earth. But it is not ſo eaſy to diſtinguiſh the time of night: unleſs to thoſe who are verſed in the doctrine of the ſphere; and are able to follow the courſe of the twelve ſigns, and to mark their diſpoſition in the heavens. With this knowledge, it is a matter of no difficulty. For, though the nights are unequal, yet, ſince in the courſe of every night ſix of the twelve ſigns are raiſed above the horizon, it neceſſarily follows, that at the ſame times of the night equal parts of the twelve ſigns muſt always appear. When it is known then what part of the zodiac the ſun occupies in the day, nothing more is requiſite, than, at the time of his ſetting, to draw a line diametrically through the circle. When this is done, as much as the zodiac ſhall afterwards riſe above the horizon, ſo much alſo of the night will have paſſed. And if the number only and the magnitude of the ſigns be known, the different parts of the night will be alſo known.

When the nights are cloudy, recourſe muſt be had to the moon. For this planet is of ſuch a magnitude, that, in whatever part of the heavens it may happen to be, the light of it may always be diſcerned. It is ſometimes from the time and place of its riſing, and ſometimes from thoſe of its ſetting, that the hours of the night are to be computed. But it will firſt be requiſite to know with exactneſs the different times of it's riſing upon each ſeveral day. Nor is this knowledge difficult to be obtained. For as the courſe of the moon is completed in a ſingle month, the right apprehenſion of its progreſs in that period will ſerve equally in all the reſt.

Upon theſe principles it may be obſerved, how well the Poet deſerves our praiſe, when he repreſents Ulyſſes, who poſſeſſed all the qualities of a great commander, forming conjectures from the appearances of the heavens, not only concerning the courſe of navigation, but with reſpect alſo to actions upon land. For even thoſe ſudden and unexpected events, by which men frequently are thrown into the greateſt difficulties, may by this method be apprehended with exactneſs before they happen. Such are violent rains and inundations; the fall of ſnows; a black and clouded air; and other ſimilar accidents. If we are therefore negligent with reſpect even to things of this kind, which are poſſible to be foreſeen; muſt we not fail, through our own fault alone, in almoſt every thing that we attempt? But indeed there is ſcarcely one, of all thoſe precautions which have been before recited, that can with ſafety be neglected; if we would avoid falling into thoſe abſurdities of conduct, into which many others are reported to have fallen. I ſhall here mention ſome of them as examples.

Aratus, the Achæan Prætor, having reſolved to attempt to take Cynætha by ſurprize, concerted the following plan with the citizens that were engaged in the deſign. That, on a certain day, having before advanced ſilently in the night, he ſhould take his poſt near to the river that ran down from the city, and for ſome time remain quiet with his army. That, about the middle of the day, the citizens, when all things were prepared, ſhould ſecretly ſend out one of their number, dreſſed in a mantle; who ſhould take his ſtand upon a certain tomb that was without the city. That the reſt ſhould then attack the guards of the gate; who, according to their cuſtom would be ſleeping at that hour: and that Aratus, in this very moment, ſhould riſe from his concealment, and advance with haſte towards the gate. The matter being thus regulated, Aratus came at the appointed time; and, having ſtationed his troops

in ſecret along the river, waited for the ſignal. It happened that one of the inhabitants, who was the maſter of ſome of thoſe delicate ſheep that were uſually paſtured near to the city, having occaſion to give ſome ſudden orders that concerned them, came out at the gate, about an hour before the middle of the day, dreſſed in a mantle; and, ſtanding upon the very tomb that had been named, looked round the country in ſearch of his ſhepherd. Aratus, being perſuaded that this was the ſignal that had been concerted, advanced in haſte towards the gate. But the gate was immediately ſhut by the guards: for things were not yet ready within the city. Thus this General not only failed in his attempt, but brought deſtruction alſo upon the citizens that were engaged in the deſign. For being now diſcovered, they all loſt their lives in torture. What now was the cauſe of this misfortune? It was only that Aratus, who was at this time extremely young, and not acquainted with the ſingular advantage of double and reſpondent ſignals, was ſatisfied with having concerted a ſingle ſignal. So ſlight is the difference, upon which the good or ill ſucceſs of any military enterprize depends.

In the ſame manner alſo Cleomenes, the king of Sparta, when he had reſolved to make an attempt of this kind upon Megalopolis, agreed with ſome of the garriſon, who were to be ſtationed upon that part of the wall that was called Colæum, that he would come with his forces in the night, about the time of the third watch. For this was the hour, in which theſe men were appointed to take the guard. But not having before conſidered, that at the time of the riſing of the Pleiades the nights were extremely ſhort, he did not begin his march from Lacedæmon till about the ſetting of the ſun. It was therefore full day before he arrived at the deſtined place. He had the raſhneſs however to attempt to ſtorm the city; but was repulſed with diſgrace and loſs, and

was even in danger of ſuffering an intire defeat: whereas, on the other hand, if he had only been exact in the computation of his time, his friends might have ſecured his entrance into the city, and the deſign have been attended with ſucceſs.

Thus again king Philip, when he attempted to take Melite in the manner that has before been mentioned, was guilty of a double error. For not only the ladders which he carried were too ſhort; but he failed alſo with reſpect to the time. Inſtead of coming to the place in the middle of the night, as it had been concerted, when the people would have been all faſt in ſleep, he began his march from Lariſſa at an early hour; and, having entered the territory of the Melitæans, as it was neither ſafe for him to halt, leſt the enemy ſhould gain notice of his approach, nor poſſible to return back again without being perceived, he was compelled by neceſſity to advance, and arrived at the city before the inhabitants were yet gone to reſt. But as he could not ſcale the walls, becauſe the ladders were not proportioned to the height; ſo neither was he able to enter through the gate, becauſe the time of the attack prevented his friends that were within the city from favouring his entrance. At laſt therefore, having only provoked the rage of the inhabitants, and loſt many of his men, he was forced to return back without accompliſhing his purpoſe; and inſtructed all mankind for the time to come, to be ſuſpicious of his deſigns, and to ſet themſelves on their guard againſt him.

Another example occurs in the example of Nicias the Athenian. This General, having found a fair occaſion for withdrawing his army from the ſiege of Syracuſe, made choice of the proper time of night, and had retreated to a ſafe diſtance undiſcovered by the enemy, when it happened that the moon was ſuddenly eclipſed. Being ſtruck by this event, and vainly imagining that it portended ſome misfortune,

tune, he immediately ſuſpended his march. The conſequence was, that when he deſigned to continue his retreat on the following night, the Syracuſans, having now gained notice of his motions, fell upon him as he marched, and rendered themſelves maſters both of the army and of all the leaders. And yet, if he only had inquired of men that were acquainted with theſe matters, he might not only not have loſt his own proper time, but have rendered the accident itſelf ſubſervient to his purpoſe, on account of the ignorance of the enemy. For the ignorance of others is the ſureſt way for conducting ſkilful men to the accompliſhment of their deſigns. It is manifeſt then, that ſo much of Aſtronomy ſhould be acquired, as may be neceſſary upon ſuch occaſions.

With regard to the meaſure of ladders, the method of determining it is this. If the height of the walls be known, by the means of ſome communication with thoſe that are in the city, the proportion of the ladders is then moſt eaſy to be aſcertained. For if the wall, for example, contain ten certain parts of any meaſure in height, the height of the ladders muſt include at the leaſt twelve ſuch parts. The diſtance of the foot of the ladders from the walls ſhould be equal to one half of their height. For this is the moſt juſt proportion with reſpect to the men that are to mount upon them. If the diſtance be greater, the ladders will too eaſily be broken under the weight. If leſs, they will then be ſo erect, that the ſoldiers, as they aſcend, muſt be continually in danger of falling headlong down. If the walls are not to be approached, and the meaſure of them is unknown; the height of any body that ſtands perpendicularly upon a plane ſurface may be taken at a diſtance. The method of doing this is not only practicable, but eaſy, to thoſe who are acquainted with the mathematicks. And thus again it is evident, that, in order to obtain ſucceſs in military operations,

tions, the ſtudy of Geometry will be alſo requiſite : not indeed in its whole extent ; but ſo far as it teaches to inveſtigate the theory of relations and proportions. For it is not only in meaſuring the height of walls, that this ſcience is ſo neceſſary ; but in changing alſo the figure of a camp, as occaſions may require. By this method it is, that a General is enabled, ſometimes, taking every kind of figure, to keep ſtill the ſame proportion between the ſeveral parts that are contained within the camp ; and ſometimes retaining the ſame figure, to vary the proportion of the parts, according to the number of thoſe that enter, or that depart from the camp. But theſe matters have already been treated by us at large, in our Diſcourſe on the Orders of Battle.

It will not, I think, be objected to me by any reaſonable man, that I require too much, in making Aſtronomy and Geometry a neceſſary part of ſtudy for the General of an army. To join indeed to any profeſſion thoſe foreign and ſuperfluous acquiſitions, which only ſerve to furniſh matter of oſtentation and idle talk, is a labour which I entirely diſapprove. But as much as I condemn ſuch unneceſſary diligence, ſo much on the other hand muſt I contend for the neceſſity of drawing even from a diſtant ſource ſome knowledge of thoſe things which are of conſtant and notorious uſe. For is it not abſurd, that perſons who profeſs the arts of dancing and of muſick, ſhould ſubmit to be inſtructed in the theory of meaſure and of harmony, and even to be trained in the gymnaſtick exerciſes ; becauſe theſe are all conſidered as the neceſſary means of obtaining perfection in their reſpective arts ; and that thoſe who aſpire to the command of armies, ſhould be diſpleaſed to find, that an acquaintance in ſome degree with other ſciences is neceſſary in their profeſſion ? Shall the men that exerciſe illiberal arts exert greater pains, and ſhew a ſtronger emulation to excel, than thoſe who are ambitious to obtain diſtinction in the no-

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bleſt and moſt ſplendid of all employments? There is no man of ſenſe that will avow ſuch ſentiments. But enough has been ſaid upon this ſubject.

CHAP. II.

THE greateſt part of men form their opinion of the ſize of a camp, or of a city, only from the circumference. When they are told therefore that Megalopolis contains in circumference fifty ſtadia, and Lacedæmon no more than forty-eight, and yet that this laſt city is twice as large as the former, they know not how to believe it. And if any one, deſigning to increaſe the ſurprize, ſhould affirm that it is poſſible that a city or a camp, which contains only forty ſtadia in circumference, may be twice as large as another that contains a hundred ſtadia, they are ſtruck with the greateſt aſtoniſhment. The cauſe of this ſurprize is, that men forget thoſe principles of Geometry which they learned in their youth. And I was the rather inclined to take ſome notice of theſe matters, becauſe not the vulgar alone, but ſome even of thoſe who are employed in the adminiſtration of ſtates, or placed at the head of armies, are ſometimes aſtoniſhed, and not able to conceive, that Lacedæmon is a much greater city than Megalopolis, though it be leſs in its circumference: and again, in the ſame manner likewiſe are perſuaded, that, by only viewing the circumference of a camp, they can eaſily determine the number of the troops which it contains. There is alſo another error in judging of cities, not unlike to that which has been mentioned. Many men imagine, that an unequal and hilly ground will contain more houſes, than a ground that is flat and level. This however is not the truth. For the houſes, being raiſed in a perpendicular line, form right angles, not with the declivity of the ground, but with the flat

ſurface which lies below, and upon which the hills themſelves alſo ſtand. This alſo may be learned from the very firſt elements of ſcience. Suppoſe a number of houſes to be ſo built upon the ſides of a hill, as to riſe to an equal height; it is manifeſt that the roofs of all of them together will form a ſurface exactly parallel and equal to the ſurface of the ground which lies under the foundations of the houſes and the hill. Let this then ſerve as a leſſon to thoſe perſons, who, though they are ſo ignorant as not to conceive how theſe things can be, are deſirous of commanding armies, and of preſiding in the government of ſtates.

EXTRACT the FIFTH.

Agrigentum in Sicily deſcribed.

AGRIGENTUM excells almoſt all other cities, not only in the advantages that have been mentioned, but in ſtrength likewiſe, and eſpecially in ornament and beauty. Situated at the diſtance of only eighteen ſtadia from the ſea, it poſſeſſes all the conveniences which the ſea procures. The whole circuit of the city is rendered uncommonly ſtrong both by nature and art. For the walls are built upon a rock, which partly by nature, and partly from the labour of art, is very ſteep and broken. It is ſurrounded alſo by rivers on different ſides. On the ſide towards the ſouth, by a river of the ſame name as the city: and on the weſt and ſouth-weſt, by that which is called the Hypſas. The citadel, which ſtands upon a hill on the north-eaſt ſide, is ſecured all round the outſide by a deep and inacceſſible valley; and has one way only by which it may be entered from the city. On the ſummit of the hill is a temple dedicated to Minerva; and another to Jupiter Atabyrius, as at Rhodes. For as the Agrigentines were a colony from Rhodes, they gave to this deity, not improperly, the ſame appellation by which he was diſtinguiſhed in the iſland from which they came. The city alſo itſelf, which is indeed in all reſpects magnificent, is adorned with porticoes and with temples. Among theſe, the temple of Jupiter Olympius, though not finiſhed indeed with ſo great ſplendour, is equal in ſize and in deſign to any of the temples of Greece.

EXTRACT the SIXTH.

The diſcourſe of Chlæneas, embaſſadour from the Ætolians to the Lacedæmonians; in which he inveighs againſt the conduct of the kings of Macedon. He is anſwered by Lyciſcus, embaſſadour from the Acarnanians: who defends the Macedonians, and warns the aſſembly of the fatal conſequences of bringing the Romans into Greece.

CHAP. I.

* * * "NOW, that the kings of Macedon have from the firſt been enemies to the liberties of Greece, there is no man, O Lacedæmonians, that will have the boldneſs to deny. Let me enter however into the proof of this fact. Among the various colonies of Greeks, that migrated from Athens and from Chalcis, that of Olynthus was the firſt, both in conſideration and in power. Philip, having ſubdued this city, ordered the inhabitants to be ſold; and, by the terror of that example, not only obtained poſſeſſion of all the other cities of Thrace, but forced Theſſaly alſo to receive his yoke. Some time afterwards, when he had defeated the Athenians in battle, he diſplayed indeed great generoſity after his victory: not from any deſire of ſhewing kindneſs to the vanquiſhed; for that was far from his intention; but that others might be induced by ſuch an inſtance of his clemency to ſubmit themſelves voluntarily to his commands. At that time however, the power of your Republick was ſo great, that it ſeemed probable that at ſome convenient ſeaſon you would not fail to place yourſelves at the head of all the ſtates of Greece. He ſeized every occaſion therefore

therefore of declaring war againſt you. He invaded your country with his armies: he waſted your lands, and deſtroyed your houſes: and at laſt, having torn both cities and whole provinces from your dominion, he beſtowed one part of the ſpoil upon the Argians; gave another to the Tegeans and the Megalopolitans; and another to the Meſſenians; and ſhewed a willingneſs to gratify all mankind, if he could only do it with your loſs. From him Alexander received the ſovereignty. This prince again, being perſuaded, that, as long as Thebes remained, ſome little ray of hope would be ſtill left to Greece, deſtroyed that city in the manner which is known to all. There is no need that I ſhould enter into a particular detail of the conduct which his ſucceſſors have held with reſpect to Greece. For no man is ſo little verſed in the tranſactions of his country, as not to have heard, that when Antipater had gained a complete victory in the Lamian war, he treated the Athenians, as well as the reſt of the Greeks, with the greateſt inſult and indignity. For to ſuch exceſs did he carry his oppreſſion and injuſtice, that he appointed perſons to hunt out the exiles; and to deſtroy in every city all thoſe that had oppoſed his party, or were upon any account obnoxious to the houſe of Macedon. And thus many of thoſe unhappy men, taken away by violence from the temples, and torn even from the altars, loſt their lives in torture: while others were compelled to fly, and found no ſafety for themſelves in any part of Greece. Ætolia alone afforded to ſome of them a place of refuge. The actions of Caſſander and Demetrius, and thoſe of Antigonus Gonatas, are ſtill recent in the memory of all. Under theſe princes, garriſons were eſtabliſhed, and tyrants ſupported in every place. Not a ſingle city was exempted from the name of ſervitude. But let me now paſs on to that laſt action of Antigonus: which, while it is viewed without ſuſpicion, may lead ſome of you perhaps to think, that you

owe an obligation to the Macedonians. Was it then to ſave the Achæan ſtates, that this prince took arms againſt you in the Social War? Or was it to free the Lacedæmonians from the tyranny of Cleomenes? By no means ſurely: it would be too great ſimplicity to ſuppoſe it. But he foreſaw, that, if you ever ſhould obtain the ſupreme command in Peloponneſus, his own kingdom would be expoſed to danger. He had remarked alſo the great talents of Cleomenes; as well as the ſucceſs with which fortune ſeemed to favour your deſigns. It was fear therefore on the one hand, and jealouſy on the other, that urged him to enter Peloponneſus with an army: not to ſuccour the inhabitants of that country; but to deſtroy your expectations, and to humble your growing power. If the Macedonians therefore, when they were maſters of your city, did not ſuffer it to be pillaged; yet you ought not ſo much to love them on account of that kindneſs, as you ought to hate, and to conſider them as your enemies, becauſe they have been upon many occaſions the only obſtacle that prevented you from obtaining the ſovereignty of Greece. With reſpect to the profligacy of the preſent Philip, this alſo is too notorious to need any long diſcuſſion. The ravages which he committed in the temple of Thermum are a ſufficient proof of his impiety towards the Gods: and his perfidious treatment of the Meſſenians his allies, an example no leſs evident of the cruelty of his diſpoſition with reſpect to men. Now the Ætolians alone, of all the Greeks, had the courage openly to defy Antipater; and afford a refuge to thoſe who had been rendered miſerable by his injuſtice. The Ætolians alone oppoſed the invaſion of Brennus and the barbarous Gauls. And laſtly, they alone, of all whom you invited, were willing to aſſiſt you with their arms, in recovering again that ſupreme dominion which your anceſtors had held over the reſt of Greece. But enough has been ſaid upon this ſubject. With regard

to the preſent deliberation, your votes indeed and your decrees muſt import a declaration of war. And yet it is by no means probable, that a war will be the conſequence. For it is not to be ſuppoſed, that the Achæans, weakened as they are by former loſſes, will attempt to invade your territory: but rather, that they will eſteem it as a favour from the Gods, if, when they find themſelves ſurrounded on every ſide by the Eleans and Meſſenians our allies, as well as by our armies, they may be able to preſerve their own. I am perſuaded likewiſe that the ardour of Philip will be at laſt abated; when the Ætolians ſhall attack him upon land, and the Romans and king Attalus upon the ſea. It is eaſy indeed to conjecture what will happen, from that which has already been experienced. For if this prince, when the Ætolians only were his enemies, was never able to ſubdue them; how is it to be imagined that he can maintain a war, in which ſo many different powers are combined againſt him?

Thus then have I endeavoured to ſhew, that, even if you had not been bound by any treaty, and the matter had been ſtill intire, you ought rather to join your arms with the Ætolians, than with the Macedonians. But ſince in fact you already are engaged, and have determined on the part that you would take, what room is there left for any more debate? If indeed the treaty which now ſubſiſts between you and us had been earlier than the kindneſs that was ſhewn towards you by Antigonus; there might then perhaps have been ſome pretence to doubt, whether, in favour of more recent benefits, you ought not to overlook in ſome degree your former obligations. But if, after you had received this ſo much boaſted liberty and ſafety, theſe benefits with which you are continually reproached, you aſſembled your council to deliberate, whether you ſhould enter into an alliance with the Ætolians or the Macedonians; if, after frequent conſultation,

ſultation, you gave the preference to the former; if you confirmed your alliance with them by exchanging mutual pledges of fidelity; and even aſſiſted them with your forces in their late war againſt the Macedonians; what reaſonable doubt can now remain? By theſe tranſactions, your obligations to Antigonus and to Philip all were cancelled. It ſhould therefore now be ſhewn, that, ſince that period, you either have received ſome injury from the Ætolians, or ſome new favour from the Macedonians. But ſince neither of theſe can be pretended, what folly is it to ſuppoſe, that, in violation of oaths and treaties, the very ſtrongeſt bands that unite mankind, you will now become confederates with a people, whoſe alliance you before rejected with juſtice, even when you might have embraced it without reproach."

Here Chlæneas ended his harangue, which ſeemed not eaſy to be refuted. Lyciſcus, the embaſſadour of the Acarnanians, then came forwards in the aſſembly. For ſome time he pauſed; obſerving that the people were diſcourſing together on what they had heard. But as ſoon as they were ſilent, he began in the following manner.

CHAP. II.

"I AM ſent to you, Lacedæmonians, by the ſtates of Acarnania, on the part of that Republick. But as we have been almoſt always joined together with the Macedonians in the ſame common hopes, we conſider this embaſſy alſo as common both to them and to ourſelves. For as, in the time of war, the ſuperior ſtrength and greatneſs of the Macedonian power has made our ſtate to be dependent on the proweſs of their arms; ſo, in the buſineſs of negotiation likewiſe, the intereſts of the Acarnanians are by conſequence included in the Macedonian rights. Yo will not

not therefore think it ſtrange, if a great part of my diſcourſe ſhould be employed on Philip and the Macedonians.

Chlæneas then, in the concluſion of his harangue, very ſhortly ſtated the nature of your preſent obligations. If, ſaid he, ſince the time when you entered into treaty with the Ætolians, you had either ſuffered any injury or inſult from that people, or received any new kindneſs from the Macedonians, this matter would then perhaps have remained intire for your deliberation. But as nothing of that kind has happened, it is the very height of folly in us to believe, that, by alledging only thoſe old benefits which you had before experienced from Antigonus, we can prevail upon you to violate oaths and treaties. For my part indeed, I am ready to confeſs, that, if nothing new had happened, and if the affairs of Greece had remained ſtill in the condition in which they ſtood when you concluded your alliance with the Ætolians, there would be great weakneſs in the attempt; and all that I am prepared to ſay would be impertinent and vain. But if things are now in a different ſtate, as I ſhall ſhew in the progreſs of this diſcourſe, you will then, I doubt not, be convinced, that I am able to point out to you your true intereſt, and that Chlæneas is unacquainted with it. For the ſole deſign and purpoſe of this embaſſy, is to demonſtrate to you, if it be poſſible, from a view of the dangers with which Greece is threatened, that the part moſt ſuitable and advantageous, the part moſt honourable and moſt worthy for you to take, is to join yourſelves now with us in the ſame common hopes: or, if that cannot be obtained, at leaſt to remain quiet during theſe diſputes. But ſince thoſe who oppoſe us have dared to load the houſe of Macedon with various accuſations from the earlieſt time; I muſt alſo firſt look backwards, and endeavour to remove the falſe perſuaſion of thoſe perſons, who may have yielded an implicit credit to all that they have heard.

It was aſſerted then by Chlæneas, that Philip the ſon of Amyntas, having rendered himſelf maſter of Olynthus, took occaſion from that ſucceſs to reduce all Theſſaly beneath his yoke. But I on the contrary affirm, that not the people of Theſſaly alone, but all the reſt of the Greeks were indebted to Philip for their ſafety. For when Onomarchus and Philomelus had taken Delphi, and ſeized with ſacrilegious violence all the treaſures of the God; who does not know, that their power appeared ſo formidable, that not a ſingle ſtate had the courage to ſtand before them: and that it was even feared, that this impious outrage would be ſoon followed alſo by the conqueſt of all Greece? At this time it was, that Philip offered himſelf uncalled; deſtroyed the tyrants; ſecured the temple againſt future inſults; and preſerved the Grecian liberty. That this is the truth, the fact that followed will ſerve as a teſtimony to all poſterity. For the Greeks, not regarding him as the oppreſſor of Theſſaly, as Chlæneas had the confidence to affirm, but as the benefactor of all Greece, conferred an honour upon him which had no example, and with one voice declared him General of their armies both by land and ſea. But Philip alſo invaded the Lacedæmonian territory with an army. Yet you all know, that it was not with any purpoſe of his own that he took this meaſure. But having been invited, and often called upon by name, by his allies and friends in Peloponneſus, he at laſt conſented to it with reluctance. And what was his conduct, Chlæneas, after he arrived? Inſtead of complying with the deſires, inſtead of gratifying the reſentments of the neighbouring ſtates, by waſting the lands, and humbling the power of Sparta, he forced his allies, as well as his enemies, to embrace ſuch meaſures as the common intereſt required, and to ſubmit their ſeveral pretenſions to a fair diſcuſſion. Nor did he even aſſume to himſelf the right of judging in their diſputes: but referred them all to the deciſion of the general

ſtates

ſtates of Greece. How proper a ſubject is this for cenſure. Thus again, you have loaded Alexander with reproaches, becauſe he inflicted that puniſhment upon the Thebans, which their ill conduct ſeemed to have deſerved: but have paſſed over in ſilence, in what manner he revenged the injuries with which the Perſians had inſulted Greece: and that he delivered you all from the greateſt evils, by conquering thoſe barbarians, and by taking from them the riches which they had employed to corrupt the Greeks, and to ſet one ſtate in war againſt another; ſometimes the Athenians againſt the anceſtors of theſe very Lacedæmonians, and ſometimes again, the Thebans; and in a word, that he reduced all Aſia beneath the Grecian yoke? And how is it that you have the confidence to mention likewiſe the ſucceeding princes; who, as conjunctures varied, have been the authors indeed of evil as well as of good to different people. But, whatever reſentment may be allowed upon this account to others, it never can be born that you, the Ætolians, ſhould of all men be ſuffered to complain: you, by whom ſo many have been injured, and who never have been the occaſion of good to any. For who were thoſe, that invited Antigonus the ſon of Demetrius to aſſiſt them in diſſolving the confederacy of the Achæan ſtates? Who entered into treaty with Alexander of Epirus, to ſhare with him the cities of Acarnania, and to ſell the inhabitants as ſlaves? Was it not you? Who ever placed at the head of their armies ſuch Generals as your nation has employed? Men, who dared to plunder even thoſe ſacred temples, which have always been eſteemed to be moſt ſecure from violence. Such was Timæus, who pillaged the temple of Neptune at Tænarum, and that of Diana at Luſſi. Such were Pharycus and Policritus; the firſt of whom ſpoiled the temple of Juno at Argos, and the other that of Neptune in Mantinea. Such alſo were Lattabus and Nicoſtratus; who, with a perfidy equal to that of Gauls or Scythians, at-

tacked the Bœotians in the midſt of peace, when they were met together in their general aſſembly. Have the ſucceſſors of Alexander ever committed outrages like theſe? Being conſcious therefore that ſuch actions can neither be defended nor excuſed, you now pretend to boaſt, that you withſtood the irruption of the Gauls at Delphi, and were the means of preſerving Greece. But if the Greeks owe any thing to the Ætolians on account of that ſingle ſervice, how greatly muſt they be indebted to the Macedonians, who employ continually their whole life and ſtrength, in ſecuring them againſt the efforts of barbarous nations? For who does not know, that Greece would be expoſed to perpetual danger, if the zeal of the Macedonian kings, and the bulwark of their empire, were not our protection. Let me mention only one ſignal inſtance. When the Gauls, after they had defeated Ptolemy ſurnamed Ceraunus, had no longer any cauſe to dread the Macedonians, they deſpiſed all other powers, and immediately led their army, with Brennus at their head, into the very midſt of Greece. The ſame misfortune muſt frequently have happened, if the Macedonians had not in all times been the barrier of this country. Much more might be urged concerning the tranſactions of thoſe ancient times: but this that I have ſaid may be ſufficient. You object impiety to the ſecond Philip, becauſe he deſtroyed a ſingle temple: but make no mention of the ſacrilegious violence, which yourſelves had exerciſed againſt the holy ſhrines in Dium and Dodona, and againſt the edifices of the gods. And yet this ſhould have been firſt recounted. But you, reciting only your own ſufferings, and exaggerating them far beyond the bounds of truth, paſs over in ſilence thoſe much greater evils which you had before inflicted upon others: as well knowing, that, in the judgement of mankind, all ſubſequent injuries are with reaſon aſcribed to thoſe who ſet the firſt example of outrage and injuſtice. With reſpect to the conduct of Anti-

gonus, I ſhall ſo far only mention it, that I may not appear to think too lightly of what was then tranſacted, or to ſet too ſmall a value upon ſo great a ſervice. A greater indeed is ſcarcely to be found in hiſtory. It was in a word an action that can never be ſurpaſſed. For conſider it, Lacedæmonians, as it happened. Antigonus was engaged in war againſt you. He defeated your army in a ſet battle. Your city and all your territory were wholly in his power. It might then have been expected, that he would have uſed all the rights of conqueſt. But ſo far was he from employing againſt you any act of hardſhip or oppreſſion, that on the contrary, beſide other benefits, he drove out your tyrant, and reſtored again thoſe laws and that form of government, which your anceſtors had eſtabliſhed. In return for this great kindneſs, yourſelves alſo publickly proclaimed him your benefactor and your preſerver, in the preſence of all the ſtates of Greece. What then, O Lacedæmonians, ſhould have been your conduct after ſuch an action? Suffer me, I intreat you, to ſpeak my ſentiments with freedom: not for the ſake of loading you with any unſeaſonable reproach; but becauſe the preſent conjuncture obliges me to declare what the common intereſt requires. What is it then that I muſt ſay? That, even in the former war, the Macedonians, and not the Ætolians, were the people with whom you ſhould have joined your arms: and that now again, when you are invited, your alliance ſhould be made with Philip, and not with the Ætolians. But this, it will be ſaid, would be a violation of the faith of treaties. Which then is the greateſt crime? To pay no regard to a convention which you concluded privately with the Ætolians; or to trangreſs a treaty that was ratified in the preſence of all the Greeks; was inſcribed upon a column; and conſecrated with religious rites? And how is it that you are more afraid of ſlighting a people from whom you have received no benefit; than of being wanting in reſpect to

Philip and the Macedonians, to whoſe favour you are indebted even for the power of holding this aſſembly? Can you think it neceſſary that you ſhould ſatisfy your engagements with your friends; and not rather that you ſhould diſcharge your obligations to thoſe who have preſerved you? To obſerve a written treaty is certainly an action not ſo pious, as it is impious to take arms againſt thoſe who have ſaved you from deſtruction. Yet this is what the Ætolians now ſollicit you to do. But I ſhall add no more upon this head. What I have already urged may be thought perhaps, by thoſe who judge according to their prejudices, to be too diſtant from the preſent ſubject. I return therefore to the principles that were firſt aſſumed; and to that which themſelves acknowledge to be the chief point in this debate. That, if the affairs of Greece remain ſtill in the ſame condition in which they ſtood when you concluded your alliance with the Ætolians, you ought to conſider yourſelves as bound by thoſe engagements. But if on the contrary the ſtate of things be intirely changed, you may then with juſtice deliberate freely on the part which you are now preſſed to take. I aſk you then, Cleonicus and Chlæneas; who were then your allies, when you prevailed on the Lacedæmonians to act in conjunction with you? Were they not all Greeks? And with whom are you at this time joined? And into what confederacy do you now invite this people? Is it not into a confederacy with barbarians? Is the condition then of your affairs the ſame as before? Is it not intirely the reverſe? At that time, you contended only for the honour of obtaining the ſupreme command in Greece, againſt others of the ſame race and country; the Achæans, and the Macedonians, with Philip at their head. But the end and tendency of the preſent war is to bring the Greeks themſelves into ſubjection to a foreign enemy. To an enemy, whom in appearance indeed you have invited

only to oppoſe the deſigns of Philip: but whom in fact you have armed, without perceiving it, both againſt yourſelves, and againſt all the inhabitants of Greece. For as it is often ſeen in the time of war, that thoſe who, with a view to their preſent ſafety, admit too ſtrong a garriſon within their walls, at the ſame time that they ſecure themſelves againſt their enemies, become ſubject to the power of their friends; juſt ſo will it happen, from the conduct which the Ætolians now purſue. For, while their deſign is only to weaken Philip, and to humble the power of the Macedonians, they obſerve not that the cloud, which they are drawing hither from the Weſt, though at firſt perhaps it may only darken Macedon, will in its progreſs ſhed the heavieſt evils upon all the Greeks. It is the duty therefore of them all, to foreſee in time the approaching ſtorm: and upon none is this duty more incumbent, than upon you, O Lacedæmonians. For what, do you ſuppoſe, were the ſentiments of your anceſtors, when they thruſt into a well, and threw earth upon the head of the meſſenger that was ſent to them by Xerxes to demand earth and water; and then bade him tell his maſter, that the Lacedæmonians had given him earth and water agreeably to his demand? What again was their intention, when Leonidas and all his army expoſed themſelves by their own free choice to certain death? Was it not to declare, that the Lacedæmonians would ſtand the foremoſt, in maintaining not only their own liberty, but that alſo of all the Greeks? And ſhall now the deſcendants of men like theſe conclude a treaty with a barbarous nation; and join them in making war againſt the Epirots, the Achæans, the Acarnanians, the Bœotians, the Theſſalians; in a word, againſt almoſt every people of Greece, except the Ætolians? Let the Ætolians themſelves commit ſuch baſeneſs; for they are accuſtomed to think no action diſhonourable, that can ſatisfy their deſire of gain. But theſe are not the manners

of

of the Lacedæmonians. And what may it not be expected that the Ætolians will attempt, when joined in an alliance with the Romans: they, who, with the aſſiſtance of the Illyrians only, made an attack upon Pylus from the ſea, in contempt of treaties; and, by land, laid ſiege to Clitor, and carried the inhabitants of Cynætha into ſlavery? Can it be doubted, that, as they before formed the project of ſharing with Antigonus the cities of Acarnania and Achaia, they have now concluded a like agreement with the Romans with reſpect to the whole of Greece? Can any one be warned of ſuch deſigns, and not dread the arrival of the Romans? And muſt we not deteſt that ſenſeleſs profligacy, which has led the Ætolians into this alliance? They have already taken Naxus and Oeniadæ from the Acarnanians. Not long before, they attacked Anticyra in conjunction with the Romans. And when the city was ſubdued, the women and the children were carried away captives by the Romans, and reſerved for all that wretchedneſs, which thoſe who fall into the power of a foreign enemy are condemned to ſuffer; while the Ætolians divided the houſes among themſelves by lot. Is this then an alliance worthy to be approved? Or can the Lacedæmonians, above all others, determine to embrace it? Thoſe Lacedæmonians, who, when the Perſians invaded Greece, reſolved by a publick decree, that, as ſoon as they ſhould have conquered the barbarians, they would devote a tenth part of the Thebans victims to the Gods, becauſe this people alone, though compelled by neceſſity to remain quiet, had taken no part in the war. Conſider therefore, I intreat you, what your own honour, and your own dignity require. Let the remembrance of your anceſtors, your apprehenſion of the power of the Romans, your jealouſy of the pernicious conduct of the Ætolians, and, above the reſt, your ſenſe of the great kindneſs that was ſhewn towards you by Antigonus, prevail with you ſtill to be

be the friends of virtuous actions. In a word, reject all alliance with the Ætolians, and join yourſelves to the Achæans and the Macedonians. Or, if thoſe who poſſeſs the greateſt power among you ſhould obſtruct that meaſure, reſolve to remain quiet in this conjuncture, and make not yourſelves confederates in the unjuſt deſigns of the Ætolians."

EXTRACT the SEVENTH.

The ſiege of Echinus by Philip.

PHILIP, having reſolved to make his approaches againſt Echinus in the part of the two towers, ordered a tortoiſe and a battering-ram to be raiſed before each of them, and a gallery to be conducted from one ram to the other, oppoſite to the ſpace that was between the towers, and parallel to the wall. The work, being completed according to this deſign, was in its form and aſpect not unlike to the city. For as the buildings upon the tortoiſes, from the ſtructure of the hurdles of which they were compoſed, had the figure and appearance of towers; ſo the gallery that was between, being formed into battlements at the top, bore no leſs reſemblance to a wall. In the loweſt part of theſe towers were placed ſome pioneers, who filled up the inequalities of the ground with earth, that the rollers might move freely. Here alſo the motions of the rams were regulated. Upon the ſecond ſtage, together with ſome catapults, there were veſſels filled with water; and other preparations for ſecuring the building againſt fire. Upon the third, which was equal in height to the towers of the city, ſtood a body of ſoldiers, ready to engage with thoſe that ſhould attempt to obſtruct the motions of the rams. From the gallery that was between the towers two trenches were opened, and carried forwards to the wall of the city: and in theſe there were three batteries of baliſtæ; one of which threw ſtones of the weight of a talent, and the other two, ſtones of thirty pounds. From the camp to the towers on either ſide was a covered paſſage; that the ſoldiers might paſs from the army

to

to the works, or return back again from the works to the camp, without being expoſed to the darts of the beſieged. Theſe works were all completed in very few days; becauſe the country afforded all things that were neceſſary for the purpoſe in the greateſt plenty. For Echinus is ſituated upon the Malian gulph, oppoſite to Thronium, and looks towards the ſouth. The ſoil alſo around it is extremely fertile. Philip therefore was readily ſupplied with all things that were requiſite for ſuch an undertaking. And when he had completed his works in the manner that has been now deſcribed, he began without delay to attack the city.

EXTRACT the EIGHTH.

The ſources and courſe of the Euphrates.

THE river Euphrates has its ſources in Armenia; and, flowing from thence through Syria and the neighbouring country, paſſes on to Babylon. It is thought that it diſcharges itſelf at laſt into the Red ſea. But this is not the truth. For it ſpends itſelf in channels which are cut through the country, and is exhauſted before it can reach the ſea. This river is different in two reſpects from almoſt all other rivers. The ſtreams of other rivers are uſually increaſed, in proportion as they flow through a larger tract of country. Their waters alſo are fulleſt in the winter, and loweſt in the height of ſummer. But the Euphrates on the contrary is fulleſt at the time of the riſing of the dog-ſtar; is no where ſo large as in Syria; and in its farther progreſs is continually diminiſhed. The cauſe of this difference is, that the increaſe of its waters is not made by the winter rains, but by the melting of the ſnows in ſummer. And the ſtream as it advances, is diminiſhed, by being turned aſide, and divided into other ſtreams, for the purpoſe of watering the country. From hence alſo it happens, that the tranſportation of armies down the Euphrates is in thoſe parts extremely tedious; the veſſels being ſo deeply loaded, and the river ſo low, that the force of the ſtream affords but little aſſiſtance in the navigation.

THE

THE

GENERAL HISTORY

OF

POLYBIUS.

BOOK the TENTH.

EXTRACT the FIRST.

The advantages of Tarentum with reſpect to commerce.

ALONG that whole ſide of Italy, which looks towards the ſea of Sicily and the coaſts of Greece, though the extent of it, from the ſtraits of Rhegium to Tarentum, be more than two thouſand ſtadia, there is not to be found a ſingle harbour, except that of the laſt mentioned city. But the country itſelf is inhabited by a very numerous people; compoſed partly of barbarians, and partly of ſome of the moſt conſiderable colonies from Greece. Among the former are the Brutians, the Lucanians, a part of the Samnites, the Calabrians, and many other nations. The Grecian cities are Rhegium, Caulonia, Locri, Croton, Metapontum, and Thurium. The merchants therefore that

come from Greece, to trade with any of the people who are ſituated along this coaſt, are obliged to bring their veſſels into the harbour of Tarentum, and to make all their exchange and traffick in that city. It may be judged what great advantages muſt ariſe from ſuch a ſituation, if we conſider only the flouriſhing condition of the inhabitants of Croton. For this people, with the convenience only of ſome places which afford an anchorage in the ſummer, and which cannot be compared in any reſpect with the harbour of Tarentum, though they are viſited but by a very ſmall number of ſhips, have drawn to themſelves great wealth. The advantages alſo of its ſituation, with reſpect to the ports of the Adriatic ſea, are ſtill very conſiderable; though not ſo great as in former times. For before Brunduſium was built, all the veſſels that came from the oppoſite coaſt, which lies between Sipontum and the Iapygian promontory, towards this part of Italy, directed their courſe always to Tarentum, and uſed that city as the market for vending all their merchandiſe. Fabius therefore, conſidering this paſſage as an object of great importance, neglected every other care, and employed all his thoughts to guard it.

EXTRACT the SECOND.

The character of Publius Scipio illuſtrated by ſome of the earlieſt actions of his life. His expedition into Spain. He renders himſelf maſter of New Carthage. Inſtances of his humanity, moderation, and continence.

CHAP. I.

AS I am now going to relate the things that were performed by Publius Scipio in Spain, and to give alſo a ſhort and general account of all the other actions of his life, it will firſt, I think, be neceſſary to lead the reader into ſome acquaintance with the character and the natural diſpoſition of this commander. For as he has ſurpaſſed almoſt all that lived before him in the celebrity of his name, there are ſcarcely any that have not a deſire to know, what manner of man he was; and by what abilities, natural or acquired, he accompliſhed ſo many, and ſuch great exploits. But they are forced either to remain in ignorance, or to form at leaſt a very falſe opinion concerning him, becauſe the writers of his life have themſelves wandered widely from the truth. That this cenſure is not ill grounded, will be manifeſt to every one, who is able to conſider with a juſt attention the account which I ſhall give even of the greateſt and the moſt aſtoniſhing of all his actions.

Theſe writers then have all of them concurred in repreſenting Scipio to us, as one of thoſe favourites of fortune, who by a kind of ſpontaneous hazard, and in ſeeming oppoſition to the rules of reaſon, conduct all their undertakings to the deſired end. They think, that men of this ſort have ſome-

ſomething in them more admirable and more divine, than thoſe who follow the guidance of reaſon in every action. They conſider not, that one of the things here mentioned is barely to be fortunate; and that the other is worthy of praiſe: that the firſt is common even to the moſt vulgar of mankind; while the latter is the portion of thoſe alone who excell in ſenſe and underſtanding: and that theſe laſt are to be regarded as approaching neareſt to divine, and as the higheſt in favour with the Gods.

To me it ſeems, that there is a great reſemblance, both in character and in conduct, between Scipio and Lycurgus, the legiſlator of the Lacedæmonians. For it muſt not be imagined, either that Lycurgus, by ſuperſtitiouſly conſulting upon all occaſions the Pythian prieſteſs, was taught to frame the Spartan government; or that Scipio was directed by dreams and omens to thoſe great actions, which ſo much enlarged the empire of his country. But becauſe they both were ſenſible, that the greateſt part of men are not eaſily engaged in new and unuſual deſigns, and fear to expoſe themſelves to manifeſt danger, unleſs they have ſome reaſon to expect that they ſhall be aſſiſted by the Gods; the firſt, by joining the authority of the Prieſteſs to all that he propoſed, rendered his own deſigns more worthy of credit, and more eaſy to be received; and the other, by cheriſhing an opinion in the multitude, that he was ſupported in all his undertakings by a ſupernatural aid, inſpired thoſe that were under his command with greater confidence, and made them more eager to engage even in the moſt difficult attempts.

That this great commander was conducted in every action by ſound ſenſe and prudence, and that his undertakings always were attended with ſucceſs, becauſe in reaſon they deſerved it, will ſufficiently appear from the facts that will be hereafter mentioned. The generoſity and magnanimity, that were ſo conſpicuous in his character, are indeed acknow-

ledged by all. But the readineſs of his conception, the ſobriety of his judgement, and the extreme attention with which his underſtanding was directed to the object which it had in view, have remained ſtill unknown; or been known to thoſe alone, who lived in friendſhip with him, and had the opportunity of beholding him in the neareſt light. Among thoſe was Caius Lælius: who was a witneſs to all his words and actions from his childhood to his death. And he it was, who firſt raiſed in me that opinion of this General which I now have mentioned. For all that he related to me concerning him was extremely probable, and perfectly conſiſtent with the actions which he performed.

The firſt thing, as he informed me, which diſtinguiſhed Scipio, was his behaviour at the time of the engagement between Annibal and his father with the cavalry near the river Po. He was then but ſeventeen years old: and, becauſe this was his firſt campaign, he was attended by a troop of ſelect horſemen as a guard. In the battle, perceiving that his father with only two or three of the cavalry was incloſed by a large body of the enemy, and was already dangerouſly wounded, he at firſt exhorted his little troop to go to his aſſiſtance. And when theſe for ſome time heſitated, becauſe the numbers that had ſurrounded the Conſul were ſo great, himſelf with the moſt deſperate fury drove his horſe into the middle of the combatants. His attendants alſo being then forced to join him in the charge, the whole body of the enemy was parted by the ſhock: and the Conſul, being thus unexpectedly reſcued from deſtruction, was the firſt to proclaim aloud, that he owed his preſervation to his ſon. As by this action he acquired the reputation of a man whoſe courage was not to be doubted; ſo, in the ſubſequent parts of his life, whenever his country repoſed all her hopes upon him, he was ready to throw himſelf without reſerve into every kind of danger. This ſurely is not the conduct of a man who truſts himſelf

himſelf to fortune; but of a commander who is guided by ſound ſenſe and prudence.

Some time after this action, his elder brother Lucius was a candidate for the Ædileſhip; which is one of the moſt honourable dignities among the Romans. The cuſtom was, to elect two Patricians into this office: and at this time there were many candidates. At firſt Scipio had not the confidence to offer himſelf a candidate for this magiſtracy in conjunction with his brother. But as the time of the election came near, perceiving that the people were not diſpoſed to favour the intereſts of his brother, but that himſelf ſtood very high in their eſteem, he judged that the only way of obtaining the Ædileſhip for his brother would be that both of them ſhould ſue for it together. He employed therefore the following method. As his father was at this time gone to take the command in Spain, the conſent of his mother alone was neceſſary to be gained. Obſerving then, that ſhe was buſied every day in viſiting the temples, and in offering ſacrifices to the gods in favour of his brother; and that her mind was filled with anxious expectation concerning the event; he told her, that he had dreamed the ſame dream twice. That it had ſeemed to him, that he was choſen Ædile with his brother: and that, as they returned home from the Forum together, ſhe had met them at the door, and had embraced and kiſſed them. The female heart was touched in a moment by this ſtory. Oh, ſhe exclaimed, that I might but ſee that day. Do you conſent then, mother, continued he, that we make the trial? And when ſhe replied, that ſhe conſented; not ſuſpecting, as he was then extremely young, that he would have the boldneſs to attempt it; but believing only that he ſpoke in jeſt; he ordered a white gown to be prepared, ſuch as the candidates for offices are accuſtomed to wear. His mother reflected no more on what had paſſed. But Scipio, in the morning while ſhe was aſleep, for the firſt time put

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on the gown, and went into the Forum. The people, ſtruck with the unexpected ſight, and who before had entertained ſtrong prejudices in his favour, received him with acclamations and applauſe. He advanced to the place in which the candidates were ranged; and, ſtanding on the ſide of his brother, obtained not only his own election, but that of his brother alſo in conſideration of himſelf. They then returned home together Ædiles. The news being carried to the mother, ſhe ran full of joy, and meeting them at the door, kiſſed both her ſons with tranſport.

From this accident, an opinion prevailed among all who heard the ſtory of theſe dreams, that Scipio, not only when he was aſleep, but in his waking moments alſo, and in the time of day, held familiar converſe with the gods. It was no dream however, that gave him any aſſiſtance in this buſineſs. But being by nature generous, magnificent, and courteous in his addreſs, he had before conciliated the favour of the multitude. Add to this, that he had alſo the ſkill to chooſe his proper time, both with the people and his mother. By theſe means it was, that he not only obtained his purpoſe; but was judged to have acted under the impulſe of a divine admonition. For it is uſual with men, who, through the fault of their own nature, and from a want either of activity or of ſkill, are unable to view diſtinctly the times, the cauſes, and the courſe of actions, to aſcribe thoſe events to the gods and fortune, which are accompliſhed only by the ready and dexterous management of ſound ſenſe and reaſon. I thought it neceſſary to make theſe reflections, that my readers might not be ſo far miſled by the opinion which is falſely propagated concerning Scipio, as to overlook what was brighteſt and moſt admirable in his character; I mean, his dexterity, and his unwearied application to affairs. In how high a degree he poſſeſſed theſe qualities, will be more clearly

ſeen from the tranſactions of the Hiſtory, to which I now return.

CHAP. II.

SCIPIO, having aſſembled the troops together, exhorted them not to be diſheartened by the loſs which they had ſuſtained. "That their defeat was by no means to be aſcribed to the ſuperior courage of the Carthaginians; but was occaſioned only by the treachery of the Spaniards, and the imprudent diviſion, which the Generals, repoſing too great a confidence in the alliance of that people, had made of their forces. That the Carthaginians themſelves were now in the ſame condition with reſpect to both theſe circumſtances. For, beſides that they were divided into ſeparate camps, they had alſo alienated by injurious treatment the affections of their allies, and had rendered them their enemies. That from hence it had happened, that one part of the Spaniards had already ſent deputies to the Romans: and that the reſt, as ſoon as the Romans ſhould have paſſed the river, would haſten with alacrity to join them; not ſo much indeed from any motive of affection, as from a deſire to revenge the inſults which they had ſuffered from the Carthaginians. That there was ſtill another circumſtance, even of greater moment. That the diſſenſion which prevailed among their leaders, would prevent the enemy from uniting their whole ſtrength in an engagement: and, if they ſhould venture on a battle with divided forces, that they would then moſt eaſily be defeated. That, with all theſe advantages in proſpect, they ſhould now therefore paſs the river with the greateſt confidence; and leave to himſelf, and to the reſt of the commanders, the whole care of what was afterwards to be done."

After this diſcourſe, he left Marcus, who was joined with him in the command, with a body of three thouſand foot and five hundred horſe, to protect the allies that were on this ſide of the Iberus; and then paſſed the river with the reſt of the forces, having concealed from every perſon his true intention. For he had determined not to do any of thoſe things which he had ſuggeſted to the army. His real deſign was ſuddenly to inveſt New Carthage.

And here we may firſt remark a moſt ſignal proof of that peculiar diſpoſition which I have aſcribed to Scipio. For firſt, though he was now no more than twenty-ſeven years old, he took upon himſelf the conduct of a war, which, from the ill ſucceſs that had attended it, all other perſons had concluded to be deſperate. In the next place, when he had engaged himſelf in this deſign, inſtead of purſuing the moſt obvious and common meaſures, he formed a plan of action, which was alike impenetrable to his own army, and unſuſpected by the enemy. And with reſpect to both theſe points, he was determined by the moſt ſolid reaſons. While he was ſtill at Rome, he informed himſelf of the true ſtate of things, by a moſt careful and exact inquiry. And being aſſured, that the treachery only of the Spaniards, and the diviſion of the Roman armies, had occaſioned the misfortune of his father, he neither feared the Carthaginians, nor yielded to that deſpondency with which others were poſſeſſed. When he was afterwards alſo told, that the allies on this ſide of the Iberus remained ſtill conſtant in the Roman friendſhip; that the Carthaginian Generals were broken by diſſenſions; and that they treated the people who had ſubmitted to them with great ſeverity; he ſet out upon the expedition with full confidence of ſucceſs: not building his expectations upon fortune, but upon the views which reaſon had ſuggeſted to him. As ſoon as he arrived in Spain, renewing his inquiries in every part with the greateſt diligence,

he was informed, that the Carthaginian army was divided into three ſeparate bodies. That Mago, at the head of one, was poſted beyond the pillars of Hercules, in the territory of the Conians: that the ſecond, under the command of Aſdrubal the ſon of Geſco, was incamped in Luſitania near the mouth of the river: that the other Aſdrubal, with the third, was laying ſiege to a town in the Carpetanian diſtrict: and that each of theſe different bodies was diſtant full ten days march from the city of New Carthage. He conſidered therefore with himſelf, that, as it would be much too dangerous, both on account of the late defeats, and becauſe the enemy alſo were far ſuperior to him in their numbers, to venture on a ſet engagement againſt their united forces; ſo, on the other hand, if he ſhould attack either of theſe ſeparate bodies, there was reaſon to fear, that, while the body attacked might retire and decline the fight, the reſt alſo would be able to advance: and that, being thus incloſed on every ſide, he ſhould fall into the ſame calamity which had been ſo fatal to his father and his uncle. Upon theſe conſiderations, he rejected the deſign of an engagement, and turned all his thoughts towards New Carthage: a place, which, as he very well knew, brought many advantages to the enemy, as well as great detriment to the Romans, in the progreſs of the war.

For, while he remained in winter quarters, having endeavoured to obtain from the priſoners a minute and particular knowledge of every thing that related to this city, he found, that it was almoſt the only place upon the coaſt of Spain, that afforded a harbour capable of receiving a fleet and naval forces: that it was ſo ſituated, that the Carthaginians might paſs over to it from Afric with the greateſt eaſe: that large ſums of money alſo, and all the baggage of the army were at this time in it; together with all the hoſtages, which the Carthaginians had taken from the cities of

Spain. He learned likewiſe, what was ſtill of greater importance, that the garriſon conſiſted only of a thouſand ſoldiers, appointed to defend the citadel. For it never had been conceived, that, while the Carthaginians were maſters of almoſt the whole of Spain, any attempt would be made to lay ſiege to this city. That the multitude of the other inhabitants indeed was very great: but that they were all artificers, labourers, or ſeamen; deſtitute of all experience in the affairs of war; and who would rather facilitate, than obſtruct, his attempt againſt the city, if he ſhould appear unexpectedly before it. He knew the manner likewiſe in which the city was ſituated; the fortifications by which it was defended; and the nature of the lake that ſurrounded it. For ſome fiſhermen, who frequented the place, had informed him, that the lake in general was marſhy; and that it was alſo fordable, as often as the tide retired; which uſually happened every day near the time of evening. From all theſe circumſtances he concluded, that ſucceſs in this attempt would not only bring a heavy loſs upon the enemy, but tend greatly to advance his own affairs: and that, if he ſhould fail, he might at leaſt be able, as he was maſter of the ſea, to withdraw the troops in ſafety; taking care only to ſecure his camp againſt any inſult. And this it would be eaſy to accompliſh, becauſe the forces of the enemy were at ſo great a diſtance. Laying aſide therefore all other thoughts, he employed himſelf, while he was in winter quarters, in making preparations for the ſiege. And though he had formed ſo great a deſign, and was only of the age that has been mentioned, he concealed his intention from every perſon, except from Caius Lælius, till the time came in which he judged it neceſſary to diſcloſe it.

Now it is generally acknowledged by Hiſtorians, that theſe were the reaſons which determined the conduct of Scipio upon this occaſion. And yet when they have gone thus far, they

they in the end, I know not how, aſcribe the ſucceſs that followed, not to the prudence of the commander, but to the interpoſition of the gods and fortune. But this opinion, as it is deſtitute of all ſupport from probability, or from the teſtimony of thoſe who lived at the time, is refuted alſo by the letters which Scipio himſelf wrote to Philip; in which he expreſsly declares, that in every thing that concerned his expedition into Spain, and more particularly in his reſolution to attack New Carthage, he was determined wholly by thoſe conſiderations which have been here recited. Let us now attend to the ſiege.

CHAP. III.

SCIPIO then, having given ſecret orders to Caius Lælius, who alone, as we have ſaid, was acquainted with his deſign, to ſail to New Carthage with the fleet, began his march with the land forces, and advanced with the greateſt haſte. His army conſiſted of twenty-five thouſand foot, and of two thouſand and five hundred horſe. After ſeven days march, he arrived and incamped on the ſide of the city that looked towards the north. The hinder part of the camp he fortified with a ditch and a double intrenchment, which was drawn from one ſea to the other. The ſide that was towards the city he left without any fortification; becauſe the nature of the place alone ſufficiently ſecured it againſt all inſult. But before we enter into a particular deſcription of the ſiege, it will be proper to give the reader ſome conception of the manner in which the city was ſituated, and the country that was round it.

New Carthage then is ſituated near the middle of the coaſt of Spain, upon a gulph that looks towards the ſouth-weſt, and which contains in length about twenty ſtadia, and about

about ten ſtadia in breadth at the firſt entrance. The whole of this gulph is a perfect harbour. For an iſland, lying at the mouth of it, and which leaves on either ſide a very narrow paſſage, receives all the waves of the ſea: ſo that the gulph remains intirely calm; except only that its waters are ſometimes agitated by the ſouth-weſt winds, blowing through thoſe paſſages. All the other winds are intercepted by the land, which incloſes it on every ſide. In the inmoſt part of the gulph ſtands a mountain in form of a peninſula, upon which the city is built. It is ſurrounded by the ſea, upon the eaſt and ſouth; and, on the weſt, by a lake, which is extended alſo ſo far towards the north, that the reſt of the ſpace, which lies between the lake and the ſea, and which joins the city to the continent, contains only two ſtadia in breadth. The middle part of the city is flat; and has a level approach to it from the ſea, on the ſide towards the ſouth. The other parts are ſurrounded by hills; two of which are very high and rough; and the other three, though much leſs lofty, are full of cavities, and difficult of approach. Of the former two, the largeſt is that which ſtands on the ſide of the eaſt. It extends itſelf into the ſea; and has a temple conſecrated to Æſculapius upon the top. The other is in like manner ſituated, oppoſite to the former, upon the weſt. Upon this laſt is a magnificent and royal palace, which was built by Aſdrubal, when he deſigned, as it is ſaid, to declare himſelf ſovereign of the country. The other three hills, which are of ſmaller ſize, incloſe the city on the ſide towards the north. The firſt of theſe, which ſtands neareſt to the eaſt, has the appellation of Vulcan. The ſecond, that of Aletes; who is ſaid to have obtained divine honours, from having firſt diſcovered the ſilver mines. The third is called the hill of Saturn. For the conveniency of thoſe who uſe the ſea, a communication is made by art between the lake and the ſea. And acroſs the narrow channel, which joins the two together, there

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is alſo a bridge; which ſerves for the paſſage of carriages and beaſts of burthen, as they come loaded with neceſſaries from the country into the city. By this ſituation of the places, the front of the Roman camp was ſecure without any fortification; being covered by the lake and the ſea. Even in the part that was oppoſite to the narrow neck that ran between the lake and the ſea, and which joined the city to the continent, Scipio had neglected to throw up any intrenchment: either becauſe, by thus leaving the very middle of his camp open, he deſigned to intimidate the enemy; or that, when he ſhould be ready to attack the city, he might advance, and return back again to his camp, without any impediment. This city formerly contained not more than twenty ſtadia in circumference. Many writers indeed affirm it to have been forty. But in this they are miſtaken. For my own part, I can ſpeak of this matter with aſſurance. For I take not my account from what I have heard; but have myſelf ſeen and examined the place. At this time the circumference is leſs.

The fleet then being arrived at the proper time, Scipio aſſembled the troops together, and explained to them the reaſons that had determined him to engage in the preſent undertaking, and which were no other than thoſe that have now been mentioned. He ſhewed them, that the enterprize itſelf was practicable. And having enumerated all the advantages which would ariſe to themſelves from this conqueſt, together with the great loſs which the enemy would ſuſtain, he promiſed crowns of gold to thoſe who ſhould firſt mount upon the walls, and the other cuſtomary rewards to all who ſhould perform any ſignal ſervice in the attack. In the end he told them, that the deſign had firſt been ſuggeſted to him by Neptune: who ſtood near him as he ſlept; and promiſed that he would ſo viſibly aſſiſt him in the very time of the action, that the whole army ſhould acknowledge the efficacy of his preſence. The juſtneſs of the reaſons that appeared in this diſcourſe,

diſcourſe, the promiſe of the golden crowns, and, above all the reſt, the expected aſſiſtance of the god, raiſed in all the ſoldiers the higheſt ardour and alacrity.

On the following day, having ſtored the fleet with miſſile weapons of every kind, he ordered Lælius, who commanded it, to preſs the city on the ſide of the ſea. By land, he ſelected two thouſand of the ſtrongeſt ſoldiers, together with the men who carried the ladders, and advanced to the aſſault about the third hour of the day. Mago, who commanded in the city, divided the garriſon of a thouſand men, and, leaving one half in the citadel, drew up the reſt in order of battle upon the hill that ſtood towards the eaſt. He ſtationed alſo two thouſand of the citizens, to whom he had given the arms that were in the city, near the gate that led to the narrow neck which joined the city to the continent, and which was oppoſite to the Roman camp. The reſt of the inhabitants were ordered to aſſiſt with their utmoſt ſtrength, in every part in which the walls ſhould be attacked.

As ſoon as the Roman trumpets had given the ſignal for the aſſault, Mago ordered the two thouſand citizens to advance through the gate; being perſuaded, that he ſhould ſtrike a terror into the enemy, and force them to deſiſt from their deſign. They advance accordingly, and vigorouſly charge the Romans, who were drawn up in battle between their camp and the iſthmus. At firſt the engagement was extremely fierce; and vehement cries were made on either ſide, as the numbers increaſed that came both from the city and from the camp. But the aſſiſtance that was ſent to either ſide was very unequal: the Carthaginian ſuccours coming only through a ſingle gate, and having the length of two ſtadia alſo to paſs; while the Romans on the contrary were near to the place, and poured in their troops from every ſide. For Scipio had deſignedly ranged his forces in battle near to the camp, that he might draw the enemy to a greater diſtance

from the city: as well knowing, that if this body, which was the very ſtrength of the inhabitants, ſhould be once defeated, the whole city would be thrown into ſo great confuſion, that none would afterwards dare to appear without the walls. As the combatants however were all choſen men, the victory remained for ſome time doubtful. But the Carthaginians, unable to ſuſtain the weight of the Romans, who came continually from the camp, were at laſt forced to fly. Many of them fell in the engagement, and in their flight. But the greateſt part were cruſhed, as they entered together in crouds through the gate. The inhabitants, on the ſight of this defeat, were ſo ſtruck with conſternation, that they immediately abandoned the walls: and the Romans, who indeed had almoſt entered the city with thoſe that fled, fixed their ladders in full ſecurity.

In this action Scipio himſelf was preſent; but uſed all the caution that was poſſible, with reſpect to his perſon. For he was attended by three ſoldiers carrying bucklers; who, when any thing was thrown from the walls, joined their bucklers together, and covered him from the danger. Under this protection, moving from ſide to ſide, or placing himſelf upon ſome eminence, he greatly promoted the ſucceſs of the action. For as by this method he ſaw every thing that paſſed, ſo, being ſeen alſo by all the army, he inſpired the combatants with courage. From hence alſo it happened, that nothing that was neceſſary was neglected in the courſe of the engagement: and that whatever the occaſion ſuggeſted to him was immediately carried into execution.

The Romans, who began now to mount the ladders with the greateſt confidence, found much leſs danger in the reſiſtance of the enemy, than from the height of the walls. The difficulties indeed which this alone occaſioned were ſo great, that the beſieged began to reſume their courage. For ſome of the ladders, being of ſo large a ſize as to admit many to aſcend

aſcend together, were broken by the weight. Upon others, the firſt who mounted loſt their ſight upon ſo great a height; and, as ſoon as they were oppoſed by the leaſt reſiſtance, threw themſelves headlong down. When any beams alſo, or other things of the ſame kind, were thrown from the battlements, whole bodies of men were torn away together, and carried to the ground. Theſe difficulties however, though ſo many and ſo great, were none of them ſufficient to reſtrain the ardour and the impetuoſity of the Romans. No ſooner were the firſt thrown down, than thoſe who followed immediately aſcended into the vacant place. But as the day began now to decline, and the ſoldiers were almoſt exhauſted by fatigue, the General ordered the trumpets to ſound the ſignal of retreat.

The beſieged, perſuading themſelves that they had repelled the danger, began to exult with joy. But Scipio, expecting now the time when the ſea would retire, ſtationed five hundred men, together with ladders, upon the border of the lake. At the ſame time he ſelected alſo a body of freſh troops; and, having exhorted them to perform their duty, he ſent them again towards the gate upon the iſthmus, and gave them a greater number of ladders than before, that the whole length of the walls might be attacked. When the ſignal then was made, and the troops began to aſcend the ladders in every part, the inhabitants within were thrown into the greateſt confuſion and diſorder. At the very time when they conceived that they had nothing left to dread, behold a new danger juſt beginning from a new aſſault. Their darts alſo began to fail: and the numbers of men which they had already loſt had ſunk their courage. Their embaraſſment therefore was very great. They defended themſelves however againſt the aſſailants with their utmoſt ſtrength.

While this conteſt was at the height, the tide began to retire, and left only a very ſhallow water upon the upper ſide

of the lake: at the ſame time running through the mouth of it, into the adjoining ſea, with ſuch rapidity and force, that thoſe who were unacquainted with the nature of the thing, regarded it as a kind of miracle. Scipio, who had ſome guides alſo ready, exhorted the troops that were ſelected for this ſervice, to enter the lake, and to fear nothing. For this, among his other talents, was that in which this General principally excelled: the art of inſpiring his troops with courage, and of making them feel all the paſſions which his diſcourſe endeavoured to infuſe. They immediately obeyed his orders; and puſhed their way with eagerneſs through the lake: the whole army being perſuaded, that what they had beheld was undoubtedly the work of ſome divinity. It was now that they remembered what Scipio had ſaid to them in his harangue, concerning the interpoſition of Neptune in their favour. Animated therefore by this perſuaſion, one part of them formed the tortoiſe; and, advancing with impetuoſity to the gate, began to break it with bars and hatchets; while the reſt, as they approached the walls, finding the battlements deſerted, not only fixed their ladders in full ſecurity, but gained alſo the top of the wall without any reſiſtance. For as the beſieged, not having any ſuſpicion that the city ever could be approached on the ſide of the lake, were wholly employed in other parts, and eſpecially near the gate that led to the iſthmus; ſo the cries alſo, and the confuſion, that aroſe from the diſordered multitude, prevented them from hearing or diſcerning any thing that was proper to be done. The Romans ran from ſide to ſide upon the walls, in order to attract the enemy: a kind of ſervice, which the manner in which they are armed enables them to perform with ſingular dexterity. And when they arrived at the gate, they deſcended; and, breaking the bars, gave entrance to thoſe that were without. The body, that had attempted to ſcale the walls on the ſide towards the iſthmus, had now alſo gained the battlements.

battlements. Thus the whole walls were at laſt in the poſſeſſion of the Romans. The hill likewiſe, that ſtood on the eaſtern ſide of the city, was ſeized by a part of thoſe who entered through the gate; and who attacked and routed the Carthaginians that were left to guard it.

As ſoon as a ſufficient number of the troops had entered, Scipio ſent away the greateſt part to deſtroy the inhabitants; commanding them to kill all that they ſhould meet, without ſparing any; and not attempt to pillage, till they ſhould receive the ſignal. Such is the cuſtom among the Romans, when they have taken a city by ſtorm. And their deſign, as I ſuppoſe, is to ſtrike the greater terror. It is common therefore to ſee, not men alone lying ſlaughtered; but dogs alſo cut in two, and other animals divided limb from limb. Upon the preſent occaſion eſpecially, there was much of this kind of carnage, becauſe the numbers that were in the place were great. The General himſelf then marched with a thouſand men to attack the citadel. At his firſt approach, Mago ſeemed determined to make ſome reſiſtance. But when he had conſidered, that the city was intirely in the power of the Romans, he ſent and obtained a promiſe of ſafety for himſelf, and delivered up the citadel. The ſignal being then made, the ſlaughter ceaſed, and the pillage was begun. When night came on, thoſe who had received ſuch orders remained in the camp. The General, with his thouſand men, was lodged in the citadel. The reſt of the ſoldiers, having been called out of the houſes by the Tribunes, were ordered to bring the booty, all of them in their ſeveral cohorts, into the Forum, and to guard it during the night. The light-armed forces were drawn from the camp, and were poſted upon the hill that was on the eaſtern ſide. In this manner the Romans became maſters of the city of New Carthage in Spain.

CHAP.

CHAP. IV.

ON the following day, the baggage of the Carthaginian garriſon, and all that had been taken both from the citizens and the artificers, being collected together in the Forum, was diſtributed by the Tribunes among the reſpective legions, according to the uſual cuſtom of the Romans. The method which this people obſerve, when they have taken a city, is this. They every day ſelect, for the purpoſe of pillage, a certain number of men, or a certain number of cohorts, according to the ſize of the city; taking care always, that not more than half of the forces be employed in this work. The reſt all remain in their ſeveral poſts; either within, or without the city, as occaſion requires. As their armies uſually are compoſed of two Roman legions with an equal number of allies, and ſometimes, though but rarely, of four legions; the men, who are employed in pillaging, bring all the booty, each of them to his reſpective legion. A ſale is then made of all that has been taken; and the money divided by the Tribunes into equal ſhares, which are allotted to all alike: not only to thoſe who were ſtationed under arms in the ſeveral poſts; but to thoſe that were left in the camp; to the ſick likewiſe; and even to thoſe that had been ſent away from the camp upon any diſtant ſervice. And that no part of the plunder may be concealed, the ſoldiers, before they begin to march, and at the time of their firſt incampment, are obliged to ſwear, that whatever they ſhall take from the enemy they will bring faithfully to the camp: as we have already more particularly mentioned, in our diſcourſe on the Roman government. Now by this precaution, of employing one half of the army only in the pillage, while the reſt remain

main under arms in the ſeveral poſts, the Romans are ſecured from any danger that might happen to them from the greedineſs of the ſoldiers. For as the hope of having a ſhare in the booty is never loſt to any of the troops; but remains as certain to thoſe who are fixed in the ſeveral poſts, as to thoſe who are employed in pillaging; every man remains quiet in his ſtation: whereas, among other nations, a contrary method is frequently attended with very fatal conſequences. So powerful is the deſire of gain, that in general it is this alone which encourages men to ſuffer hardſhips, or to throw themſelves into dangers. When occaſions therefore of this kind ariſe, it is not to be ſuppoſed, that thoſe who are left in the camp, or ſtationed in any poſt, will contentedly forego the opportunity that is offered; if every man, as the cuſtom is in almoſt all other armies, be allowed to retain the booty which he takes. For though a prince perhaps, or a General, may at ſuch times give the ſtricteſt orders for bringing all the ſpoil together into a common heap; yet, whatever the ſoldiers are able to conceal, they are accuſtomed to conſider as their own. And while they all purſue this object with an ardour which it is not poſſible to reſtrain, the ſafety of the whole is often brought into the greateſt danger. Very frequently it has been ſeen, that commanders, when they have ſucceeded in their firſt deſign, and have either taken a city, or forced their way into the camp of the enemy, have, from this ſingle cauſe alone, not only loſt all the fruits of their victory, but even ſuffered an intire defeat. There is nothing therefore that more deſerves the foreſight and attention of the leader of an army, than to make ſuch proviſion, that all the troops may be aſſured of obtaining an equal ſhare of the plunder upon theſe occaſions.

While the Tribunes were employed in making a diſtribution of the ſpoil, the General, having ordered all the priſoners

ſoners, who were not much fewer than ten thouſand men, to be brought before him, divided them into two ſeparate bodies. In the firſt were the free citizens, together with their wives and children: and the artificers of the city in the other. Having exhorted the former to embrace the friendſhip of the Romans, and to bear in remembrance the favour which they now received, he diſmiſſed them to their ſeveral habitations. A deliverance ſo unexpected melted them into tears of joy. They proſtrated themſelves before him, and retired. He then told the artificers, that for the preſent they were the publick ſlaves of the Roman people: but that, if they would ſhew an affection towards this people, and ſerve them with alacrity in their reſpective trades, they might be aſſured of obtaining their freedom, as ſoon as the war with Carthage ſhould be brought to a happy end. He then ordered them to be enrolled by the Quæſtor; and having divided them into bands of thirty men, appointed a Roman to take the charge of every band. The whole number amounted to about two thouſand men. From the reſt of the priſoners he ſelected thoſe that were in the vigour of their age, and of the ſtrongeſt bodies, and joining them to his naval forces, ſo that the whole now conſiſted of a half part more than double the former number, he not only furniſhed the ſhips that had been taken from the enemy, but allotted to every veſſel in the fleet almoſt twice as many ſeamen as they had before. For the veſſels that were taken were eighteen in number; and his own fleet conſiſted of thirty-five. To theſe men likewiſe, upon condition that they would only diſcharge their duty with diligence and zeal, he gave the ſame aſſurance of their freedom, as ſoon as the Carthaginians ſhould be conquered. In this manner, by his indulgent treatment, he intirely gained the confidence of the citizens, and ſecured their affection both to himſelf and to the common cauſe. The artificers, encouraged by the hopes

of

of freedom, applied themſelves to their work with the greateſt chearfulneſs. And the fleet, by the prudent diſpoſition which he made, was increaſed in the proportion that has been mentioned.

When this buſineſs was finiſhed, he ſeparated Mago, and the other Carthaginians that were of rank, from the reſt. For among thoſe that were taken, there were two that were of the council of the Ancients, and fifteen of the Senate. All theſe he committed to the care of Lælius; and ordered them to be treated with particular attention. He then commanded all the hoſtages, who were in number more than three hundred, to be brought before him. And calling the children to him one by one, he careſſed and ſoothed them; telling them, that in a ſhort time they ſhould ſee their parents. The reſt he ordered to write to their ſeveral cities, that they were ſafe and well; and that they ſhould ſoon be permitted to return to their reſpective habitations, if their friends would only conſent to embrace the alliance of the Romans. With theſe words, having before ſelected from the ſpoil what was moſt proper for his deſign, he preſented all of them with ſuch ornaments as were ſuitable to their ſex and age. To the girls he gave bracelets and little pictures; and ſwords and poniards to the young men and boys.

At this time, one of the female captives, the wife of Mandonius, who was the brother of Andobalis king of the Ilergetes, fell at his feet, and intreated him with tears to give ſuch orders concerning the women that were priſoners, that they might obtain more decent treatment than they had experienced from the Carthaginians. Scipio was moved at this ſight: for the woman was advanced in years, and had ſomething venerable in her appearance. He aſked her therefore, whether they were in want of any neceſſaries. And when ſhe made no anſwer, he ordered thoſe that were appointed to take care of the women to be called; and was

told by them, that the Carthaginians had always furniſhed them with neceſſaries in the greateſt plenty. But as ſhe ſtill embraced his knees, and continued to repeat the ſame requeſt, Scipio, being more perplexed, and ſuſpecting that the men had told him an untruth, and had undoubtedly been negligent in their charge, bade her and the reſt of the women take courage; and aſſured them, that he would appoint other perſons, who ſhould take care that they ſhould be in want of nothing. You underſtand not our requeſt, replied the woman after a little ſilence, if you think that we are thus importunate with you for the ſake of meat and drink. In a moment Scipio underſtood her meaning: and, when he ſaw before him the daughters of Andobalis, and of many other princes, all in the flower of their age, he was unable to refrain from tears. The whole diſtreſs of their condition was diſcloſed to him by a ſingle word. He ſignified therefore to the woman, that he now knew perfectly what ſhe intended: and taking her by the hand, he again bade her to take courage, and all the reſt that were with her: aſſuring them, that he would be no leſs careful of them, than if they were his own ſiſters or his daughters; and that he would give them in charge to perſons of approved fidelity, whoſe behaviour ſhould agree with this aſſurance.

After this, he delivered to the Quæſtors all the publick money that had been taken from the Carthaginians. The amount of it was more than ſix hundred talents. He had brought alſo with him from Rome four hundred: ſo that, with both ſums together, he had now more than a thouſand talents, to defray the expences of the war.

About the ſame time alſo it was, that ſome young ſoldiers, having found a virgin of a moſt uncommon bloom and beauty, and knowing that Scipio was inclined to the love of women, brought and placed her before him, and intreated him to receive her as a preſent. Scipio was ſtruck

with the ſight; and, having expreſſed his admiration of her beauty, "If I were a private man, ſaid he, you could not have offered to me a more acceptable preſent; but, in the ſtation in which I now am placed, it is quite otherwiſe." Intimating, as I ſuppoſe, by this diſcourſe, that, in the hours of leiſure and repoſe, young men may ſometimes agreeably amuſe themſelves with theſe enjoyments; but that, in ſeaſons of buſineſs, the activity both of the mind and body is too much obſtructed by ſuch indulgence. He therefore thanked the ſoldiers; and having called the father of the virgin, he delivered her into his hands, and exhorted him to marry her to any one of her own citizens whom he ſhould chooſe. By this inſtance of his continence and moderation, the character of Scipio was raiſed high in the opinion of all who were under his command.

When he had thus regulated all things, and committed the reſt of the priſoners to the care of the Tribunes, he ſent Lælius, with the Carthaginians, and ſome others of the moſt eminent rank that were taken, in a Quinquereme to Rome, to carry the news of this ſucceſs. For he very well knew, that as the affairs of Spain had been conſidered as almoſt deſperate, an account of this important conqueſt could not fail to infuſe new courage into the people, and engage them to apply themſelves with much greater earneſtneſs to the buſineſs of the war. With reſpect to himſelf, remaining for ſome time in New Carthage, he exerciſed continually the naval forces; and inſtructed the Tribunes alſo to exerciſe the land army in the following manner.

On the firſt day, the legions were commanded to run the ſpace of thirty ſtadia with their arms. On the ſecond, to ſcour and brighten their arms, and to examine in open view their whole armour. The third day was allotted to relaxation and repoſe. On the fourth, they fought together, with wooden ſwords caſed with leather, and guarded with a button at the

end; and threw javelins, which were covered alſo with a button. On the fifth day, they returned again to the ſame courſe of running with which they had begun.

He employed alſo a principal part of his attention upon the artificers; that the arms might be finiſhed in the completeſt manner, both for the exerciſes in the field, and for real ſervice. With this view, he not only appointed ſkilful men to regulate the workmen, as we have already mentioned; but himſelf went every day among them, and ſaw that they were ſupplied with neceſſaries. And thus, while the legions were exerciſing themſelves continually before the walls, and the naval forces upon the ſea contending together in rowing and in mock engagements; while the workmen in the city were ſharpening weapons, or labouring in braſs and wood; and, in a word, while all without exception were employed in preparing arms; whoever had beheld the ſight, might have obſerved in the words of Xenophon, that this city was in truth the very workingſhop of war. When all things ſeemed at laſt to be in the condition which he deſired, and the troops were perfect in their exerciſe; having ſecured the city alſo by placing guards, and making the fortifications that were neceſſary, he put both the army and the fleet in motion, and began his march towards Taraco, carrying the hoſtages alſo with him.

The motions which Scipio judged to be moſt uſeful for the cavalry upon all occaſions, and in which he commanded them to be exerciſed, were theſe. To turn every man ſingly his horſe to the left, and again to the right, and then to make him fall back. With reſpect to whole troops, they were alſo taught to turn to one ſide at once, and to recover again their firſt poſition: to turn their backs to the enemy in two motions, and to face about again in three: to make little bodies of ten, or of twenty men, go off with ſpeed from the wings, or ſometimes from the centre; and return again to their place in

in the main body without breaking their ranks: to extend themſelves upon the wings, in order to prevent the camp from being attacked, or to cover the rear of the army. The breaking of the whole body into looſe and ſeparate bands, was a thing which he thought deſerved but little attention; becauſe it was nothing more than the order into which troops would naturally fall upon a march. In the laſt place, they were inſtructed ſo to advance againſt the enemy, or to retire again, in all the different movements, that, even when running with full ſpeed, they might keep their ranks intire, and preſerve the ſame diſtance between the troops. For his opinion was, that nothing was more dangerous or fatal, than for a body of cavalry to charge with diſordered ranks.

When he had communicated theſe inſtructions to the officers and ſoldiers, he afterwards went round to the ſeveral cities, and examined, in the firſt place, whether the men comprehended his plan of diſcipline; and ſecondly, whether thoſe who commanded in the cities were clear and perfect in their manner of teaching it. For he judged that the ſucceſs of this new method would principally depend upon the ſkill of the particular commanders. As ſoon as every thing was perfected, he drew out all the cavalry from the cities to one place; and himſelf directed them in all the movements, and made them perform the whole exerciſe in his preſence. Nor did he, upon this occaſion, take his ſtation at the head of all the troops, as the Generals of this age are accuſtomed to do; imagining that the foremoſt place is the proper place for a commander. But in truth they both ſhew a want of judgement, and bring much diſadvantage upon the ſervice itſelf, by chooſing a poſt, in which, while they are ſeen by every one, they can themſelves ſee nothing. For the buſineſs in queſtion, at ſuch a time, is not to diſplay the power and dignity of the commander, but to ſhew ability and ſkill; to attend to the ſoldiers in all their movements; and, for this purpoſe, to be

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ſometimes at the head, ſometimes again in the rear of all, and ſometimes in the centre. It was thus that Scipio acted. He rode from rank to rank, and ſaw all the troops himſelf. He inſtructed thoſe that were leſs ready; and corrected in the beginning whatever was amiſs. But as ſo great attention had been uſed before in exerciſing each particular body, the miſtakes that now appeared were very few and inconſiderable. For this indeed, as Demetrius Phalereus has very juſtly obſerved, is the only method than can render a body of troops perfect in their diſcipline. As a building, ſays this writer, will be firm and ſolid, if every ſcantling, and every joint, and each ſingle apartment, has been diſpoſed and finiſhed with the neceſſary care; ſo an army likewiſe will have its proper ſtrength, when every troop, and every ſoldier, have firſt been ſeparately trained, and rendered perfect in their duty.

EXTRACT the THIRD.

An obſervation on the policy of the Romans with reſpect to Greece.

THE preſent ſtate of things very much reſembled, it was ſaid, the diſpoſition of an army drawn up in battle. Upon ſuch occaſions, the light-armed and moſt active of the troops are placed always in front, and are the firſt attacked: but the event of the battle is decided by the phalanx of heavy forces that ſtand behind them. In the ſame manner the Ætolians, and the people of Peloponneſus their allies, are now firſt expoſed to danger; while the Romans, like the phalanx, keep themſelves in reſerve. If the firſt ſhould be defeated, the latter will withdraw themſelves in ſafety from the fray. But if they ſhould be victorious, which the gods avert, the Romans will then be able to ſubdue, not only the Ætolians, but all the reſt alſo of the people of Greece.

EXTRACT the FOURTH.

A deſcription of Ecbatana, the capital city of Media. The expedition of Antiochus againſt Arſaces.

MEDIA is the moſt powerful of all the kingdoms of Aſia; whether we conſider the extent of the country, or the numbers and goodneſs of the men, and alſo of the horſes, which are there produced. For theſe animals are found in it in ſo great plenty, that almoſt all the reſt of Aſia is ſupplied with them from this province. It is here alſo that the royal horſes are always fed, on account of the excellence of the paſture. The whole borders of the province are covered with Grecian cities; which were built as a check upon the neighbouring barbarians, after the country had been ſubdued by Alexander. Ecbatana only is not one of theſe. This city ſtands on the north ſide of Media, and commands all that part of Aſia which lies along the Mœotis and the Euxine ſea. It was, even from the moſt ancient times, the ſeat of the royal reſidence: and ſeems, in ſplendour and magnificence, very greatly to have exceeded all other cities. It is built on the declivity of the mountain Orontes; and not incloſed with any walls. But there is a citadel in it, the fortifications of which are of moſt wonderful ſtrength: and below the citadel ſtands the palace of the Perſian kings. With reſpect to other particulars, I am in doubt whether I ſhould ſpeak, or be intirely ſilent. To thoſe who love exaggeration, and to ſtrike their readers with ſomething wonderful in their deſcriptions, this city would afford ample matter for ſuch digreſſion. But others, who go not without great diffidence into things that exceed the common apprehenſion, will, for

this very reaſon, be the more perplexed. Thus much however I ſhall ſay. The palace contained ſeven ſtadia in circumference. And the magnificence of the ſtructure in every part was ſuch as muſt have raiſed a very high opinion of the wealth and power of thoſe who built it. For though the wood was all of cedar, or of cypreſs, no part of it was left naked: but the beams, the roofs, and the pillars that ſupported the porticoes and periſtyles, were all covered, ſome with plates of ſilver, and ſome of gold. The tiles likewiſe were all of ſilver. The greateſt part of theſe riches was carried away by the Macedonians who attended Alexander: and the reſt was pillaged in the reigns of Antigonus and Seleucus. At this time however, when Antiochus arrived, there were ſtill remaining in the temple of Æna ſome pillars caſed with gold, and a large quantity of ſilver tiles laid together in a heap. There were alſo ſome few wedges of gold, and a much greater number of ſilver. Theſe were now coined into money with the royal ſtamp; and amounted to the ſum of almoſt four thouſand talents.

Arſaces had expected, that Antiochus would advance as far as to this city; but was perſuaded, that he never would attempt to lead ſo great an army through the deſart that was beyond it: eſpecially becauſe he could not fail of being in great want of water. For, in theſe parts, no water is ever ſeen above the ſurface of the ground. But, through the whole of the deſert, there are many ſubterraneous wells and ſtreams, which are known only to thoſe who are acquainted with the country. The account which the inhabitants give of theſe is true. That the Perſians, when they were maſters of this part of Aſia, gave to thoſe who brought a ſtream of water into places in which there was none before, the free inheritance of the ground for five generations: and that the natives, encouraged by this advantage, ſpared no labour or expence, to bring the water, which falls from mount Caucaſus

in many large ſtreams, through ſubterraneous channels to a very great diſtance; ſo that, in the preſent times, thoſe who uſe the waters know not the beginning, nor the courſe, of the channels through which they flow. When Arſaces ſaw however, that the king had determined to paſs through the deſert, he ordered the wells to be broken and filled up. But Antiochus, being informed of this deſign, ſent away Nicomedes with a thouſand horſe; who, finding on his arrival that Arſaces had retreated, and that a ſmall body of cavalry only was employed in ſtopping the mouths of the ſtreams, forced them to fly upon his firſt approach, and returned back again to Antiochus.

The king, having paſſed the deſert, arrived at Hecatompylus; a city ſituated in the middle of the Parthian territory, and which takes its name from the great number of roads which lead from it into all the neighbouring parts. In this place he allowed the army ſome time to reſt. And when he had conſidered with himſelf, that, if Arſaces had been inclined to venture on a battle, he never would have left his country, or have looked for any ground more proper for his own army than that which lay round Hecatompylus; and that it was evident from his retreat that he had no ſuch deſign; he reſolved to advance into Hyrcania. Arriving at Tagæ, and being informed by the inhabitants, that the whole way leading to the ſummit of the mountain Labutas, which overlooked Hyrcania, was extremely difficult, and that great numbers of barbarians alſo had already poſſeſſed themſelves of all the paſſes; he divided his light-armed forces into many little bodies, and ſent them away under different leaders, aſſigning to each the route which they ſhould take. The pioneers of the army were ſeparated alſo into little bands; and were ordered to attend the light-armed troops, and, in every part, as they arrived, to make the aſcent practicable for the heavy forces, and the beaſts that were loaded with the baggage.

When

When he had made this diſpoſition, he gave to Diogenes the van of the army; which was compoſed of archers and ſlingers, and thoſe mountaineers, who are very ſkilful in throwing darts or ſtones; and who, not keeping any rank, but engaging man with man, as time and place may require, perform the greateſt ſervice in ſuch difficult paſſes. Next to theſe marched a body of two thouſand Cretans, armed with bucklers, and led by Polyxenidas of Rhodes. And in the rear of all were the heavy forces, under the command of Nicomedes of Cos, and Nicolaus an Ætolian.

As the army advanced, the way was found to be much more rough and difficult, than it had been before conceived. For as the whole length of the aſcent was not leſs than three hundred ſtadia; ſo the greateſt part of the way alſo was through a deep and hollow road, formed by the winter torrents, and filled with trees and fragments of rocks which had fallen from the mountains that hung over it. The barbarians likewiſe not only had increaſed theſe difficulties, by laying trees together in heaps, and ſtones of the largeſt ſize; but had ſpread themſelves upon all the eminences that were moſt proper for their purpoſe, along the whole border of the road. And indeed if they had not wholly been miſtaken in their judgement, the king muſt have been forced to deſiſt from his deſign. For having perſuaded themſelves, that the whole army muſt neceſſarily paſs along this road, they had taken the meaſures that were moſt agreeable to this perſuaſion, and ſecured the poſts that were moſt proper for defending the paſſage. But they never had conſidered, that, though the baggage and the heavy forces muſt paſs indeed along this way, becauſe it was not poſſible for them to aſcend the neighbouring mountains, yet the light-armed troops might advance along the very ſummit of the rocks. No ſooner therefore was the firſt of their poſts attacked, than the whole face of things was intirely changed. For Diogenes,

perceiving in the very firſt conflict what was neceſſary to be done, led his troops out of the hollow way, and having gained the heights that were above the enemy, galled them with darts and ſtones. The ſtones eſpecially, that were diſcharged by the ſlingers from a conſiderable diſtance, ſpread among them ſo great diſorder, that they were forced to abandon their poſt. The pioneers then cleared the ground in full ſecurity: and as the number of them was great, this taſk was ſoon accompliſhed. And thus, as the archers and ſlingers, with the reſt of the light-armed troops, ſtill continued to advance; ſometimes ſpreading themſelves along the ſides of the rocks, and ſometimes uniting in a body, and ſeizing all the advantageous poſts; while the Cretans, as a reſerve, marched ſlowly and in good order through the hollow road; the barbarians, unable to ſuſtain theſe different attacks, abandoned their ſeveral ſtations, and retreated together to the top of the mountain. In this manner Antiochus at laſt conducted his army through the paſſes, though very ſlowly, and with great difficulty: for he had ſcarcely gained upon the eighth day the ſummit of the mountain. As the enemy had aſſembled all their forces together in this place, and were perſuaded that they ſhould ſtill compel him to deſiſt from his deſign, a new and fierce battle enſued. But the barbarians were defeated in the following manner. They had formed themſelves into a cloſe body, and maintained the fight with courage againſt the heavy forces that attacked them in front; when they perceived that the light-armed troops, having made a circuit in the night, had poſſeſſed themſelves of the eminences in their rear. At this ſight they were ſtruck with terror, and began to fly with great precipitation. The king would not ſuffer them to be purſued, but ordered the trumpets to ſound a retreat; that he might deſcend with all his army, in good order, into Hyrcania. Having regulated his march as he deſired, he ar-

rived at Tambracus; a city not incloſed with walls; but of great extent, and in which there was alſo a royal palace. In this place he incamped: and being informed that the greateſt part of the routed army, together with many of the neighbouring people, had retired to Syrinx; which was at no great diſtance from Tambracus, and, on account both of its ſtrength and ſituation, was conſidered as the capital of all Hyrcania; he reſolved to make himſelf maſter of that city. Advancing therefore with his army, he extended his forces round it, and began the ſiege. The chief part of his labour was employed in preparing tortoiſes, for the purpoſe of filling up the intrenchments. For the city was ſurrounded by three ditches; each of which contained not leſs than thirty cubits in breadth, and fifteen in depth. Upon the top of each was a double paliſade: and beyond them a ſtrong wall. It was here that continual combats paſſed without any intermiſſion: ſo that neither the beſiegers nor the beſieged were able to remove the wounded and the dead. For they not only fought above the ground; but often met together in the mines which they had digged below. By the activity however of the king, as well as from the number of the troops employed, the ditches were in a ſhort time filled, and the wall fell in the part that was undermined. The barbarians, unable any longer to make reſiſtance, killed all the Greeks that were in the place; and, having pillaged the city of all the goods that were of greateſt value, endeavoured to eſcape by night. But Antiochus, being informed of their retreat, ordered Hyperbaſis to purſue them with the mercenaries. The barbarians, upon the firſt approach of theſe troops, threw away their baggage, and fled back into the city. And when they found that the heavy-armed forces had alſo entered the city through the breach, they deſpaired of any farther means of ſafety, and ſurrendered themſelves to the king.

EXTRACT the FIFTH.

The Conſuls Marcellus and Criſpinus are loſt through their own imprudence. Reflections of the Hiſtorian upon this event.

THE Conſuls, Claudius Marcellus and Criſpinus, being deſirous to take a perfect view of thoſe parts of the hill that looked towards the camp of the enemy, ordered the reſt of the army to remain within the intrenchment, and, attended only by two troops of horſe, ſome light-armed, and about thirty lictors, advanced to examine the ground. It happened, that ſome of the Numidians, who were accuſtomed to wait in ambuſcade, and to attack by ſurprize thoſe who came out to ſkirmiſh, or upon any occaſion advanced from the Roman camp, had at this very time concealed themſelves, lying cloſe under the foot of the hill. As ſoon then as their ſcout gave notice by a ſignal, that ſome of the enemy were above them, they roſe from their place, and, winding along the ſides of the hill, intercepted the Conſuls, and cut off their return to the camp. The Conſul Claudius, and ſome others, were killed in the firſt onſet: and the reſt, being wounded, directed their flight by different ways among the precipices. The ſon of Claudius, who was alſo wounded, very unexpectedly eſcaped, and with great difficulty. The Romans from their camp ſaw diſtinctly every thing that paſſed, but were not able to ſend any aſſiſtance. For while they cried aloud, and were ſtruck with conſternation at what had happened; while ſome bridled their horſes, and others prepared their arms, the action was intirely finiſhed. Thus was Marcellus loſt through

his own ſimplicity, and by not attending to the proper duty of a General.

I have often been forced, in the courſe of this Hiſtory, to make ſome reflection upon faults like theſe. For, among all into which the leaders of armies are betrayed, there is none more frequent: nor any on the other hand that affords a clearer proof of ignorance. What good indeed can be expected from a man, who knows not that the commander of an army ſhould keep himſelf, as much as it is poſſible, out of little combats, which decide nothing with reſpect to the whole: and that, if ever any occaſion ſhould oblige him to take a part in ſuch engagements, he ought to ſee many fall, before the danger be ſuffered to approach himſelf? Let the baſe Carian riſk his life, as the proverb expreſſes it, and not the General. To ſay afterwards, I did not think it; and, who could have expected ſuch an accident; is in my judgement the ſtrongeſt proof that a General can give of his want of capacity and ſenſe. I cannot therefore but conſider Annibal, who was indeed in many other reſpects an excellent commander, as moſt particularly admirable upon this account: that in all the long time which he paſſed in a hoſtile country, amidſt much variety of fortune, and in the courſe of ſo many and ſo great battles, though upon many occaſions he ſurpriſed the enemy, he never was himſelf ſurpriſed. So great was the prudence with which he provided always for the ſafety of his own perſon. And ſurely nothing is more commendable than ſuch precaution. For though an army may have ſuffered an intire defeat, yet, if the General be unhurt and ſafe, many favourable occaſions may ariſe, for repairing the loſs that has been ſuſtained. But when he, who is as the pilot in a veſſel, falls; the army, though ſuperior perhaps in the action to the enemy, cannot draw any advantage even from victory; becauſe the hopes of every man are all centered in the leader.

leader. Let this then ſerve as a caution to thoſe commanders, who through oſtentation, youthful folly, a want of experience, or a contempt of the enemy, are apt to fall into ſuch abſurdity of conduct. For to one or other of theſe cauſes misfortunes like that which has now been mentioned muſt always be aſcribed.

EXTRACT the SIXTH.

The conduct of Scipio in Spain. He is joined by Mandonius and Andobalis: defeats Asdrubal in battle; and forces him to leave the country. He rejects the title of king, which was offered to him by the Spaniards.

CHAP. I.

WHILE Scipio remained in winter quarters at Taraco, as we before have mentioned, he endeavoured to ſecure the confidence and friendſhip of the Spaniards, by delivering to them the ſeveral hoſtages which had fallen into his power. An accident happened, which greatly aſſiſted him in this deſign. Edeco, a powerful prince in the country, no ſooner heard that the Romans were become maſters of New Carthage, and that his wife and children were in their hands, than he conſidered with himſelf, that it was highly probable that the Spaniards would in no long time revolt, and join the conquerours. He reſolved therefore to ſet the firſt example of this change: being perſuaded, that by ſuch a meaſure he not only ſhould recover again his wife and children, but appear alſo to have embraced the friendſhip of the Romans, not through neceſſity, but by choice. Nor was he indeed diſappointed in his hopes. As ſoon as the armies were fixed in winter quarters, he came to Taraco, with ſome of the neareſt of his friends: and, being admitted into the preſence of Scipio, "he thanked the gods, he ſaid, who had permitted him to be the firſt in coming to him, of all the princes of the country. That others indeed extended their hands towards the Romans; but ſtill turned their eyes towards the

Carthaginians, and held a correſpondence with them. But that he, on the contrary, was ready to ſurrender without reſerve, not only himſelf, but his kindred alſo and friends, to the Romans. That, if Scipio would conſider him as an ally and friend, he might draw from ſuch compliance many great advantages, both now and in future times. That, with reſpect to the preſent, the reſt of the Spaniards, as ſoon as they ſhould find that he was treated as a friend, and had obtained what he deſired, would haſten to follow his example; with the hopes of recovering again their families, and of being received into the ſame alliance. And that hereafter likewiſe, poſſeſſed as they would be with a ſenſe of ſo great an honour as well as kindneſs, they would be ready to aſſiſt him without reſerve in all the operations of the war. He intreated him therefore to reſtore to him his wife and children; to conſider him as his friend; and to ſuffer him to return with that denomination to his own country; till ſome occaſion ſhould ariſe, in which he might ſhew in the moſt effectual manner the ſincerity of his own attachment, as well as that of his friends, both to Scipio himſelf, and to all the intereſts of the Romans."

Here he ended his diſcourſe. Scipio, who long before had viewed the thing in this very light, and had reaſoned upon it with himſelf in the ſame manner as Edeco had done, immediately reſtored his wife and children, and gave him an aſſurance of his friendſhip. And when, in the courſe of many converſations which they afterwards held together, he had inſinuated himſelf by various methods into the heart of the Spaniard, and had raiſed alſo in all his friends great expectations of future honour and advantage, he ſent them back to their own country. The report of this tranſaction being ſoon noiſed abroad, all the Spaniards that lived on that ſide of the Iberus, and who before were enemies of the Romans, immediately with one conſent embraced their party. When the

the ſucceſs of this meaſure had ſo fully anſwered all his expectations, Scipio, having now no enemy upon the ſea, diſbanded his naval forces; and, ſelecting the ableſt of the men, diſtributed them among the companies, and increaſed his land army.

CHAP. II.

MANDONIUS and Andobalis were two of the moſt powerful among the princes in Spain; and had always been conſidered as the firmeſt friends of the Carthaginians. But they long had harboured a ſecret diſſatisfaction in their minds, becauſe Aſdrubal, on pretence that he ſuſpected their fidelity, had demanded their wives and children as hoſtages, together with a large ſum in money, as we have already related. Conceiving therefore the preſent opportunity to be moſt favourable for carrying into execution the deſign which they had from that time meditated, they withdrew their troops from the Carthaginian camp by night, and retired to ſome fortified poſts, in which they were ſecure from being attacked. This revolt was followed alſo by that of many others of the Spaniards; who for a long time had ſupported with great pain the haughtineſs of the Carthaginians; and were ready to ſeize the firſt occaſion that was offered to declare their real inclinations.

Examples of the ſame kind have been indeed extremely frequent. It is a great thing undoubtedly to obtain ſucceſs in action, and to defeat an enemy in the field. But, as we have often taken occaſion to obſerve, it requires much greater ſkill and caution, to make a good uſe of victory. There are many who know how to conquer: and but few, in the compariſon, who uſe their conqueſt with advantage. The Carthaginians were among the firſt of theſe. As ſoon as they

had defeated the Roman army, and killed the two Conſuls, Publius and Cnæus, being perſuaded that they ſhould now hold without diſpute the ſovereignty of Spain, they treated all the people of the country with the greateſt haughtineſs. Inſtead therefore of allies and friends, they made all who had ſubmitted to their power their enemies. And how indeed could it be otherwiſe? They conceived, that one way was the beſt for gaining empire, and another for maintaining it. They ought however to have learned, that men moſt eaſily preſerve their power, by perſiſting in the ſame courſe of conduct by which it was at firſt obtained. Now nothing is more evident, or more confirmed by a great variety of examples, than that the ſureſt way of drawing any people to ſubmiſſion, is to flatter them with kindneſs, and to allure them by the proſpect of advantage. But if men, when they have gained the end which they deſired, reverſe this treatment, and load thoſe that have ſubmitted to them with rigour and ſeverity, the inclinations of the ſubjects, as the Carthaginians now experienced, will not fail to correſpond with the change of conduct in the governours.

In this dangerous condition of affairs, the mind of Aſdrubal was filled with many apprehenſions, and diſtracted by various thoughts. He was grieved at the revolt of Andobalis. The diſcontents of his own officers, and their oppoſition to his will, added much to his anxiety. He dreaded alſo the arrival of Scipio with his army. And as he judged that this would very ſhortly happen; perceiving likewiſe, that the Spaniards had deſerted him, and were haſtening with one conſent to join the Romans; he at laſt reſolved, that he would diſpoſe all things in the beſt order that was poſſible, and try the fortune of a battle. That, if happily he ſhould be victorious in the action, he might afterwards deliberate upon future meaſures in full ſecurity. If, on the other hand, he ſhould be conquered; he would then retreat with the remains

mains of his army into Gaul; and, being joined by as many of the barbarians as he ſhould be able to draw together in that country, would from thence paſs into Italy, to aſſiſt Annibal his brother, and to partake with him in the ſame common hopes.

While Aſdrubal was forming this deſign, Scipio, having been joined again by Lælius, who brought to him the orders of the ſenate, drew all the troops from their winter quarters, and began his march. In every place through which he paſſed, the Spaniards were prepared to meet him, and joined themſelves to the army with alacrity and joy. Among the reſt, Andobalis, who had long before ſent meſſages to Scipio, no ſooner was informed of his approach, than he went out of his camp to meet him, attended by his friends. And when he had joined him, he began with giving an account of his late connection with the Carthaginians: diſplaying, on the one hand, the advantages which they had drawn from his alliance, and the fidelity with which he had always ſerved them; and, on the other, the many injuries and inſults, with which his ſervices had been requited. He intreated Scipio therefore to be himſelf the judge of what he had heard. That, if he ſhould be found to have falſely accuſed the Carthaginians, it might with good reaſon be ſuppoſed, that he would not long maintain his faith in this new alliance. But if, on the contrary, he had only ſeparated himſelf from his former friends, becauſe a long courſe of injurious treatment had compelled him to abandon them; there was good ground to hope, that, having now embraced the party of the Romans, he would adhere to it with a firm affection. He ſaid many other things upon this ſubject. And when he had ended, Scipio replied; "That he doubted not of the truth of what he had heard. That he could well judge what muſt have been the inſolence of the Carthaginians towards him; not only from the manner in which they had treated all the people

people of Spain; but more particularly from the inſults, to which the wives and daughters of Andobalis and the other princes had been expoſed. That himſelf, on the contrary, when theſe women had fallen into his power, not as hoſtages, but as priſoners and ſlaves, had obſerved towards them ſuch ſtrict fidelity, that even they who were their parents ſcarcely could have equalled him in diſcharging that duty." Andobalis declared aloud, that he ſpoke the truth; and, proſtrating himſelf before him, ſaluted him with the appellation of King. The reſt that were preſent all applauded the word. But Scipio, inclining himſelf towards them, only exhorted them to take courage, and to be aſſured, that they ſhould receive every mark of kindneſs from the Romans. He then delivered to them their wives and daughters: and on the next day concluded a treaty with them in which the chief condition was, that they ſhould be ſubject to the command of the Roman leaders, and obey the orders which they ſhould give. The Spaniards, after this tranſaction, returned back again to their own camp; and, taking with them all their forces, came and incamped together with the Romans, and began their march with them towards Aſdrubal.

The Carthaginian General was at this time incamped in the neighbourhood of Bætula, a city ſituated in the Caſtalonian diſtrict, at no great diſtance from the ſilver mines. But when he heard that the Romans were advancing towards him, he went into another camp, which was ſecured behind by a river. In his front he had a plain, which was bordered at the extremity by a riſing ground; of a height ſufficient to cover the camp; and of ſufficient length alſo for drawing up the army in battle. In this place he remained; taking care only to place continually an advanced guard of troops upon the riſing ground. As ſoon as Scipio arrived, he was impatient to engage: but the great advantages of the ground in which Aſdrubal was incamped filled him with perplexity. When

When he had waited however two whole days, and began to fear, that, if Mago and Aſdrubal the ſon of Geſco ſhould advance alſo with their armies, he ſhould then be incloſed on every ſide, he reſolved to make ſome attempt at leaſt to draw the enemy to a battle. Having ordered therefore the reſt of the army to remain in the intrenchments, and to hold themſelves in readineſs to engage, he ſent away a part of the light-armed troops, together with the extraordinaries of the infantry, to attack thoſe bodies of the enemy that were poſted upon the riſing ground. This order was executed with vigour. The Carthaginian General remained for ſome time quiet, and expected the event. But, when he ſaw that his men were cloſely preſſed by the Romans, and that they ſuffered greatly in the action, he drew out his army, and, truſting to the advantage of his ſituation, began to range them in order of battle upon the riſing ground. Scipio then ſent away all the light-armed forces, to aſſiſt thoſe that were firſt engaged: and, at the ſame time, dividing the reſt of his army into two equal bodies, he gave one of them to Lælius, and ordered him to make a circuit round the riſing ground, and fall upon the right of the enemy, while himſelf with the other wheeled round on the oppoſite ſide, and attacked their left. While this was done, Aſdrubal was but juſt beginning to draw out his troops from the intrenchments. For to this moment he had remained quiet; not expecting that the Romans would riſk a battle againſt him in ſo ſtrong a poſt. And now, when the thing had happened, it was too late to draw up his army in proper order. The Romans therefore falling thus upon the wings before they had taken their reſpective poſts, not only gained the top of the riſing ground without reſiſtance, but continuing alſo to advance, while the enemy was ſtill in motion to be formed, killed thoſe who preſented their flank to them as they marched, and forced the reſt, who had juſt formed themſelves in front, to fly. When Aſdrubal

perceived, that his troops were repulſed in every part, perſiſting in the plan which he at firſt had formed, he reſolved not to continue the battle to the laſt extremity. Taking with him therefore the money and the elephants, and collecting together as many as he was able of thoſe that fled, he retreated towards the Tagus, with deſign to paſs over the Pyrenæan mountains into Gaul.

Scipio, not judging it proper to purſue the enemy, leſt the other Generals ſhould in the mean time advance towards him, gave permiſſion to the ſoldiers to pillage the camp. On the following day, he aſſembled together all the priſoners, and gave the neceſſary orders concerning them. Their numbers were ten thouſand of the foot, and more than two thouſand horſe. The Spaniards through all the country, who had taken arms in favour of the Carthaginians, came and ſubmitted themſelves to the Romans at diſcretion. In the converſations which they held with Scipio upon this occaſion, they all ſaluted him by the name of King. This appellation had firſt been given to him by Edeco, who had alſo proſtrated himſelf before him. Andobalis uſed afterwards the ſame expreſſion. The word at that time paſſed without any obſervation. But after the preſent victory, when Scipio found that all the Spaniards addreſſed him by that title, he thought it a matter that deſerved his moſt ſerious reflection. Having aſſembled them therefore all together, he told them; "that he ſhould always deſire to be, and to be eſteemed by all, a man of a mind truly royal; but that he neither would be a king, nor would be ſo called by any one: and that, for the time to come, they ſhould addreſs him by no other appellation than that of General.

The greatneſs of ſoul, that was diſplayed by Scipio upon this occaſion, may very juſtly be thought to deſerve applauſe. Though at this time he was extremely young, and fortune had ſo favoured him in his career, that a whole ſub-

ject people made a voluntary offer to him of the royal title, he remained conſtant to himſelf, and was not to be tempted by ſo flattering a ſhew of honour. But this ſame greatneſs will appear in a degree much more exalted, if we turn our view upon the later period of his life. For when, after his exploits in Spain, he had ſubdued the Carthaginians, and brought the faireſt and the largeſt provinces of Afric, from the Philænean altars even to the pillars of Hercules, into ſubjection to his country; when he had conquered Aſia and the Aſſyrian kings; and forced the nobleſt and the moſt conſiderable parts of the whole known world to ſubmit to the Roman ſway; how many occaſions aroſe, of eſtabliſhing himſelf in royalty, in almoſt any part of the earth that he ſhould chooſe? A ſituation like this might have inſpired not only a human mind, but even divinity itſelf, if I may be allowed to ſay it, with ambitious pride. But ſo elevated, ſo ſuperior was the ſoul of Scipio to that of other men, that, though ſovereignty is regarded as the greateſt bleſſing which the Gods can give, and though it was thrown ſo often in his way by fortune, he rejected it with diſdain; and preferred his own duty, and the intereſts of his country, to all the dazzling ſplendour and imagined happineſs of power. But let us return from this digreſſion.

Scipio, having ſeparated the Spaniards from the reſt of the priſoners, diſmiſſed them without ranſom to their ſeveral countries. He permitted Andobalis to chooſe for himſelf three hundred of the horſes, and diſtributed the reſt among thoſe who had none. He then took poſſeſſion of the Carthaginian camp, becauſe it was ſituated with ſo great advantage; and remained there with the army, expecting the other Generals of the Carthaginians. He ſent ſome troops alſo towards the Pyrenæan mountains, to obſerve the motions of Aſdrubal. When the ſummer was ended, he again decamped; and returned back to Taraco, to take his winter quarters in that city.

EXTRACT the SEVENTH.

The preparations of Philip for maintaining the war againſt the Ætolians, ſupported by Attalus and the Romans. A digreſſion on Signals by lighted torches.

CHAP. I.

THE Ætolians, having now conceived the greateſt expectations from the arrival of Attalus and the Romans, ſtruck a terrour into all the Greeks, and were ready to attack them by land, while Publius Sulpitius and Attalus preſſed them on the ſide of the ſea. The Achæans therefore ſent an embaſſy to Philip, to implore aſſiſtance. For, beſides the danger which threatened them from the Ætolians, Machanidas alſo had drawn together an army upon the borders of the Argian territory. The Bœotians, apprehenſive that the fleet would make a deſcent upon their coaſts, demanded likewiſe from Philip a leader and a body of troops. The Eubœans preſſed him with the greateſt earneſtneſs to take ſome meaſures for their defence. The Acarnanians urged the ſame requeſt. An embaſſy came alſo from Epirus. At the ſame time a report was ſpread, that Scerdilaidas and Pleuratus were drawing together their forces: and that the Thracians, who were contiguous to Macedon, and eſpecially the Mædians, had reſolved to invade that kingdom, as ſoon as Philip ſhould be removed to any diſtance from it. The Ætolians likewiſe had already ſecured Thermopylæ, by ditches and intrenchments, and ſtrong bodies of troops: and were perſuaded, that they had ſhut the entrance againſt Philip;

Philip; and that it would not be poſſible for him to advance to the aſſiſtance of his allies that were within thoſe paſſes.

Conjunctures like theſe, in which the leaders of armies are obliged to exert all their ſtrength, and to bring into trial their whole ability both of mind and body, are thoſe which moſt particularly deſerve the attention of the reader. For as, in the diverſions of the field, the force and vigour of the hunted beaſts are never ſo conſpicuouſly diſplayed, as when they are preſſed on every ſide by danger; juſt ſo it happens with reſpect to theſe commanders; and in this light it was that Philip now appeared. As ſoon therefore as he had diſmiſſed the embaſſadours, with an aſſurance that he would aſſiſt them with his utmoſt power, he applied his whole attention to the war: turning himſelf on every ſide; and conſidering with the greateſt care, to what part firſt he ſhould direct his aim. Being informed that Attalus had paſſed over with his army to the iſland Peparethus, and was maſter of the open country, he ſent a garriſon to ſecure the city. He ordered Polyphantas to march with a body of troops, to cover Phocis and Bœotia. To Chalcis, and the other cities of Eubœa, he ſent Menippus with a thouſand heavy-armed ſoldiers, and five hundred Agrianians. At the ſame time he began his own march towards Scotuſſa; having ordered the Macedonian troops to be aſſembled in that place. But when he heard that Attalus had ſailed away to Nicæa; and that the Ætolian chiefs were aſſembled together at Heraclea, in order to deliberate concerning the operations of the war; he again left Scotuſſa, and marched with the greateſt haſte, that he might either prevent or diſperſe their meeting. But the aſſembly had ſeparated before he was able to arrive. He therefore waſted the country; and when he had deſtroyed, or taken away, all the corn that was found among the people who lived round the Ænian bay, he returned back to Scotuſſa, and, leaving there the body of his army, went

himſelf to Demetrias with the light-armed forces and the royal troop, and attended to the deſigns of the enemy. And that the earlieſt knowledge might be obtained of all their motions, he ſent orders to Peparethus, to the people of Phocis, and thoſe of Eubæa, that they ſhould inform him of every thing that ſhould happen, by ſignals of lighted torches raiſed upon Tiſæum; a mountain of Theſſaly, which ſtood commodious for conveying this kind of notice from all the parts now mentioned. But as this manner of making ſignals is of the greateſt ſervice in war; and no perfect method has hitherto appeared of carrying it into practice; it will not be unuſeful, if we here pauſe awhile, and beſtow upon it ſuch conſideration as the importance of the ſubject well deſerves.

CHAP. II.

IT is a thing well known, that opportunity, which has ſo great a ſhare in the accompliſhment of all deſigns, has the greateſt in thoſe that belong to war. Now, of all the inventions which have been contrived for ſecuring opportunity, the moſt effectual is that of making ſignals by the means of lighted torches. By this method, things which have been juſt tranſacted, and others at the very time in which they happen, may be communicated to thoſe who are concerned to know them; though they are diſtant perhaps three or four days journey, and ſometimes even many days from the place; and the requiſite aſſiſtance be received, when it ſeems ſcarcely poſſible to expect it. In former times, the manner of conveying this notice was too ſimple; and the invention, upon that account, loſt much of its advantage. For the method was, to ſettle by concert ſome fixed and determinate ſignals. But as the things which hap-

pen are infinite, the greater part were incapable of being ſignified by ſuch a method. Thus, for example, that an army is arrived at Oreum, Peparethus, or at Chalcis, may be expreſſed by ſignals before concerted. But accidents of a different kind, ſuch as the revolt of the citizens, the diſcovery of treaſon, maſſacres committed in the city, and other events like theſe; accidents, which, though they are very frequent, cannot before be taken into account; and which, becauſe they happen unexpectedly, require a ſpeedier conſultation and more quick relief; theſe accidents never could be ſignified by ſignals of torches before concerted. For it is not poſſible that ſignals ſhould be concerted, to give notice of events which cannot be foreſeen.

Æneas, who compoſed a work on the Art of War, perceiving the defects of this method, added indeed ſome little improvement to this invention; but was very far from carrying it to that degree of perfection which the thing requires. The reader may judge of it from the account that follows.

Let thoſe, ſays he, who intend to convey and to receive intelligence of what has happened by the means of lighted torches, take two earthern veſſels, of a depth and breadth exactly equal. The depth of three cubits may commonly be ſufficient, and the breadth of one. Let them then take two corks, a little leſs in ſize than the mouths of the veſſels, and in the middle of them fix two ſticks; which muſt be divided, on the outſide, into equal portions, very diſtinctly marked, and containing three fingers breadth in each. Upon each of the portions inſcribe one or other of thoſe events which uſually happen in the time of war. On one, for example; "A body of cavalry is come into the country." On the next; "A body of heavy infantry." Upon a third; "Light-armed forces." On another; "A body of cavalry and infantry." Then again; "A fleet of ſhips."

After-

Afterwards; "Corn." And in the ſame manner upon the reſt; till all the portions are ſeverally filled with thoſe events, which are capable of being foreſeen, and which the ſtate and condition of the war may render probable. Particular care is to be taken, that the tapholes in both the veſſels be exactly equal; that the water may be diſcharged alike from both. Let the veſſels be then filled with water, and the corks with the ſticks be placed upon the water; and then let the tapholes be opened. When this is done, it is clear, that, if all things are exactly equal in both veſſels, the corks, together with the ſticks that are upon them, will ſink alike in both, as the water is diſcharged. When the experiment therefore has firſt been made, and the ſticks are found to deſcend in equal time, let the veſſels be carried to the reſpective places, in which the ſignals are to be given and received. And when any one of thoſe events, which are inſcribed upon the ſticks, has happened, let thoſe on one ſide raiſe a lighted torch, and hold it erect, till another torch be ſhewn on the other ſide. Then, let the firſt be dropped; and the tapholes of the veſſels on both ſides be opened. And when, by the ſinking of the cork, that portion of the ſtick, which is inſcribed with the event intended to be communicated, becomes level with the mouth of the veſſel, let thoſe on one ſide again raiſe a lighted torch, and thoſe on the other ſtop the taphole of their veſſel, and examine the inſcription that is alſo level with the mouth. For the writing in this part will be the ſame in one veſſel as in the other; if all things have been performed in exact and equal time.

But this method, though preferable indeed to that of making concerted ſignals with the help of torches, is far from being attended with ſufficient certainty. For it is evident, that all things cannot be foreſeen: and, if they could, that it would be impoſſible to inſcribe them all upon a ſtick. When an event

event therefore happens, of which there was no ſuſpicion, no notice can ever be given of it in this method. Add to this, that the inſcriptions alſo upon the ſticks are themſelves too indeterminate. They neither ſhew the numbers of the infantry or cavalry; nor into what part of the country they are come; nor the number of the ſhips arrived; nor the quantity of the corn. For as theſe are circumſtances, which cannot poſſibly be known before they happen, it is by conſequence impoſſible to aſcertain or mark them. And yet this is the moſt important part of the whole. For, unleſs we know the numbers of the enemy, and the place into which they are come, how ſhall it be determined what aſſiſtance is neceſſary to be ſent? Unleſs we are informed, how many ſhips the fleet contains, and what quantity of corn the allies have furniſhed, how can we frame a judgment with regard to the event, or how in a word be able to take any meaſures?

The laſt method, which I ſhall mention, was invented either by Cleoxenus or Democlitus, but perfected by myſelf. This method is preciſe, and capable of ſignifying every thing that happens with the greateſt accuracy. A very exact attention however is required in uſing it. It is this which follows.

Take the alphabet, and divide it into five parts, with five letters in each. In the laſt part indeed, one letter will be wanting; but this is of no importance. Then let thoſe, who are to give and to receive the ſignals, write upon five tablets the five portions of the letters in their proper order; and concert together the following plan. That he, on one ſide, who is to make the ſignal, ſhall firſt raiſe two lighted torches, and hold them erect, till they are anſwered by torches from the other ſide. This only ſerves to ſhew, that they are on both ſides ready and prepared. That afterwards, he again who gives the ſignal, ſhall raiſe firſt ſome torches upon the left hand, in order to make known to thoſe on the other ſide,

which

which of the tablets is to be inſpected. If the firſt, for example; a ſingle torch: if the ſecond, two: and ſo of the reſt. That then he ſhall raiſe other torches alſo upon the right; to mark in the ſame manner, to thoſe who receive the ſignal, which of the letters upon the tablet is to be obſerved and written. When they have thus regulated their plan, and taken their reſpective poſts, it will be neceſſary firſt to have a dioptrical inſtrument, framed with two holes or tubes; one for diſcerning the right, and the other the left hand of the perſon who is to raiſe the torches on the oppoſite ſide. The tablets muſt be placed erect, and in their proper order, near the inſtrument. And, upon the right and left, there ſhould be alſo a ſolid fence, of about ten feet in length, and of the height of a man: that the torches, being raiſed along the top of theſe ramparts, may give a more certain light; and, when they are dropped again, that they may alſo be concealed behind them. When all things then are thus prepared, if it be intended, for example, to convey this notice; "that ſome of the ſoldiers, about a hundred in number, are gone over to the enemy;" it will be neceſſary in the firſt place to chooſe words for this purpoſe which contain the feweſt letters. Thus, if it be ſaid; "Cretans a hundred have deſerted;" the ſame thing is expreſſed in leſs than half of the letters which compoſe the former ſentence. Theſe words then, being firſt written down, are communicated by the means of torches in the following manner. The firſt letter is Cappa; which ſtands in the ſecond diviſion of the alphabet, and upon the ſecond tablet. The perſon therefore, who makes the ſignal, firſt holds up two torches upon the left; to ſignify that it is the ſecond tablet, which is to be inſpected: and afterwards, five upon the right; to ſhew that Cappa is the letter, which he who receives the ſignal muſt obſerve and write. For Cappa ſtands the fifth in the ſecond diviſion of the letters. Then again, he holds up four torches upon the left; becauſe Ro is found

found in the fourth diviſion: and two upon the right, to denote that it ſtands the ſecond in that diviſion. From hence, the perſon who receives the ſignal writes Ro upon his tables: and, in the ſame manner all the reſt of the letters. By this method, an account of every thing that happens may be conveyed with the moſt perfect accuracy. It is true indeed, that, becauſe every letter requires a double ſignal, a great number of torches muſt be employed. If the neceſſary pains however be uſed, the thing will be found to be very practicable. In both theſe methods, it is principally requiſite, that the perſons employed ſhould firſt be exerciſed by practice: that, when a real occaſion happens, the ſignals may be made and anſwered without any miſtake.

With reſpect to the ſeeming difficulty of the method, it would be eaſy to ſhew by many inſtances, that there is a very great difference in the ſame things, when they are firſt propoſed, and when they are afterwards rendered familiar to us by habit: and that many things, which appear in the beginning to be not only difficult but abſolutely impracticable, in the courſe of time, and by continued uſe, are accompliſhed with the greateſt eaſe. Among numberleſs examples, the art of reading may be mentioned, as one of the cleareſt and the moſt convincing proofs of the truth of this remark. Take a man, who has never learned to read, but is otherwiſe a man of ſenſe. Set a child before him, who has learned; and order him to read a paſſage in a book. It is certain that this man will ſcarcely be able to perſuade himſelf, that the child, as he reads, muſt conſider diſtinctly, firſt the form of all the letters; in the next place their power; and thirdly, their connection one with another. For each of theſe things requires a certain portion of time. When he hears him therefore read four or five lines together without any heſitation, and in a breath, he will find it very difficult to believe, that the child never ſaw the book before. But if

to the reading ſome geſture alſo ſhould be added; if the child ſhould attend to all the ſtops; and obſerve all the breathings rough and ſmooth; it will be abſolutely impoſſible to convince the man, that this is true. From hence therefore we may learn, never to be deterred from any uſeful purſuit by the ſeeming difficulties that attend it; but to endeavour rather to ſurmount thoſe difficulties by practice and by habit. It is habit, which gives to men the nobleſt acquiſitions: even thoſe which are upon many occaſions the principal means of their ſafety. With reſpect to myſelf, what induced me to enter into a diſcuſſion of this kind, was the remark that was made in a former part of this work: that, in the preſent age, the ſciences are advanced to ſo great perfection, that almoſt every thing is capable of being taught by method. Such digreſſions therefore deſerve to be conſidered as ſome of the moſt uſeful parts of a hiſtory that is well compoſed.

EXTRACT the EIGHTH.

The manner in which the Aſpaſians paſs the Oxus.

THE wandering tribes that are called Aſpaſians live between the Oxus and the Tanais. The firſt of theſe rivers diſcharges itſelf into the Hyrcanian ſea, and the other into the Mœotis. Both of them are ſo large as to be navigable. It is difficult therefore to conceive, in what manner this barbarous people paſs the Oxus without the help of veſſels, and come into Hyrcania with their horſes *. Two different accounts are given of this fact: one of which is probable; and the other, though very extraordinary, not impoſſible. The Oxus takes its ſources from mount Caucaſus; and being increaſed by the addition of many large ſtreams as it flows through Bactriana, rolls its waters over the plain with a full and impetuous courſe. From thence it paſſes through a deſert to the top of a craggy precipice; whoſe height, together with the ſtrength and the rapidity of the waters, throws the ſtream forward with ſuch violence, that it falls

* There is much Geographical error in this account. For Hyrcania itſelf is ſituated between the Tanais and the Oxus. It might be imagined, that what the author calls the Oxus ſhould mean the Araxes; which enters the Hyrcanian ſea on the weſtern ſide, as the Oxus does on the eaſt. And theſe two rivers are often miſtaken one for the other by the ancients. But on the other hand, what he afterwards ſays, that this river riſes in mount Caucaſus and runs through Bactriana, agrees with the Oxus, but not with the Araxes. The truth is, the ancients, even after the expedition of Alexander, had a very imperfect knowledge of theſe parts of the globe. As this is almoſt the ſingle miſtake of this kind that I have obſerved in Polybius, I was willing to remark it. In general, he is more exact and accurate, in the names of places and deſcriptions of countries, than even the profeſſed writers of geography.

upon the ground below at the diſtance of more than a ſtadium from the rock. By this way, it is ſaid, the Aſpaſians enter Hyrcania; paſſing cloſe along the rock, and under the fall of the river. But there is another account, which appears to be much more probable. This account affirms; that at the bottom of the rock there are ſome large cavities in the ground; that the river, forcing its way downward through theſe cavities, runs to a moderate diſtance under ground, and afterwards appears again; and that the barbarians, being well acquainted with the part that is left dry, paſs over it with their horſes into Hyrcania.

EXTRACT the NINTH.

Antiochus gains the victory in an engagement againſt Euthydemus who had revolted.

WHEN Antiochus was informed, that Euthydemus had incamped with his whole army near Taguria, and that he had ſtationed a body of ten thouſand cavalry upon the banks of the river Arius, to defend the paſſage; he immediately raiſed the ſiege, and reſolved to paſs the river, and to advance towards the enemy. Being diſtant three days journey from the place, during the two firſt days he moved with a moderate pace. But on the evening of the third, having ordered the reſt of the army to decamp and follow him at break of day, he took the cavalry and the light-armed troops, together with ten thouſand of the Peltaſtæ, and continued his march all night with the greateſt haſte. For he had heard, that the cavalry of the enemy, which guarded the paſſage of the river by day, retired, as ſoon as night came on, to a certain city, which was full twenty ſtadia diſtant from the river. As the country was a level plain, commodious for the march of cavalry, he arrived at the expected time, and paſſed the river with the greateſt part of his forces before the day approached. But the Bactrian cavalry, being now informed by their ſcouts of what had happened, ran towards the river, and were ready to attack the troops as they marched. The king, judging it to be neceſſary that he ſhould receive their firſt charge, exhorted the two thouſand horſemen, that always fought near his perſon, to perform their duty; and having ordered the reſt to range themſelves in troops and cohorts, and to take their accuſtomed poſts, led on his body of caval-

ry and engaged with the foremoſt of the enemy. In this action he diſtinguiſhed himſelf above all that were with him. Many fell on both ſides: but the firſt ſquadron of the enemy was at laſt broken by the king. When the ſecond, and afterwards the third ſquadron advanced to the charge, the troops of Antiochus were in their turn preſſed, and began to fall into diſorder. But Panætolus, bringing up the reſt of the cavalry, who were now almoſt all completely formed, reſcued the king from the danger; and forced the Bactrians, whoſe ranks were already broken, to fly in great diſorder. Nor did they ſtop their flight, till they had reached the camp of Euthydemus: being ſtill cloſely purſued by Panætolus, and having loſt the greateſt part of their men. The royal cavalry, when they had killed great numbers, and taken many alſo alive, at laſt deſiſted from the purſuit, and incamped upon the banks of the river. Antiochus had a horſe killed under him in the battle; and was himſelf wounded in the mouth, and loſt ſome of his teeth. Nor was there indeed any action of his life, in which he gained ſo high a reputation for courage, as in this engagement. Euthydemus, diſheartened by this defeat, retreated to Zariaſpa, a city of Bactriana, with all his army.

THE

THE

GENERAL HISTORY

OF

POLYBIUS.

BOOK the ELEVENTH.

EXTRACT the FIRST.

Aſdrubal, having entered Italy, is defeated by the Romans. His death and character.

ASDRUBAL was in all reſpects diſſatisfied with the ſtate in which things appeared. But as it was now too late to take other meaſures, becauſe the Romans were already formed, and beginning to advance towards him, he was conſtrained to draw up the Spaniards, and the Gauls that were with him, in order of battle. He placed the elephants, which were ten in number, in front; increaſed the depth of his files; and ranged his whole army upon a very narrow ground. He then took his poſt in the centre of the line, behind the elephants; and moved to attack the left of

the enemy: having before determined, that in this battle he would either conquer or die. Livius, leading on his troops with a ſlow and haughty pace, began the combat with great vigour. But Claudius, who commanded on the right, was unable to advance ſo as to ſurround the enemy; being utterly obſtructed by thoſe difficulties of the ground which have before been mentioned, and which had determined Aſdrubal to make his whole attack upon the left. Anxious therefore, and not willing to remain inactive, he had recourſe to the meaſure which the occaſion itſelf ſuggeſted to him. For having drawn away his troops from the right, he led them round the field of battle; and, paſſing beyond the left of the Roman army, attacked the Carthaginians in flank behind the elephants. To this moment, the ſucceſs of the battle had remained doubtful. For both the Carthaginians and the Romans, well knowing that they had no hopes of ſafety but in victory, maintained the fight with equal bravery. The ſervice alſo, which the elephants performed, had been the ſame to both. For theſe beaſts, being incloſed between the two armies, and wounded by the darts, ſpread no leſs diſorder among the ranks of the Spaniards, than among thoſe of the Romans. But when Claudius fell upon the enemy from behind, the engagement was no longer equal. The Spaniards, preſſed at once both in front and rear, were almoſt all ſlaughtered in their ranks. Six of the elephants were killed, together with the men that conducted them: and four, which had forced their way through the diſordered ranks, were afterwards taken, but without their leaders. Aſdrubal, who had ſo often diſtinguiſhed himſelf upon former occaſions, diſplayed no leſs courage in this laſt action, and fell in the battle. It would be unjuſt not to pauſe awhile, and give the praiſe that is due to the character of this great commander.

It

It has already been mentioned, that he was the brother of Annibal; and that the latter, when he began his march towards Italy, left to him the care of the affairs of Spain. The many engagements, which he ſuſtained againſt the Romans in that country; the various difficulties in which he was involved, by the jealouſy of thoſe commanders who were ſent from time to time into Spain from Carthage; how truly he ſhewed himſelf, upon all thoſe occaſions, to be the worthy ſon of Amilcar Barcas; and with what ſpirit and magnanimity he ſupported his misfortunes and defeats; theſe things have been all related in the former books. But his conduct, in the laſt ſcene of this contention, is that which eſpecially deſerves to be remarked, and is moſt worthy to be imitated.

The greateſt part of Generals and of princes, when they are ready to engage in a deciſive action, place continually before their eyes the honour and advantages that may reſult from victory; and conſider only, how they may beſt improve each circumſtance, and in what manner they ſhall uſe the fruits of their ſucceſs: but never turn their view upon the conſequences of a defeat; nor form for themſelves any rule of action in the caſe of a misfortune. And yet the conduct, which the firſt of theſe ſituations may require, is ſufficiently plain and obvious: but the ſecond demands great foreſight. Now from hence it has happened, that commanders, through the want of this attention, and not having before determined in what manner they ſhall act upon ſuch occaſions, after the braveſt efforts of their ſoldiers, have often been defeated with diſgrace and ſhame; have diſhonoured all their former actions; and loaded the remainder of their lives with reproach and infamy. How many have been loſt by this fatal negligence; and how much one man is in this reſpect ſuperior to another, may be learned with lit-

tle pains. The hiſtory of paſt times is filled with ſuch examples. But Aſdrubal diſplayed a very different conduct. As long as any hope remained, of performing actions not unworthy of his former glory, he attended to nothing ſo much in every battle, as to the care of his own ſafety. But when fortune had taken from him every future proſpect, and confined him to the laſt deſperate extremity; though he neglected nothing that might ſecure the victory, either in the diſpoſition of his army, or in the time itſelf of the engagement; yet he conſidered alſo with no leſs attention, in what manner, in caſe that he ſhould be defeated, he might ſubmit with dignity to his adverſe fortune, and not ſuffer any thing unworthy of his former actions. Let other commanders then be taught by this example; as, on the one hand, not to fruſtrate the hopes of thoſe who depend upon them, by throwing themſelves unneceſſarily into danger; ſo, on the other, never to add diſgrace to their misfortunes, by cheriſhing an immoderate deſire of life.

The Romans, as ſoon as they had gained the victory, pillaged the camp of the enemy. Finding many of the Gauls drunk, and ſleeping upon their ſtraw, they ſlaughtered them as victims without reſiſtance. The priſoners were then collected together: and from this part of the booty more than three hundred talents were brought into the publick treaſury. Not fewer than ten thouſand Gauls and Carthaginians fell in the engagement; and about two thouſand of the Romans. Some of the Carthaginians that were of eminent rank were taken alive: the reſt were deſtroyed in the action.

When the account of this great ſucceſs arrived at Rome, ſo vehement was the deſire that it might be true, that it was not at firſt believed. But when meſſengers after meſſengers not only confirmed the news of the victory, but reported

ported alſo all the circumſtances of the battle, the whole city was tranſported with extravagant joy. Every ſhrine was then adorned: and every temple filled with libations and with ſacrifices. In a word, ſo flattering were the hopes, and ſo ſtrong the confidence, which poſſeſſed all the people, that even Annibal, whom they had hitherto ſo greatly dreaded, ſeemed no longer to be in Italy.

EXTRACT the SECOND.

The Diſcourſe of an Embaſſadour, exhorting the Ætolians to put an end to their war with Philip, and to be upon their guard againſt the deſigns of the Romans.

"WITH what earneſtneſs, O Ætolians, king Ptolemy and the cities of Rhodes and Byzantium, of Chios and Mitylene, have endeavoured to perſuade you to conclude a peace with Philip, let the facts themſelves demonſtrate. For this is neither the firſt, nor the ſecond embaſſy, that has been ſent to you with that intention. Even from the moment when the war firſt began, we have never ceaſed to follow you; and have taken every occaſion that was offered, to awaken in you an attention to your proper intereſts: being led to this meaſure, not only by the conſideration of thoſe evils, which the Macedonians and yourſelves at this time ſuffer; but by the foreſight of the ruin which will hereafter fall upon our own countries alſo, and indeed upon the whole of Greece. For as a fire, when it has once been kindled, is no longer controuled by him who lighted it; but is directed in its courſe either by the winds that blow, or the combuſtion of the matter with which it is fed; and as it often turns moſt unaccountably the firſt efforts of its rage againſt the perſon himſelf who raiſed it into a flame; juſt ſo it happens in the caſe of war. Once kindled, it firſt conſumes the authors of it: and from thence, ſpreading itſelf upon every ſide, devours without diſtinction every thing that it meets: acquiring ſtill new ſtrength; and being blown as it were into a flame by the folly of the neighbouring people. You now therefore ſee before you all

the Greeks of Aſia, and the people of all the iſles, implor-ing you to put an end to a war, the effects of which they have too great reaſon to fear will extend hereafter to them-ſelves. Embrace the ſentiments which prudence dictates; attend at laſt to our intreaties; and give a favourable anſwer to our juſt demand. If the war indeed, in which you are now engaged, though attended like all other wars, with preſent diſadvantage, had both been honourable in the firſt intention, and glorious alſo with reſpect to the events that have happened in it, this perſevering obſtinacy might per-haps be excuſed. But, if the motives that led you into it were moſt ſhameful; and if the conduct of it has been loaded with diſhonour and reproach; how much does it now deſerve your moſt ſerious conſideration? For my part, I ſhall ſpeak my ſentiments without reſerve: and you, if you are wiſe, will not be offended with this freedom. It is cer-tainly much better, by cenſuring your conduct to preſerve you before it be too late; than to ſooth you with a flatter-ing diſcourſe, which in a ſhort time would be followed by your own ruin, and by that of all the Greeks. Obſerve then the miſtakes into which you have fallen. You pretend that you have taken arms againſt Philip, only to prevent the Greeks from falling under the abſolute dominion of that prince. But the true deſign and tendency of your engage-ment is to deſtroy all Greece, and to bring it into a ſtate of ſervitude. Your treaty with the Romans very plainly de-clares, that this is your only purpoſe. That treaty, which ſubſiſted before in writing, and which now is carried into execution. While it was only written, it covered you with ſhame: and now, when it appears in the effects, your diſ-honour is become notorious to all mankind. The name then of Philip is only uſed, to cover your true intention. For this prince can ſuffer nothing from the war. His allies, the people of Peloponneſus, thoſe of Eubœa, Bœotia, and Phocis,

Phocis, the Locrians, the Theſſalians, and the Epirots, have alone any thing to dread from the conditions of your treaty. Theſe are they, againſt whom it is ſtipulated; "that the people and the ſpoil ſhall be allotted to the Romans, and the cities with the territory to the Ætolians." If yourſelves had taken any cities in open war, you neither would have ſet the places in flames, nor have expoſed the free citizens to any injurious treatment. Such cruelty would have been judged too horrible, and worthy only of barbarians. Yet you have made a treaty, which delivers all the reſt of the Greeks into the hands of a barbarous enemy, and expoſes them to the moſt ſhameful outrage. The fatal tendency of this tranſaction was for ſome time unobſerved; but that which has happened to the Oritæ, and to the miſerable people of Ægina, has now ſhewn it in the cleareſt light. For fortune ſeems to have brought your imprudence into open view, like a machine upon the ſtage, to unravel the intricacy of your plot. Such was the commencement, and ſuch to this time has been the event of the preſent war. And what, can it be expected, will be the end of it, if all things ſhould ſucceed as you deſire? Muſt it not be the beginning of the worſt of evils, in which all Greece will be involved? For when the Romans ſhall have ended the war in Italy; and this, as Annibal is now ſhut up in a narrow corner of the Brutian diſtrict, muſt very ſhortly happen; it is manifeſt that they will then bring all their power into Greece: on pretence indeed of aſſiſting the Ætolians againſt Philip; but, in reality, with a deſign to add this country to their other conqueſts. If, after they ſhall have become the maſters of it, they treat the people with favour, the whole grace and honour of ſuch indulgence will be their own. If on the contrary they are inclined to uſe ſeverity, they alone will poſſeſs the ſpoils of thoſe that are loſt; and alone will exerciſe the rights of ſovereignty over thoſe that are pre-

ſerved. In vain will you then obteſt the Gods. The Gods will not be willing, nor will men be able, to lend you any aſſiſtance.

Theſe then are the fatal conſequences, which you ought to have foreſeen from the beginning. Your honour might then have been preſerved. But ſince the events that lie in the boſom of futurity too often eſcape the eye of human foreſight, yet now at leaſt be warned by thoſe that have already happened, and turn yourſelves to more prudent counſels. With regard to us, as we have omitted nothing that was fit for true friends either to ſpeak or to act in the preſent conjuncture; ſo, with reſpect to the future likewiſe, we have declared our ſentiments with a proper freedom. And we now conjure you with the greateſt earneſtneſs, not to envy both yourſelves, and the reſt of the people of Greece, the bleſſings of liberty and ſafety."

When this diſcourſe was ended, and ſeemed to have made ſome impreſſion upon the people, the embaſſadours from Philip came into the aſſembly; and, without entering into any particular diſcuſſion, ſaid only, that they had received two orders from the king. The firſt, that they ſhould conclude a peace, if the Ætolians would conſent: and the other, that, if this propoſal was rejected, they ſhould immediately depart; having firſt called the Gods to witneſs, and the embaſſadours that were preſent, that the Ætolians, and not Philip, muſt be conſidered as the cauſe of all the evils which ſhould fall hereafter upon Greece.

EXTRACT the THIRD.

The ſentiments of Philopœmen concerning the brightneſs and neatneſs of arms. The character of this General. He gains a complete victory againſt Machanidas the tyrant of Sparta, in the battle of Mantinea.

UPON this occaſion it was ſaid by Philopœmen: "that the brightneſs of arms very much contributed to ſtrike an enemy with terror; and that great advantage alſo aroſe in action, from having the ſeveral parts of the armour well fitted to the body. That it was much to be wiſhed, that men would transfer that attention to their armour, which they now beſtowed upon their common dreſs; and become as negligent in the care of their dreſs, as they had hitherto been in that of their arms. That ſuch a change would both be ſerviceable to their private fortunes, and be attended likewiſe with manifeſt advantage with reſpect to the public ſafety. If a man therefore, continued he, be preparing himſelf for any military exerciſe, or for an expedition in the field, when he puts on his boots, let him be more careful in obſerving whether they are bright and well fitted to his legs, than in examining his ſhoes or ſandals. When he takes his buckler, his breaſtplate, or his helmet, let him deſire to ſee more ſplendour, and more coſtly ornaments, in theſe parts of his armour, than in his coat or mantle. For when men preferred mere ſhew and oſtentation to things of real uſe, it was eaſy to foreſee, what would be their conduct in the time of danger. In a word, he ſaid, he wiſhed that they would be perſuaded, that an affected nicety in dreſs was worthy only of

of women, and thoſe perhaps not extremely modeſt: but that a diſplay of ſplendour and of coſtlineſs in arms denoted a man of courage; ambitious of acquiring honour; and determined to employ his utmoſt efforts in the defence of himſelf and of his country."

All the people that were preſent were ſo ſtruck with this diſcourſe, and with the good ſenſe which it contained, that, as ſoon as the aſſembly was diſmiſſed, they began to point out thoſe that were elegantly dreſſed, and forced ſome of them to retire from the Forum. And afterwards, in all their military exerciſes and expeditions, they were moſt particularly careful to bear in remembrance this advice. Such power is there even in a ſingle exhortation, when delivered by a perſon of high authority, not only to deter men from bad habits, but to lead them into thoſe that are the beſt. When the life eſpecially of the ſpeaker is known to correſpond with his diſcourſe, it is impoſſible not to give the fulleſt credit to his words. And ſuch was the character of Philopœmen. Plain in his dreſs, and frugal in his table, he beſtowed but a very ſlight attention upon the care of his body. In his converſation he was agreeably conciſe, and never gave any offence. In the whole courſe of his life, it was his greateſt ſtudy, always to ſpeak the truth. A few words therefore which he at any time ſpoke, and which ſeemed to fall from him without deſign, were ſufficient to gain an entire credit with thoſe who heard him. The example of his life rendered a long diſcourſe unneceſſary. With ſome ſhort ſentences, ſupported by this credit, and by the opinion which his actions had inſpired, he often overthrew the long and plauſible harangues of thoſe who oppoſed him in the government. But let us now return to the hiſtory.

When the aſſembly was diſſolved, the people all returned back to their ſeveral cities; greatly applauding the virtue of the ſpeaker, and the diſcourſe which they had heard: and

were perſuaded, that under the adminiſtration of ſuch a governour the ſtate could never ſuffer any loſs. Philopœmen then went round to the ſeveral cities, and inſpected every thing with the greateſt diligence and care. He aſſembled the people together; formed them into troops; and inſtructed them in the military exerciſes. And when he had employed almoſt eight months in completing the neceſſary preparations, he drew together his army to Mantinea, to defend the liberty of all the people of Peloponneſus againſt the Spartan tyrant.

Machanidas, filled with confidence, and conſidering this meaſure as moſt favourable to his own deſires, as ſoon as he heard that the Achæans were ſo near, aſſembled the Lacedæmonian forces at Tegea; harangued them as the occaſion required; and early on the following day began his march towards Mantinea. Himſelf led the right wing of the phalanx. Upon either ſide of the van were the mercenaries, in two bodies, parallel each to the other: and behind theſe, a great number of carriages filled with catapults and darts. At the ſame time, Philopœmen alſo drew his army, in three diviſions, out of the city. The Illyrians, the troops that were armed with coats of mail, the foreign mercenaries, and the light-armed forces, paſſed through the gate that led to the temple of Neptune. The phalanx through another gate, that looked towards the weſt: and the cavalry of the city through a third that was near to the former. Upon a hill of conſiderable height, that ſtood before the city, and which commanded alſo the temple of Neptune and the road called Xenis, he poſted firſt the light-armed forces; and next to them, on the ſide towards the ſouth, the troops that were armed with mail, and alſo the Illyrians. Next to theſe, and upon the ſame right line, the phalanx, divided into ſeparate cohorts with the uſual diſtances between, was ranged along the border of a ditch, which, beginning at the temple of

Neptune, was continued through the middle of the plain of Mantinea, as far as to thoſe mountains which are the boundary of the Eliſphaſian territory. Upon the right of the phalanx ſtood the Achæan cavalry, commanded by Ariſtænetus, a citizen of Dyme. Upon the left was all the foreign cavalry, formed in cloſe order, and without any intervals between the troops. At the head of theſe was Philopœmen.

When the time of engaging approached, and the enemy appeared in ſight, this General, riding through the intervals of the phalanx, exhorted the troops to perform their duty, in few but very forcible words. But the greateſt part of what he ſaid was not even heard. For ſo ſtrong was the affection which the whole army bore towards him, ſo great was their confidence, and ſuch their ardour to engage, that the ſoldiers rather ſeemed to animate their General; and, with a kind of enthuſiaſtick tranſport, called upon him to lead them againſt the enemy, and to be aſſured of victory. As often however as he had power to ſpeak, he in general endeavoured to make them comprehend, that the object of the preſent conteſt was, on the part of the enemy, baſe and ignominious ſlavery; and, on their own part, glorious and immortal liberty.

Machanidas, as he at firſt advanced, made a ſhew of attacking the right of the enemy with his phalanx formed in the oblong ſquare. But when he approached nearer, and had gained the diſtance that was proper for his purpoſe, turning ſuddenly the whole body to the right, he extended his front, till the right of his line was equal to the left of the Achæans; and at the ſame time diſpoſed his catapults along the whole front at proper diſtances. Philopœmen, perceiving that his intention was, by diſcharging ſtones, and wounding the cohorts as they ſtood, to throw the whole phalanx into diſorder, allowed him not time to effect his purpoſe: but began the action vigorouſly with the Tarentines, who

were poſted near the temple of Neptune, upon a ground that was flat aud level, and very proper for cavalry. Machanidas was then forced to ſend his own Tarentines alſo to oppoſe them. The charge was violent, and ſuſtained on both ſides with great courage. The light-armed forces came ſoon afterwards to ſupport their reſpective bodies; ſo that all the mercenaries of both armies were in a ſhort time engaged. And as the combatants fought man with man, and without regarding any order, the diſpute was for a long time doubtful. Nor were the reſt of the troops able to diſcern, to which ſide the duſt was driven; becauſe both parties had changed their ground, and were removed far from the place in which the action was firſt begun. At laſt however, the mercenaries that belonged to the tyrant, who exceeded the others not only in numbers, but in the dexterity alſo which they had acquired in the uſe of their arms, prevailed.

It was reaſonable indeed that this ſhould be the iſſue; the ſame which is almoſt always found to happen upon ſuch occaſions. For as much as the citizens who live under a democratical government diſplay greater courage in action than the ſubjects of a tyrant, ſo much on the other hand are the mercenaries, which a tyrant retains in pay, ſuperior to the foreign ſoldiers that ſerve in the armies of a democracy. The reaſon of this difference is, that the people, in the one caſe, fight for liberty; and in the other, to be ſlaves: and that the zeal and courage of the mercenaries are rewarded, on the one ſide, with new advantages; and, on the other, tend only to their loſs. For a democratical ſtate, when it has once conquered thoſe who attempt to ſubvert it, no longer employs mercenary troops, to guard its freedom. But a tyrant, in proportion as his ſucceſſes are increaſed, has ſtill greater need of ſuch aſſiſtance. For, by accumulating injuries, he adds to the number of thoſe whom he has reaſon to fear.

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The very ſafety therefore of every tyrant depends wholly upon the ſtrength and the attachment of his foreign ſoldiers.

From theſe reaſons then it happened, that the mercenaries of Machanidas, upon this occaſion, maintained the action with ſo great force as well as courage, that not even the Illyrians, nor the heavy forces, which ſupported the Achæan mercenaries were able to ſtand againſt them; but fled in diſorder to Mantinea, though that city was diſtant full ſeven ſtadia from the place of the action. This occaſion afforded alſo a very clear and convincing proof of the truth of a thing which ſome have doubted: that the iſſue of battles is moſt frequently determined by ſkill on one ſide, and by the want of it on the other. A chief, it muſt be acknowledged, diſplays no ſmall ability, when, after having gained the advantage in the firſt part of a battle, he conducts the action to the end with the ſame ſucceſs with which it was begun. But his capacity will be ſeen in a much more exalted point of view, if, when he has been defeated in the beginning, he is ſtill able to retain a preſence of mind; to obſerve the errors which his adverſary commits in the courſe of his ſucceſs; and to turn thoſe errors to his own advantage. For it has often happened, that ſome, when they have ſeemed to have the victory already in their hands, in a ſhort time afterwards have ſuffered an intire defeat: and that others, who have failed in the beginning, by ſome ſudden and dexterous effort have changed the whole fortune of the battle, and obtained an unexpected victory. The two Generals, who commanded in the preſent action, afford very eminent examples of both theſe caſes.

For when the whole body of the Achæan mercenaries was in this manner routed, and the left wing of their army broken and compelled to fly; Machanidas, whoſe duty it was to remain in the place, to finiſh what he had begun, to ſurround the left of the enemy, and to charge their main body both

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in flank and front, attempted nothing of this kind; but, putting himſelf at the head of his victorious mercenaries, with an intemperate and childiſh valour purſued thoſe that fled: as if their own fear alone, after they once were broken, would not have been ſufficient to carry them even to the gates of the city. But the Achæan General, after he had employed all poſſible efforts to ſtop the flight of the troops, calling to the officers by name, and encouraging them to ſtand, when he perceived that they were forced to yield to the ſtrength of the enemy, was not himſelf diſheartened, nor quitted the action in deſpair: but, having poſted himſelf on the wing of his phalanx, as ſoon as the enemy, by their purſuit of thoſe that fled, had left the field clear where the action had paſſed, he turned to the left with his firſt cohorts, and ran in good order to take poſſeſſion of the vacant ground. By this poſition, he both cut off the return of thoſe that were engaged in the purſuit, and at the ſame time commanded the wing of the enemy. He exhorted the phalanx to fear nothing; and to remain in their place, till they ſhould receive the ſignal to charge. At the ſame time he ordered Polybius the Megalopolitan, to collect together all the Illyrians and the mercenaries who had not fled with the reſt; to poſt them behind the wing of the phalanx; and to obſerve with the greateſt care the return of the enemy from the purſuit.

The Lacedæmonian phalanx, elated by the firſt ſucceſs, without waiting for the ſignal to engage, levelled their ſpears, and advanced towards the enemy. When they came to the bank of the ditch, whether becauſe, as they were now ſo near, there was not time to change their purpoſe, or whether the ditch itſelf, being eaſy in the deſcent, and not having either wood or water in it, appeared contemptible, they continued their way through it without any heſitation. Philopœmen, perceiving that the moment was now come which he had long expected, ordered his phalanx alſo to level their ſpears, and

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to advance. The Achæans run together to the charge with loud and terrible cries. The Lacedæmonians, who had broken their ranks as they deſcended into the ditch, no ſooner ſaw the enemy upon the bank above them, than they immediately began to fly. But great numbers of them were deſtroyed in the ditch: ſome by the Achæans; and ſome by their own men. Nor was this event to be aſcribed to chance, or even to the interpoſition of a lucky moment; but wholly to the ability of the commander. For Philopœmen had covered himſelf with the ditch in front, not with any intention, as ſome ſuſpected, to avoid a battle; but becauſe his great ſkill and judgement had enabled him to foreſee, that, if Machanidas, not regarding the difficulty of the ditch, ſhould lead his phalanx to the charge, the event muſt happen which now had happened: and, if the tyrant, on the other hand, ſtopped by this impediment, ſhould change his purpoſe, and be forced to break the order of his battle, that his ignorance would be then confeſſed; and that he would leave to his enemies the honour of a victory, and carry away the ſhame of a defeat, even without having riſked a general engagement. Such diſgrace, the greateſt indeed that can happen in war, has been the lot of many commanders: who, when they have formed their army, have been deterred from engaging with the enemy, either by the diſadvantage of the ground, the ſuperiority of numbers, or ſome other cauſe; and being forced to break again the order of their battle, have depended wholly upon their rear for victory, or for the opportunity at leaſt of making their retreat with ſafety. With regard to Philopœmen, his foreſight was proved true by the event: for the Lacedæmonians were completely routed.

When he found then that his phalanx had thus gained the victory, and that all things had ſucceeded moſt glorioufly as he deſired, he now turned his thoughts to the only remaining point, which was, to prevent the tyrant from eſcaping. Know-

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ing him to be intercepted, together with his mercenaries, between the city and the ditch, he ſtood expecting his return. Machanidas, at laſt coming back from his inconſiderate purſuit, and ſeeing the flight of his forces, was ſenſible of the miſtake which he had committed, and at the ſame time perceived that all was loſt. He ordered the mercenaries therefore that were near him to form themſelves into a cloſe body, and to force their way through the enemy, who were ſpread looſely over the field, and buſied in purſuing the routed army. Some of his troops obeyed this order, and remained for ſome time with him; conceiving this to be the only expedient by which they might be able to eſcape. But when they came to the bridge that was upon the ditch, and found it guarded by the Achæans, they immediately loſt all hope; and all of them diſperſed themſelves, and ſought their ſafety by different ways. Machanidas himſelf, laying aſide all thoughts of attempting to eſcape by the bridge, rode along the bank of the ditch, and looked earneſtly for ſome place in which he might paſs it. Philopœmen ſoon diſcerned him by his purple habit, and by the trappings of his horſe. Leaving therefore the care of the bridge to Ariſtænetus; with orders that he ſhould ſpare none of the mercenaries, becauſe they had always been the inſtruments of eſtabliſhing tyranny in Sparta; and taking with him two of his intimate friends, Polyænus the Cypariſian and Simias, he paſſed to the other ſide of the ditch, and rode along the bank oppoſite to the tyrant, with deſign to ſtop him in his paſſage, and thoſe who attended him. For he alſo was followed by two companions; Anaxidamus, and one of the mercenaries. Machanidas, having at laſt found a place that was eaſy of deſcent, ſpurred his horſe, and drove him furiouſly through the ditch. But Philopœmen, in this very moment turning himſelf to meet him, happily wounded him with his ſpear; and then, ſhifting the ſpear in his hand, ſtruck him again with the lower part of it, and

and killed him. One of his companions, Anaxidamus, was at the ſame time killed by the two friends who attended Philopœmen; and the other ſought his ſafety in flight. Simias then ſpoiled the bodies; and, having cut off the head of the tyrant, ran to ſhew it to thoſe that were engaged in the purſuit: that the ſoldiers, perceiving that Machanidas was dead, might aſſume new confidence, and follow the flying enemy without any fear even to Tegea. This ſpectacle produced the effect that was deſired; and raiſed ſo great ardour in the army, that they even gained poſſeſſion of Tegea upon their firſt approach. On the following day, they incamped along the banks of the Eurotas, and were maſters of all the open country. Thus the Achæans, who not long before had been unable to drive the enemy out of their own territory, had now all Laconia in their power, and ravaged it without reſiſtance. They had loſt but few of their men in the action: but, on the ſide of the Lacedæmonians, four thouſand were killed, and a greater number taken priſoners. All the baggage alſo, and the arms, fell into the hands of the Achæans.

EXTRACT the FOURTH.

Reflections on the great abilities of Annibal. The cauſe of his failing in his attempt to ſubdue the Romans.

IT is impoſſible to contemplate the length of the time in which Annibal was employed in action; the general battles, as well as little combats, in which he was engaged; the ſieges that were undertaken by him; the revolts of cities that had ſubmitted to him; the difficult conjunctures that often preſſed him; and, in a word, the whole extent and greatneſs, both in deſign and execution, of his war againſt the Romans; and not to be ſtruck with admiration of the ſkill, the courage, and the ability of this great commander. How wonderful is it, that, in a courſe of ſixteen years, in which he maintained the war in the very heart of Italy, he ſhould never once diſmiſs his army from the field; and yet be able, like a wiſe and prudent governour, to keep in ſubjection ſo great a multitude, and to confine them within the bounds of their duty, ſo that they neither mutinied againſt him, nor broke into any ſedition among themſelves upon any occaſion. Though his army was compoſed of people of various countries; of Africans, Spaniards, Gauls, Carthaginians, and Greeks; men, who had different laws, different manners, a different language, and, in a word, nothing among them that was common; yet ſo dexterous was his management, that, notwithſtanding this great diverſity, he forced all of them to acknowledge one authority, and to yield obedience to one command. And this too he effected in the midſt of very various fortune. For ſometimes he was carried

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in his courſe by the moſt favourable gales: and ſometimes, he was involved in ſtorms. How high as well as juſt an opinion muſt theſe things convey to us of his ability in war. It may be affirmed with confidence, that, if he had firſt tried his ſtrength in the other parts of the world, and had come laſt to attack the Romans, he could ſcarcely have failed in any part of his deſign. But now, as he began with thoſe with whom he ſhould have ended, the people, that was the firſt object of his conqueſt, was the laſt alſo which he had the power to invade.

EXTRACT the FIFTH.

The defeat of Aſdrubal, the ſon of Geſco, by Publius Scipio.

ASDRUBAL, having drawn together his army from the ſeveral cities in which they had remained during the winter, came and incamped at the foot of a mountain, not far from a city that was called Elinga; and threw up an intrenchment round his camp. In his front was a large plain, very proper for a battle. The number of his forces was ſeventy thouſand foot, and four thouſand horſe; together with thirty-two elephants. At the ſame time Scipio ſent away Marcus Junius, to receive from Colichas the troops which that Spaniard had raiſed; and which conſiſted of three thouſand foot, and five hundred horſe: while himſelf collected together the reſt of the allies, as he advanced in his march towards the enemy. When he arrived near Caſtalo and Bæcula, he was met by Junius, with the forces which Colichas had ſent. He was now involved however in very great perplexity. On the one hand, the Roman forces alone, without the aſſiſtance of the allies, were too few to engage in a general battle. On the other, to place any dependance upon theſe allies, in ſo deciſive an action, appeared to be extremely hazardous and full of danger. After much deliberation therefore, as the neceſſity preſſed him cloſely on either ſide, he at laſt reſolved, that he would employ the Spaniards in ſuch a manner, that they ſhould appear to the enemy to bear a part in the action, but that only the Roman legions ſhould be engaged. Having thus determined, he began his march with all the army, which con-

conſiſted of forty-five thouſand foot, and three thouſand horſe: and when he came near to the Carthaginians, and was in ſight, he incamped upon ſome hills that were oppoſite to the enemy. Mago, judging this to be a favourable time for attacking the Romans, before they had completed their incampment, took with him the greateſt part of his own cavalry, together with the Numidians with Maſſaniſſa at their head, and advanced with ſpeed towards the camp, not doubting but that he ſhould find Scipio wholly unprepared. But the Roman General, having foreſeen that this might happen, had placed a body of cavalry, equal to that of the enemy, in ambuſcade at the foot of one of the hills. When theſe troops then ſuddenly appeared, the Carthaginians were ſo ſtruck with ſurprize at the unexpected ſight, that many of them, as they turned themſelves to fly, were thrown from their horſes. The reſt indeed ſtood firm, and maintained the fight with courage. But being cloſely preſſed, and diſordered chiefly by that dexterity with which the Romans were accuſtomed to quit their horſes in the very time of action; and having loſt alſo many of their men, they were forced to turn their backs after a ſhort reſiſtance. At firſt they retreated in good order. But when the Romans followed cloſely after them, they broke their ranks, and continued their flight in diſorder even to their own camp. This ſucceſs inſpired the Romans with greater eagerneſs to engage; and, on the other hand, depreſſed the ardour of the Carthaginians. During ſome days that followed, they drew out their forces on both ſides in the plain that was between the camps. And having tried their ſtrength in many little ſkirmiſhes between their cavalry and their light-armed troops, they at laſt reſolved to engage in a general and deciſive action.

Upon this occaſion Scipio employed two ſtratagems. He had remarked, that Aſdrubal always drew out his army at a late

a late hour of the day; and that he placed the Africans in the centre, and the elephants before the Spaniards upon the wings. Himſelf, on the other hand, had been accuſtomed to bring his army into the field at his own time after the other, and to poſt the Romans, oppoſite to the Africans, in the centre, and the Spaniards on the wings. On the day then, in which he had determined to engage, he took in both theſe reſpects juſt the contrary method; and, by that change chiefly, procured to his troops the advantage which they gained againſt the enemy. For ſcarcely had the morning begun to appear, when he ſent orders to the Tribunes and to all the army, that they ſhould immediately take their repaſt, put on their armour, and march out of the camp. The ſoldiers, conceiving what would follow, obeyed the orders with alacrity. He then ſent away the cavalry and the light-armed troops; commanding them to advance boldly towards the camp of the enemy, and to engage in ſkirmiſhing: and, the ſun being now riſen, he put himſelf at the head of the infantry, and began his march. And when he arrived near the middle of the plain, he then drew up the army in battle, but in an order contrary to that which he before had uſed. For he now placed the Spaniards in the centre, and the Romans upon the wings. The Carthaginians, ſurpriſed by the unexpected approach of the cavalry towards their camp, and perceiving that the reſt of the army was drawn up in battle, and already in ſight, had ſcarcely time ſufficient to be armed. Aſdrubal therefore, before the ſoldiers had taken any repaſt, was forced to ſend away in haſte his cavalry and light-armed troops againſt the Roman cavalry; and to draw up his infantry in the uſual order upon the plain, very near to the foot of the mountain.

While the light troops were engaged in ſkirmiſhing, the Roman infantry remained for ſome time quiet in their place. But as the day was now advanced, and no great advantage

was gained on either ſide, becauſe the cuſtom of theſe troops was to retreat when they were preſſed, and then returning again to renew the fight; Scipio called back his men from the engagement, and, having made them paſs through the intervals of the cohorts, ranged firſt the light-armed, and next to them the cavalry, behind the infantry upon each of the wings. He then ordered the whole line to move with equal pace towards the enemy. But when he came to the diſtance of about a ſtadium from them, having directed the Spaniards in the centre to keep their ranks, and to advance ſtill with the ſame pace; he ordered the infantry and cavalry of the right wing to turn to the right, and thoſe of the left to the left. He then took from the right wing three of the foremoſt troops of cavalry, with the accuſtomed number of light-armed in front; and three maniples of infantry, which the Romans call a cohort; while Lucius Marcius and Marcus Junius took in the ſame manner as many from the left: and then turning, Scipio with his diviſion to the left, and the others to the right, they led on the troops in a direct line, and with great ſpeed againſt the enemy; the reſt of the wings making alſo the ſame movement, and following cloſe in the ſame line. In this manner, as the wings were brought near to the enemy, while the Spaniards in the centre advanced with a ſlow pace, and were ſtill at a great diſtance, Scipio accompliſhed what he had at firſt deſigned, and fell direct upon both the wings of the enemy with only the Roman forces. The movements which were made afterwards by the troops that followed, in order to fall into a right line with thoſe that led, were contrary the one to the other, not only in the two wings, but in the cavalry alſo and the infantry of either wing. For, in the right wing, the cavalry and the light-armed forces, by turning to the right, fell into the line with thoſe that were before, and attempted to gain the flank of the enemy; while the infantry wheeled

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to the left, and joined their leaders. In the left wing, the infantry turned to the right; and the cavalry and light-armed to the left. By theſe movements of the cavalry and light-armed forces, the troops changed their place, ſo that the right in either wing became the left. This change however Scipio conſidered as in itſelf of no great moment. His attention was fixed upon ſomething more important; which was, to gain the flank of the enemy. And in this he judged right and reaſonably. For though it is neceſſary indeed that a General ſhould know the movements that may be made, it is of much greater moment to be able to apply thoſe movements upon each occaſion to their proper uſe.

As ſoon as the action was begun, the elephants, pierced by the darts of the cavalry and light-armed troops, and preſſed cloſely on every ſide, were not leſs hurtful to their friends than to their enemies. For as they were driven from ſide to ſide in great diſorder, they deſtroyed all without diſtinction that were within their reach. At the ſame time the infantry upon the wings of the Carthaginian army was vigorouſly attacked: while their centre, compoſed of the Africans, which were the choiceſt of their troops, remained inactive. For as they dared not, on the one hand, to leave their ſtation and ſuccour the wings, leſt the Spaniards that were in the centre of the Roman army ſhould advance to attack them; ſo neither were they able, on the other hand, to do any thing in their poſt againſt the Spaniards, becauſe the latter were ſtill at too great a diſtance from them. Thus the action was maintained by the wings alone; and, as the whole ſtreſs of the battle lay upon them, was for ſome time maintained on both ſides with equal bravery. But when the ſun had now gained his greateſt height, the Carthaginians, who had been brought haſtily into the field, and before they had taken any repaſt, began to faint under the heat. The Romans, on the other hand, not only were ſuperior in vigour and in ſpirit,

ſpirit, but derived alſo another advantage from the prudence of their General, who had oppoſed the ſtrongeſt part of his army to the weakeſt in that of the enemy. Aſdrubal therefore, unable any longer to reſiſt, at firſt retreated ſlowly, and in good order. But after a ſhort time, his whole army, turning their backs together, ran in crouds to the foot of the mountain: and from thence, being ſtill violently preſſed, they fled in diſorder into their camp. And indeed, if ſome deity had not interpoſed to ſave them, they muſt afterwards have been driven alſo out of their intrenchments. But ſuddenly the face of the heavens was changed; and the rain deſcended in ſuch violent and continual torrents, that the Romans were ſcarcely able to return back again to their camp.

EXTRACT the SIXTH.

The manner in which Scipio ſuppreſſed and puniſhed a ſedition that had happened in the Roman army.

THOUGH Scipio had now gained a ſufficient experience in affairs, he was thrown however by this revolt into a ſtate of great irreſolution and perplexity. Nor was this indeed without good reaſon. For as, in the caſe of the human body, the cauſes of external injuries, of thoſe for example which ariſe from heat and cold, from fatigue or wounds, may either be guarded againſt before they happen, or afterwards be remedied without much difficulty; while the diſorders on the other hand which are bred in the body itſelf, ulcers and diſeaſes, are neither eaſily foreſeen, nor eaſy to be cured; juſt ſo it happens with reſpect to governments and armies. When they are attacked by any enemy from without, if the neceſſary attention only be employed, it is no hard thing to take the meaſures that are requiſite for their ſecurity and defence. But to appeaſe the violence of inteſtine factions, to quell popular tumults and ſeditions, is a work of the greateſt difficulty; and ſuch as requires a very uncommon exertion both of addreſs and prudence. There is one precaution however, which, in my judgement, would be greatly ſerviceable in the caſe of ſtates and armies, as well as in human bodies: and that is, not to ſuffer in any of them a too long continuance in lazineſs and inactivity; eſpecially when they enjoy the bleſſings of plenty and proſperous fortune.

Scipio then, who, beſides that ſteady application to affairs which we before have mentioned, was very ready alſo and

and dexterous both in thought and action, contrived the following method for remedying the diſorder that had happened. He called together the Tribunes, and told them, that the ſtipends that were demanded ſhould be paid. And, that his promiſe might gain the greater credit, he directed that the taxes, which had been before impoſed upon the cities for the ſupport of the whole army, ſhould be levied publickly and with the greateſt diligence; as if his only intention had been, to raiſe the ſums that were now required. He ordered the Tribunes alſo to go back again to the revolted troops; and to uſe all intreaties, to engage them to return to their duty, and to come and receive their ſtipends, either ſeparately, if they ſhould chooſe that method, or all together in a body: aſſuring them alſo, that, when this was done, he would then conſider in what manner all other things might be adjuſted. Agreeably to this plan, the money was collected without delay. And when Scipio was informed, that the Tribunes had diſcharged alſo their commiſſion, he aſſembled the Council together, to conſider what was moſt proper to be done. The reſult of their deliberations was; that the troops ſhould come all to New Carthage on an appointed day: that a general pardon ſhould then be granted to the multitude: but that the authors of the mutiny ſhould be puniſhed with the laſt ſeverity. Theſe were in number thirty-five.

When the day was come, and the revolted troops were now on their way towards the city, to receive their pardon and the ſtipends that were due, Scipio gave ſecret inſtructions to the ſeven Tribunes who had been before deputed to them, to meet them as they approached: and that each of them, taking five of the ſeditious leaders, and accoſting them with a ſhew of friendſhip, ſhould preſs them to take a lodging in their quarters, or at leaſt to accept of the entertainment of a ſupper. Three days before, he had ordered the troops that were in the city to furniſh themſelves with proviſions for a

conſiderable time; on pretence that they were to march, under the command of Marcus, againſt Andobalis who had revolted. The ſeditious, being informed alſo of this order, were filled with ſtill greater confidence. For they perſuaded themſelves, that, as the reſt of the army would be removed, they ſhould have all things in their own power, as ſoon as they ſhould join the General.

When they were now ready to enter the city, Scipio ſent orders to the other troops, that they ſhould begin their march with all their baggage very early in the morning on the following day. But the Tribunes and the Prefects were at the ſame time ſecretly commanded, to ſend the baggage forwards as ſoon as they ſhould come out of the city, but to keep the ſoldiers in arms near the gate; to divide them afterwards into parties at every gate; and to be careful that none of the ſeditious ſhould come out of the city. The Tribunes, who had been appointed to receive the ſeditious leaders, met them as they arrived; and, having accoſted them with much civility, carried them to their houſes. The order given to them was, that they ſhould immediately ſecure the perſons of theſe men; and, when ſupper was ended, ſhould bind them, and keep them ſafe: and that no perſon afterwards ſhould be ſuffered to go out of the houſes; except only a meſſenger from each, to acquaint the General that the thing was done. This order was punctually obſerved and executed. On the morrow, when the day appeared, and the ſeditious already had begun to come in crouds towards the Forum, Scipio ordered the aſſembly to be called. As ſoon as the ſignal was made, the ſoldiers ran together, according to their cuſtom: expecting eagerly to ſee again their General, and to hear what he would ſay to them on the preſent occaſion. Scipio then ſent orders to the Tribunes who were without the gates, that they ſhould bring the troops in arms, and ſurround the aſſembly. At the ſame time he preſented himſelf before them; and in the

the inſtant, by his very firſt appearance, filled them with extreme confuſion. For they had ſuppoſed him to be broken with diſeaſe; and they behold him vigorous and ſtrong. His very aſpect therefore, ſo different from all that they had conceived, ſtruck them at once with ſurprize and terror. He then began his diſcourſe to them in the following manner.

He could not, he ſaid, but wonder, what motives, either of expectation or diſguſt, had led them into this revolt. That men uſually rebelled againſt their country and their leaders, either becauſe they were diſſatisfied with the conduct of thoſe who held the ſupreme command; or were diſpleaſed with the condition of affairs; or laſtly perhaps, becauſe they were ambitious of ſome greater fortune, and had filled their minds with aſpiring hopes. "Tell me then, continued he, to which of all theſe cauſes is your revolt to be aſcribed? Is it with me that you are offended, becauſe the payment of your ſtipends has been ſo long delayed? The fault however is not mine: for, during the whole time of my command, your ſtipends have been always fully paid. If it be Rome then that is in fault, in having neglected to diſcharge your former arrears, was it juſt that you ſhould ſhew this reſentment? taking arms againſt your country; and declaring yourſelves the enemies of her who had bred and nouriſhed you? How much better would it have been, to have made me the judge of your complaints; and to have intreated your friends to join together in obtaining for you the relief which you deſired? When mercenary troops indeed, who have no other object but their pay, deſert the ſervice in which they are engaged, ſuch a conduct, in certain circumſtances, may perhaps be excuſed. But in men who fight for themſelves, their wives, and children, this defection is a moſt unpardonable crime. It is no other indeed, than if a ſon, on pretence that his parent had defrauded him in ſettling an account, ſhould go armed to take away the life of him, from whom himſelf had

had received his being. Or will you ſay then, that I have employed you in more painful duties, or expoſed you more frequently to danger than the reſt; and have given to others the advantages of the war, and the chief part of all the booty? You dare not ſay, that I have ever made this diſtinction: and, if you dare, you cannot ſhew the proof. To what part of my conduct then can you impute the cauſe of your revolt? Speak, for I wiſh to be informed. There is not one among you that is able to declare, not one among you that can even form to himſelf in thought, the leaſt matter of offence againſt me. Nor is it again in the condition of affairs, that you can find any reaſonable ground of diſcontent. For when were all things in a more proſperous ſtate? At what time was Rome diſtinguiſhed by ſo many victories? At what period were her ſoldiers flattered with a fairer proſpect? But ſome of you perhaps are diffident of theſe appearances, and have fixed your hopes upon greater advantages, to be found among our enemies. And who are theſe enemies? Mandonius and Andobalis? Do not all of you then know, that, when they firſt joined our army, they broke their treaty with the Carthaginians: and that now again they have no leſs violated the moſt ſolemn oaths, by commencing new hoſtilities againſt us? How honourable is it for you to place a confidence in men like theſe; and to become, for their ſakes, the enemies of your country. You had ſurely never any hopes, that with ſuch allies you could render yourſelves the maſters of Spain. Neither aſſiſted by Andobalis, nor ſeparately by yourſelves, would you ever be able to ſtand in the field againſt our forces. What then was your deſign? Let me hear it only from yourſelves. Is it the ſkill, the courage of thoſe leaders, whom you have choſen to command you, that has filled you with this confidence? Or thoſe rods and axes, which are carried in ſolemn ſtate before them; and which it is even ſhameful for me now to mention? No, ſoldiers, theſe

are not the cauſes: nor can you offer even the ſmalleſt matter of complaint, either againſt me, or againſt your country. I muſt endeavour then to juſtify your conduct, both to Rome and to myſelf, by thoſe common principles, the truth of which is acknowledged by all mankind. The multitude is eaſily deceived; is impelled by the ſmalleſt force to every ſide; and, in a word, is ſuſceptible upon all occaſions of the ſame agitations as the ſea. For as the latter, though in itſelf it is calm and ſtable, and carries no face of danger, is no ſooner ſet in motion by ſome violent blaſt, than it reſembles the winds themſelves which raiſe and ruffle it; in the ſame manner the multitude alſo aſſumes an aſpect, conformable to the deſigns and temper of thoſe leaders, by whoſe counſels it is ſwayed and agitated. From this conſideration, all the officers of the army and myſelf have reſolved to pardon your offence, and to engage our promiſe, that no remembrance of it ever ſhall remain. But to thoſe who excited you to this revolt we are inexorable. The crime which they have committed, both againſt us, and againſt their country, ſhall be puniſhed with the ſeverity which it deſerves."

As ſoon as he had ended this diſcourſe, the troops that had ſurrounded the aſſembly in arms, upon a ſignal given, claſhed their ſwords againſt their bucklers; and at the ſame time the ſeditious leaders were brought in, bound and naked. And while ſome of them were ſcourged, and ſome beheaded, the whole multitude was ſo ſtruck with terror, both by the danger that incompaſſed them, and by the diſmal ſpectacle that was before their eyes, that not one among them changed his countenance, or uttered a ſingle word; but all of them ſtood fixed in ſilent aſtoniſhment and dread. The leaders, being thus put to death, were dragged through the midſt of the aſſembly. The General then, and all the officers, gave a ſolemn aſſurance to the reſt, that their fault ſhould never be remem-

remembered. The ſoldiers, approaching one by one, renewed their oath before the Tribunes; that they would be obedient to their chiefs, and not engage in any deſigns againſt their country. In this manner Scipio by his great prudence ſtifled a danger in its birth, which might have grown to be extremely formidable; and reſtored again his army to its former ſtate.

EXTRACT the SEVENTH.

The revolt of Andobalis. Scipio marches againſt that prince; defeats him in an engagement; and finiſhes the war in Spain.

SCIPIO, having called together without delay, and in the city of New Carthage, an aſſembly of all the troops, communicated to them the daring deſigns of Andobalis, and his perfidy towards them. Upon theſe topicks he ſpoke ſo largely, that the minds of the ſoldiers were ſharpened in the higheſt degree againſt that prince. Having then enumerated the many battles in which the Romans had been engaged, againſt the united forces of the Spaniards and the Carthaginians, with Carthaginian leaders alſo at their head; it would be abſurd, he ſaid, to think, when they had been always conquerours in thoſe actions, that they could fail to obtain the victory againſt the Spaniards alone, commanded by Andobalis. That, upon this account, he would not have recourſe to the aſſiſtance of any of the Spaniards, but would employ the Romans only in the preſent expedition: that from thence it might be known to all, that it was not by the ſtrength of the Spaniſh forces, as ſome pretended, that the Romans had driven the Carthaginians out of Spain; but that the Roman ſpirit alone, and the Roman bravery, had conquered both the Carthaginians and the Spaniards. "Baniſh then, continued he, from among you all diſſenſion: and, if ever you have engaged in any war with confidence, let me exhort you now to aſſume it. With regard to the ſucceſs, myſelf, with the aſſiſtance of the gods, will take ſuch meaſures as ſhall ſecure the victory." This diſcourſe inſpired

ſuch ardour into all the army, that by their countenance they ſeemed as if they were already in ſight of the enemy, and waiting only for the ſignal to engage. He then diſmiſſed the aſſembly.

On the following day he began his march: and arriving in ten days upon the banks of the Iberus, he paſſed the river on the fourth day afterwards, and incamped near to the enemy, having before him a valley which ſeparated the two camps. On the next day, having ordered Lælius to hold the cavalry in readineſs, and ſome Tribunes to prepare the light-armed forces for action, he drove ſome of the cattle that followed the army into the valley; and, when the Spaniards ran haſtily to ſeize this prey, ſent a part of the light-armed to attack them. The action was ſoon begun; and, as greater numbers advanced on either ſide to ſupport the firſt, a ſharp and general ſkirmiſhing enſued. But Lælius, who ſtood ready with his cavalry, perceiving the occaſion to be favourable, fell ſuddenly upon the enemy; and, having cut off alſo their retreat at the foot of the mountain, deſtroyed a great part of the Spaniards who were diſperſed through the valley. The barbarians, enraged by the loſs which they had ſuſtained, and dreading leſt they ſhould ſeem to be diſheartened, and to have ſuffered an intire defeat, drew out all their army as ſoon as the morning appeared, and reſolved to engage in a general battle. Scipio on his part was no leſs ready. But as he perceived that the Spaniards ſhewed ſo little ſkill and judgement, that they deſcended with all their forces into the valley, and ranged their infantry as well as their cavalry upon the plain, he waited for ſome time, that as great a number of them as was poſſible might come down. For though he placed great confidence in his cavalry, he depended ſtill more upon his infantry; becauſe the latter, both from their bravery, and from the manner alſo in which they were armed, were far ſuperior to the Spaniards, in cloſe and ſet engagements. When he ſaw then,

that as great a number had come down as he deſired, he advanced in order of battle againſt that part of the Spaniſh army which was poſted near to the foot of the mountain; and ſent away four cohorts, drawn up in cloſe order, to attack the infantry in the valley. At the ſame time Lælius, having led his cavalry along the hills that extended from the camp to the valley, fell upon the cavalry of the enemy in their rear, and kept them cloſely engaged. The Spaniſh infantry, being in this manner deprived of the aſſiſtance of the cavalry, by which they had expected to be ſupported, were unable to maintain the fight. The cavalry alſo laboured under no leſs diſadvantage. Confined within a narrow ground, and diſordered by the difficulties of their ſituation, they killed more of their own men than the Romans killed. For they were preſſed in flank by their own infantry; by the Roman infantry in front; and by the Roman cavalry in their rear. Such then was the courſe of this engagement. The Spaniards who had come down into the valley were almoſt all of them deſtroyed: and the reſt that were drawn up near the foot of the hills ſought their ſafety in flight. Theſe were the light-armed troops, which compoſed about a third part of the army. Among theſe Andobalis found means to eſcape; and fled to a certain fortified place. The war in Spain being thus intirely finiſhed, Scipio returned back to Taraco full of joy: having atchieved for his country a glorious conqueſt, and ſecured to himſelf the honour of a ſplendid triumph. Being then deſirous to be preſent at the election of Conſuls, as ſoon as he had regulated all things in Spain, he committed the care of the army to Marcus and Syllanus, and ſailed away with Lælius and the reſt of his friends to Rome.

EXTRACT the EIGHTH.

Antiochus concludes a treaty with Euthydemus; and returns from his expedition into the upper provinces of Aſia.

EUTHYDEMUS, who was himſelf a native of Magneſia, endeavoured to juſtify his conduct, and ſaid, that Antiochus had no reaſon for attempting to deprive him of his kingdom; ſince he never had rebelled againſt him, but had only obtained poſſeſſion of Bactriana, by deſtroying the deſcendants of thoſe who had before revolted. He inſiſted long upon this point; and intreated Teleas to mediate for him with Antiochus; that hoſtilities might ceaſe, and that he might be allowed to retain the name of king. He urged, that ſuch a reconciliation was even neceſſary for their common ſafety. That thoſe wandering tribes, who were ſpread in great numbers along the borders of the province, were alike dangerous to them both; and that, if ever they ſhould gain admittance into it, the whole country muſt inevitably fall into a ſtate of barbariſm. With theſe inſtructions he ſent back Teleas to the king.

Antiochus, who had been long deſirous of putting an end to the war, acknowledged the force of theſe reaſons, and declared himſelf willing to accept the peace that was offered. And when Teleas had gone and returned again many times, Euthydemus at laſt ſent his own ſon Demetrius to ratify the treaty. The king received him favourably; and judging by his appearance and his converſation, as well as by a certain air of majeſty that was conſpicuous in his perſon, that the young man was worthy of a kingdom, he promiſed to give him one of his daughters in marriage, and to ſuffer his

his father to retain the name of king. The reſt of the treaty was expreſſed in writing, and the alliance confirmed by oaths.

After this tranſaction, Antiochus, having firſt diſtributed a large quantity of corn among his troops, and taken the elephants that belonged to Euthydemus, began his march with all his army. Paſſing mount Caucaſus, he came into India, and renewed his alliance with Sophagaſenus the Indian king. In this place he obtained more elephants; ſo that his whole number was now a hundred and fifty: and having furniſhed his army alſo with a new ſupply of corn, he again decamped; but left Androſthenes behind him, to receive the money which the king had engaged to pay. He then traverſed the province of Arachoſia; and, having paſſed the river Erymanthus, and advanced through Drangiana into Carmania, as the winter now approached, he ſent his troops into quarters. Such was the end of the expedition of Antiochus into the upper provinces of Aſia: an expedition, which ſecured to him the obedience not only of thoſe provinces, but of all the maritime cities, and all the princes likewiſe that were on this ſide of mount Taurus; covered his own proper kingdom againſt invaſion, and gave to all mankind the higheſt opinion both of his courage and his love of labour. For from this time, not the people of Aſia only, but thoſe alſo of Europe, conſidered him as a prince that was moſt worthy to reign.

THE

GENERAL HISTORY

OF

POLYBIUS.

BOOK the TWELFTH.

EXTRACT the FIRST.

The miſtakes of Timæus in his accounts of Africk, and of Corſica. The manner of conducting herds of ſwine in Italy and in Greece.

AFRICK is indeed a country of wonderful fertility. How blameable then is Timæus, who not only neglected to acquire a proper knowledge in theſe matters, but with a childiſh weakneſs, deſtitute of judgement, and truſting to the credit of ancient ſtories which have been long ago exploded, repreſents this whole part of the world as a dry and barren ſand, incapable of producing any fruits. Nor is this country leſs remarkable with reſpect to the animals with which it abounds. For not only horſes and oxen, but ſheep alſo and goats, are found in it in greater numbers, than any other

other part of the world perhaps can ſhew. Upon this account it is, that many of the inhabitants of this vaſt country, neglecting the cultivation of the lands, live upon the fleſh of their cattle, and among their cattle. Every one alſo knows, that Africk breeds elephants, lions, and leopards, in great numbers, and of a ſurpriſing ſtrength; together with buffaloes which are extremely beautiful, and oſtriches of an enormous ſize; and that none of theſe animals are found in any part of Europe. But Timæus is ſilent with reſpect to all theſe things; and ſeems indeed as if he had deſigned to give ſuch a deſcription of this country as ſhould be moſt contrary to the truth.

The ſame want alſo of exactneſs and fidelity appears in his account of Corſica. Speaking of this iſland in his ſecond book, he ſays; that the goats, the ſheep, and the oxen, which are found in great numbers upon it, are all of them wild, as well as the deer, the hares, the wolves, and other animals; and that the inhabitants hunt them with dogs, and paſs their whole lives in that employment. Now it is certain, that there is not any ſuch thing in the iſland as a wild goat or ox; nor even a hare, a wolf, or a deer, or any other animal that is wild; except only ſome foxes, ſome rabbits, and a ſort of wild ſheep. The rabbit, at a diſtance, appears to be a hare of a ſmaller ſize: but when taken, is found to be very different from the hare, both in figure and taſte. This creature lives chiefly under the ground. It is true indeed that the animals in this iſland all appear to be wild: and the reaſon is this. As the iſland is rough and rocky, and covered alſo with woods, the ſhepherds are not able to follow their cattle into the places in which they are diſperſed: but, when they have found a convenient paſture, and are deſirous of bringing them together, they ſound a trumpet. Upon this ſignal, the whole herd immediately run together, and follow the call of their own ſhepherd, never

never miſtaking one for another. When ſtrangers therefore come upon the iſland, and attempt to take any of the goats or oxen which they ſee feeding by themſelves, the cattle, not uſed to be approached, immediately fly. And if the ſhepherd, perceiving what has happened, at the ſame time ſounds his trumpet, they all run towards him with the greateſt haſte. From hence it is that they are ſuppoſed to be wild: and Timæus, having made only a ſlight and curſory inquiry, has fallen into the ſame miſtake.

That the cattle ſhould be thus obedient to the ſound of a trumpet, is no very wonderful thing. In Italy, thoſe who have the care of ſwine never incloſe them in ſeparate paſtures, nor follow them behind, as the cuſtom is among the Greeks; but go always before them, and from time to time ſound a horn. The ſwine follow, and run together at the ſound: and are ſo taught by habit to diſtinguiſh their own proper horn, that their exactneſs in this reſpect appears almoſt incredible to thoſe who never heard of it before. As the conſumption of theſe animals is very great in Italy, the herds that are raiſed to ſatisfy the demand are alſo very numerous; though fewer indeed than they were in ancient Italy, when the country was poſſeſſed by the Tyrrhenians and the Gauls. At this time however, a thouſand hogs, and ſometimes a greater number, are reared from a ſingle ſow. In the morning they are turned out of their pens, in different troops, according to their breed and age. But when the herds meet together, it is not poſſible to keep them thus diſtinct; or to prevent them from being mingled one with another, either when they leave their pens, or as they feed in the paſtures, or when they return back again at night. The horn therefore was invented, as a method of ſeparating them without any difficulty. For as ſoon as the conductors go to different ſides, and ſound their horns, the herds ſeparate themſelves each from the reſt; and run all of them with

ſuch alacrity to the ſound of their own horn, that no violence is ſufficient to ſtop them in their courſe. In Greece on the contrary, when different herds meet together in the foreſts, he who has the moſt numerous herd, whenever he finds a proper opportunity, drives away the cattle of his neighbour, which are thus mingled with his own. Or ſome robber perhaps, who has waited in ambuſcade, carries away a whole herd unperceived; if the ſwine, as it often happens, have wandered too far from their conductor, in ſearch of the acorns when they begin to fall. But this is ſufficient upon this ſubject.

EXTRACT the SECOND.

The account given by Ariſtotle of the Locrians of Italy is confirmed by the cuſtoms and traditions which are found among that people.

I HAVE often viſited the Locrians, and have even performed for them ſome conſiderable ſervice. It was through my requeſt, that they were excuſed from attending the Roman armies into Spain; and from furniſhing the ſuccours which they were bound to ſend to the Romans by ſea, in their war againſt the Illyrians. Upon theſe accounts, conſidering me as a perſon whoſe good offices had exempted them from much fatigue, as well as from great danger and expence, they have always treated me with ſingular reſpect and honour. I ſhould certainly therefore be inclined, rather to ſpeak favourably of this people, than otherwiſe. Yet I cannot heſitate to declare, that the account, which Ariſtotle has delivered to us concerning this colony, is nearer to the truth, than that which is reported by Timæus. The Locrians themſelves have indeed aſſured me, that their own traditions are more conformable to the account of Ariſtotle, than to that of Timæus. Of this they mention the following proofs.

The firſt is, that all nobility of anceſtry among them is derived from women, and not from men. That thoſe, for example, alone are noble, who draw their origin from the hundred families. That theſe families were noble among the Locrians, before they migrated: and were the ſame indeed, from which a hundred virgins were taken by lot, as the oracle had commanded, and were ſent to Troy. That ſome women of theſe families came with the colony into

Italy: and that thoſe who have deſcended from them are ſtill reputed noble, and are called the deſcendants of the hundred families.

Another inſtance is ſeen, in the appointment of the virgin called the Phialephorus. The account which the Locrians give of the inſtitution is this. At the time when they drove the Sicilians out of this part of Italy, the latter had a cuſtom of appointing a young man, who was choſen always from the nobleſt and the moſt illuſtrious of their families, to lead the proceſſion in their ſacrifices. The Locrians, not having received any religious ceremonies from their own nation, adopted many of thoſe that were uſed by the people with whom they were mixed, and among others this that is here mentioned. But they changed it in one circumſtance. For, inſtead of a young man, they appointed a virgin to perform the office; becauſe nobility among them was derived from women.

The ſame people affirm, that they never had any treaty with the Locrians of Greece, and that there was no account remaining among them of any ſuch treaty: but that they know by conſtant tradition that they had a treaty with the Sicilians, which was executed in the following manner. When they came firſt into the country, and found that the Sicilians were ſtruck with terror, and made no attempt to oppoſe their entrance, they concluded a convention with them in theſe words. "That they would live together as friends, and poſſeſs the country in common, as long as they ſhould tread upon this earth, and carry the heads upon their ſhoulders." But the Locrians, at the time of taking this oath, had put ſome earth within the ſoles of their ſhoes, and ſome heads of garlick, which appeared not in ſight, upon their ſhoulders. And having afterwards ſhaken the earth out of their ſhoes, and thrown away the heads, they ſeized the firſt favourable opportunity, and in a ſhort time drove the Sicilians out of the country.

EX-

EXTRACT the THIRD.

An obſervation concerning truth and falſehood in Hiſtory.

TIMÆUS ſays, that, as a rule, which is perhaps defective either in length or breadth, is ſtill a rule, and deſerves to be ſo called, if it be only ſtrait and even; and, if it wants this chief and moſt eſſential property, ought to be called any thing rather than a rule; in the ſame manner thoſe written memoirs which record events, however faulty they may be in ſtile and diſpoſition, and however defective in ſome neceſſary properties, yet, if the facts be true which are related, deſerve to be called a Hiſtory, and, if theſe be falſe, are utterly unworthy of that name. For my part, I am ready to acknowledge, that truth ſhould be conſidered as the principal and moſt eſſential part in all ſuch compoſition. I have even ſaid in a former part of this work, that as an animal, when deprived of ſight, becomes incapable of performing its natural and proper functions, ſo, if we take away truth from Hiſtory, what remains will be nothing but an uſeleſs tale. But there are two kinds of falſehood: one, which proceeds from ignorance; and the other from deſign. And as thoſe writers may be excuſed, who offend againſt the truth through ignorance; ſo thoſe on the contrary, who pervert it with deſign, ought never to be pardoned.

EXTRACT the FOURTH.

The malignity of Timæus cenſured.

WHEN men of ſenſe revenge an injury, they examine in the firſt place, what puniſhment it becomes them to inflict, and not what their enemies deſerve to ſuffer. In the ſame manner alſo, when we throw reproaches upon others, we ought principally to conſider, not what is fit for them to hear, but what is proper for us to ſpeak. For if our own paſſion and reſentment be the rule, we ſhall ſet no bounds to what we ſay; but muſt fall into the moſt unwarrantable exceſs.

Upon this account it is, that I cannot allow any degree of credit to Timæus, in the things which he has reported againſt Demochares. His calumnies are indeed ſo groſs, that they are neither to be admitted, nor excuſed. They ſhew too plainly, that the natural acrimony of his own temper has tranſported him beyond all the bounds of decency. Nor is the account which he has given of Agathocles, how much ſoever that prince may have exceeded all other tyrants in impiety, in any degree more juſtifiable. For in the concluſion of his hiſtory he writes; that Agathocles from his earlieſt youth was a common proſtitute, obedient to the call of the moſt debauched: that he was a jay and a buzzard; ready to act or to ſuffer, with all that offered, in the moſt infamous luſt: and that, when he died, his wife, as ſhe lamented over him, uſed theſe exclamations: "What have not I for you? What have not you for me?" In this inſtance again, not only the ſame ſpirit is diſcernible, which appeared in his cenſure of Demochares; but ſuch an exceſs alſo of rancour, as is indeed

indeed aſtoniſhing. For, from the facts which Timæus himſelf has mentioned, it is evident that Agathocles was endowed by nature with very extraordinary talents. To leave the wheel, the kiln, and the clay, and to come to Syracuſe at the age of eighteen years; to follow his deſign with ſuch ſucceſs, as in a ſhort time to become maſter of all Sicily; to render himſelf formidable and dangerous to Carthage; and laſtly, to grow old in the ſovereignty which he had gained, and to die with the title of king; are not theſe moſt ſignal proofs, that he was born with wonderful abilities, and poſſeſſed all the powers that are requiſite for the adminiſtration of great affairs? The hiſtorian then, inſtead of confining himſelf to thoſe actions which might ſerve to vilify Agathocles, and render him odious in the eyes of poſterity, ſhould have inſiſted likewiſe upon thoſe parts of his conduct that were worthy of praiſe. For this is indeed the proper office of hiſtory. But Timæus, blinded by his own rancourous ſpirit, takes a malignant pleaſure in recounting with exaggeration the defects of this prince, but paſſes haſtily over all his ſhining qualities: and ſeems not to have known, that to ſuppreſs facts in hiſtory, is no leſs a kind of falſehood, than to report what never had exiſtence.

EXTRACT the FIFTH.

A law of Zaleucus concerning the occupancy of a thing conteſted. A remarkable inſtitution of the ſame lawgiver.

TWO young men among the Locrians had a conteſt together concerning a ſlave. One of them had for a long time had him in his poſſeſſion. The other, two days only before the ſuit, went into the country, took away the boy by force in the abſence of his maſter, and carried him to his own houſe. The maſter, as ſoon as he was informed of what had happened, went to the houſe, and, getting his ſlave again into his hands, carried him before the judges, and contended, that, upon his giving ſureties, the boy ought to remain with him, till the right ſhould be determined. For the law of Zaleucus, he ſaid, declared; that the thing conteſted ſhould remain, during the ſuit, in the poſſeſſion of him from whom it was taken. The other young man inſiſted on the other hand, that, by this very law, the boy ought to be left with him: becauſe he was the perſon from whom he was taken; and that it was from his houſe that he was brought before the judges. The judges, conceiving that there was ſome difficulty in the caſe, went and referred it to the Coſmopolite: and this magiſtrate explained the law in the following manner. He ſaid, that by the words, "from whom it was taken," was to be underſtood the perſon who had laſt held an undiſturbed poſſeſſion of the thing in diſpute for a certain time: but that, if any one ſhould come and take away a thing by force from another, and carry it to his own houſe, and the firſt poſſeſſor ſhould come afterwards and take it from him again, the perſon, from whom it laſt was taken, was not the

perſon intended by the law. The young man, againſt whom the judgement was given, was diſſatisfied with this interpretation, and denied it to be the ſenſe of the Legiſlator. The Coſmopolite then demanded, whether any one would diſpute with him concerning the intention of the law, in the manner which Zaleucus had preſcribed. The manner was, that the two diſputants ſhould ſpeak, each with a rope round his neck, in the preſence of a thouſand perſons: and that he, who ſhould be judged to have contended for a wrong interpretation, ſhould be ſtrangled in ſight of the aſſembly. The young man replied, that the condition was not equal. For the Coſmopolite, who was almoſt ninety years old, had only two or three years left to live: but that himſelf, in all appearance, had ſtill the greateſt part of his life before him. This facetious anſwer turned the whole matter into pleaſantry: and the judges gave their ſentence according to the opinion of the Coſmopolite.

EXTRACT the SIXTH.

The groſs abſurdities of Calliſthenes, in his deſcription of the battle between Alexander and Darius in Cilicia.

IN order to ſhew the truth of what I have affirmed, I ſhall examine only one ſingle battle: a battle, which is very much celebrated; which happened at no very diſtant time; and, becauſe this alſo is a circumſtance of the greateſt moment, a battle in which Calliſthenes himſelf was preſent. I mean the battle which was fought between Alexander and Darius in Cilicia.

In the account then which Calliſthenes has given of this battle, he relates; that Alexander had already led his army through the paſſes which are called the Pylæ of Cilicia, when Darius, having advanced along the paſſes of the mountain Amanus, and being informed by the people of the country that his enemy ſtill continued his march forwards into Syria, reſolved to follow him. That when he arrived near the paſſes of Cilicia, he incamped along the river Pyramus: that the ground which he occupied contained a ſpace of only fourteen ſtadia from the ſea to the foot of the mountain: and that the river, falling down the craggy ſides of the mountain, ran obliquely through this ground, and paſſing over the plain, between ſome hills that were rough and difficult of approach, diſcharged itſelf into the ſea. After this deſcription, he ſays; that, when Alexander returned back again with a deſign to engage, Darius and his officers drew up the whole phalanx in order of battle upon the very ground upon which they had incamped; and that they were covered in front by the river, which ran cloſe to the camp: that they poſted

poſted the cavalry near to the ſea: next to theſe, in the ſame line, the mercenaries, along the bank of the river: and laſtly the Peltaſtæ, adjoining to the foot of the mountain.

But it is not poſſible to conceive, that theſe troops could have been thus drawn up in order of battle between the phalanx and the river, if the river ran cloſe to the camp: eſpecially if we conſider the numbers of which the ſeveral bodies were compoſed. For the cavalry, as Calliſthenes himſelf affirms, amounted to thirty thouſand; and the mercenaries to as great a number. Now it is eaſy to determine, what extent of ground this number of troops would require. The uſual method of drawing up cavalry in the time of action is to range them eight in depth. It is neceſſary alſo to leave a certain ſpace between each of the troops in front, that they may be able to perform their ſeveral motions. A ſingle ſtadium then will contain eight hundred horſe; ten ſtadia eight thouſand; and four ſtadia, three thouſand and two hundred. According to this computation, a body of eleven thouſand and two hundred horſe would have filled the whole extent of fourteen ſtadia. And if the whole thirty thouſand were formed in order of battle, there muſt have been three ſuch bodies, within a very ſmall number at leaſt, drawn up each behind the other. In what place then were the mercenaries ranged? Was it behind the cavalry? But Calliſthenes ſays no ſuch thing. On the contrary he affirms, that the mercenaries were engaged againſt the Macedonians in the very beginning of the action. It is manifeſt therefore, that one half of the ground that has been mentioned, the part that was on the ſide of the ſea, was occupied by the cavalry; and the other half, which was next to the mountain, by the mercenaries. And from hence we may clearly judge, what muſt have been the depth of the cavalry; and, by conſequence, how very diſtant the river muſt have been from the camp.

Afterwards he relates, that, when the enemy approached, Darius, who was in the centre of the line, called the mercenaries to him from one of the wings. But how was this poſſible? The very part in which the mercenaries were joined to the cavalry was itſelf the centre. If Darius then was among the mercenaries, how, or from whence, or to what place did he call them? He then adds alſo, that the cavalry upon the right wing advanced, and vigorouſly charged the Macedonians: that the latter received them with equal courage: and that the fight on both ſides was maintained with the greateſt bravery. But he forgets that there was a river between this cavalry and the Macedonians; and ſuch a river too, as he had juſt before deſcribed.

Nor is this writer more exact in his account with reſpect to Alexander. He ſays, that this prince firſt carried with him into Aſia forty thouſand foot, and four thouſand five hundred horſe: and that, when he was ready to enter Cilicia, a new ſupply arrived from Macedon, of five thouſand foot, and eight hundred horſe. If we take then from theſe three thouſand foot, and three hundred horſe; which is the greateſt number that can be allowed for occaſional and abſent ſervices; there will remain forty-two thouſand foot, and five thouſand horſe. With this army Alexander, as the hiſtorian writes, being informed, after he had advanced beyond the Pylæ, that Darius had entered Cilicia, and was at the diſtance of only a hundred ſtadia behind him, immediately returned, and directed his march back again through the paſſes: having the infantry in his van; behind theſe, the cavalry; and the baggage in the rear. As ſoon as he came into the open plain, he ſeparated the army from the baggage, and formed the troops into a phalanx, by thirty-two in depth. At ſome diſtance afterwards, he ranged them by ſixteen in depth: and at laſt, when he was come near to the enemy, by eight.

Now theſe abſurdities are even greater than thoſe that were before remarked. For when a body of troops marches by ſixteen in depth, if we allow the uſual intervals of ſix feet between every rank, a ſtadium will contain only ſixteen hundred men: ten ſtadia, ſixteen thouſand; and twenty ſtadia, thirty-two thouſand. If Alexander therefore formed his phalanx by ſixteen in depth, he muſt have filled a ſpace of twenty ſtadia, and would ſtill have wanted room for all his cavalry, and for ten thouſand of his foot. Calliſthenes then adds, that when this prince was at the diſtance of forty ſtadia from the enemy, he ordered the phalanx to advance in an extended front towards them. A greater abſurdity than this is ſcarcely to be conceived. For where is the ground, eſpecially in Cilicia, that will admit ſuch a phalanx as is here deſcribed to advance in an extended front againſt an enemy: a ground, containing twenty ſtadia in depth, and forty in length? The impediments alſo, which would inevitably break the order of ſuch a diſpoſition, are too many to be recounted. Calliſthenes himſelf has mentioned one, which is alone ſufficient. For he ſays, that the torrents, which deſcended from the hills, had formed ſo many pits in the plain, that the greateſt part of the Perſians were loſt in thoſe cavities as they fled.

But Alexander, perhaps this writer might ſay, was willing to be ready to receive the enemy, in what part ſoever they ſhould come to attack him. But nothing is more unfit for this purpoſe, than the phalanx formed in an extended front, if this front be broken and diſunited. And would it not alſo have been much more eaſy, to have ranged the ſeveral parts of this great body in the very order in which they followed each of them the other in the march: inſtead of forming the whole army in a ſingle line, in which there muſt have been many vacancies, and leading it in an extended front to action, over a ground that was covered with buſhes and broken cavi-

cavities. He ought rather then to have formed a double, or a quadruple phalanx, one part following behind another. For if the ground would have admitted this order in the march, there would have been time ſufficient to draw up the troops in the ſame order in battle: eſpecially as he might have received notice from his ſcouts of the approach of the enemy, even while they were at a conſiderable diſtance from him.

Another fault in this deſcription is, that the hiſtorian, while he repreſents the phalanx as advancing in an extended front over a plain, forgets to make the cavalry march before; and places them upon the ſame line with the infantry. But the greateſt of all his miſtakes is this which follows. He ſays that Alexander, when he approached the enemy, drew up the phalanx eight in depth. The whole line therefore muſt have been equal in length to forty ſtadia. Or, let it be ſuppoſed, that the men ſtood ſo cloſe together, as even to be wedged one within another. In that caſe, they muſt have covered at the leaſt twenty ſtadia. And yet Calliſthenes had before affirmed, that the whole length of the ground was leſs than fourteen ſtadia: that a part of it, which was neareſt to the ſea, was occupied by one half of the cavalry: that the other half was poſted upon the right: and that between the whole line and the mountain there was left alſo a conſiderable diſtance; that the troops might not fall under a body of the enemy, which was poſted upon the ſides of the mountain. I know indeed, that, in order to oppoſe this body, he here forms a part of the line in the figure called the Forceps. Let us allow then ten thouſand men; which is even a greater number than this purpoſe would require. In that caſe it is evident, that there would remain, according to Calliſthenes, eleven ſtadia only at the moſt, for the length of the whole line: and that thirty-two thouſand men, contained in a ſpace of this extent, how cloſely ſoever they were crouded, muſt neceſſarily

ly have been formed by thirty in depth. And yet Calliſthenes affirms, that at the time of the action they were ranged by eight. Miſtakes like theſe cannot even be excuſed. For what credit is to be given to things that are impoſſible? When a writer lays down the exact meaſure of the ground, fixes the number of the men, aſcertains the diſtance of one man from another, and gives afterwards an account which is wholly incompatible with all theſe circumſtances; the falſehood is too glaring to be pardoned.

It would be tedious to examine all the errors into which this writer has fallen. One or two more however may juſt be mentioned. He ſays that Alexander took care to draw up his army in ſuch a manner, that he might himſelf be engaged againſt Darius: and that Darius alſo had at firſt the ſame intention with reſpect to Alexander; but that he afterwards altered his deſign. But he neither mentions, how theſe princes knew, in what part of their reſpective armies they ſeverally intended to engage; nor to what other part Darius retired, after he had changed his purpoſe. How again was it poſſible for the phalanx to advance, in order of battle, up the bank of a river, which was broken and uneven, and covered alſo with buſhes in almoſt every part? Such an abſurdity can never be aſcribed to Alexander; who is acknowledged to have been trained both in the ſtudy and the exerciſe of war from his earlieſt age. It muſt therefore be imputed to the hiſtorian himſelf; who, from a want of ſkill in matters of this kind, was unable to diſtinguiſh what was poſſible to be done from that which was impracticable. But this will be ſufficient concerning Ephorus and Calliſthenes.

EXTRACT the SEVENTH.

Topicks for a diſcourſe in praiſe of peace.

IN the firſt place, he ſays, the aſſembly may be told, that men are wakened in the morning, in the time of war by trumpets, and, in the time of peace, by the crowing of cocks. And again; that Hercules, when he inſtituted the Olympick Games, as a remiſſion after his toil, ſufficiently declared this to be his meaning: that, whenever he had brought miſchief upon any by making war, he was forced to it by neceſſity, and the commands of others; but that willingly he had never done harm to any perſon. To theſe arguments may be added the authority of the Poet: who introduces Jupiter, expreſſing his diſpleaſure againſt the god of war in the following words.

Of all the Gods that in Olympus dwell,
Thou art to me moſt hateful: for in ſtrife,
In war, and battles, ever is thy joy. *

In another paſſage, the wiſeſt of his heroes thus exclaims.

The man who ſtirs
The bloody horrors of inteſtine war,
No rights of kindred, or of family,
No laws of juſtice knows. †

Of the ſame kind alſo are the ſentiments of Euripides, expreſſed in the following lines.

* Iliad. B. V. 890. † Iliad. B. I. 63.

Parent

Parent of wealth, celeſtial Peace,
Thou faireſt of the heavenly train, O why,
Why this delay? Wilt thou again
Theſe longing eyes ne'er viſit? How I fear,
That age, inſenſible and cold,
My trembling limbs will ſeize, e'er I ſhall hail
The moment of thy bleſt return,
With the crown'd banquet, and the choral ſong. *

Again, it may be urged; that war reſembles a diſeaſe, and peace a ſtate of health. In one, the ſick are recovered: but the other deſtroys thoſe that are well. That in peace alſo, the old are buried by the young, as the courſe of nature requires: but, in war, the young are buried by the old. And again; that, in the time of war, we are not ſafe within the walls of our cities; but that, in peace, there is full ſecurity, even to the fartheſt limits of the country. The other motives which he mentions are of a like kind with theſe.

* Chorus from the Creſphontes.

EXTRACT the EIGHTH.

Men converſant in affairs are alone properly qualified for writing Hiſtory.

THERE are two organs given to man by nature, through which all information, and all knowledge of things is derived, the hearing and the ſight; and of theſe, the latter is by much the moſt conformable to truth. For the teſtimony of the eyes, as Heraclitus obſerves, is far more exact than that of the ears. But Timæus, in making his inquiries, had recourſe to the eaſieſt, though the leaſt preferable, of theſe two methods; and never employed his eyes, but only his ears. And even ſtill more; as the knowledge which is gained by hearing is alſo of two ſorts; the one derived from reading books, and the other from interrogating other men; Timæus, as we have already ſhewn, took no pains to obtain the latter. What determined his choice in this reſpect, is not difficult to be diſcovered. The knowledge that is acquired by reading is gained without any danger, or any kind of toil. If a man will only fix his reſidence in the neighbourhood of a library, or in a city that abounds with written memoirs, he may make his reſearches with perfect eaſe; and, repoſing himſelf in full tranquillity, may compare the accounts, and detect the errors of former writers. But the knowledge which is drawn from perſonal examination and inquiry, is attended with great fatigue and great expence. It is this however, which is the moſt important; and which gives indeed the chief value to Hiſtory. Hiſtorians themſelves are ready to acknowledge this truth.

For

For thus Ephorus ſays; that if it was poſſible for the writers of hiſtory to be preſent at all tranſactions, ſuch knowledge would be preferable to any other. To the ſame purpoſe is that paſſage of Theopompus: that the experience which is gained in battles renders a man a conſummate General: that practice in pleading cauſes forms the perfect Orator: and that the ſame obſervation is juſt with reſpect to the arts of navigation and of medicine. The Poet alſo inculcates the ſame truth with ſtill greater force. For deſigning to ſhew, in the perſon of Ulyſſes, what kind of qualities would render a man fit for the adminiſtration of affairs, he deſcribes him in the following words.

Sing Muſe the man, for various arts renown'd,
Who wander'd long through many different climes.

And afterwards:

Oft through the deep with heartfelt anguiſh born,
To diſtant nations he his courſe eſſay'd,
Their cities viſited, their manners knew.

And in another place he ſays; that he had experienced

The rage of battles, and the boiſterous wave. *

Now ſuch a man alſo is it, in my judgement, that would alone be able to give a proper figure to Hiſtory. It was ſaid by Plato, that human affairs would then be well adminiſtered, when philoſophers ſhould be kings, or kings philoſophers. In the ſame manner I would ſay; that Hiſtory would be well compoſed, if thoſe who are engaged in great affairs would undertake to write it; not in a ſlight and negligent manner,

* Odyſſ. B. I. 1. and Iliad. B. XXIV. 8.

like ſome of the preſent age; but regarding ſuch a work as one of the nobleſt and moſt neceſſary of their duties, and purſuing it with unremitted application, as the chief buſineſs of their lives: or if thoſe, on the other hand, who attempt to write, would think it neceſſary to be alſo converſant in the practice of affairs. Till this ſhall happen, there will be no end of miſtakes in hiſtory. Now Timæus never uſed the leaſt endeavours to acquire ſuch practice: but confining his reſidence to a ſingle place, in which alſo he was a ſtranger, he even induſtriouſly renounced an active life; was acquainted neither with politicks, nor war; nor ever expoſed himſelf to the fatigue of viſiting diſtant countries, and of making perſonal inquiries. And yet this man has gained the reputation of being an excellent hiſtorian. I know not, for my own part, upon what ſuch pretenſions can be grounded: eſpecially as he has himſelf acknowledged, that a good hiſtorian ſhould poſſeſs the qualifications which have been here enumerated. For, in the Preface to his ſixth book, he takes notice of an opinion which ſome perſons had advanced; that the demonſtrative kind of writing required greater genius, greater labour, and a greater ſtock of knowledge, than Hiſtory. This notion, as he ſays, had before given offence to Ephorus: and, becauſe that writer had not been able ſufficiently to refute it, he endeavours to ſtate, and to compare together, theſe two kinds of compoſition. * * * *

THE

GENERAL HISTORY

OF

POLYBIUS.

BOOK the THIRTEENTH.

EXTRACT the FIRST.

Avarice compared to a dropsy. Deceit and artifice are too generally practised in publick affairs. The different conduct of the Achæans: and in some degree also of the Romans.

AS in the case of those who are diseased with a dropsy, no application of liquours from without is sufficient to remove or allay the thirst, unless the internal disposition of the body be first changed by proper remedies; in the same manner also the desire of gain is never to be satisfied, unless reason be employed to correct the vicious inclination in the mind.

There are many who employ that dark and treacherous policy which has now been mentioned: and yet no one will deny,

deny, that ſuch a conduct is utterly unworthy of a king. But becauſe arts like theſe are now common in the world, ſome men are willing to ſuppoſe, that the practice of them is become altogether neceſſary in the adminiſtration of publick affairs. The Achæans however at all times were diſtinguiſhed by different ſentiments. So far were they from forming any ſecret deſigns againſt their friends, in order to enlarge their power; that they diſdained even to ſubdue their enemies with the aſſiſtance of deceit. In their opinion, victory was neither honourable nor ſecure, unleſs it was obtained in open conteſt, and by the force of ſuperior courage. Upon this account, they eſtabliſhed it as a kind of law among them, never to uſe any concealed weapons, nor to throw darts at a diſtance: being perſuaded, that an open and cloſe engagement was the only fair method of combat. From the ſame reaſon it was, that they not only made a publick declaration of war, but ſent notice alſo, each to the other, of their reſolution to try the fortune of a battle, and of the place likewiſe in which they had determined to engage. In the preſent times, a General is ſuppoſed to be ignorant in his profeſſion, if he diſcovers his intentions. Among the Romans alone, ſome ſlight traces of the ancient virtue ſtill remain. For they make beforehand a denunciation of war: they ſeldom form ambuſcades: and they fight always man to man in cloſe engagement. But in general artifice ſo much prevails, that it is now become the chief ſtudy of men to deceive each other, both in the adminiſtration of civil affairs, and in the conduct of war. And this it was which gave occaſion to theſe reflections.

EX-

EXTRACT the SECOND.

The deſigns of Philip againſt the Rhodians. The character of Heraclides.

PHILIP, being willing to give a proper ſubject to Heraclides for the exerciſe of his abilities, commanded him to contrive ſome method for diſabling or deſtroying the Rhodian fleet; and at the ſame time ſent ſome embaſſadours to Crete, to excite the people of that iſland againſt the Rhodians, and prevail with them to join him in the war. Heraclides, whoſe nature was well adapted to any ill deſign, received this commiſſion with joy: and, after ſome time employed in regulating his plan, ſailed away to Rhodes. This Heraclides was originally from Tarentum; and was born of vulgar parents, who exerciſed ſome mechanical trade. He poſſeſſed all the qualities that are requiſite to form a daring and a licentious profligate. From his earlieſt age he abandoned himſelf to the moſt ſcandalous proſtitution. He had a ready conception, and a ſtrong memory: was bold and terrible to his inferiors, but a baſe flatterer of thoſe who were above him. He had firſt been forced to leave Tarentum, on account of a ſuſpicion that was entertained againſt him, as if he had deſigned to betray the place to the Romans. Not that he at that time poſſeſſed any authority in the city: but being an architect, under the pretence of making ſome repairs in the walls, he had gotten into his hands the keys of the gate which led into the country. He then took refuge among the Romans; and, while he remained in their camp, entered again into a correſpondence with Annibal, and ſent letters

letters to Tarentum. But being diſcovered, and dreading the conſequences of his treaſon, he fled into Macedon; and, having inſinuated himſelf into the confidence of Philip, gained afterwards ſo great a power over him, that he was almoſt the principal cauſe of the ruin of that mighty kingdom.

EXTRACT the THIRD.

The force of Truth.

FOR my part I am perſuaded, that there is not in nature a greater goddeſs, or any that has a ſtronger power over men, than Truth. For, though all unite in oppoſition to her, and though falſehood draws up a whole train of probabilities, and ſets them in array againſt her, ſhe triumphs, I know not how, ſingle and unſupported, and forces her way into the heart. Sometimes her power is inſtantly diſcerned. Sometimes ſhe is obſcured for a while; but appears at laſt in perfect ſplendour, and ſurmounts by her own force alone the falſehood under which ſhe has been oppreſſed.

EXTRACT the FOURTH.

The cruelty of Nabis the tyrant of Sparta.

THE Lacedæmonian tyrant Nabis, though he had now for three years held the government, was deterred by the ill fortune of Machanidas, who had ſo lately been defeated by the Achæans, from attempting any thing of importance; but employed himſelf in forming the deſign, and laying the foundations of a ſevere and laſting tyranny. With this view he ſeemed determined to deſtroy all that were now left in Sparta: driving into baniſhment the citizens that were moſt diſtinguiſhed by their wealth or families; and diſtributing their poſſeſſions and their wives among the chief of thoſe that were attached to his party, and among the mercenaries that were retained in his ſervice. Theſe were all of them aſſaſſins, houſebreakers, nightly thieves, and robbers. For he ſpared no pains to collect together perſons of this ſort from every quarter: men whoſe crimes had forced them to abandon their own countries. Of all theſe he was the declared protector and the ſovereign: and, as he had formed them alſo into a guard for his perſon, it was manifeſt that he had determined to maintain his power by wickedneſs and violence. And indeed, not ſatisfied with driving the citizens into baniſhment, he reſolved that they ſhould find no ſafety even in the places to which they fled, nor any retreat ſecure. For ſome were deſtroyed upon the road by meſſengers whom he ſent to overtake them; and others brought back again and killed. In the cities alſo in which they had fixed their abode, having hired by the means of unſuſpected perſons the houſes that

that were adjoining to thoſe in which any of the exiles lived, he ſent thither ſome Cretans, who made holes in the walls, and, ſhooting arrows through the openings, killed ſome as they were ſtanding, and others as they repoſed themſelves in their own houſes. Thus the unhappy Lacedæmonians were in no time or place ſecure: and in this manner great numbers of them were deſtroyed.

He contrived alſo a machine, if it may be called indeed by ſuch a name; an image of a woman, magnificently dreſſed, and formed in a moſt exact reſemblance of his wife. And when his intention was to draw money from any of the citizens, he invited them to his houſe, and at firſt with much civility repreſented to them the danger with which their country was threatened from the Achæans; the number of mercenaries which he was forced to retain in pay for the ſake of the common ſafety; and the great coſt of maintaining the worſhip of the gods, as well as the other articles of publick expence. If theſe arguments prevailed, it was ſufficient for his purpoſe. But if all his ſollicitations were without effect, he then uſed to ſay: I want, it ſeems, the power of perſuaſion; but Apega, I believe, will be able to perſuade you. Apega was the name of his wife. Upon theſe words, the image of the woman that has been mentioned immediately appeared. Nabis then, taking her by the hand, raiſed her from her ſeat: and folding afterwards his arms round the perſon whom he had been ſolliciting, brought him near by degrees to the body of the image, whoſe breaſts, hands, and arms were ſtuck full with points of iron, concealed under the clothes; and then, preſſing the back of the pretended woman with his hands, by the means of ſome ſecret ſprings he fixed the man cloſe to her breaſt, and ſoon forced him to promiſe all that he deſired. But there were ſome alſo who periſhed in this torture, when they refuſed to comply with his demands.

THE GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS.

BOOK the FOURTEENTH.

EXTRACT the FIRST.

The conduct and exploits of Publius Scipio in Africk. He ſets fire to the camps of Aſdrubal and Syphax. The Carthaginians draw together a new army: and are defeated in a ſet engagement. They reſolve to recall Annibal from Italy, and to continue the war.

CHAP. I.

WHILE the Conſuls were employed in theſe affairs, Publius Scipio, who remained ſtill in Africk, having received information during the winter that the Carthaginians were getting ready a fleet, reſolved to put his own fleet alſo in order, but not to relinquiſh his deſign of laying ſiege to Utica. He ſtill encouraged alſo in himſelf the hope which he had conceived, that he ſhould be able to bring back Syphax again to the Roman party. With this view, taking advantage of the

the neighbourhood of the two armies, he urged him by continual deputations; and was perſuaded, that he ſhould at laſt be able to draw him away from his alliance with the Carthaginians. For when he conſidered on the one hand, that it was the nature of the Numidians to paſs ſoon from enjoyment to diſguſt; and, on the other, that they were no leſs ready to break through their engagements to the gods and men; he had ſcarcely any doubt, but that this prince was already ſatiated, not only with his wife, for whoſe ſake he had joined the Carthaginians, but in general alſo with his new allies. But while his mind was thus filled with different cares, and agitated by no leſs various hopes, unable as he was to contend openly in the field againſt an enemy whoſe numbers were far ſuperior to his own, he took the occaſion that was offered, to carry into execution an attempt of a different kind in the manner which we are now going to relate.

Some of the meſſengers, whom he had ſent to Syphax, informed him at their return; that the tents in which the Carthaginians were lodged during the winter were framed of wood of every kind, and of the branches of trees, without any mixture of earth: that thoſe of the Numidians, who were from the beginning in the army, were compoſed wholly of reeds: that the reſt of the Numidians, who had been drawn lately from the cities, had framed their tents only with branches; and that, though ſome of them were lodged within the intrenchment, the greateſt part remained without. Having conſidered therefore with himſelf, that, if he could ſet fire to the camps, it would be an action not leſs ſurpriſing to the enemy than ſerviceable to his own deſigns, he began to take the meaſures that were neceſſary for that purpoſe. In the courſe of all the deputations, it had ſtill been urged by Syphax, that the Carthaginians ſhould retire from Italy, and the Romans alſo from Africk: and that both of them ſhould retain poſſeſſion of all that they then held between

tween thoſe two countries. To this time, Publius had utterly rejected theſe conditions. But his meſſengers were now inſtructed to ſuggeſt ſome little hope to Syphax, that it was not impoſſible but that his offer might be accepted. The Numidian, ſoftened by this expectation, was more earneſt to continue the intercourſe that was begun; and ſuffered the meſſengers to go and to return, more frequently, and in greater numbers than before. Sometimes they even remained whole days, without being obſerved, in either camp. Upon theſe occaſions, Publius always ſent among his meſſengers ſome perſons of experienced prudence, and ſome officers concealed under a vulgar dreſs, or diſguiſed in the habit of ſlaves; that they might carefully obſerve the approaches and the entrances of both the camps. For there were two different camps: one occupied by Aſdrubal, with thirty thouſand foot, and three thouſand horſe; and another, at the diſtance of ten ſtadia from the former, poſſeſſed by the Numidians, whoſe numbers amounted to ten thouſand horſe, and at this time to about fifty thouſand foot. The latter, as it was eaſieſt of approach, was the beſt ſuited alſo to the purpoſe of being ſet on fire; becauſe the Numidians, as I have already ſaid, had framed their tents, not of wood nor of earth, but only of ſtraw and reeds.

When the ſpring then was come, Scipio, having obtained all the information that was requiſite for carrying into execution this deſign againſt the enemy, ſet all his ſhips afloat, and ſtored them with military machines, as if his purpoſe had been to attack Utica on the ſide of the ſea. At the ſame time he ſent away a body of two thouſand foot, who took poſſeſſion again of the hill which commanded the city; and began to fortify it, and to throw up an intrenchment round it with the greateſt diligence. By this meaſure likewiſe he induced the enemy to believe, that he had nothing in view but the ſiege. But his true intention was, to leave

theſe men as a body of reſerve; that they might be ready, when the time of the expedition ſhould come, to intercept the garriſon of Utica, if they ſhould ſally out after the departure of the army, and attack the camp that was near, or attempt to inveſt the troops that would be left to guard it. While he was employed in theſe preparations, he ſent alſo again to Syphax, deſiring to be informed, whether he was ſatisfied with the terms that had been propoſed; whether the Carthaginians alſo were ready to receive them; or whether theſe laſt would not again pretend, that they wanted a longer time to deliberate upon them. He ordered the meſſengers alſo not to return, till they had received an anſwer to each of theſe demands. The Numidian had now no doubt, but that Scipio was ſincere in his deſire of peace: both becauſe he had ordered the meſſengers not to return without an anſwer, and had ſeemed likewiſe more particularly careful to be aſſured of the conſent of the Carthaginians. He ſent therefore immediately to Aſdrubal, informing him of all that had been done, and urging him to accept the peace that was offered: and himſelf in the mean while paſſed his time without any care or caution, and ſuffered the Numidians, who came from time to time to the army, to remain without the intrenchment. Publius on his part alſo affected the ſame ſhew of negligence; but in reality was ſtill moſt intent upon the execution of his deſign.

As ſoon as Syphax had received notice from the Carthaginians that he might finiſh the treaty, he with great joy communicated the anſwer to the Roman deputies, who then returned back to their own camp, to inform their General what the king had done. But Scipio immediately ſent them back again to acquaint him, that for his own part he was ſtill firm and earneſt in his deſire of peace: but that his council were of a different opinion, and had reſolved that the war ſhould be continued. His deſign in ſending this meſſage

meſſage was, that he might not be charged with any breach of faith, if he ſhould commence hoſtilities while the conferences ſtill ſubſiſted for a treaty. This declaration being made, he thought that whatever he ſhould attempt would be free from all reproach and blame.

As Syphax had already conceived the ſtrongeſt hopes of peace, he was much grieved at this unexpected change, and went himſelf to Aſdrubal to acquaint him with the reſolution of the Romans. The two Generals, being thus filled with new diſquietude, deliberated long together concerning the meaſures that were now proper to be purſued. But both their apprehenſions and their deſigns were very far diſtant from the truth. For they conceived not a thought of any danger threatening them, or of taking any precaution for their own ſecurity: but were intent only on the means of attempting ſomething againſt the enemy; and earneſt to contrive ſome method of drawing them to a battle in the open country.

Before this time Scipio, both by his preparations, and by the orders which he gave, had induced the whole army to believe, that his intention was to take Utica by ſurprize. But now, having aſſembled together the ableſt of the Tribunes, and thoſe that were moſt worthy of his confidence, he diſcloſed to them his deſign; commanded them to take their ſupper at the uſual hour; and that, as ſoon as the trumpets ſhould have all ſounded, according to the cuſtom, they ſhould draw the legions out of the camp. For the Roman cuſtom is, to ſound all the trumpets of the army, immediately after ſupper, near the tent of the General; as the ſignal for placing in their reſpective poſts the guards of the night. He then ordered the perſons alſo to be called, who had been employed as ſpies to inſpect the camps of the enemy; compared together and cloſely examined their accounts of the ways and entrances; and took the opinion of Maſſa-

niſſa concerning all that they reported, becauſe he eſpecially was well acquainted with the country. And when all his meaſures were adjuſted, having left a ſufficient body of troops to guard the camp, he began his march towards the enemy, who were at the diſtance of about ſixty ſtadia from him, at the end of the firſt watch; and, arriving near them about the end of the third, he allotted one half of the Romans, and all the Numidians, to Lælius and Maſſaniſſa, and ordered them to attack the camp of Syphax. He exhorted them to behave themſelves like men of courage; to do nothing without due conſideration; and to remember, that, in nightly expeditions, as much as the darkneſs was an impediment to action, ſo much ſhould this diſadvantage be compenſated by valour and by prudence. Taking then the reſt of the army, he advanced, but with a ſlow pace, towards the camp of Aſdrubal. For his intention was, not to attempt any thing on his part, till Lælius ſhould have firſt ſet fire to the Numidian camp.

This General then and Maſſaniſſa, having divided their forces into two bodies, approached the camp of the enemy, and began the work. As the camp ſeemed framed, as I have ſaid, for the very purpoſe of being ſet on fire, no ſooner was the flame thrown by the foremoſt troops, and had ſeized the firſt tents, than in a moment, becauſe the tents were crouded cloſe together, and the quantity of the matter alſo which fed the conflagration was extremely great, the evil was ſuch as could admit no remedy. Lælius, keeping his troops together, remained in his poſt, and ſtood as a reſerve: while Maſſaniſſa diſtributed his men along all the paſſages, through which he knew that the enemy would endeavour to ſave themſelves from the flames. Not any of the Numidians, nor even Syphax himſelf, had the leaſt ſuſpicion of the truth: but ſuppoſed that the fire had happened by ſome accident. With this perſuaſion, either wakened from their

ſleep, or ſtarting, full of liquour, from their nightly revels, they leaped haſtily from their tents. Many of them were trampled down in the crouds that filled the paſſages of the camp. Many were intercepted as they fled, and periſhed in the fire. And the reſt, who eſcaped the flames, fell all under the ſword of the enemy; and were deſtroyed before they knew, either what they were doing, or what they ſuffered.

The Carthaginians, when they beheld from their camp the greatneſs of the fire, and the height to which the flames were raiſed, ſuppoſed alſo that the misfortune had happened by accident. While ſome of them therefore went in haſte to carry aſſiſtance, the reſt, running all out of their tents, ſtood without arms before the intrenchment, and viewed with aſtoniſhment the dreadful ſpectacle. Scipio, perceiving that all things had happened as he deſired, fell upon thoſe that were come out; killed one part, and, purſuing the reſt, at the ſame time threw fire alſo upon their tents. In an inſtant, the ſame ſcene of conflagration and of ſlaughter appeared in the Carthaginian camp, as in that of the Numidians. Aſdrubal uſed no endeavours to extinguiſh the flames. He now clearly perceived that the fire in the Numidian camp had not happened by accident, but from the bold attempt of the Romans. He began therefore only to conſider, by what means he might eſcape with ſafety; though indeed he had but little hopes of being able to accompliſh even that deſign. For the fire had ſpread itſelf with great rapidity, and incircled every part. All the paſſages alſo of the camp were filled with horſes, with beaſts of burthen, and with men: ſome of them half dead, and deſtroyed by the flames; and ſome driven from their ſenſes by aſtoniſhment and horror. Such diſorder and confuſion, which was ſufficient to appall even the ſtouteſt courage, ſeemed likewiſe to preclude every hope of ſafety. Syphax alſo and his officers were in

the ſame condition. The two Generals however at laſt found means to eſcape, with a ſmall body of horſe. But the other thouſands and ten thouſands, of men, of horſes, and of beaſts of burthen, moſt miſerably periſhed in the flames: or thoſe among the men, who eſcaped the violence of the fire, were encountered by a foul and a diſhonourable death. For they not only were without their arms; but ſome, even without their clothes, were cut down by the enemy naked as they fled. In a word, every place was filled with lamentable ſhrieks; with diſordered cries; with frantick conſternation; with confuſed and undiſtinguiſhable noiſe. With all theſe there was a devouring fire, and flames hurled to a tremendous height. Any one of theſe things alone would be ſufficient to ſtrike terror into the human heart: how much more all of them together? It is not poſſible indeed to ſhew any thing like the diſaſter; or to form any image of the greatneſs of it by any compariſon. So much do the moſt dreadful accidents that have hitherto been known fall below the horrors of this moſt aſtoniſhing ſcene. And in truth, though Scipio was diſtinguiſhed by a courſe of many glorious actions, there is none, in my judgement, among all that he performed, ſo glorious, or ſo adventurous, as this exploit.

When the morning appeared, and the enemies were all either killed or diſperſed in flight, he exhorted the Tribunes, and purſued without delay after thoſe that had fled. Aſdrubal, though he received notice of his approach, remained for ſome time in the city to which he had retired, truſting to the ſtrength of the place. But when he perceived that the inhabitants were preparing to riſe againſt him, not daring to wait the arrival of the Romans, he again continued his flight with the reſt that had eſcaped. The number of theſe was five hundred horſe, and about two thouſand foot. The inhabitants were then quiet, and ſurrendered themſelves to the

the Romans at diſcretion. Scipio ſpared the place; but gave two cities that were near to be plundered by the army, and then returned back again to his own camp.

CHAP II.

THE Carthaginians were heavily affected by this great loſs. The deſigns which they had formed were now intirely fruſtrated; and all their proſpects fatally reverſed. For they had flattered themſelves with the hopes, that they ſhould be able to inveſt the Romans, both by land and ſea, upon the hill adjoining to Utica, which was the ſeat of their winter quarters; and had directed all their preparations to that purpoſe. But now they are not only forced, by a moſt ſtrange and unexpected accident, to leave the enemy in poſſeſſion of all the open country; but have reaſon alſo to fear, that their whole ſtate would ſoon be expoſed to the moſt imminent danger. Their conſternation therefore and their apprehenſions were extreme. As the condition however of affairs required that ſomething ſhould be determined with reſpect to future meaſures, the ſenate met together, but in great perplexity, and was diſtracted by confuſed and different ſentiments. For ſome were of opinion, that Annibal ſhould be called home from Italy; as if the only hope that now remained was in that General, and in his army. Some again adviſed, that deputies ſhould be ſent to Publius to obtain a truce, and to enter into conferences for a treaty. But others exhorted the aſſembly to reſume their courage; to raiſe new forces; and to ſend ſome meſſengers to Syphax, who had retired to Abba, a city at no great diſtance, and was employed in collecting together all thoſe that had eſcaped from the late misfortune. And this was the opinion which at laſt prevailed. They ordered Aſdrubal therefore to make new levies; and

and ſent to Syphax, intreating him to aſſiſt them, and to remain firm to his firſt engagements; at the ſame time aſſuring him, that their General very ſoon would join him with another army.

Scipio was at this time intent on his firſt deſign of forming the ſiege of Utica. But when he heard that Syphax remained in his poſt, and that the Carthaginians were raiſing a new army, he collected together all his forces, and incamped before that city. At the ſame time having made alſo a diſtribution of the ſpoil, he ſent merchants to purchaſe it; which was done with very great advantage. For the ſoldiers, conſidering the late ſucceſs as a certain aſſurance of the intire conqueſt of all the country, were ready to ſell their ſhares of the booty at the ſmalleſt rates.

Syphax and his friends had at firſt reſolved to continue their retreat, and to return back to their own country. But a body of four thouſand Celtiberians, whom the Carthaginians had juſt now taken into their pay, having met this prince in the neighbourhood of Abba, he was ſo much encouraged by this additional ſtrength, that he remained where he then was, and began to aſſume new confidence. And when his young wife alſo, the daughter, as we have ſaid, of Aſdrubal, joined all her power of intreaty, to prevail with him not to deſert the Carthaginians in the preſent exigency, he at laſt ſuffered himſelf to be perſuaded, and complied with all that ſhe deſired. The Carthaginians themſelves had conceived likewiſe no ſmall hopes from the arrival of theſe ſuccours. Inſtead of four thouſand, it was pretended that ten thouſand Celtiberians were arrived: and that their courage, and the manner in which they were armed would render them invincible. This report, as it filled every mouth, and was ſpread univerſally among the people, inſpired the troops eſpecially with ſo great confidence, that they were impatient once more to take the field. At the end therefore of thirty days, they came and joined the Numidians and the Celtiberians, and incamped in the

the place that was called the Great Plains; forming all together an army of thirty thouſand men.

As ſoon as it was known in the Roman camp, that the enemy had again taken the field, Publius reſolved to advance towards them. Having given the neceſſary orders therefore to the fleet, and to the troops that were employed in the ſiege of Utica, he began his march with the reſt of the army, diſincumbered of all their baggage; and, arriving on the fifth day in the neighbourhood of the Great Plains, fixed his camp upon a hill, at the diſtance of thirty ſtadia from the enemy. On the next day, he deſcended into the plain, and formed his troops in order, placing his cavalry at the diſtance of ſeven ſtadia before the reſt. In this ſituation both the armies remained during the two following days, and only made trial of their ſtrength in little ſkirmiſhes. But on the fourth day the Generals, agreeably to their deſign, drew out their forces on both ſides, and ranged them in order of battle. The diſpoſition that was made by Publius was ſimply the common diſpoſition of the Romans. The Haſtati were firſt placed in front; behind theſe the Principes; and laſtly, the Triarii in the rear. Upon the right wing ſtood the Roman cavalry: the Numidians and Maſſaniſſa upon the left. On the ſide of Aſdrubal and Syphax, the Celtiberians were drawn up in the centre, oppoſite to the Roman cohorts; the Numidians upon the left wing; and the Carthaginians upon the right. But the Numidians, even in the firſt onſet, fled from the charge of the Roman cavalry; and the Carthaginians from that of Maſſaniſſa. So much was their courage broken by the late defeats. The Celtiberians alone ſtood firm, and maintained the fight with vigour: having but little reaſon to hope, either that they could eſcape by flight, as they were wholly unacquainted with the country; or that their lives would be ſpared, if they ſhould fall into the power of the Romans. For as Scipio had committed no hoſtility againſt them

them in the courſe of the war in Spain, they ſeemed clearly to have violated the laws of good faith and juſtice, by taking arms in favour of the Carthaginians. When the wings however were broken, theſe troops were ſoon ſurrounded by the Principes and the Triarii, and were almoſt all of them deſtroyed in the place, after they had performed the greateſt ſervice for the Carthaginians, not only in the battle, but in ſecuring alſo their retreat. For if the Romans had not been retarded by this obſtacle, but had immediately purſued thoſe that fled, ſcarcely any part of the army would have been able to eſcape. But while they were ſtopped by the brave reſiſtance of theſe troops, Syphax, with his cavalry, found means to retreat to his own kingdom; and Aſdrubal, with the reſt that were ſaved, to Carthage.

The Roman General, as ſoon as he had given the neceſſary orders concerning the priſoners and the ſpoil, called together his Council, to deliberate on the meaſures that were next to be purſued. In this aſſembly it was determined, that Publius, with one part of the army, ſhould go round to the ſeveral cities; and that Lælius and Maſſaniſſa, with the Numidians, and a part alſo of the Roman legions, ſhould follow Syphax, and not allow him time to ſtand, or to make any new preparations. Theſe reſolutions were immediately carried into execution. Among the cities, ſome were ſtruck with terror, and ſurrendered themſelves voluntarily to the Romans: and others, being inveſted by them upon their firſt approach, were immediately taken by ſtorm. Through all the country indeed, ſo grievous were the diſtreſſes which the long continuance of the war had brought upon the people, and ſo heavy the tributes that were impoſed, that all things were ready for a change.

In the city of Carthage, the minds of men, which had before been much diſordered, were now filled with new and greater conſternation. Their whole hopes indeed ſeemed at once

once to ſink under this ſecond blow, and to give place to voluntary deſpair. There were ſome however, among the firmeſt of the ſenators, who adviſed; that they ſhould ſend a fleet to Utica, and endeavour to raiſe the ſiege of that city, by attacking the Roman fleet, which was wholly unprepared for an engagement; and that Annibal alſo ſhould be recalled from Italy, and a trial be made of that reſource without any farther delay. They inſiſted, that both theſe meaſures, as far as it could reaſonably be judged, would be productive of very ſalutary conſequences. But it was urged by others, that the times would not now bear any ſuch remedy. That their preſent buſineſs was to fortify the city, and to put it into a condition to ſuſtain a ſiege. That if the citizens would only agree in ſentiments, chance itſelf would afford many opportunities of retrieving their affairs. At the ſame time they adviſed, that a conſultation likewiſe ſhould be held concerning peace; and that they ſhould ſeriouſly conſider, by what kind of treaty, and upon what conditions, they might be delivered from the preſent evils. After long and vehement debates, all theſe opinions were adopted by the ſenate. As ſoon therefore as the aſſembly was diſſolved, the meſſengers that were to be diſpatched to Annibal ſet ſail for Italy: the commander of the naval forces went on board of the fleet: and the reſt employed themſelves in putting the city into a ſtate proper for defence; and in holding conſtant deliberations together concerning each particular meaſure that was fit to be purſued.

The Roman army, having marched through all the country, and not met with any reſiſtance, was loaded with an immenſe booty. Publius therefore reſolved to ſend away the greateſt part of the ſpoil to be ſtored in his firſt camp; and, when he had thus lightened the army, to march and inveſt Tunis, and to incamp in the very ſight of the Carthaginians:

being perſuaded, that by this boldneſs he ſhould ſtrike them moſt effectually with terror and diſmay.

The Carthaginians, having completed in few days their naval forces, together with the neceſſary ſtores, were juſt now ready to ſail out to ſea, and to carry into execution the deſign that has been mentioned. On the arrival of Publius at Tunis, the garriſon fled from the place, and relinquiſhed it to the Romans. Tunis is ſituated at the diſtance of a hundred and twenty ſtadia from Carthage; and may be ſeen from almoſt every part of the city. It has already been mentioned, that both art and nature had concurred in making it a place of very uncommon ſtrength. But ſcarcely had the Romans finiſhed their incampment, when they diſcovered the Carthaginian fleet directing their courſe towards Utica. Publius therefore, being apprehenſive that the conſequences would be fatal to his own fleet, which neither expected ſuch an attempt, nor was prepared againſt it, immediately decamped, and marched alſo towards Utica with the greateſt haſte. On his arrival, perceiving that his decked ſhips were well fitted indeed for the purpoſe of raiſing machines, and carrying them near the walls, and, in a word, for every other uſe that is requiſite in a ſiege, but were in no reſpect prepared for an engagement upon the ſea; conſidering alſo on the other hand, that the Carthaginians had employed the whole time of winter in preparing their fleet for this very deſign; he reſolved not to engage in a naval action: but, having drawn up the decked ſhips cloſe to the ſhore, he covered them with a line of the tranſport veſſels, which were ranged by two and by three in depth. * * * *

THE

THE

GENERAL HISTORY

OF

POLYBIUS.

BOOK the FIFTEENTH.

EXTRACT the FIRST.

Scipio ſends embaſſadours to Carthage, to demand the reſtitution of ſome veſſels which had been taken by the Carthaginians during the truce. The perfidious attempt of the Carthaginians againſt the embaſſadours. The war is renewed on both ſides. The preparations of Annibal and Scipio. The interview between theſe two Generals. The battle of Zama.

CHAP. I.

PUBLIUS was in no ſmall degree diſturbed by this perfidious action. Not only his own proviſions were loſt, but the enemy alſo were at the ſame time furniſhed with a very plentiful ſupply. But the chief cauſe of his

concern was, that the Carthaginians, in making this attempt, had been guilty of an open violation of the late ſolemn treaty, and that the war again was kindled. He ſent therefore Lucius Servilius, Lucius Bæbius, and Lucius Fabius, embaſſadours to Carthage, to complain of this tranſaction; and at the ſame time to acquaint the Carthaginians, that he had received letters from Rome, with an account that the treaty had been ratified by the Roman people. When the embaſſadours arrived, and were introduced firſt into the ſenate, and afterwards into an aſſembly of the people, they diſcourſed on the whole ſtate of affairs with very great boldneſs. They began with telling the Carthaginians; "that, when the embaſſadours who had been deputed by them to the Roman camp arrived at Tunis, and were admitted to appear before the council, they not only made libations to the Gods, and adored the earth, as the cuſtom is among other men; but proſtrated themſelves alſo in an abject manner upon the ground, and kiſſed the feet of all the aſſembly. That afterwards, when they aroſe again, they made a voluntary confeſſion of their guilt; and acknowledged, that they from the firſt had violated the treaties which ſubſiſted between the Carthaginians and the Romans. That they were ſenſible therefore, that the latter might moſt reaſonably inflict upon them every evil. That they implored them however, in the name of the common fortune of mankind, not to puniſh them with too great ſeverity; but rather to ſuffer their inconſiderate folly to become a laſting monument of the Roman generoſity and virtue." The embaſſadours then added: "That Scipio and all the members of the council, who remembered this tranſaction, were now ſtruck with ſurprize, and not able to conceive what confidence it was, that had induced the Carthaginians to forget all which they had at that time ſpoken, and to violate again their treaties and their oaths. That it ſeemed indeed moſt probable, that

that the return of Annibal, and of the army that was with him, had encouraged them in this bold deſign. That nothing however could be more abſurd and ſenſeleſs. For do not all men know, continued they, that it is now the ſecond year, ſince Annibal, compelled to retire from every part of Italy into the neighbourhood of Lacinium, has been confined, and as it were beſieged in that narrow ſpace; and has now brought away his forces with the greateſt difficulty. But if he had even returned with conqueſt, and was ready to engage us; victorious as we have been againſt you in two ſucceſſive battles; you ought ſurely to entertain very doubtful expectations of ſucceſs; and, while you flatter yourſelves with the proſpect of a victory, to take alſo into your conſideration the poſſible chance of another defeat. And if the latter ſhould be the event, what Gods will you then invoke; or what arguments will you employ in your diſtreſs, to draw the compaſſion of the conquerours towards you; when your perfidiouſneſs and your rāſh attempt ſhall have rendered you alike unworthy of the protection of the Gods and of men?"

The embaſſadours after this diſcourſe retired. There were but few among the Carthaginians, who adviſed an adherence to the treaty. The greateſt part, not only of thoſe who directed the adminiſtration of the government, but of the reſt alſo of the members of the council, beſide that they were diſſatisfied with the conditions which the Romans had impoſed, were incenſed alſo by the boldneſs of the embaſſadours. Add to this, that they were unwilling to loſe the veſſels that had been taken, and the ſupplies with which they were ſtored. But the chief and moſt prevailing reaſon was, that they had conceived the greateſt hopes, that with the aſſiſtance of Annibal they ſhould now draw the victory to their ſide. The reſolution therefore of the aſſembly was, that the embaſſadours ſhould be ſent back without any anſwer. But

the

the chief perſons alſo in the government, having determined to leave no means untried that might ſerve to rekindle the war, concerted between themſelves the following project. Pretending that ſome care at leaſt ſhould be taken, that the embaſſadours might return back to their own camp with ſafety, they prepared two triremes to attend them. At the ſame time, they ſent orders to Aſdrubal, who commanded their fleet, that he ſhould hold ſome veſſels in readineſs not far from the Roman camp: and, as ſoon as theſe triremes ſhould have left the Romans, that he ſhould bear down upon the veſſel in which the embaſſadours ſailed, and ſink it. For the Carthaginian fleet was at this time ſtationed along thoſe parts of the coaſt that were near to Utica. They then ſuffered the embaſſadours to depart; having firſt ordered thoſe that attended them in the triremes, that, as ſoon as they ſhould have paſſed beyond the mouth of the river Macar, which was the place from whence the camp of the enemy might be diſcerned, they ſhould there leave the Romans, and return. Agreeably to theſe inſtructions, the commanders of the triremes, when they arrived at the appointed place, ſaluted the Romans, and directed their courſe back again to Carthage. The embaſſadours had no ſuſpicion of any ill intention; and only were diſſatisfied, becauſe it ſeemed that the Carthaginians ſhewed ſome contempt towards them in leaving them ſo ſoon. But as they held on their courſe alone, they were ſuddenly attacked by three triremes, which had been prepared for the deſign. As theſe veſſels however could not pierce with their beaks the Roman quinquereme, becauſe the latter eaſily withdrew itſelf from the ſtroke; ſo neither were the men able to throw themſelves on board, becauſe the Romans reſiſted all their efforts with the greateſt bravery. The Carthaginians therefore, ſhifting their ſhips from ſide to ſide, and continuing the fight from every quarter, killed and wounded a great number

number of the Romans: till the latter, perceiving that ſome ſoldiers from their own camp, who had been foraging near to the coaſt, were drawn together upon the ſhore, and ready to aſſiſt them, drove their veſſel cloſe in to the land. The greateſt part of the men that were on board had been killed in the action: but the embaſſadours were moſt ſtrangely and unexpectedly preſerved. Thus was the war reſumed, with greater violence than before, and with a more implacable rage. For the Romans, incenſed by this perfidious action, were now moſt earneſt in their deſire to bring the Carthaginians into an intire ſubjection. The Carthaginians on the other hand, being conſcious of their guilt, reſolved to attempt and ſuffer every thing, rather than fall into the power of the Romans. When ſuch was the diſpoſition on both ſides, it was manifeſt, that the conteſt could only be decided by a battle. The minds of all men therefore, not in Italy alone and Africk, but in Spain, in Sicily, and in Sardinia, were held in ſuſpenſe, and diſtracted by an anxious expectation of the event.

As Annibal was at this time in great want of cavalry, he ſent to a certain Numidian named Tychæus, whoſe territory was contiguous to that of Syphax, inviting him to ſeize the very moment of his ſafety, and to join him with his forces. For he could not but know, that if the Carthaginians ſhould be ſuperior in the war, he might ſtill be able to hold poſſeſſion of his kingdom: but, if the Romans on the other hand ſhould remain the conquerours, the ambition of Maſſaniſſa would ſoon deprive him not only of his dominions but of his life. Tychæus was prevailed on by theſe reaſons, and came and joined him, as he deſired, with a body of two thouſand horſe.

Publius, having regulated all things that were neceſſary for the ſecurity of the fleet, left the command to Bæbius, and himſelf led the army round the country to reduce the cities:

cities: not ſuffering any to ſurrender upon terms of voluntary ſubmiſſion as before; but taking all of them by ſtorm, and ſending the inhabitants into ſlavery; that he might ſhew more ſtrongly the reſentment which he had conceived againſt the enemy on account of their late perfidy. He ſent alſo continual meſſengers to Maſſaniſſa; to inform him of the manner in which the Carthaginians had broken the treaty; and urging him to draw together as large a body of forces as he was able to raiſe, and to join him with the greateſt haſte. For Maſſaniſſa, as we have already mentioned, as ſoon as the treaty was concluded, taking with him his own troops, together with ten companies of Roman infantry and cavalry, and ſome Roman deputies which he had obtained from Scipio, had gone from the camp, in order not only to recover his paternal kingdom, but with the aſſiſtance of the Romans to add that of Syphax alſo to his own dominions. And this deſign he had now completely executed.

CHAP. II.

ABOUT this time it happened, that the embaſſadours, returning back from Rome, arrived at Utica, where the fleet of the Romans lay. Bæbius ſent away immediately the Roman embaſſadours to Publius: but detained thoſe of Carthage; whoſe minds, dejected as they were upon other accounts, were now filled with apprehenſions of the greateſt danger. For having heard of the late wicked attempt of the Carthaginians againſt the Roman embaſſadours, they expected to ſuffer all the vengeance that was due to ſo baſe an action. When Publius was informed, that both the ſenate and the people had readily confirmed the treaty, and were diſpoſed alſo to concur with him in every meaſure, he was filled with no ſmall joy. He then ordered

Bæbius to diſmiſs the Carthaginian embaſſadours with all civility. This reſolution was, in my judgement, very wiſe and commendable. For as he knew that his country had always paid the moſt ſacred regard to the rights of embaſſadours, he conſidered only what was fit for the Romans to do upon ſuch an occaſion, and not what the Carthaginians deſerved to ſuffer. Suppreſſing therefore his own anger, and the reſentment that was due to the late tranſaction, he endeavoured to maintain, as the Poet expreſſes it, "the glorious deeds of his progenitors:" and by this conduct he broke the ſpirit of all that were in Carthage, and even of Annibal himſelf; when they ſaw their own baſeneſs oppoſed and conquered by ſuch generous virtue.

The Carthaginians, impatient to behold their cities waſted and deſtroyed, ſent ſome meſſengers to Annibal, intreating him not to admit any longer delay, but to advance towards the enemy, and to bring things to a deciſion by a battle. This General anſwered, that they ſhould attend to their own buſineſs: that it belonged to him alone to chooſe the time for repoſe, and the time for action. But, after ſome days, he began his march from Adrumetum, and went and incamped in the neighbourhood of Zama; a city, which ſtood at the diſtance of about five days journey from Carthage towards the weſt. From this place he ſent three ſpies, to examine into the ſituation and condition of the Roman camp. Theſe men were diſcovered by the enemy, and were carried to the General. But ſo far was Publius from puniſhing them, as the cuſtom is upon ſuch occaſions, that he ordered a Tribune to attend them, and to ſhew them diſtinctly every part of the camp. When this was done, he aſked the men, whether the Tribune had faithfully executed his order. And when they anſwered, that he had; having furniſhed them with proviſions, and ſome troops alſo to conduct them, he ordered them to go back, and report to Annibal an exact ac-

count of all that had happened to them. The Carthaginian General, ſtruck with the magnanimity and boldneſs of the action, conceived, I know not how, a deſire to enter into a conference with Scipio; and ſent a herald to acquaint him, that he ſhould be glad to hold ſome diſcourſe with him on the ſtate of affairs alone. Publius, when he had received this meſſage, told the herald, that he accepted the offer; and that he would ſend notice to Annibal of the time and the place in which they might meet. On the following day, Maſſaniſſa arrived at the camp, and brought with him ſix thouſand foot, and about the ſame number of horſe. Scipio received him with great favour; and congratulated him upon his ſucceſs, in having prevailed upon all the ſubjects of Syphax to receive him as their prince. He then put the army in motion, and went and incamped in the neighbourhood of Margarus; in a poſt which, beſide other advantages, had water within the throw of a dart. From this place he ſent notice to the Carthaginian General, that he was ready to enter into a conference with him. On receiving this meſſage, Annibal alſo decamped; and, approaching to the diſtance of no more than thirty ſtadia from the Romans, fixed his camp upon a hill, which, though in other reſpects well ſituated, was rather too far removed from water. And indeed the ſoldiers were upon this account expoſed to very great hardſhip.

On the following day, the two Generals came out from their ſeveral camps with a ſmall body of horſemen: and afterwards, leaving theſe, they advanced forwards, and approached each other, attended only by an interpreter. Annibal firſt ſaluted Scipio, and began in the following manner.

"Well would it have been, if the Romans had never coveted any thing beyond the extent of Italy, nor the Carthaginians beyond that of Africk; but had both of them remained

mained contented with the poſſeſſion of thoſe fair empires, which nature itſelf ſeems indeed to have circumſcribed with ſeparate bounds. But ſince we engaged in war againſt each other, firſt to acquire the ſovereignty of Sicily, and afterwards that of Spain; ſince at laſt, like men infatuated by fortune, we advanced ſo far together in our prepoſterous courſe, as to bring even the ſafety of our own native ſeats into alternate danger; that danger which you have ſo lately known, and to which we alſo at this moment are expoſed; what now remains, but to endeavour, by ourſelves, to deprecate the anger of the Gods, and find ſome means, if it be poſſible, of putting an end to this moſt obſtinate contention. I for my part, who have ſeen in the courſe of a long experience the great inconſtancy of fortune, with how ſlight a turn ſhe effects on either ſide the greateſt changes, and that ſhe ſports with us continually as with children, am moſt ready to conſent to a peace. But much do I fear, that you, Publius, who ſtill are in the flower of your age, whoſe deſigns both in Spain and Africk have all been attended with ſucceſs, and who have never hitherto been driven back again in your courſe by any adverſe blaſt, will be inclined to different ſentiments, and not be moved by my perſuaſions, how worthy ſoever they may be of credit. Yet conſider only and obſerve, at leaſt in one example, the inſtability of human affairs. An example, not drawn from diſtant times, but which is preſent now to your eyes. In a word, view it in me who am before you. I am that Annibal, who after the battle of Cannæ was maſter of almoſt the whole of Italy; and, having advanced not long afterwards into the very neighbourhood of Rome, fixed my camp within forty ſtadia only of the city, and deliberated with myſelf in what manner I ſhould diſpoſe of you and of your country. Behold me now, returned back again to Africk, and holding a conference with you a Roman, concerning my

own ſafety, and that of all the Carthaginians. Let this example incline you to embrace moderate ſentiments; and to judge in this conjuncture, as it becomes a man to judge: that is, to chooſe always the greateſt good, and the leaſt of evils. And ſurely no man of ſenſe would ever voluntarily meet the danger to which you are now expoſed. For if you ſhould gain the victory in the preſent battle, you will add but little either to the reputation of your country, or your own. But, if you ſhould be conquered, the whole fame and glory of all your former actions will be for ever loſt. What then is the purpoſe of this diſcourſe? It is to inform you, that the countries which have been the objects of our wars, Sardinia, Sicily, and Spain, ſhall be yielded to the Romans: and that the Carthaginians at no future time ſhall attempt to recover by arms the poſſeſſion of thoſe territories. To the Romans likewiſe ſhall belong all the iſlands, which lie between Sicily and Africk. Theſe conditions, while they leave Carthage in ſecurity, are at the ſame time, in my opinion, highly honourable, both to yourſelf and to all the Romans."

Here Annibal ended his diſcourſe: and Scipio anſwered in the following words.

"It was well known, he ſaid, that the Carthaginians, and not the Romans, were the cauſe both of the war of Sicily, and of that of Spain: that Annibal himſelf was moſt perfectly acquainted with this truth: and that the Gods alſo had born teſtimony to it, by turning the ſucceſs to the ſide, not of thoſe who had unjuſtly attacked, but of thoſe who had taken arms in their own defence." He then added likewiſe; that no man was more ſtrongly impreſſed than himſelf, with a juſt ſenſe of the inſtability of fortune, and the uncertain courſe of human affairs. "But with reſpect, continued he, to the terms which you offer; if, before the Romans had come into Africk, you had retired from Italy,

and propoſed to us the ſame conditions of peace, you would not perhaps have been diſappointed in your hopes. At this time, when you have been forced moſt reluctantly to abandon Italy, and we on the other hand have paſſed over into Africk, and have rendered ourſelves the maſters of all the open country, it is clear that the ſtate of affairs is very conſiderably changed. But, beſide this difference, there is ſomething alſo of much greater moment. When your countrymen were defeated, and ſued for peace, we refuſed not to accede to their requeſt. A treaty was framed in writing; which, beſide thoſe conceſſions which you have now propoſed, contained alſo the following articles. That the Carthaginians ſhould reſtore without ranſom all the Roman priſoners; ſhould deliver up to us their decked ſhips; ſhould pay a ſum of five thouſand talents; and, in the laſt place, that they ſhould give hoſtages for the performance of all that was impoſed. Such were the conditions, to which we on both ſides gave conſent. We then deputed jointly ſome embaſſadours to Rome, to lay the treaty before the ſenate and the people: on our part intimating, that we approved of the conditions; the Carthaginians, on the other hand, requeſting even with intreaty that they might be accepted. They were accordingly admitted by the ſenate, and were ratified by the people. But no ſooner had the Carthaginians obtained what they deſired, than they annull at once the whole treaty by an action of the groſſeſt perfidy. After ſuch a conduct, what remains to be done? Put yourſelf in my place, and anſwer. Shall we releaſe them now from all the heavieſt of the conditions that were before impoſed? This would indeed be an admirable method, by beſtowing a reward upon their treachery, to teach them to deceive in future times the perſons by whom they have been obliged. Or think you, if they could obtain their wiſh, that they would hold themſelves indebted to us for the favour? They be-

fore

fore obtained what with the moſt earneſt ſupplication they deſired. And yet no ſooner had they conceived ſome faint hopes from your return, than they again diſcloſed their enmity, and renewed hoſtilities againſt us. If you had added therefore ſome conditions ſtill more rigorous, the treaty might have been once more carried before the Roman people. But ſince you have detracted even from thoſe that were admitted, the terms which you now propoſe cannot ſo much as be referred to their conſideration. To what then tends alſo my diſcourſe? It is to acquaint you; that you either muſt ſubmit yourſelves and your country to us at diſcretion, or muſt conquer us in a battle." After theſe diſcourſes, which left no hopes of an accommodation, the two Generals parted from each other, and retired.

On the following day, as ſoon as the dawn appeared, they drew out their forces on both ſides, and prepared to engage: the Carthaginians, for their own ſafety and the poſſeſſion of Africk; the Romans, for the ſovereignty of the whole, and for univerſal empire. Is there any one that can forbear to pauſe at this part of the ſtory, or remain unmoved by the relation? Never were there ſeen more warlike nations: never more able Generals, or more completely exerciſed in all the art and diſcipline of war: never was a greater prize propoſed by fortune, than that which was now laid before the combatants. For it was not Africk alone, or Italy, that waited to reward the conquerours; but the intire dominion of the whole known world. And this indeed was not long afterwards the event. Scipio drew up his army in battle in the following manner. He placed in the firſt line the Haſtati, leaving intervals between the cohorts. In the ſecond, the Principes: but poſted their cohorts, not, as the Roman cuſtom was, oppoſite to the intervals, but behind the cohorts of the former line, and at a conſiderable diſtance from them, on account of the great number of elephants that were in the

the Carthaginian army. Laſt of all, in the third line, he drew up the Triarii. Upon the left wing he ſtationed Caius Lælius, with the cavalry of Italy; and Maſſaniſſa and the Numidians upon the right. The intervals of the firſt line he filled with companies of the light-armed troops: who were ordered to begin the action; and, if they ſhould find themſelves too violently preſſed by the elephants, that the ſwifteſt of them ſhould retire through the ſtrait intervals, to the rear of all the army; and the reſt, if they ſhould be intercepted on their way, direct their courſe to the right or left, along the open diſtances that were between the lines. When his diſpoſition was thus completed, he went round to all the troops, and harangued them in few words, but ſuch as the occaſion ſeemed to require.

"Remember, ſaid he, your former victories; and ſhew now a courage worthy of yourſelves and of your country. Let it be ever preſent to your view, that, by gaining the victory in this battle, you not only will become the maſters of all Africk, but ſecure to Rome the undiſputed ſovereignty of the reſt of the world. If, on the other hand, you ſhould be conquered, they who fall bravely in the action, will obtain an honour far more glorious than any rights of ſepulture, the honour of dying for their country: while thoſe that ſhall eſcape, muſt be condemned to paſs the remainder of their lives in the extremity of diſgrace and miſery. For Africk will afford no place of ſafety: and, if you fall into the hands of the Carthaginians, what your condition muſt be, your own reaſon will eaſily inſtruct you to foreſee. But may none of you ever know it by experience. When fortune then, continued he, has offered to us upon either ſide ſo noble a prize, univerſal empire or a glorious death, how loſt muſt we be both to honour and to ſenſe, if we ſhould reject theſe the greateſt of goods, and chooſe, through a deſire of life, the moſt inſupportable of evils. When you advance

vance therefore againſt the enemy, carry that reſolution with you into action, which is ſure always to ſurmount the ſtrongeſt reſiſtance. Be determined either to conquer or to die. Retain not ſo much as a thought of life. With ſuch ſentiments, the victory cannot fail to be your own."

Such was the harangue of Scipio. Annibal, on his part, having placed the elephants, more than eighty in number, at the head of all the army, formed his firſt line of the mercenaries; who were a mixed multitude of Gauls, Ligurians, Balearics, and Mauruſians, and amounted together to about twelve thouſand men. Behind theſe were the Carthaginians and the ſubject Africans. The third line was compoſed of the troops which he had brought with him from Italy; and was placed at the diſtance of more than a ſtadium from the ſecond line. The cavalry was poſted upon the wings: that of the Numidian auxiliaries upon the left; and the Carthaginian cavalry upon the right. He ordered the officers who commanded the different bodies of the mercenaries, to exhort ſeverally their own ſoldiers, and to encourage them to be aſſured of victory, ſince they were now joined by Annibal and his veteran forces. The leaders of the Carthaginians were inſtructed on the other hand, to lay before their view the fatal conſequences of a defeat; and to enumerate all the evils, to which their wives and children would be expoſed. And while theſe orders were obeyed, he himſelf going round to his own troops, addreſſed them with the greateſt earneſtneſs, and in words like theſe.

"Remember, ſoldiers, that we have now born arms together during the courſe of ſeventeen years. Remember in how many battles we have been engaged againſt the Romans. Conquerours in them all, we have not left to the Romans even the ſmalleſt hope, that they ever ſhould be able to defeat us. But beſide the other innumerable actions in which we always obtained the victory, remember alſo,

above

above all the reſt, the battle of Trebia, which we ſuſtained againſt the father of that very General who now commands the Roman army; the battle of Thraſymene, againſt Flaminius; and that of Cannæ, againſt Æmilius. The action, in which we are now ready to engage, is not to be compared with thoſe great battles, with reſpect either to the number, or the courage of the troops. For turn now your eyes upon the forces of the enemy. Not only they are fewer; they ſcarcely make even a diminutive part of the numbers againſt which we were then engaged. Nor is the difference leſs with reſpect to courage. The former were troops whoſe ſtrength was intire, and who had never been diſheartened by any defeat. But theſe before us are either the children of the former, or the wretched remains of thoſe very men whom we ſubdued in Italy, and who have ſo often fled before us. Loſe not then, upon this occaſion, the glory of your General, and your own. Preſerve the name which you have acquired: and confirm the opinion which has hitherto prevailed, that you are never to be conquered."

When the Generals had thus on both ſides harangued their troops, and the Numidian cavalry for ſome time had been engaged in ſkirmiſhing againſt each other, all things being now ready, Annibal ordered the elephants to be led againſt the enemy. But the noiſe of the horns and trumpets, ſounding together on every ſide, ſo affrighted ſome of theſe beaſts, that they turned back with violence againſt their own Numidians, and threw them into ſuch diſorder, that Maſſaniſſa diſperſed without much difficulty that whole body of cavalry which was on the left of the Carthaginian army. The reſt of the elephants, encountering with the light-armed forces of the Romans in the ſpace that was between the armies, ſuffered much in the conflict, and made great havock alſo among the enemy: till at laſt, having loſt all courage, ſome of them took their way through the inter-

vals of the Roman army, which afforded an open and ſafe paſſage for them, as Scipio wiſely had foreſeen; and the reſt, directing their courſe to the right, were chaſed by darts from the cavalry, till they were driven quite out of the field. But as they occaſioned likewiſe ſome diſorder upon their own right wing in their flight, Lælius alſo ſeized that moment to fall upon the Carthaginian cavalry: and having forced them to turn their backs, he followed cloſely after them; while Maſſaniſſa on his ſide was purſuing the Numidian cavalry with no leſs ardour.

And now the heavy-armed forces on both ſides advanced to action with a ſlow and ſteady pace: thoſe troops alone excepted, which had returned with Annibal from Italy; and which remained ſtill in the ſtation in which they at firſt were placed. As ſoon as they were near, the Romans, ſhouting all together, according to their cuſtom, and rattling their ſwords againſt their bucklers, threw themſelves upon the enemy. On the other ſide, the Carthaginian mercenaries advanced to the charge with confuſed and undiſtinguiſhable cries. For as they had been drawn together, as we have ſaid, from different countries, there was not among them, as the Poet expreſſes it,

One voice, one language found:
But ſounds diſcordant as their various tribes. *

In this firſt onſet, as the combatants were ſo cloſely joined, that they were unable to make uſe of their ſpears, or even of their ſwords, and maintained the action hand to hand, and man to man; the mercenaries, by their boldneſs and dexterity, obtained at firſt the advantage, and wounded many of the Romans. But the latter, aſſiſted by the ex-

* Iliad. IV. 437.

cellence

cellence of their diſpoſition and the nature of their arms, preſſed forwards, and ſtill gained ground; being ſupported alſo by the reſt of their own army, who followed and encouraged them from behind. The mercenaries on the other hand were neither followed nor ſupported. For the Carthaginians that were behind them came not near to aſſiſt them in the action, but ſtood like men who had loſt all courage. At laſt therefore the ſtrangers turned their backs: and, thinking themſelves manifeſtly to have been deſerted by their own friends, they fell, as they retired, upon the Carthaginians that were behind, and killed them. The latter however fell not, without a brave and vigorous defence. For being thus unexpectedly attacked, and compelled to fight both with their own mercenaries and with the Romans, they exerted their utmoſt efforts, and engaging with a frantick and diſordered rage, made a promiſcuous ſlaughter of friends and enemies. Amidſt this confuſion, the Haſtati alſo were ſo preſſed that they were forced to break their ranks. But the leaders of the Principes, perceiving the diſorder, brought up their troops cloſe behind to ſupport them: ſo that, in the end, the greateſt part of the Carthaginians and the mercenaries were deſtroyed in the place; partly by themſelves, and partly by the Haſtati. Annibal would not ſuffer the reſt that eſcaped to be received into the third line towards which they fled: but ordered the foremoſt ranks to point their ſpears againſt them as they approached. They were forced therefore to retire along the wings into the open plain.

As the whole ground, that was between the forces which now remained, was covered with blood, and ſlaughter, and dead bodies, the Roman General was in no ſmall degree perplexed; being apprehenſive that this obſtacle would prevent him from obtaining a complete and perfect victory. For it ſeemed to be no eaſy thing, to lead on the troops, without breaking their ranks, over bleeding and ſlippery carcaſes,

thrown one upon another; and over arms, which were ſcattered in confuſion, and prepoſterouſly intermingled with the heaps of the dead. Having ordered the wounded however to be carried into the rear of the army, he called back the Haſtati from the purſuit, and drew them up in order as they returned, in the forepart of the ground upon which the action had paſſed, and oppoſite to the centre of the enemy. He then commanded the Principes and the Triarii to cloſe their ranks; to form a wing on either ſide; and to advance over the dead. And when theſe troops, having ſurmounted all the intermediate obſtacles, were come into the ſame line with the Haſtati, the action was then begun on both ſides with the greateſt eagerneſs and ardour. As the numbers were nearly equal; as the ſentiments, the courage, and the arms on both ſides were the ſame; the battle remained for a long time doubtful. For ſo obſtinate was the contention, that the men all fell in the place in which they fought. But Lælius and Maſſaniſſa, returning back from the purſuit of the routed cavalry, arrived moſt providentially in the very moment in which their aſſiſtance was chiefly wanted, and fell upon the rear of Annibal. The greateſt part therefore of his troops were now ſlaughtered in their ranks. And, among thoſe that fled, a very ſmall number only were able to eſcape; as they were followed cloſely by the cavalry through an open country. Above fifteen hundred of the Romans fell in the action. But, on the ſide of the Carthaginians, more than twenty thouſand were killed; and almoſt an equal number taken priſoners. Such was the battle between Annibal and Scipio: the battle which gave to the Romans the ſovereignty of the world.

When the action was ended, Publius, after he had for ſome time purſued thoſe that fled, and pillaged the camp of the Carthaginians, returned back to his own camp. Annibal, with a ſmall number of horſemen, continued his retreat without

without ſtopping, and arrived ſafe at Adrumetum: having performed, upon this occaſion, all that was poſſible to be done by a brave and an experienced General. For firſt, he entered into a conference with his enemy; and endeavoured by himſelf alone to terminate the diſpute. Nor was this any diſhonour to his former victories: but ſhewed only, that he was diffident of fortune; and willing to ſecure himſelf againſt the ſtrange and unexpected accidents which happen in war. In the battle afterwards, ſo well had he diſpoſed things for the action, that no General, uſing even the ſame arms, and the ſame order of battle as the Romans, could have engaged them with greater advantage. The order of the Romans in battle is very difficult to be broken; becauſe the whole army in general, as well as each particular body, is ready always to preſent a front to their enemies, on which ſide ſoever they appear. For the cohorts by a ſingle movement turn themſelves together, as the occaſion requires, towards the ſide from whence the attack is made. Add to this, that their arms alſo are well contrived, both for protection and offence: their bucklers being large in ſize; and their ſwords ſtrong, and not eaſily injured by the ſtroke. Upon theſe accounts, they are very terrible in action, and are not to be conquered without great difficulty. But Annibal oppoſed to each of theſe advantages the moſt effectual obſtacles that it was poſſible for reaſon to contrive. He had collected together a great number of elephants, and ſtationed them in the front of his army; that they might diſturb the order of the enemy, and diſperſe their ranks. By poſting the mercenaries in the firſt line, and the Carthaginians afterwards in a line behind them, he hoped to diſable the Romans by fatigue, before the battle ſhould be brought to the laſt deciſion; and render their ſwords uſeleſs by continual ſlaughter. As he had thus placed the Carthaginians alſo between two lines, he compelled them to ſtand; and, as the Poet has ſaid,

Forced

Forced them by ſtrong neceſſity to fight,
However loth. *

In the laſt place, he drew up the braveſt and the firmeſt of his troops at a diſtance from the reſt: that, obſerving from afar the progreſs of the action, and poſſeſſing their whole ſtrength as well as their courage intire, they might ſeize the moſt favourable moment, and fall with vigour upon the enemy. If therefore, when he had thus employed all poſſible precautions to ſecure the victory, he was now for the firſt time conquered, he may very well be pardoned. For fortune ſometimes counteracts the deſigns of valiant men. Sometimes again, according to the proverb,

A brave man by a braver is ſubdued.

And this indeed it was, which muſt be allowed to have happened upon the preſent occaſion.

* Iliad, IV. 30.

EXTRACT the SECOND.

The Carthaginians in the moſt abject manner ſue for peace. The conditions upon which it is granted by Scipio. The ſentiments of Annibal, and his behaviour in the ſenate of Carthage upon this occaſion.

WHEN men, in lamenting the wretchedneſs of their fortunes, exceed in their actions all the cuſtomary forms of grief, if their behaviour ſeems to be the effect of genuine paſſion, and to ariſe only from the greatneſs of their calamities, we are all ready to be moved by the ſtrangeneſs of the ſight, and can neither ſee nor hear them without commiſerating their condition. But if theſe appearances are feigned, and aſſumed only with an intention to deceive, inſtead of compaſſion, they excite indignation and diſguſt. And this was now what happened, with reſpect to the Carthaginian embaſſadours. Publius told them in few words; "That, with regard to themſelves, they had clearly no pretenſions to be treated with gentleneſs or favour: ſince, by their own acknowledgement, they had at firſt begun the war againſt the Romans, by attacking Saguntum in contempt of treaties; and now lately again had violated the articles of a convention, which they had ratified in writing, and bound themſelves by oaths to obſerve. That the Romans however, as well upon their own account, as in conſideration alſo of the common condition and fortune of humanity, had reſolved to diſplay towards them upon this occaſion a generous clemency. That ſuch indeed it muſt appear to themſelves to be, if they would view all circumſtances in a proper light. For, ſince fortune, having firſt precluded them, by the means of their

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own perfidious conduct, from every claim to mercy or to pardon, had now thrown them wholly into the power of their enemies; no hardſhips which they ſhould be forced to ſuffer, no conditions which ſhould be impoſed, no conceſſions which ſhould be exacted from them, could be conſidered as rigorous or ſevere: but rather it muſt appear to be a matter of aſtoniſhment, if any article of favour ſhould be yielded to them." After this diſcourſe he recited firſt the conditions of indulgence which he was willing to grant; and afterwards thoſe of rigour, to which they were required to ſubmit. The terms which he propoſed to them were theſe.

"That they ſhould retain all the cities which they held in Africk, before the beginning of the laſt war which they had made againſt the Romans; and all the lands likewiſe which they had anciently poſſeſſed, together with the cattle, the men, and the goods that were upon them. That from the preſent day all hoſtilities againſt them ſhould ceaſe. That they ſhould be governed by their own laws and cuſtoms; and not receive any garriſon from the Romans." Such were the articles of favour: the others, of a contrary kind, were theſe.

"That the Carthaginians ſhould reſtore all that they had taken unjuſtly from the Romans during the continuance of the truce. That they ſhould ſend back all the priſoners and deſerters, that had at any time fallen into their hands. That they ſhould deliver up all their long veſſels, ten triremes only excepted; and likewiſe their elephants. That they ſhould not make war at any time upon any ſtate out of Africk: nor upon any in Africk, without the conſent of the Romans. That they ſhould reſtore to king Maſſaniſſa the houſes, lands, and cities, and every thing beſides, that had belonged to him, or to his anceſtors, within the limits which ſhould hereafter be declared. That they ſhould furniſh the Roman army with corn ſufficient for three months; and pay alſo the ſti-

pends of the troops, till an anſwer ſhould be received from Rome, confirming the conditions of the treaty. That they ſhould pay ten thouſand talents of ſilver in the courſe of fifty years; bringing two hundred Euboic talents every year. That, as a ſecurity for their fidelity, they ſhould give a hundred hoſtages: which ſhould be choſen by the Roman General out of all their youth, between the age of fourteen and of thirty years."

As ſoon as Publius had finiſhed the recital of theſe articles, the embaſſadours returned back in haſte to Carthage, and reported the terms that were propoſed. Upon this occaſion, when one of the ſenators was going to object to the conditions, and had begun to ſpeak, Annibal, it is ſaid, ſtepped forwards, and taking hold of the man, dragged him down from his ſeat. And, when the reſt of the ſenate appeared to be much diſpleaſed at an action ſo injurious to the cuſtoms of that aſſembly, he again ſtood up, and ſaid: "That he might well be excuſed, if his ignorance had led him to offend againſt any of their eſtabliſhed forms. That they knew, that he had left his country when he was only nine years old; and had now returned to it again at the age of more than forty-five. He intreated them therefore, not ſo much to conſider, whether he had violated any cuſtom, as whether he had been moved by a real concern for the diſtreſſed condition of his country. That what he had felt upon that account was indeed the true cauſe of his offence. For that it appeared to him to be a moſt aſtoniſhing thing, and altogether prepoſterous, that any Carthaginian, not ignorant of all which their ſtate in general, as well as particular men, had deſigned againſt the Romans, ſhould not be ready to worſhip his good fortune, when, having fallen into their power, he now found himſelf treated by them with ſo great clemency. That if the Carthaginians had been aſked but a few days before, what their country muſt expect to ſuffer,

if they ſhould be conquered by the Romans, they would not have been able to make any anſwer: ſo great, ſo exceſſive were the calamities which were then in proſpect. He begged therefore, that they would not now bring the conditions into any debate, but admit them with unanimous conſent: offering ſacrifices at the ſame time to the Gods; and joining all together in their prayers, that the treaty might be ratified by the Roman people." This advice appeared to be ſo ſenſible, and ſo well ſuited to the preſent exigency, that the ſenate reſolved to conſent to a peace upon the terms which have been mentioned; and immediately ſent away ſome embaſſadours to conclude the treaty.

EXTRACT the THIRD.

The unjuſt deſigns of Philip and Antiochus againſt young Ptolemy: with a reflection on the manner in which thoſe princes afterwards were puniſhed.

IT is ſtrange to conſider, that, as long as Ptolemy lived, Philip and Antiochus were ready always to ſupport him, though he wanted not their aſſiſtance: and yet no ſooner was he dead, and had left an infant ſon, than theſe princes, whoſe duty it was according to the laws of nature to maintain the child in the poſſeſſion of his kingdom, combined together to ſhare his dominions between themſelves, and to deſtroy the helpleſs orphan. Nor did they even endeavour, like other tyrants, to cover the ſhame of this proceeding, ſo much as with the ſlighteſt pretext: but proſecuted their deſign with ſuch barefaced and brutal violence, as made the ſaying very applicable to them, which is commonly uſed concerning fiſhes; that the deſtruction of the ſmall, though they are all of them of the ſame kind, is the life and nouriſhment of the great. We need only to turn our eyes indeed upon the treaty that was made between the two kings upon this occaſion: and we ſhall behold, as in a glaſs, the ſtrongeſt picture of their avowed impiety, their ſavage inhumanity, and their ambition extended beyond all bounds. If any one however ſhould be diſpoſed to cenſure fortune, and indeed with good ſhew of reaſon, for admitting ſuch injuſtice in the courſe of human affairs; he will judge perhaps more favourably, when he conſiders, that afterwards ſhe puniſhed both theſe princes in the manner which their actions merited, and expoſed them as a memorable warning, to deter all thoſe

who in future times might be inclined to follow their example. For while they were practiſing all the arts of treachery againſt each other, and tearing away by pieces the dominions of the infant king; this deity, having raiſed up the Romans againſt them, inflicted upon them, with the moſt exact meaſure of juſtice, thoſe very evils which they had unjuſtly meditated againſt others. Subdued, each of them in his turn, they were at firſt compelled to ſubmit to the impoſition of a tribute, and to receive orders from the Romans. And in the end, before any long time had elapſed, the dominions of Ptolemy were eſtabliſhed again in full ſecurity: while, on the other hand, the kingdom and the ſucceſſors of Philip were intirely ſubverted and deſtroyed; and thoſe of Antiochus very nearly alſo involved in the ſame calamities.

EXTRACT the FOURTH.

The Cianians, a people of Bithynia, are conquered and carried into ſlavery by Philip. Reflections on the cauſe of their misfortune, and the conduct of the king.

THESE great calamities indeed, in which the Cianians were involved, ought not to be aſcribed ſo much to fortune, or even to the unjuſt deſigns of others againſt them, as to their own want of wiſdom, and the wrong adminiſtration of their government. For as they raiſed continually the very worſt men into the poſts of honour, and puniſhed all thoſe that oppoſed their meaſures, for the ſake only of enriching themſelves with the ſpoils of the plundered fortunes, they threw themſelves, as it may be ſaid, with their own free conſent, into all that wretchedneſs which is the neceſſary reſult of ſuch a conduct. Examples of this kind are frequent and notorious: and yet men, I know not how, never ceaſe to fall into the ſame imprudence. They ſeem not to entertain even the ſmalleſt diffidence upon ſuch occaſions; but are worſe in this reſpect than animals that are deſtitute of reaſon. For theſe, not only if they have extricated themſelves before with difficulty from any trap or ſnare, but even if they have ſeen any other animal in danger, are not eaſily led to the like again, but ſuſpect the very place, and diſtruſt every thing that is before their eyes. But men are ſtrangers to all this caution. Though they have heard that many have been loſt by the ill conduct that has now been mentioned; though they ſee others periſhing through the ſame imprudence; allure them only

only with the proſpect of enriching themſelves with the ſpoils of others, they catch greedily at the bait, which they are aſſured has been in all times fatal to thoſe who have taſted it, and purſue thoſe very meaſures which are acknowledged to have been pernicious to every government.

Philip, when he had ſo well ſucceeded in this deſign, and rendered himſelf maſter of the city, was elated with no ſmall joy. He thought that he had performed an honourable and a glorious action. For he had brought the ſpeedieſt ſuccour to his ſon-in-law in his diſtreſs: he had ſtruck a terror into all thoſe that were inclined to oppoſe him: and had gained, as he ſuppoſed, by the faireſt means, a very great booty in priſoners and in money. But the circumſtances that were oppoſite to theſe he never once conſidered, though they were indeed ſufficiently notorious. For firſt, he had aſſiſted his ſon-in-law, not when he was unjuſtly attacked, but when he had himſelf made war upon his neighbours in direct breach of treaties. In the next place, by involving a Grecian city, without any juſt cauſe, in the moſt dreadful calamities of war, he confirmed the opinion which before was entertained concerning his inhuman treatment of his allies: and taught all poſterity to conſider him, upon both theſe accounts, as a man who paid no regard to the moſt ſacred obligations. Thirdly, this action was a very groſs inſult upon the embaſſadours who had come to him from the cities, in order to reſcue the Cianians from their danger. For while they were encouraged to remain, and were ſoothed by him with daily conferences, they were forced to be ſpectators of thoſe very evils, which they had wiſhed moſt earneſtly not to ſee. Add to all this, that the Rhodians now held him in ſo great abhorrence, that they would not ſo much as ſuffer the name of Philip to be any more mentioned among them. Indeed chance itſelf conſpired to raiſe againſt him this averſion. For when his embaſſadour,

baſſadour, in a ſtudied diſcourſe which he addreſſed to the people in the theatre at Rhodes, was endeavouring to diſplay the great generoſity of his maſter; who, though he had at this time the city of the Cianians almoſt wholly in his power, was willing, as he ſaid, to yield it as a favour to the Rhodians, and to refute by ſuch indulgence the calumnies of thoſe that oppoſed his intereſts, as well as to give alſo a moſt ſignal proof of his affection towards their ſtate; it happened that a certain man arrived from the fleet, and related in what manner the Cianians had been carried into ſlavery, and the whole cruelty that had been exerciſed upon the occaſion. Theſe news, being reported to the aſſembly by the firſt magiſtrate, at the very time when the embaſſadour was delivering his harangue, ſtruck all the people with ſuch aſtoniſhment, that they were ſcarcely able to believe that Philip could be guilty of ſo black a perfidy. And yet this prince, when by his treacherous conduct he had been falſe rather to himſelf than the Cianians, was ſo deſtitute of judgement, as well as loſt to all ſenſe of duty, that, inſtead of feeling remorſe and ſhame, he on the contrary boaſted of the action, as if it had been a glorious and a great exploit. From this time therefore, the Rhodians regarded him as an enemy; and reſolved to hold themſelves in readineſs to begin hoſtilities againſt him. Nor was the reſentment leſs, which the Ætolians conceived againſt him upon the ſame account. For he had juſt before compoſed his differences with that people. And yet, in the very moment almoſt when he was extending his hands towards them, when not even any pretence could be urged to cover ſuch a conduct, of the three cities, Chalcedon, Lyſimachia, and Cianus, which had lately been received into a confederacy with them, he forced the two former to ſeparate themſelves from the alliance, and carried the inhabitants of the latter into ſlavery, though an Ætolian governour

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at that very time commanded in the place. With reſpect to Pruſias, though he was pleaſed that his deſign had been attended with ſucceſs, yet was he on the other hand no leſs diſſatisfied, when he found that all the advantages of the conqueſt were poſſeſſed by another, and that nothing remained for himſelf but the bare ground of a ruined city. He was forced however to bear what he had no power to remedy.

EXTRACT the FIFTH.

The lamentable deſtruction of Agathocles, the guardian of young Ptolemy, together with all his family, in a popular inſurrection at Alexandria. His conduct and character. Some obſervations on the manner of relating tragical events in Hiſtory.

CHAP. I.

AGATHOCLES, having ordered the Macedonians firſt to be aſſembled, appeared before them, bringing with him the young king, and attended by his ſiſter Agathoclea. For ſome time he pretended, that his tears flowed ſo faſt that he was not able to ſpeak. But when he had often wiped his face with his mantle, and ſeemed to have ſtopped the violent courſe of his grief, lifting up the child, "Receive, ſaid he, O Macedonians, this young prince, whom his father, when he was dying, delivered indeed into the arms of my ſiſter, but intruſted to your fidelity. The affection of my ſiſter can now but little avail. His preſervation depends upon you alone: in your hands reſts all his fortune. It was notorious long ago to all men of judgement, that Tlepolemus was forming deſigns too high for his condition. He has now fixed the day, and even the hour, in which he has determined to aſſume the royal diadem. I aſk not, continued he, that you ſhould give credit to me alone; but to thoſe who have ſeen the truth, and who are juſt now come from being witneſſes of the tranſaction." With theſe words, he introduced to them Crito-

laus, who declared that he had ſeen the altars ready, and the victims which the people had prepared for the celebration of the ceremony. But the Macedonians were ſo far from being moved with compaſſion towards him from this diſcourſe, that they did not even attend to what he ſaid: but began to ſneer and to whiſper together; and inſulted him with ſo much ſcorn, that he ſcarcely knew in what manner he at laſt withdrew himſelf from the aſſembly. He then called together, in their proper aſſemblies, the other bodies of the ſoldiery: and was received with the ſame ill treatment by them all.

During the time of this confuſion, many of the troops arrived continually from the armies that were in the upper provinces; and began to urge their kindred and their friends, to apply ſome remedy to the diſorders of the ſtate, and not ſuffer themſelves any longer to be inſulted by ſuch unworthy governours. The people were the more eaſily engaged in this deſign, and began to fear that even the leaſt delay might be attended with dangerous conſequences, becauſe Tlepolemus was maſter of the port of Alexandria, and had it in his power to ſtop all the proviſions that ſhould be coming to the city. Agathocles alſo himſelf helped greatly at this very time to provoke the rage of the multitude, as well as to incenſe Tlepolemus. For, as if he had been willing that the whole city ſhould know that a difference ſubſiſted between this General and himſelf, he took Danae, who was the ſtep-mother of the former, from the temple of Ceres, and, having dragged her through the ſtreets with her face uncovered, threw her into priſon. This action ſo exaſperated the minds of all men, that they no longer communicated their diſcontent in private confidence, and with ſecrecy, as before: but fixed up writings in the night in every part of the city; and in the day-time aſſembled together

gether in parties, and declared aloud their deteſtation of the government.

Agathocles, perceiving this diſpoſition of the people, began now to apprehend ſome fatal conſequences. Sometimes he reſolved that he would endeavour to eſcape by flight. But as he had been ſo imprudent as not to have made any of the neceſſary preparations for ſuch a purpoſe, he was forced to deſiſt from that deſign. Sometimes again, he was beginning to form aſſociations of his friends; and ſeemed determined to make at leaſt one deſperate attempt: to deſtroy one part of his enemies; to ſeize the reſt; and afterwards avowedly to uſurp the tyranny. While he remained in this ſtate of ſuſpenſe, one of his guards, whoſe name was Mœragenes, was accuſed of betraying all his ſecrets to Tlepolemus, through the means of a correſpondence with Adæus, the governour of Bubaſte. Agathocles immediately gave orders to his ſecretary Nicoſtratus, that he ſhould take this man, and force him by every kind of torture to declare the truth. He was ſeized accordingly; and, being conducted by Nicoſtratus into a remote apartment of the palace, was at firſt interrogated, as he ſtood, concerning the facts with which he was charged: and when he refuſed to confeſs any thing, he was ſtripped. The guards, ſome of them were preparing the inſtruments of torture, and others, with rods in their hands, were taking off his clothes; when a ſervant came running into the apartment, and, having whiſpered ſomething to Nicoſtratus in his ear, retired again with the greateſt haſte. Nicoſtratus immediately followed him; ſpeaking not a word, but ſmiting continually his thigh. The ſituation in which Mœragenes now found himſelf was very ſingular and ſtrange. The rods were already raiſed to ſtrike him, and the inſtruments of torture lay ready at his feet; when the attendants, upon

this departure of Nicoſtratus, ſtood motionleſs, and, looking one upon another, expected his return. After ſome time, as he came not back, they all gradually withdrew themſelves from the apartment. Mœragenes, being thus left alone, paſſed through the palace unobſerved, and came, naked as he was, into a tent of the Macedonians that was near. It happened that the ſoldiers were aſſembled together to take their dinner. He related to them all that had been done, and the ſurpriſing circumſtances of his eſcape. Though the ſtory appeared to be almoſt incredible, yet when they ſaw that he was ſtill naked, they could not doubt of the truth. Taking occaſion therefore from this accident, he began now with tears to intreat the Macedonians, not only to afford protection to himſelf, but to take the meaſures alſo that were neceſſary for the preſervation of the king, or rather indeed for their own ſafety. For the deſtruction of them all was imminent and certain; unleſs they would ſeize the moment, when the hatred of the people againſt Agathocles, and their deſire of vengeance, were at the greateſt height. And this, he ſaid, was now that moment: and nothing was wanting, but that ſome perſons ſhould begin the enterprize. The ſoldiers were raiſed into fury by this diſcourſe; and conſented to all that was propoſed. They went firſt into the tents of the other Macedonians; and afterwards into thoſe of the reſt of the army. For they were all contiguous one to the other, and ſtood together on the ſame ſide of the city. As the diſpoſition to revolt had long been general, and waited only to be called into action, no ſooner was this ſpirit ſet in motion, than it ſpread every way like a raging flame: ſo that, before four hours had paſſed, all orders and ranks of men, both in the camp and in the city were united in the ſame deſign. An accident alſo at this time happened, which tended

tended greatly to facilitate the ſucceſs of the undertaking. Some ſpies were brought to Agathocles, together with a letter which had been written by Tlepolemus to the army. The purport of the letter was, that Tlepolemus was preparing to join the army: and the ſpies declared, that he was now ready to come. On receiving theſe news, Agathocles ſeemed to be bereaved at once of all his underſtanding. For, inſtead of preparing himſelf for action, or taking any of the meaſures which ſuch an exigency required, he calmly retired to his repaſt, and indulged himſelf in all the pleaſures of his table in the uſual manner.

But Oenanthe, oppreſſed with grief, went into the temple of Ceres and Proſerpine, which was now opened for the celebration of an annual ſacrifice. At her firſt entrance, ſhe fell upon her knees, and ſupplicated the protection of the Goddeſſes with the moſt ſoothing prayers. She then ſate down near the altar, and was quiet. Many of the women who were preſent beheld her grief and her dejection with a ſecret pleaſure, and ſaid nothing. The relations only of Polycrates, and ſome others of rank, not knowing the cauſe of her diſorder, came near to her, and were beginning to comfort her. But Oenanthe cried out with a loud voice; "Approach me not, wild beaſts as you are; I know you very well; you are enemies to our intereſts, and are praying the Goddeſſes to inflict upon us the worſt of evils: but I hope on the contrary, that they will force yourſelves to feed upon your own children." With theſe words, ſhe ordered her attendants to drive them from her, and even to ſtrike thoſe that ſhould refuſe to retire. The women therefore all left the temple; lifting up their hands to heaven, and imploring the Gods, that Oenanthe herſelf might feel thoſe curſes which ſhe had imprecated upon others. And as the men already had determined to revolt, this reſentment

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of their wives, being now ſpread through every houſe, added new ſtrength to the rage with which they were before inflamed.

As ſoon as night was come, in the whole city nothing was to be ſeen but tumult, lighted torches, and people running to and fro in every part. For ſome aſſembled themſelves together in the Stadium with loud cries: ſome animated the reſt: and ſome, running every way in diſorder, ſought for houſes and ſecret places in which they might lie concealed. All the open ſpaces that were near to the palace, the ſquare, the Stadium, and the court that was round the theatre of Bacchus, were now filled with an innumerable multitude of people of every kind; when Agathocles, who had not long left his table, was awakened from ſleep, full of wine, and informed of what had happened. Immediately collecting all his kindred, Philo only excepted, he went to the king; and, after ſome few words of lamentation, took him by the hand, and carried him up into the gallery that was between the Mæander and the Palæſtra, and which led to the entrance of the theatre. He faſtened behind him the two firſt doors, and paſſed on to the third, with only two or three guards, the king, and his own family. The doors were framed in the manner of an open lattice; and were faſtened with double bars.

The numbers of the people that were drawn together from all parts of the city were now ſo great, that not only the open places, but the ſteps alſo and the roofs of the houſes were covered with them. A confuſed noiſe and clamour was heard, from the voices of women and children mingled with thoſe of the men. For ſuch is the cuſtom at Alexandria, as well as at Carthage, that, in tumults of this kind, the children are no leſs active than the men. When the day fully appeared, amidſt the many undiſtinguiſhable cries,

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it was heard however above all the reſt that they called for the king. The Macedonians therefore, now firſt advancing together in a body from their tents, took poſſeſſion of the gate of the palace, which was the place of the royal audience. And, after ſome little time, being informed to what part the king had retired, they went round to the place, forced open the firſt doors of the gallery, and, as they approached the ſecond, demanded the child with loud cries. Agathocles, perceiving that the danger was ſo near, intreated the guards to go, and to declare to the Macedonians; "that he was ready to lay down the guardianſhip of the king, and all his other power: to diveſt himſelf of all his honours; and even to abandon all that he poſſeſſed. That he deſired only that his life might be ſpared; and that ſmall allowance yielded to him, which would be neceſſary for his ſupport. That when he ſhould have thus gone back again to his firſt condition, it would no longer be in his power, whatever might be his will, to do harm to any perſon." But the guards all refuſed to be employed in this ſervice; till at laſt it was undertaken by Ariſtomenes: the ſame who held afterwards the chief adminiſtration of the government. This man was an Acarnanian by birth; and having, as he advanced in life, obtained the ſupreme direction of affairs in Ægypt, he governed with a very high reputation both the king and kingdom; and demonſtrated indeed no leſs ability in maintaining himſelf in that exalted ſtation, than he had ſhewn before in flattering Agathocles during the time of his proſperity. For he was the firſt, who at a banquet had preſented to Agathocles alone of all the gueſts a golden crown: an honour, never accuſtomed to be paid to any but kings. He had the courage alſo to be the firſt, who wore a portrait of Agathocles in a ring. And when he had a daughter born, he gave her the name

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of Agathoclea. But this may be ſufficient to mark his character.

This man then, having received the orders before mentioned, went out through a little wicket, and came to the Macedonians. He had ſcarcely ſpoken a few words, and begun to declare the intentions of Agathocles, when the ſoldiers attempted in the inſtant to ſtrike their darts through his body. But ſome perſons, having covered him with their hands, and appeaſed that firſt fury, ordered him immediately to return, and to tell Agathocles, that he ſhould either bring out the king, or not dare to come out himſelf. When they had thus diſmiſſed him, they advanced againſt the ſecond door of the gallery, and forced it open. Agathocles, perceiving both by the anſwer that was brought, and by this new violence, with what rage the Macedonians were inflamed, extended now his hands through the lattice of the fartheſt door. Agathoclea likewiſe ſhewed her breaſts, which ſhe ſaid had ſuckled the king. With the moſt ſuppliant words that could be uttered, they begged that at leaſt their lives might be ſpared. But when neither their prayers nor their intreaties any thing availed, they at laſt ſent out the child, together with the guards.

The Macedonians, when they had received the king, ſet him immediately upon a horſe, and conducted him to the Stadium. As ſoon as he appeared, the people broke together into the loudeſt ſhouts of acclamation and applauſe. They ſtopped the horſe, took down the king, and conducted him to the ſeat in which their kings were accuſtomed to be ſeen. But the joy which the multitude ſhewed was ſtill mingled with grief. For while they rejoiced that they had gotten the king into their poſſeſſion, they were grieved on the other hand, that the guilty perſons were not taken, and brought to ſuffer a juſt puniſhment. They demanded

manded therefore with continual clamour, that the authors of all the evils ſhould be delivered up to the publick vengeance. As the day was now far advanced, and the people ſtill wanted the objects upon which they might vent their rage, Soſibius, who was the ſon of Soſibius, and was at this time one of the royal guards, had recourſe to an expedient, the beſt indeed that could be deviſed, with reſpect both to the king and the publick peace. Perceiving that the commotion was not likely to be appeaſed, and that the young prince alſo was uneaſy at ſeeing himſelf ſurrounded by perſons unknown, and terrified by the noiſe of a rude multitude, he went and aſked him, whether he conſented that thoſe who had been guilty of crimes againſt his mother and himſelf ſhould be delivered up to the people. And when he anſwered, that he conſented; Soſibius ordered ſome of the guards to declare this reſolution to the people, and at the ſame time carried the king to his own houſe which was near, to give him ſome refreſhment. As ſoon as the intentions of the king were known, the whole place again reſounded with ſhouts of approbation and of joy.

During this time Agathocles and Agathoclea had retired ſeverally to their own apartments. Some of the ſoldiers from their own own voluntary motion, and others urged by the people, ſoon went in ſearch of them. But the firſt beginning of the ſlaughter that enſued was occaſioned by the following accident. One of the paraſites and ſervants of Agathocles, whoſe name was Philo, came drunk into the Stadium; and, ſeeing what was the diſpoſition of the people, told thoſe who ſtood near him, that, as ſoon as Agathocles ſhould appear, they would change their ſentiments, as they had done before. Upon hearing theſe words, ſome began to revile him, and others puſhed him: and, when he

attempted to defend himſelf, they tore his clothes; and ſome ſtruck the points of their ſpears into his body. He was then dragged along, ſtill breathing, and with many inſults, through the midſt of the multitude. As the people had now taſted of blood, they were impatient to ſee the others brought out. In a ſhort time afterwards, Agathocles came firſt, loaded with chains. As ſoon as he appeared, ſome perſons ran towards him, and inſtantly killed him. In this they performed the office, not of enemies, but of friends: for they ſaved him from the more dreadful death which his crimes deſerved. After Agathocles, Nico was brought out; then Agathoclea naked, with her ſiſters; and afterwards all the reſt of their kindred. Laſt of all, Oenanthe alſo was torn from the temple, and was brought naked on horſeback into the Stadium. All theſe were now abandoned to the fury of the multitude. Some bit them with their teeth; ſome pierced them through with weapons; and ſome tore out their eyes. And as each of them fell, they were divided limb from limb, till they were all torn into pieces. For the anger of the Ægyptians always is attended with moſt terrible cruelty. At the ſame time likewiſe, the young women who had been educated with Arſinoe, being informed that Philammon had come three days before to Alexandria from Cyrene, with a deſign to kill the queen, ran to his houſe: and, having forced their entrance, they murthered him with clubs and ſtones; ſtrangled his ſon who was an infant; and then dragged his wife naked into the ſtreets, and killed her. In this diſmal manner periſhed Agathocles, Agathoclea, and all their kindred.

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CHAP.

CHAP. II.

I AM not ignorant indeed, with what pains ſome writers, in order to ſtrike their readers with aſtoniſhment, have heightened this tranſaction into a moſt portentous ſtory; and loaded it with a detail of ſtudied obſervation, exceeding even the relation itſelf in length. Some of them, aſcribing every thing that happened to the ſole influence of fortune, attempt to paint in the ſtrongeſt colours the inconſtancy of that Goddeſs, and to ſhew how difficult it is for men to ſecure themſelves againſt her power. Others again, when they have repreſented all the circumſtances to be indeed aſtoniſhing, endeavour afterwards to aſſign ſome probable cauſes of ſo wonderful an event. For my own part, I have reſolved not to undertake the taſk of making any ſuch reflections. For I cannot diſcover that Agathocles was diſtinguiſhed either by his military ſkill and courage; or that he poſſeſſed in any conſiderable degree that happy dexterity in the adminiſtration of civil affairs which might deſerve to be imitated; or laſtly, that he ever excelled in that talent of courtly intrigue, that refined and crafty policy, by the means of which Soſibius and many other miniſters preſerved through their lives a ſupreme influence over thoſe princes who ſucceſſively intruſted them with the management of their affairs. He was indeed in all reſpects the very reverſe of theſe. For it was only the incapacity and weakneſs of Philopator, which firſt raiſed him, with the aſtoniſhment of all men, into high authority. And when afterwards he had the faireſt opportunity, upon the death

of that prince, to maintain himſelf in his exalted ſtation, he in a ſhort time threw away, by the mere want of ſpirit and ability, both his power and his life. The ſtory of a man like this needs no enlargement; nor affords any room for ſuch reflections as might be drawn from the fortunes of that other Agathocles and Dionyſius, the two tyrants of Sicily; and of ſome beſides, who acquired a name by their ability and great exploits. The latter of the two here mentioned derived his origin from the very loweſt of the people. The former left the wheel, the kiln, and the clay, as Timæus has ſaid of him in the way of reproach, and came young to Syracuſe. And yet each of them, in his time, raiſed himſelf to be the tyrant of that renowned and opulent city. Afterwards, they became the ſovereigns of all Sicily; and were maſters likewiſe of many of the parts of Italy. Agathocles alſo formed ſtill greater deſigns. For he even invaded Africk: and at laſt died in the full poſſeſſion of all his honours. And from hence, it is ſaid, when Publius Scipio, the firſt conquerour of Carthage, was aſked what perſons he judged to have been the moſt diſtinguiſhed by their ſkill in government, and their wiſdom in conducting the boldeſt enterprizes, he anſwered, Dionyſius and Agathocles. Theſe then are the men, from whoſe actions an Hiſtorian may take a fair occaſion to ſtop his readers with reflections; to remind them of the power of fortune; to remark the courſe of human affairs; and, in a word, to inculcate many uſeful leſſons. But others, like the Agathocles whoſe fate we have deſcribed, are very unfit to be made the ſubjects of ſuch diſcourſe. Upon this account, I have related without any enlargement the bare circumſtances of his fall. But there was alſo indeed another reaſon, which determined me with no leſs weight, to reject all ampli-

amplification in the recital of this ſtory. Thoſe changes of fortune which are dreadful and aſtoniſhing ſhould be exhibited in a ſingle view, and ſo far only as that they may be barely known. To keep them afterwards in ſight, and to exaggerate them in a long deſcription, not only is attended with no advantage, but muſt even be painful to thoſe to whom they are ſhewn. In every thing that is offered to the eyes or ears, the deſign ſhould always be, to convey either ſome utility, or ſome pleaſure. All Hiſtory eſpecially ſhould be directed conſtantly to theſe two ends. But an exaggerated deſcription of aſtoniſhing accidents is certainly neither uſeful nor pleaſing. It cannot be uſeful, ſince no one would wiſh to imitate what is contrary to reaſon: nor pleaſing, becauſe none can be delighted either with the ſight or the relation of ſuch events as are repugnant both to nature and to the common apprehenſions of men. We may deſire indeed once, and for the firſt time only, to ſee or to hear of ſuch diſaſters; for the ſake of being aſſured, that ſome things may happen which we conceived to be impoſſible. But when we have this aſſurance, any lengthened repetition, forced upon us, only fills us with diſguſt. An hiſtorian therefore ſhould be contented barely to relate, what may ſerve for imitation, or may be heard with pleaſure. An enlarged deſcription of calamity, which exceeds thoſe bounds, may be proper indeed for Tragedy, but not for Hiſtory. Some indulgence however may be allowed perhaps to thoſe hiſtorians, who, becauſe they neither have conſidered the works of nature, nor are acquainted with the general courſe of things in the world, are ready to regard the events which themſelves have ſeen, or which they have greedily received from others, as the greateſt and moſt wonderful that have happened in any age. Miſled by this perſuaſion, and not ſenſible of the miſtake into which they have

have fallen, they ſet themſelves to relate with large exaggeration tranſactions which have not even the praiſe of novelty, ſince they have before been recounted by others, and from which their readers alſo never can derive either advantage or delight. * * *

THE

THE

GENERAL HISTORY

OF

POLYBIUS.

BOOK the SIXTEENTH.

EXTRACT the FIRST.

The naval engagement between Attalus and Philip near the iſland of Chios.

PHILIP was now filled with great perplexity, and began to be extremely anxious with reſpect to the event. His progreſs in the ſiege had in no degree anſwered his expectation: and the enemy alſo were lying at anchor near him, with a greater number of decked ſhips than his own. As there was therefore no room left for choice, he ſuddenly ſailed away with all his fleet. This motion occaſioned no ſmall ſurprize in Attalus; who expected that the king would ſtill

ſtill have continued the work of his mines againſt the city. But Philip had perſuaded himſelf, that, by getting firſt out to ſea, he ſhould be ſecure from being overtaken by the enemy; and, directing his courſe along the coaſt, might be able to arrive ſafe at Samos. He was however very greatly diſappointed in his hopes. For Attalus and Theophiliſcus no ſooner ſaw that he was getting out to ſea, than they reſolved immediately to follow him. Their fleet was not formed in order: for they had expected, as we have ſaid, that Philip would ſtill have perſiſted in the ſiege. They exerted however their whole ſkill in rowing; and, when they had overtaken the enemy, Attalus attacked the right, which was alſo the van of their fleet, and Theophiliſcus the left. Philip, finding himſelf thus intercepted in his courſe, gave the ſignal to his ſhips upon the right; commanding them to turn their prows towards the enemy, and to engage with vigour: and himſelf with ſome boats retired to the little iſlands that were in the middle of the ſtrait, deſigning to obſerve from thence the progreſs of the battle. His fleet conſiſted of fifty-three decked ſhips; beſides open veſſels, ſuch as boats and long gallies, which were in number one hundred and fifty. Some others were left at Samos, which he had not been able to get ready. On the ſide of his enemies were ſixty-five decked ſhips, including thoſe ſent by the Byzantines; and, beſide theſe, nine biremes, and three triremes.

The veſſel in which Attalus ſailed began the combat: and the neareſt of the ſhips on both ſides, without waiting for any ſignal, immediately engaged each with the other as they approached. Attalus, having attacked an octireme, laid open the ſide by a fortunate ſtroke below the ſurface of the water; ſo that the veſſel ſunk at laſt to the bottom, though the men upon the deck maintained the fight

fight for ſome time with the greateſt bravery. Another veſſel that belonged to Philip, carrying ten banks of oars, and which was the firſt ſhip in the fleet, was loſt by a very ſtrange accident. A bireme, having fallen under the prow of this large ſhip, was ſtruck by the latter with ſo great violence, that all the art of the pilot was not able to draw out the beak, which was fixed faſt in the middle of the hulk of the little veſſel, juſt below the uppermoſt bank of the oars. At this very time two quinqueremes came up; and ſtriking their beaks into both the ſides of the large ſhip, which was ſo fixed in its poſition by the little veſſel that was ſuſpended from it that it was not able to move, ſunk it to the bottom, together with all that were on board. Among theſe was Democrates, the chief commander of the fleet. About the ſame time likewiſe, Dionyſidorus and Dinocrates, two brothers and commanders on the ſide of Attalus, were engaged, with circumſtances not leſs ſingular, the one with a ſeptireme, and the other with an octireme of the enemy. Dinocrates, who attacked the latter, having raiſed the prow of his veſſel, received a ſtroke in the part that was above the water, and at the ſame time ſtruck his own beak ſo deep into the lower part of the octireme, that he was not able to draw it back, though he many times attempted it by lightening his ſtern. In this ſituation, he was ſo cloſely attacked by the Macedonians, that he found himſelf in the greateſt danger. But Attalus, perceiving what had happened, bore down upon the octireme; and by the violence of the ſhock ſeparated the two veſſels, and ſet Dinocrates free. The Macedonians were all killed after a brave reſiſtance; and the veſſel remained in the power of the conquerours. Dionyſidorus on his part, bearing down upon the ſeptireme, miſſed his ſtroke; and, as he fell againſt the enemy, loſt all the banks

of his oars upon the right ſide of his veſſel, and all the battlements of his deck. The Macedonians attack him on every ſide with loud ſhouts and cries. The veſſel was ſoon ſunk, together with all that were on board. Dionyſidorus alone, and two others, ſaved themſelves by ſwimming to a bireme that was near. Among the reſt of the ſhips that were engaged, the conteſt was more equal. The advantage which Philip had in the number of his ſmall veſſels was balanced by the ſtrength of the decked ſhips on the ſide of Attalus. And, though the hopes of ſucceſs were the moſt promiſing on the ſide of Attalus, the vigour of the Macedonians in the right of the fleet rendered the victory at this time doubtful.

The Rhodians, when they firſt ſailed out to ſea, were at a very great diſtance behind the enemy, as we before have mentioned. But as they far exceeded them in the ſwiftneſs of their courſe, they ſoon reached the rear of the Macedonian fleet; and began to attack the veſſels in ſtern, as they were ſailing from them, and to break their banks. The Macedonians were then forced to turn, and aſſiſt the ſhips that were thus attacked. And when the reſt of the Rhodian veſſels were come up, and had joined Theophiliſcus, the whole fleets on both ſides turned their prows, the one againſt the other, and amidſt the ſound of trumpets, and the noiſe of animating cries, engaged in ſet battle with the greateſt ardour. The action however would have been determined in a very ſhort time, and with little difficulty, if the Macedonians had not intermingled ſome ſmall veſſels among their decked ſhips, and by that meaſure fruſtrated in various manners the efforts of the Rhodian fleet. For no ſooner was the order of battle broken by the firſt ſhock, and the ſhips mingled together in confuſion, than theſe ſmall veſſels, falling in among the reſt, either ſtopped them

in

in their courſe, or prevented them from turning, and employing with advantage their proper ſtrength; and, by obſtructing ſometimes the working of the oars, ſometimes by attacking the prow, and ſometimes again the ſtern of the larger ſhips, rendered the ſkill of the pilots, and the dexterity of the rowers alike unſerviceable. When any of the ſhips were engaged beak with beak, the Rhodians indeed diſplayed their ſuperior art. For ſetting their own veſſels low upon the prow, while they received the ſtroke of the enemy above the water, they at the ſame time ſtruck the adverſe ſhips below it, and made ſuch breaches as were irreparable. It was but ſeldom however that they availed themſelves of this advantage. Deterred by the vigour which the Macedonians ſhewed, in maintaining the fight hand to hand againſt them from their decks, they in general declined the danger of a cloſe engagement: and choſe rather to run through the fleet of the enemy, and to break the oars; and then, returning again, to direct their ſtrokes againſt the ſtern of the veſſels, or againſt the ſides, as they were turning themſelves obliquely from them; and either pierced them with their beaks, or carried away ſome part that was neceſſary for the working of the ſhip. By this method, they deſtroyed a very great number of veſſels in the Macedonian fleet.

There were three Rhodian quinqueremes, that were diſtinguiſhed in a very remarkable manner in this engagement. One of theſe was the veſſel in which Theophiliſcus ſailed, who was the commander of the fleet. Philoſtratus was captain in the ſecond. The third had Nicoſtratus on board, and was commanded by Autolychus. The laſt of theſe ſhips had ſtruck one that belonged to the enemy with ſo great violence, that the beak was left ſticking in the veſſel. The ſhip that was ſtruck ſoon ſunk with all the men: and

the other, while the water flowed in faſt at the prow, was ſurrounded on every ſide by the enemy. Autolychus defended himſelf for ſome time with the greateſt courage: till, being covered with wounds, he at laſt fell with his arms into the ſea. The reſt that were on board maintained the fight with no leſs bravery, till they were all likewiſe killed. At this time Theophiliſcus advanced towards them. Not being able to ſave the veſſel, which was already filled with water, he ſtruck two ſhips of the enemy, and forced out all that were on board. But being ſoon ſurrounded by a very great number both of light and heavy veſſels, he loſt the greateſt part of his men after a brave reſiſtance. And having himſelf alſo received three wounds, and being preſſed by the moſt imminent danger, he at laſt with great difficulty ſaved his ſhip through the aſſiſtance of Philoſtratus, who had the courage to take his place in the action. Being then joined by ſome other veſſels, he returned once more to the fight: and, though the ſtrength of his body was much weakened by his wounds, yet ſuch was the vigour of his mind, that he diſtinguiſhed himſelf by more glorious efforts, and by a courage more aſtoniſhing than before.

In this battle there were properly two actions, at a great diſtance one from the other. For the right of the fleet of Philip, which was attacked by Attalus, having kept their courſe cloſe along the ſhore, as they had at firſt deſigned, was not far diſtant from the continent of Aſia: while his left, which had turned to ſupport the ſhips in the rear, had approached the iſland Chios, and was engaged with the Rhodian fleet. The ſucceſs of Attalus againſt the right had been almoſt complete; and this prince, as he purſued his victory, was now come near to thoſe little iſlands, where Philip was ſtationed expecting the event of the battle; when he perceived,

ceived, that one of his own quinqueremes, which had advanced too far beyond the reſt, was ſtruck by a Macedonian veſſel, and was ready to ſink. He haſtened therefore with two quadriremes to ſave this ſhip. And when the enemy, as he approached, declined the combat, and retired towards the land, he purſued with the greateſt eagerneſs, and was earneſt to render himſelf maſter of the Macedonian veſſel. Philip, perceiving that the king was ſo far ſeparated from the reſt of his fleet, took four quinqueremes, three biremes, and ſome boats that were near, and ſtood ready to intercept him in his return. Attalus, finding his return cut off, and being filled with the greateſt apprehenſions for his ſafety, was at laſt forced to run his ſhip cloſe in to the land, and eſcaped ſafe to Erythræ, with the reſt that were on board; while the veſſel, and all the royal furniture, fell into the hands of Philip. An artifice indeed, which he had employed upon this occaſion, very greatly facilitated his eſcape. He had ordered his moſt ſplendid furniture to be brought out, and placed upon the deck of the ſhip. When the Macedonians therefore firſt entered from their boats, and ſaw many rich goblets, a veſt of purple, and all the utenſils which accompany the regal pomp; inſtead of following the purſuit, they ſet themſelves to pillage what was before them, and by that delay gave full time to the king, to continue his flight with ſafety to Erythræ.

Though Philip had been by much the greateſt ſufferer in the whole of the engagement, yet ſo much was he elated with this ſucceſs, that he ſailed back again into the open ſea, and began with great diligence to draw together his ſhips, and to encourage his men, as if he had now clearly obtained the victory. And indeed when his enemies on the other ſide perceived, that he was followed by the royal veſſel bound faſt to his own, they were all ready to believe

that

that Attalus had periſhed. Dionyſidorus among the reſt was filled with that perſuaſion. He made the ſignal therefore for bringing together the ſhips of his own fleet: and, having ſoon collected them into a body, he ſailed away to the ports of Aſia without any danger. At the ſame time alſo, the Macedonian ſhips that were engaged againſt the Rhodians, having for a long time ſuffered greatly in the action, withdrew themſelves ſeparately from the fight, under the pretence of carrying aſſiſtance to ſome other part of the fleet. The Rhodians, when they had bound faſt to the ſtern of their own ſhips one part of the veſſels which they had taken, and broken the reſt into pieces, directed their courſe to Chios. In the engagement againſt Attalus, Philp had loſt one veſſel of ten banks of oars, one of nine, one of ſeven, and one of ſix; together with ten other decked ſhips, three biremes, and twenty-five boats. Theſe veſſels were all deſtroyed, together with the men that were on board. In the engagement againſt the Rhodians, ten of his decked ſhips were deſtroyed, and forty boats: two quadriremes were alſo taken, and ſeven boats, with all their men. On the ſide of Attalus, one bireme and two quinqueremes were ſunk; and the royal veſſel was taken. Two quinqueremes of the Rhodians were deſtroyed, and ſome triremes; but none of their veſſels taken. No more than ſixty men were killed on the ſide of the Rhodians; and about ſeventy in the fleet of Attalus. But on the ſide of Philip, three thouſand of the Macedonian ſoldiers, and ſix thouſand of the naval forces loſt their lives. Two thouſand alſo of the Macedonians and their allies were taken priſoners. Among theſe, ſeven hundred were Egyptians. Such was the end of the naval battle near the iſland of Chios.

When the action was finiſhed, Philip aſſumed to himſelf upon two accounts the honour of the victory. The firſt

was, that he had forced Attalus to run his veſſel in to the land, and had made himſelf maſter of the ſhip: and the other, becauſe he had caſt anchor, after the engagement, near the promontory Argennum, and taken his ſtation in the very midſt of the wrecks of the fleets. On the next day likewiſe, he endeavoured by his actions to ſupport the ſame pretenſion. With this deſign, and in order to perſuade men ſtill more ſtrongly that he remained the conquerour, he collected together the wrecks of all the ſhips, and took up the bodies of his own men that were to be diſtinguiſhed among the dead. But it very ſoon appeared, that this was not his own opinion. For while he was employed in this very work, Dionyſidorus and the Rhodians, having joined their fleets together, came ſailing towards the place where he was, and ſtood for ſome time before him in order of battle. And when he declined the engagement, they returned unmoleſted back to Chios.

In reality, this prince had never at any time before ſuffered ſo great a loſs in a ſingle action, either by land or ſea. He felt himſelf very deeply affected with the misfortune; and was forced to abate much of his former ardour. He endeavoured indeed, by every method, to conceal his ſentiments from others: but the very face of things alone rendered even this attempt impracticable. For, beſide other circumſtances, the objects that preſented themſelves on every ſide, after the engagement, ſtruck all with horrour who beheld them. So great had been the ſlaughter, that the whole ſtrait at the time was covered with blood; and was filled with dead bodies, with arms, and wrecks of the ſhips. And for many days afterwards, theſe objects were ſeen mingled together, and thrown in heaps upon the ſhores. So dreadful a ſpectacle not only ſtruck Philip with confuſion, but filled all the Macedonians with extreme diſmay.

Theo-

Theophiliſcus, who ſurvived only one day after the battle, wrote an account of the action to his country; appointed Cleonæus in his own ſtead commander of the fleet; and then died of his wounds: having merited immortal honour, not only by his courage in the engagement, but on account of the reſolution alſo which he had ſhewn in conducting the whole deſign. For unleſs his ſpirit had determined him to be thus early in attacking Philip, ſo univerſally was that prince at this time dreaded, that the preſent opportunity would have been wholly loſt. But he not only reſolved to begin the war againſt him, but obliged his country alſo to ſeize the favourable moment: and forced Attalus likewiſe, not to waſte his time in preparations, but to enter immediately into action, and to try the fortune of a battle without any delay. It was not without good reaſon therefore, that the Rhodians after his death decreed ſuch honours to his memory, as were moſt proper to encourage, not thoſe alone who were then alive, but the men alſo of future times, to render upon great occaſions the moſt effectual ſervice to their country.

EXTRACT the SECOND.

The reaſon why men often abandon their deſigns.

WHAT was it then, which forced him to ſtop at once in the midſt of this purſuit? It was nothing indeed but the mere nature of things. For we often ſee, that men, while they contemplate objects at a diſtance, and attend only to the great advantages that would follow from ſucceſs, engage eagerly in deſigns which are impoſſible to be accompliſhed. The violence of their deſires precludes altogether the exerciſe of their reaſon. But when the time of execution is come, and the difficulties which appear upon a nearer view are found to be abſolutely unſurmountable, their thoughts are ſuddenly bewildered and perplexed; their underſtanding becomes confuſed; and the attempt is then abandoned with the ſame precipitation with which it had before been undertaken.

EXTRACT the THIRD.

Philip renders himſelf maſter of Prinaſſus by a ſtratagem.

AFTER ſome attacks, which the ſtrength of this little city rendered fruitleſs, Philip deſiſted from the attempt; and, leading his army through the country, deſtroyed the citadels, and plundered the villages that were near. He then went and incamped before Prinaſſus: and having in a ſhort time finiſhed his blinds, and completed the other preparations that were neceſſary for a ſiege, he began to undermine the wall of the city. But when he found that the rockineſs of the ſoil rendered this work altogether impracticable, he had recourſe to the following ſtratagem. He ordered the ſoldiers to make a great noiſe under ground in the day time, as if they were employed in digging the mines, and in the night to bring earth from diſtant parts, and to lay it along the mouths of the pits that were opened; that the beſieged, on ſeeing a large quantity of earth, might be ſtruck with apprehenſions of their danger. At firſt however, the inhabitants diſplayed a great ſhew of bravery, and ſeemed determined to maintain themſelves in their poſt. But when Philip informed them by a meſſage, that the wall was undermined to the length of four hundred feet; and that he left it to their choice, whether they would now retire with ſafety, or, remaining till he ſhould ſet fire to the props, be then all deſtroyed amidſt the ruins of the place; they gave an intire credit to his account, and delivered up the city.

EX-

EXTRACT the FOURTH.

The ſituation of Iaſſus. The judgement of the author concerning wonderful ſtories.

IASSUS in Aſia is ſituated upon the gulph, which is terminated on one ſide by the temple of Neptune in the Mileſian territory, and on the other by the city of Mindus; and which by many is called the Bargylietic gulph, from the cities of the ſame name which are ſpread round the innermoſt parts of it. The inhabitants of Iaſſus boaſt that they were originally a colony from Argos: but that afterwards their anceſtors, when they had ſuffered a great loſs in the Carian war, received a new colony of Mileſians, which was brought to them by the ſon of Neleus, the firſt founder of Miletus. The city contains ten ſtadia in circumference. There is a report, which is firmly credited among the inhabitants of the Bargylian cities: that no ſnow, or rain, ever falls upon the ſtatue of the Cindyan Diana, though it ſtands in the open air. The people of Iaſſus affirm the ſame thing alſo concerning their ſtatue of Veſta: and both theſe ſtories are related as facts by ſome hiſtorians. For my own part, I know not how it is, that I am ſtill forced in the courſe of my work to take ſome notice of ſuch traditions, which are ſcarcely to be heard with patience. It is certainly a proof of a moſt childiſh folly, to relate things, which, when they are brought to be examined, appear to be not only improbable, but even not poſſible. When a writer affirms, for example, that certain bodies, though placed in the light of the ſun, project no

ſhade, what is it but a plain indication of a diſtempered brain? And yet Theopompus has declared that this happens to thoſe who are admitted into the temple of Jupiter in Arcadia. Of the ſame kind are the ſtories that have now been mentioned. I muſt confeſs indeed, that, when things of this ſort tend only to preſerve in vulgar minds a reverential awe of the divinity, writers may ſometimes be excuſed, if they employ their pains in recounting miracles, and in framing legendary tales. But nothing which exceeds that point ſhould be allowed. It is not eaſy perhaps to fix in every inſtance the exact bounds of this indulgence: yet neither is it abſolutely impoſſible. My opinion is, that ignorance and falſehood may be admitted in a ſmall degree; and, when they are carried farther, that they ought to be exploded.

EXTRACT the FIFTH.

Scipio returns to Rome. His Triumph. The death of Syphax.

NOT long after this time Publius Scipio returned back to Rome from Africk. As the greatneſs of his actions had raiſed in men a very high and general expectation, he was ſurrounded by vaſt crouds upon his entrance, and received by the people with the greateſt marks of favour. Nor was this only reaſonable, but an act alſo of neceſſary duty. For they who not long before had not ſo much as dared to hope, that Annibal ever could be driven out of Italy, or the danger be removed from their own perſons and their families, now ſaw themſelves not only freed from the apprehenſion of any preſent evils, but eſtabliſhed alſo in a laſting and firm ſecurity, by the intire conqueſt of their enemies. Upon this occaſion therefore, they ſet no bounds to their joy. On the day likewiſe in which he entered the city in triumph, as the objects that were viewed in the proceſſion repreſented moſt clearly to the ſenſes of the people the dangers from which they had eſcaped, they ſtood as in an ecſtaſy of paſſion, pouring out thanks to the Gods, and acknowledgements to the author of ſo great a deliverance. Among the reſt of the priſoners Syphax alſo, the Maſſæſylian king, was led along a captive in the proceſſion: and after ſome time he died in priſon. When the ſolemnity of the triumph was finiſhed, there

there was afterwards in Rome during many days a continual ſucceſſion of games and ſpectacles; the expence of which was defrayed by Scipio, with a generoſity which was worthy of him.

EXTRACT the SIXTH.

The prudent conduct of Philip after his defeat.

THERE are many men indeed, who may be obſerved to begin an action well, and even to redouble their ardour as they advance, till they have made a very conſiderable progreſs: but to conduct an enterprize completely to the end, and, even when fortune obſtructs them in their courſe, to ſupply by prudence whatever may have been defective in alacrity and vigour, is the portion only of a few. In this view, as the inaction of Attalus and the Rhodians, after their late victory, may juſtly be cenſured; ſo, on the other hand, the magnanimity and the royal ſpirit, with which Philip perſiſted ſtill in his deſigns, deſerves not leſs to be applauded. Let it be remarked however, that it is not my meaning to apply this commendation to the general character and conduct of this prince: but that I am ſpeaking only of the attention, which he exerted upon the preſent occaſion. Without this diſtinction, I might be charged perhaps with inconſiſtency; in having not long before applauded Attalus and the Rhodians, and cenſured Philip, and delivering now a contrary judgement. But for this very purpoſe it was, that I obſerved expreſsly in the beginning of my work, that an Hiſtorian often is obliged to applaud and to condemn the ſame perſons, as different occaſions may require. For the revolutions of affairs, and ſudden accidents as they ariſe, are frequently ſeen to change the intentions of men from good to bad, or from bad to good. And even without the impreſſion of external circumſtances, the natural inconſtancy of the human

man mind ſometimes determines men to a right courſe of action, and ſometimes to that which is altogether wrong. The force of one or other of theſe cauſes was now clearly viſible in Philip. For though this prince ſuffered no ſmall concern from his late defeat, and was apt, almoſt at all times, to be hurried along by violence and paſſion, yet upon this occaſion he accommodated himſelf with a moſt aſtoniſhing prudence to the exigency of the times. By this conduct he was again enabled to reſume the war againſt the Rhodians and king Attalus; and in the end accompliſhed all that he propoſed. Such an inſtance of his prudence deſerved not to paſs altogether without remark. For ſome men, like bad racers, abandon their deſigns, when they are arrived even almoſt at the end of their courſe: while others, on the contrary, obtain a victory againſt their rivals, by exerting in that very moment more ſtrenuous efforts than before.

EXTRACT the SEVENTH.

The ſituation of Seſtus and Abydus. The ſiege of this laſt city: and the deſperate reſolution of the citizens.

IT would be needleſs to enter into a long deſcription of the ſituation of Seſtus and Abydus, or to enumerate the conveniences which they poſſeſs. For theſe cities are ſo ſingularly placed, that there is ſcarcely any one, unleſs among the moſt vulgar of mankind, who has not acquired ſome knowledge of them. But it will not be unuſeful upon the preſent occaſion, to turn the attention of the reader to a general view of their poſition. And indeed whoever will compare and lay together what I am going to ſay, may obtain from thence a juſter notion of theſe two cities, than even from an examination of the ground upon which they ſtand.

As it is not poſſible then to ſail from the Ocean, or, as it is called by others, from the Atlantick, into our ſea, without paſſing through the ſtrait of the Pillars of Hercules; ſo neither is there any way of ſailing from our ſea into the Propontis and the Pontus, unleſs through the paſſage that lies between Seſtus and Abydus. In one reſpect indeed, theſe ſtraits are very differently formed. For that of the Pillars of Hercules is much larger than the Helleſpont, and contains ſixty ſtadia in breadth; whereas the other, between Seſtus and Abydus, has no more than two. But in making this difference, Fortune ſeems to have acted not altogether without deſign. One reaſon of it, as far as we are able to conjecture, ſeems to be, that the exterior

ocean is by many degrees larger than our ſea. To this we may add, that the ſtrait of Abydus is better adapted, upon this account, to the neceſſities of thoſe who live upon it. For as both ſides of it are covered with inhabitants, the narrowneſs of the paſſage ſerves as a kind of gate for their mutual intercourſe. For this purpoſe, they ſometimes throw a bridge over the ſtrait, and paſs from one ſide to the other on foot. At other times, veſſels are ſeen ſailing continually upon it. But the ſtrait of the Pillars of Hercules is very rarely uſed, and only by a few. For the people that live on both ſides, in the extreme borders of Africk and of Europe, have but little communication one with another, and ſcarcely any knowledge of the exterior ſea. The city Abydus is incloſed alſo on either ſide by the promontories of Europe; and has a harbour, which affords a ſafe ſhelter to the ſhips that are ſtationed in it againſt every wind. But without the entrance of the harbour, it is not poſſible for any veſſel ever to caſt anchor, on account of the rapidity and violence with which the waters are carried through the ſtrait.

This was the city, to which Philip was now laying ſiege both by land and by ſea. On the ſide of the latter, he had blocked the place cloſely by piles planted croſsways: and, by land, had carried an intrenchment round the walls. The greatneſs of the preparations that were made, the variety of the works that were contrived, the ſkill and artifice that were employed in carrying into execution every uſual method either of attack or of defence; theſe, however memorable, are not the things that are moſt worthy of admiration upon the preſent occaſion. But the generous reſolution and the extravagant ſpirit, which appeared in the beſieged, were ſo ſingular and aſtoniſhing, that this ſiege, upon that account alone, deſerves more than any other to

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be tranſmitted to poſterity in laſting characters. At firſt, repoſing an intire confidence in their own ſtrength, they ſuſtained all the attacks of Philip with the greateſt firmneſs: diſabling the machines that were advanced againſt the city from the ſea, by ſtones thrown from their Baliſtæ; or deſtroying them by fire; ſo that the Macedonians were ſcarcely able to withdraw even their ſhips from the danger. On the ſide of the land likewiſe, they repulſed the king in his approaches with ſo great vigour and ſucceſs, that for ſome time they ſeemed to hope, that they ſhould force him to deſiſt from his attempt. But when they ſaw the outer wall of the city fall down; and that the Macedonians had brought their mines very near alſo to the wall which had been raiſed within the other, to ſupply the place of that which had fallen; they then ſent Iphiades and Pantacnotus to treat with Philip, and offered to ſurrender the city to him upon theſe conditions: that the troops which they had received from Attalus and the Rhodians ſhould be diſmiſſed with an aſſurance of ſafety; and the free citizens be allowed to depart to what places ſoever they ſhould chooſe, with the garments that were upon their bodies. But Philip ordered the deputies to go back again and tell the beſieged, that they either muſt ſurrender at diſcretion, or continue to defend themſelves with courage.

The Abydenians, when they had received this anſwer, met together in council, and, with minds agitated by deſpair, deliberated on the meaſures which they now ſhould take. They reſolved firſt, that the ſlaves ſhould be made free; that they might aſſiſt without reſerve in the defence of the city. In the next place, that all the women of the city ſhould be aſſembled together in the temple of Diana; and all the children, with their nurſes, in the Gymnaſium.

That all their gold and ſilver likewiſe ſhould be laid together in the Forum: and, in the ſame manner, all their valuable veſtments, in the Rhodian quadrireme, and in the trireme of the Cyzicenians. Theſe things, being thus decreed, were carried into execution with one conſent. They then called together another aſſembly: and, having choſen fifty of the oldeſt men, who were judged to be moſt worthy of ſuch a truſt, and who had ſtrength ſufficient alſo to accompliſh all that was propoſed, they made them ſwear in the preſence of all the citizens, that, as ſoon as the enemy ſhould become maſters of the inner wall, they would kill the women and the children; ſet fire to the two veſſels; and throw the gold and the ſilver into the ſea. After this, the prieſts being called, all the reſt of the citizens were engaged likewiſe by a ſolemn oath, that they would either conquer, or die fighting in the defence of their country. And to conclude the whole, having ſlain ſome victims in ſacrifice, they obliged the prieſts and prieſteſſes to pronounce, upon the burning entrails, dire execrations againſt thoſe who ſhould neglect to perform what they had ſworn. When all was finiſhed, they no longer endeavoured to countermine the enemy; but reſolved only, that, as ſoon as the wall ſhould fall, they would exert their utmoſt efforts upon the breach, and continue fighting till they ſhould all expire.

And now may it not be ſaid, that both the deſperate reſolution of the Phocæans, which has before been mentioned, and the magnanimous ſpirit alſo of the Acarnanians, were ſurpaſſed by the daring courage which the Abydenians ſhewed upon this occaſion? For when the Phocæans entered into a like determination with reſpect to their families, they had ſtill ſome hopes of ſaving themſelves by a victory; having

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an opportunity of engaging the Theſſalians in a ſet battle. The Acarnanians likewiſe had in their power the ſame reſource. For when they only expected an invaſion from the Ætolians, they paſſed in their council a ſimilar decree. We have before given a particular account of theſe tranſactions. But the Abydenians, already incloſed on every ſide, and having no means of ſafety remaining in their power, choſe rather to periſh, every man, together with their wives and children; than to live with the certain expectation of ſeeing their children and their wives fall into the hands of their enemies. The conduct therefore of Fortune, with regard to this laſt people, may well be charged with ſome injuſtice. She compaſſionated the diſtreſſes of the others, retrieved their affairs by a victory, and reinſtated them in ſafety when they had almoſt loſt all hope. To the Abydenians alone ſhe ſhewed no favour. The men all loſt their lives; the city was taken; and the children with their mothers came alive into the power of the enemy. For as ſoon as the inner wall fell down, the citizens, in obſervance of their oaths, all mounted the breach, and oppoſed the entrance of the enemy with ſo great fury, that Philip, though he ſent continually, even till night came on, freſh troops to the aſſault, was at laſt forced to deſiſt, and began to apprehend that the whole deſign was irrecoverably loſt. For the foremoſt of the Abydenians not only advanced with a frantick kind of deſperation over the dead bodies of the enemy; nor were contented to employ their ſpears and their ſwords alone with a moſt aſtoniſhing force; but, when their weapons were rendered uſeleſs, or were torn by violence out of their hands, graſping the Macedonians cloſe, they threw ſome of them with their armour upon the ground; broke the ſpears of others; and, catching the fragments from them, turned

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the points againſt their faces, and againſt the other parts of their bodies that were uncovered; and by theſe means threw them into extreme conſternation and diſmay. But when the night had put an end to the combat, the greateſt part of the citizens being left dead upon the breach, and the reſt diſabled by fatigue and wounds, Glaucides and Theognetus, having aſſembled together a ſmall number of the oldeſt men, prevailed with them to abandon that moſt glorious and moſt admirable determination which they ſo lately had embraced, and to conſider only their own preſent ſafety. They reſolved therefore to ſave the women and the children alive; and, as ſoon as the day ſhould appear, that they would ſend the prieſts and prieſteſſes, dreſſed in their holy habits, to implore the mercy of Philip, and to deliver the city to him.

At the very time of this tranſaction, Attalus, having heard that the Abydenians were beſieged, ſailed through the Ægean ſea to Tenedos: and Marcus Æmilius, who was the youngeſt of the Roman embaſſadours, came to Abydus. For the embaſſadours that were ſent from Rome, having received alſo at Rhodes the notice of this ſiege, and becauſe they had orders likewiſe to obtain an interview with Philip, ſtopped their journey to the other kings, and ſent Æmilius to Abydus to confer perſonally with that prince. The Roman, being admitted into his preſence, declared to him the orders of the ſenate: "that he ſhould not make war upon any of the people of Greece, nor invade any of the dominions that belonged to Ptolemy; and that he ſhould engage to make an equitable compenſation for the loſſes which Attalus and the Rhodians had unjuſtly ſuſtained. That, if he would comply with theſe conditions, he might ſtill remain in peace: if otherwiſe, that the Romans would de-

clare war againſt him." The king endeavoured to convince the embaſſadour, that the Rhodians had firſt attacked him. But Æmilius, interrupting him; "And what, ſaid he, did the Athenians? what, the Cianians? what, at this moment, the unhappy Abydenians? did either of theſe firſt attack you?" Philip, after ſome heſitation, told him; that for three reaſons he would excuſe the haughtineſs of this addreſs. Firſt, becauſe he was a young man, not yet experienced in affairs: in the next place, becauſe he was the handſomeſt man of his age; which indeed was true: and laſtly, becauſe he was a Roman. He then added; that it was his earneſt wiſh, that the Romans would ſtill confine themſelves within the bounds of their treaties, and lay aſide all thoughts of war. But, if they determine otherwiſe, we ſhall then, continued he, invoke the aſſiſtance of the gods, and defend ourſelves againſt them with our utmoſt ſtrength. After this diſcourſe they ſeverally retired. The king then took poſſeſſion of the city; and without any difficulty ſeized all the treaſure, which the Abydenians had before collected, and laid together in heaps. But how great was his aſtoniſhment, when he ſaw the numbers of the perſons that deſtroyed themſelves, together with their wives and children, with the moſt eager fury. Some ſtabbed, ſome ſtrangled themſelves; ſome plunged themſelves alive into wells; and others threw themſelves headlong down from the roofs of the houſes. Filled with grief at this diſmal ſight, he ordered proclamation to be made, that he would allow three days to thoſe who ſhould chooſe to hang, or otherwiſe deſtroy themſelves. But the Abydenians had before determined their own fate, and adhered inflexibly to their firſt purpoſe. They conſidered themſelves as guilty of a kind of treaſon againſt thoſe brave citizens, who had periſhed in the

the defence of their country: nor would any among them ſubmit to live, except thoſe whoſe hands were tied, or who were reſtrained by ſome other kind of force. The reſt, with their whole families, without any delay, embraced a voluntary death.

EXTRACT the EIGHTH.

The expedition of Philopœmen againſt Nabis.

PHILOPOEMEN, having firſt computed the reſpective diſtances of all the Achæan cities, and conſidered alſo, which of them lay along the ſame roads in going towards Tegea, wrote letters to them all, and ſent them, in different parcels, to the cities that were at the greateſt diſtance from that place: the parcels being ſo compoſed, that each of theſe cities, together with the letter addreſſed to itſelf, received thoſe likewiſe that were written to the reſt of the cities which ſtood upon the ſame road. The firſt letter was addreſſed to the chief magiſtrate of the city, and contained the following words. "As ſoon as you have received this letter, aſſemble together in the Forum all the men of military age with their arms. Let them be furniſhed with proviſions, and with money for five days: and, when they are formed into a body, conduct them to the next city. On your arrival there, deliver the letter that is addreſſed alſo to the chief magiſtrate of that city; and let the contents of it in like manner be obeyed." This ſecond letter contained the ſame orders as the former; and was different only in the name of the next city to which the troops were to be conducted. The ſame method was obſerved through all the cities: and the reſult of this management was, that, as no one was able to conjecture what was the deſign and object of the expedition, ſo neither had the troops themſelves any farther knowledge of their march, than that they were going to the next city; but remaining

ſtill in a ſtate of doubt and ignorance, joined themſelves each to the others, and continued to advance. As the firſt and moſt diſtant cities were not all ſituated at an equal diſtance from Tegea, care had been alſo taken, that the letters ſhould not be delivered to them all at once; but at different times, proportioned to their reſpective diſtances. And from hence it happened, that, when neither the Tegeans nor the troops themſelves had conceived any expectation of ſuch an accident. The Achæans all arrived at Tegea in the ſame moment in arms, and entered the city together by all the different gates. The deſign of Philopœmen was, to elude by this contrivance the obſervation of thoſe ſpies and gatherers of news, which Nabis, the Spartan tyrant, had diſperſed through the country.

Having thus formed his project, on the day on which the Achæans were expected to arrive, he ſent away a ſelect body of troops from Tegea; with orders, that they ſhould conceal themſelves during the night in the neighbourhood of Selaſia, and early on the following day make incurſions into the Lacedæmonian territory. That, if the Spartan mercenaries ſhould be drawn together to oppoſe them, they ſhould then retreat towards Scotita; and in all other things obey the orders of Didaſcalondas of Crete, to whom he had communicated his whole deſign. This meaſure being carried into execution, he directed the Achæans to take their ſupper at an early hour, and then led them out of Tegea. Having continued his march all night with the greateſt haſte, he arrived at break of day, and took his poſt ſecretly in the neighbourhood of Scotita, which lies between Tegea and Sparta. The Spartan mercenaries that were ſtationed in Pellene, having received notice in the morning from their ſcouts, that ſome troops of the enemy were making incurſions in the country, immediately

ſallied out, and attacked them with their accuſtomed vigour. The Achæans obſerved their orders and retreated. The mercenaries purſued with the greateſt eagerneſs: till, being at laſt arrived at the place where the reſt of the Achæans lay concealed, they were ſuddenly ſurrounded by them, and were all either killed or taken priſoners.

THE

GENERAL HISTORY

OF

POLYBIUS.

BOOK the SEVENTEENTH.

EXTRACT the FIRST.

Conferences between Philip, Flaminius, and the deputies of the allies. They all ſend embaſſadours to Rome. The Roman ſenate reſolves that the war ſhall be continued againſt Philip.

CHAP. I.

WHEN the day appointed for the conference was come, Philip ſailed from Demetrias in an armed ſloop, accompanied with five boats, and came into the Malian gulph. He was attended by his two ſecretaries, Apollodorus

rus and Demoſthenes, both Macedonians; by Brachyllus of Bœotia; and by Cycliadas an Achæan, who had been forced to fly out of Peloponneſus, for the reaſons that have before been mentioned. On the other ſide, with Titus Flaminius, came the king Amynander; Dionyſodorus, on the part of Attalus; and deputies alſo from the other ſtates and cities. On the part of the Achæans appeared Ariſtænetus and Xenophon: for the Rhodians, Aceſimbrotus, their chief naval commander: and, in the name of the Ætolians, Phæneas their Prætor, with many others that were employed in the adminiſtration of the government. When they were all come near together upon the coaſt of Nicæa, Flaminius ſteered his veſſel cloſe in to the land, and went and ſtood upon the ſhore. But Philip, though he alſo approached the land, ſtood aloof at ſome little diſtance from it: and, when the former called to him to come on ſhore, he anſwered from his ſhip that he would not do it. The other aſked him, who it was that he feared? I fear no one, ſaid Philip, except the Gods: but I have juſt reaſon to be diſtruſtful of many that are here preſent, eſpecially of the Ætolians. Flaminius was ſurpriſed, and ſaid, that the opportunity was the ſame, and the danger equal to all. The danger is by no means equal, replied Philip: for if Phæneas were to be killed, the Ætolians might find many other Prætors; but, if the ſame thing ſhould happen to me, the Macedonians would at this time be left without a king. This beginning gave no ſmall offence to all that were preſent. He was deſired however by the Roman General to ſpeak what he had to ſay upon the ſubject of their meeting. Philip anſwered, that it belonged not to him to ſpeak, but to the Roman. That for his own part therefore he only deſired Flaminius to declare, upon what conditions he might be ſuffered to remain in peace. The conditions,

ditions, replied Flaminius, are clear and ſimple. I order you to relinquiſh every part of Greece: to ſend back all the priſoners and deſerters to their reſpective countries: to reſtore to the Romans the places which you have conquered in Illyria ſince the treaty of Epirus; and to Ptolemy all the cities which you have taken from him ſince the death of Ptolemy Philopator. Then turning himſelf towards the other deputies, he bade them declare the orders which they had received from their ſeveral ſtates. Dionyſodorus began the firſt; and demanded in the name of Attalus, that Philip ſhould deliver to that prince all the ſhips and men which he had taken in the engagement near the iſland of Chios; and reſtore alſo, in the ſame condition as before, the Nicephorium and the temple of Venus, which he had plundered and deſtroyed. Next to him, Aceſimbrotus on the part of the Rhodians required, that the king ſhould reſtore the diſtrict of Peræa, which he had taken from them; withdraw his garriſons from Iaſſus, and the cities of Bargylia and Euromea; allow the Perinthians to be united as before in the ſame common government as the Byzantines; and, in the laſt place, that he ſhould deliver up Seſtus and Abydus, together with all the ports and places of traffick which he poſſeſſed in Aſia. After the Rhodians, the Achæans demanded likewiſe the reſtitution of Argos and of Corinth. Laſt of all, the Ætolians inſiſted alſo, as the Romans had done, that Philip ſhould relinquiſh every part of Greece; and to this they added, that he ſhould reſtore unhurt the cities which had been before aſſociated with them in their government.

Theſe demands were made by Phæneas the Ætolian Prætor. But there was a certain Alexander, ſurnamed the Iſian, who was conſidered among the Ætolians as a very able ſpeaker, and well verſed alſo in affairs. This man then began

began to ſpeak. "It was not, he ſaid, to be expected, that Philip would now employ any greater ſincerity in making peace, than he had at any time ſhewn ſpirit in making war. That in conferences and negotiations, his endeavour was always to lay ſnares; to watch for ſome advantage; and to act even upon ſuch occaſions a hoſtile part. That his manner of making war was alike contrary to juſtice, and void of courage. That he never dared to look his enemies in the face, but fled always before them: pillaging and burning the cities in his flight; and depriving the conquerours by this diſhonourable method of the juſt fruits of their victory. How different, continued he, was the conduct of the former kings of Macedon? They engaged continually in ſet battles in the open field; and ſcarcely at any time deſtroyed or overthrew the cities. Such was the manner in which Alexander maintained his war in Aſia againſt Darius, and atchieved the conqueſt of that mighty empire. The ſame was the conduct of his Generals who came after him, when they contended together for the ſame Aſia againſt Antigonus. The ſame was that of all the ſucceeding princes to the time of Pyrrhus. Eager always to encounter with their enemies in the field, they employed every effort to determine their diſputes by arms: but ſpared the cities, that the conquerours might poſſeſs them, and gain ſubjects by whom they might be honoured. And indeed, to relinquiſh the war itſelf, and only to deſtroy thoſe things for the ſake of which it is made; what is it but the work of the very ſtrongeſt madneſs? Yet this is the manner in which Philip acts. For ſince the time of his retreat, which was made with ſo great haſte through the paſſes of Epirus, he has deſtroyed in Theſſaly, among the people who are his allies and friends, more cities than their enemies have at any time deſtroyed." Many other things were urged.

urged by him in ſupport of the ſame charge. And he then concluded his diſcourſe, with demanding of Philip; for what reaſon, when Lyſimachia was confederated with the Ætolians, and governed by an Ætolian Prætor, he had driven out that magiſtrate, and placed a Macedonian garriſon in the city? Upon what pretences, even while himſelf was allied by treaty with the Ætolians, he had carried the Cianians into ſlavery, who were aſſociated alſo with the Ætolian ſtate? And laſtly, by what ſhew of right he now held poſſeſſion of Echinus, of the Pthian Thebes, of Pharſalus and of Lariſſa?

As ſoon as he had ended, Philip approached nearer to the land; and, ſtanding forwards in his ſhip, "This is in truth, ſaid he, an harangue very worthy of an Ætolian, a declamation proper only for the ſtage. For who does not know, that no man ever willingly occaſions the deſtruction of his allies: but that in certain conjunctures the leaders of armies are forced to take many meaſures that are repugnant to their inclinations." He was ſtill ſpeaking, when Phæneas, who was very near-ſighted, roughly interrupted him, and told him that he was wandering from the ſubject; for that he ought either to conquer in the field, or to receive the law from the conquerours. "Without doubt, replied Philip, turning himſelf quick towards him; even a blind man can ſee that." For this prince had a ſtrong propenſity to raillery: and even at this time, when his affairs were in no very proper condition for jeſting, he was not able to reſtrain his natural inclination. Afterwards, addreſſing his diſcourſe again to Alexander; "You demand of me, ſaid he, for what reaſon I poſſeſſed myſelf of Lyſimachia? It was to prevent the Thracians from taking advantage of your negligence to deſtroy that city: the very thing which happened afterwards; when the war forced

me to withdraw the troops, which I had placed there, not as a garriſon, but as a defence only againſt thoſe invaders. Nor was it I that made war upon the Cianians. But when Pruſias had declared war againſt them, I aſſiſted him indeed in conquering their city. If there was any crime in this proceeding, to yourſelves alone the guilt muſt be imputed. For how often have we demanded of you, both myſelf and all the ſtates of Greece, an abrogation of the law, which allows you to take ſpoils from the ſpoils? But you have always anſwered, that you would ſooner ſeparate Ætolia from Ætolia, than relinquiſh that law." Flaminius was aſtoniſhed, not being able to conceive the meaning of theſe words. Philip therefore explained it by informing him, that it was the cuſtom of this people not only to pillage the lands of thoſe with whom they were at war; but that when any other perſons, even thoſe that were the allies and friends of the Ætolians, were engaged in war againſt each other; the latter held it to be lawful for them to join their arms, though without any publick decree, both to the one and the other of the contending parties, and to ravage the lands of both. That upon ſuch occaſions they knew not any difference between enmity and friendſhip: for that their neighbours, all equally without diſtinction, whenever any contention aroſe among them, were ſure to have the Ætolians for their enemies? "With what ſhew of juſtice then, continued he, do they now urge it as a crime, that, when I was indeed in friendſhip with the Ætolians, but at the ſame time was allied to Pruſias, I ſcrupled not to attack the Cianians, in ſupport of my ally? But that which is moſt inſufferable is, that theſe men now aſſume to themſelves an equality with the Romans; and, like them, command the Macedonians to relinquiſh the whole of Greece. This language, haughty indeed as it is,

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may be born however from the Romans: but from the Ætolians it is intolerable. And tell me, I pray you, what is this Greece, from which I am commanded to retire? By what limits is it to be circumſcribed? For a great part even of the Ætolians are not Greeks. The countries of the Agræans, the Apodotæ, the Amphilochians; theſe are no parts of Greece. May I be allowed to retain poſſeſſion of theſe?" Flaminius ſmiled at this pleaſantry. "But enough has been ſaid, continued Philip, upon the ſubject of the Ætolians. With regard to Attalus and the Rhodians, it would be thought more reaſonable by any equitable judge, that they ſhould reſtore to me the ſhips and the men which they have taken from me, than that I ſhould reſtore their ſhips to them. But, if ſuch be your pleaſure Alexander, I will reſtore the diſtrict of Peræa to the Rhodians, and to Attalus thoſe of his ſhips and men which are ſtill preſerved. The Nicephorium and the temple of Venus, ſince they already are deſtroyed, it is not in my power, unleſs by one way only, to reſtore. I will ſend ſome plants to the place, and ſome gardeners alſo, who ſhall cultivate the ground, and make the trees grow that have been cut down." Flaminius laughed again at this droll conceit: and Philip, paſſing next to the Achæans, enumerated all the acts of kindneſs which they had received from Antigonus, and from himſelf. He then recounted alſo the many and great honours which this people had conferred upon the kings of Macedon. And having, in the laſt place, recited the decree, by which they had renounced the friendſhip of the Macedonians, and embraced the party of the Romans, he from thence took occaſion to inveigh largely againſt their ingratitude and their breach of faith. In concluſion he ſaid, that he was willing however

to reſtore Argos to them; but that with reſpect to Corinth, he would deliberate concerning it with Flaminius.

Having in this manner finiſhed his diſcourſe to all the reſt, he now addreſſed himſelf, as he expreſſly declared, to Flaminius and the Romans: and deſired to be informed, what places and what cities of Greece he was commanded to relinquiſh; thoſe only which he had conquered, or the others alſo which had been tranſmitted to him from his anceſtors. As Flaminius made no anſwer, Ariſtænetus immediately roſe up to ſpeak on the part of the Achæans, and Phæneas for the Ætolians. But the day being now almoſt cloſed prevented any farther debate. Philip then requeſted, that he might receive all together in writing the conditions upon which peace might be obtained. He was left, he ſaid, alone; without a ſingle perſon, by whom he might be adviſed: and that he wiſhed to retire, and to conſider with his beſt attention the conceſſions that were exacted from him. Flaminius had heard with pleaſure the railleries which this prince had mingled with his diſcourſe: and not being willing that it ſhould be ſaid, that he had nothing to reply, he now rallied Philip in his turn. "You do well indeed, ſaid he, to complain that you are left alone: how can it be otherwiſe; when you have put all thoſe to death, who might at this time have aſſiſted you with the beſt advice?" The king forced a kind of reluctant ſmile, and made no reply. The demands of the ſeveral ſtates were then given to him in writing, and were the ſame that have been mentioned. After this the aſſembly ſeparated; having appointed a ſecond meeting in the ſame place on the following day.

On the next day then Flaminius came again to the place. All the reſt alſo were preſent, Philip only excepted, who

did not appear. But when the day was ſo far advanced, that there remained but little expectation of his coming, he at laſt arrived juſt in the evening, attended by the ſame perſons as before. The conditions, he ſaid, were ſo perplexing, and ſo full of difficulty, that he had waſted the whole day in the conſideration of them. But the others believed, that his deſign in coming ſo late was, that the Ætolians and Achæans might not have time ſufficient to accuſe him. For he had obſerved, when he retired from the former conference, that they were both ready to enter into farther altercation, and to renew their complaints againſt him. And this indeed appeared to be the truth, when now, upon his firſt approach, he deſired to be allowed a ſeparate conference with Flaminius; that, inſtead of ſkirmiſhing any more together with words, ſome end might at laſt be put to their diſputes. As he urged this requeſt with repeated earneſtneſs, Flaminius, when he had firſt aſked the opinion of the reſt, and received their conſent for him to hear what the king would offer, took with him the Tribune Claudius, and, having directed the other deputies to retire to a little diſtance from the ſhore, ordered Philip to come upon the land. The king accordingly left his ſhip, attended by Apollodorus and Demoſthenes; joined Flaminius; and conferred with him for a very conſiderable time. What paſſed on both ſides upon this occaſion, it is not eaſy for me to ſay. But Flaminius, after Philip had departed from him, informed the reſt; that the king was ready to ſurrender to the Ætolians Pharſalus and Lariſſa, but not Thebes; and to the Rhodians the diſtrict of Peræa, but not the cities of Iaſſus and Bargylia: that he would reſtore to the Achæans both Argos and Corinth: would deliver to the Romans all the places in Illyria, and all the priſoners: and to Attalus, the ſhips which he had taken from him in the

the late engagement, together with the men likewiſe that were at this time in his hands. Theſe offers were rejected at once by all the aſſembly. They demanded that Philip ſhould firſt conſent to the condition which they all required; that of relinquiſhing the whole of Greece. Unleſs this was done, the conceſſions which he was diſpoſed to make to particular ſtates would be vain and ineffectual. Philip, perceiving that the conteſt was likely to be vehement, and being apprehenſive that he ſhould again be forced to hear himſelf accuſed, deſired that the aſſembly might be deferred to the morrow: that the day was already cloſed: and that he would either bring himſelf to yield to the conditions that were exacted from him, or prevail with the others to accept the terms which he had offered. Flaminius conſented to this requeſt, and appointed the ſhore near Thronium for the place of the third conference.

On the following day they all met together at an early hour. Philip, having firſt in a ſhort diſcourſe, intreated all that were preſent, and Flaminius above the reſt, not to obſtruct the concluſion of the peace, when it was manifeſt that the greateſt part were inclined to conſent to ſome accommodation, ſaid that he wiſhed indeed, if it was poſſible, that all their differences might be adjuſted among themſelves. But, if this was not to be accompliſhed, he then deſired, that he might be allowed to ſend embaſſadours to Rome. That he either would engage the ſenate to yield to him the matters in diſpute; or would ſubmit to every thing which they ſhould otherwiſe injoin. The deputies all at once rejected this propoſal, and cried out that the war muſt be continued. But Flaminius ſaid; that he very well knew that Philip never would perform the conditions that were demanded of him. That their compliance however with this requeſt would bring no injury to their affairs. That the

the conditions themſelves, as they had been now propoſed, could not otherwiſe be ratified, than by the authority of the ſenate: and that the preſent time was the moſt commodious for informing themſelves of the inclinations of that aſſembly. For as the armies would not be able to attempt any thing during the winter, by employing that ſeaſon of inaction in ſending deputies to Rome, they would advance, and not retard, the end which they all deſired. As it appeared from this diſcourſe, that Flaminius himſelf was not unwilling to refer the matter to the ſenate, the reſt readily concurred in this deſign, and conſented that Philip ſhould ſend ſome embaſſadours to Rome. At the ſame time it was determined, that embaſſadours ſhould be deputed likewiſe from the other ſtates, to lay their pretenſions before the ſenate, and ſupport their accuſations againſt the king.

CHAP. II.

FLAMINIUS, having in this manner brought the conferences to an end moſt favourable to his own intentions, and the fame which he had from the firſt deſigned, applied himſelf now to finiſh what remained of the work; and, while he took ſuch meaſures as were neceſſary for his own ſecurity, was careful not to leave any handle of advantage to Philip. Granting therefore to him a truce for two months, he commanded him to ſend his embaſſadours to Rome within that time, and immediately to withdraw his garriſons from Phocis and from Locris: at the ſame time taking alſo every other precaution that was requiſite, to prevent the allies from receiving any injury from the Macedonians during the continuance of the truce. He gave theſe orders in writing to Philip: and then made haſte

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to finiſh what more particularly regarded his own deſign. He firſt engaged Amynander to go immediately to Rome: well knowing that this prince, who was of a flexible and pliant diſpoſition, would eaſily be directed by his friends in the city; and that the title alſo of king would raiſe the publick expectation, and give ſplendour to the negociation. He then deputed thither, on his own part, Quintus Fabius, the nephew of his wife; Quintus Fulvius; and Appius Claudius, whoſe ſurname was Nero. On the part of the Ætolians were ſent Alexander the Iſian, Damocritus of Calydon, Dicæarchus of Trichonium, Polimarchus of Arſinoe, Lamius of Ambracia, and Nicomachus of Acarnania. The exiles that had been driven from Thyreum, and had taken refuge in Ambracia, ſent alſo in their name Theodotus of Pheræ; who, after his baniſhment from Theſſaly, had fixed his reſidence in Stratus. The Achæans deputed Xenophon of Ægium; king Attalus, only Alexander: and the Athenians, Cephiſodorus.

When theſe embaſſadours arrived at Rome, the ſenate had not finally determined the allotment of the provinces to the magiſtrates of the year; but were making it the ſubject of their deliberation, whether both the Conſuls ſhould be ſent into Gaul, or one of them be charged with the war againſt the king of Macedon. But after ſome time, when the friends of Flaminius were at laſt aſſured, that both Conſuls would remain in Italy, on account of the apprehenſion of a Gallic war; the deputies were then introduced into the ſenate, and declaimed with great acrimony againſt Philip. Their diſcourſes were in general the ſame which they had made in the late conferences with the king. But the opinion which they chiefly laboured to impreſs upon the ſenate was, that as long as Philip ſhould hold Chalcis, Corinth, and Demetrias in ſubjection, the Greeks could never entertain

tain ſo much as a thought of being free. That this was acknowledged by Philip himſelf, who uſed to call theſe places the fetters of Greece: and that no declaration ever was more true. For, while a royal garriſon remained in Corinth, the people of Peloponneſus would be afraid to move. That the Locrians, the Bœotians, and Phocæans, muſt in the ſame manner loſe all courage, if the king ſhould retain poſſeſſion of Chalcis, and the other parts of Eubœa. And laſtly, if the Macedonians were allowed to hold Demetrias, that the Theſſalians and Magneſians could never hope to obtain even the ſmalleſt portion of freedom. That the offer therefore that was made by Philip, to relinquiſh any other places, was merely an empty ſhew, contrived only to elude the preſent danger: for, if he ſtill ſhould be permitted to remain maſter of thoſe three cities, he would be able to bring the Greeks again into ſubjection, at any time that he ſhould chooſe. Upon this account, they requeſted of the ſenate, either that the king might be forced to make an immediate ceſſion of thoſe places; or otherwiſe, that things might remain in their preſent ſtate, and the war be continued with vigour againſt him. That the war indeed was at this time very nearly finiſhed: ſince the Macedonians had been already twice defeated; and that their ſupplies by land were all exhauſted. To theſe reaſons they in the end added alſo their intreaties; and implored the ſenate, not to diſappoint the Greeks of their hopes of liberty, nor to deprive themſelves of the honour of a glorious name.

When theſe and other things of the ſame kind had been urged by the deputies from the ſeveral ſtates, the embaſſadours of Philip were ready alſo to make a long harangue, but were ſtopped in the very beginning of it. Being aſked if they would relinquiſh Chalcis, Corinth, and Demetrias,

they anſwered, that they had received no inſtructions concerning thoſe places. They were loaded therefore with reproaches from every ſide, and were forced to be ſilent. It was then decreed, that both the Conſuls ſhould be ſent into Gaul, as we before have mentioned; and that the war ſhould he continued againſt Philip, and Flaminius be intruſted with the affairs of Greece. And thus all things happened as Flaminius had deſired. Nor was his ſucceſs upon this occaſion ſcarcely in any degree to be aſcribed to chance, but chiefly to his own foreſight and prudent management. For there was not in all Rome a man more dexterous, or that ſhewed greater wiſdom and ability, either in the conduct of publick affairs, or in the advancement of his own particular intereſts. And yet he was at this time very young: not more than thirty years old. He was the firſt alſo of the Romans that led an army into Greece.

EXTRACT the SECOND.

A reflection on the depravity of mankind.

IT ſeems that men, who in the practice of craft and ſubtlety exceed all other animals, may with good reaſon be acknowledged to be more depraved than they. For other animals are ſubſervient only to the appetites of the body, and by them are led to do wrong. But men, who have alſo ſentiments to guide them, are guilty of ill conduct, not leſs through the abuſe of their acquired reaſon, than from the force of their natural deſires.

EXTRACT the THIRD.

The difference between the Roman Paliſade and that of the Greeks. The motions of the Macedonian and Roman armies. The battle of Cynoſcephalæ, between Philip and Flaminius. The Macedonian Phalanx compared with the arms and order of battle of the Romans.

CHAP. I.

FLAMINIUS had not yet been able to diſcover, in what place the Macedonians were incamped. But being aſſured that they had entered Theſſaly, he ordered all his ſoldiers to cut pales for the intrenchment, and to carry them with them, that they might be ready for uſe whenever occaſion ſhould require. This is a labour, which in the diſcipline of the Grecian armies is conſidered as impracticable: but the Romans perform it without much difficulty. For the Greeks, in their marches, ſcarcely can ſupport the toil of carrying their own bodies. But the Romans, when they have flung their ſhields by the leathern braces behind their ſhoulders, take their javelins in their hands, and are able at the ſame time to carry the pales. What renders the taſk indeed the eaſier is, that theſe pales are very different from thoſe that are uſed by the Greeks. For the Greeks eſteem thoſe to be the beſt, which have many, and very large branches all around the trunk. But the Romans chooſe thoſe that have only two or three branches, or four at the moſt; and thoſe alſo, upon one ſide of the

trunk, and not ſpringing alternately from both. By this method, the carriage of them is rendered altogether eaſy: for three or four of them may be laid cloſe together, and be carried by a ſingle ſoldier. In this way alſo, they are much better contrived than the other, for the ſecurity of the camp. The pales uſed by the Greeks are eaſily torn out of the ground. For, as they are planted ſingly, and each of them ſtanding as it were alone, with many great branches ſpreading from the trunk, if two or three ſoldiers apply their ſtrength to the branches, the trunk is ſoon drawn from the ground, and leaves a very ſpacious opening: and the adjoining pales alſo are at the ſame time looſened; becauſe their branches are too ſhort to be interwoven each with the other. But it is otherwiſe in the method of the Romans. Among them, the branches are ſo twiſted together, that it is not eaſy to diſtinguiſh, what branches belong to the ſtems in the ſeveral pales, or what ſtems to the branches. Add to this, that the texture of them is ſo cloſe, as to leave no room for a hand to paſs; and that the points alſo of all the branches are very carefully ſharpened. And even when it is poſſible to lay hold on any part, it is ſtill extremely difficult to draw out any of the pales: not only becauſe they are very firmly fixed in the ground; but becauſe the force alſo, which is applied to any ſingle branch, muſt at the ſame time draw along many other branches, which are inſeparably twiſted with it. Nor is it ſcarcely ever practicable for two or three men to lay hold on the ſame pale together. And if a ſingle pale, or if two, by the efforts of continual ſhaking ſhould at laſt be removed from their place, the opening that is made is ſo ſmall that it is ſcarcely to be diſcerned. As theſe pales then have in three reſpects a very great advantage over the others; in being found almoſt in any place; in being carried with eaſe;

eaſe; and in forming, when they are uſed, a rampart the moſt ſtable and ſecure; it is manifeſt, at leaſt in my judgement, that there is not any part of the Roman diſcipline, which ſo well deſerves to be approved and imitated.

Flaminius then, having ordered the ſoldiers, as we have mentioned, to cut and carry the pales with them, that they might be ready for uſe, advanced ſlowly with all the army. When he arrived at the diſtance of about fifty ſtadia from the city of Pheræ, he there incamped: and, early on the following day, he ſent out a body of his men, to diſcover, if it was poſſible, in what place the enemy lay, and what were their deſigns. Philip on the other hand, having been informed that the Romans remained ſtill in the neighbourhood of Thebes, decamped from Lariſſa at this very time with all his army, and, directing his march alſo towards Pheræ, arrived before the day was cloſed at the diſtance of thirty ſtadia from the city. In this place, he ordered the troops to take their refreſhment and repoſe: and, on the following day, having ſent forwards his advanced guard, before it was light, to take poſſeſſion of the hills that were above the city, as ſoon as the day appeared, he began to draw out all his forces from the camp. The troops that were ſent forwards from both the armies had almoſt met together, as they advanced, on the top of the hills. But perceiving the approach of each other through the dawn, when there was now but a very moderate diſtance between them, they immediately halted, and ſent ſome to inform the Generals of what had happened, and to receive their orders. The Generals on both ſides reſolved to remain quiet in their reſpective camps; and recalled the troops that had advanced. On the next day, they ſent away again on both ſides about three hundred of their cavalry and light-armed troops to make diſcoveries. Among thoſe that

that went from the Roman camp, were two troops of Ætolians, ſelected for this ſervice by Flaminius, on account of their knowledge of the country. The two bodies met together on the road that leads from Pheræ to Lariſſa, and the engagement was begun with vigour. But ſo ſtrenuous were the efforts of Eupolemus, who headed the Ætolians, and ſo well did he animate the troops of Italy to ſupport the charge, that the Macedonians ſuffered very greatly in the action. When the ſkirmiſh however had continued for a conſiderable time, both parties returned back again to their ſeveral camps.

On the following day, the two Generals, being alike diſſatisfied with the ground in the neighbourhood of Pheræ, which was covered every where with plantations, gardens, and fences, reſolved both of them to change their camp. Philip therefore, having put his troops in motion, directed his march towards Scotuſſa: with deſign to draw from thence a plentiful ſupply of all proviſions, and afterwards to incamp in ſome place more commodious for his army. At the ſame time Flaminius, ſuſpecting that this was his intention, began his march alſo towards the ſame place with the greateſt haſte; that he might be able to arrive before the king, and deſtroy the proviſions through the country. Between the two armies was a chain of lofty hills, which intercepted the view of each from the other: ſo that the Romans ſaw not the courſe in which the Macedonians directed their march, nor the Macedonians that of the Romans. At the end of the day, the former arrived near Eretria in Pthiotis, and the latter upon the banks of the river Oncheſtus, and remained there for the night; not knowing in either army, in what place the other had halted. On the next day they continued their march forwards, and ſeverally incamped; Philip, near the place called Melambium

bium in the diſtrict of Scotuſſa; and Flaminius in the neighbourhood of Thetidium in Pharſalia; but were ſtill alike unacquainted, each of them with the ſituation of the other. On the third day, at early dawn, came on violent ſtorms of rain accompanied with thunder; and the whole earth was covered with ſo black a ſky, that the ſoldiers were ſcarcely able to ſee a ſtep before them. Philip however, being earneſt to accompliſh his deſign, reſolved to continue his march with all the army. But when he had advanced but a little way forwards, he found himſelf ſo incommoded by the darkneſs, that he again halted, and incamped; but ſent away a body of troops, to take their poſt upon the top of the hills that were between the two armies. Flaminius remained ſtill in his camp near Thetidium: but being ſollicitous to know in what place the enemy lay, he ſent away ten troops of cavalry, together with a thouſand of the light-armed infantry, to make diſcoveries; commanding them to direct their courſe with caution through the country. As this party advanced, they were betrayed by the darkneſs, and fell, without perceiving them, among the Macedonians who had taken their ſtation upon the top of the hills. The two bodies, being alike ſurpriſed, ſtood awhile in ſuſpenſe: but after a ſhort time they began to engage together in action, and ſent notice to their reſpective Generals of what had happened. As the engagement became more warm, the Romans were ſo unequally preſſed by the Macedonians, that they were forced to ſend and requeſt ſuccours from the camp. Flaminius therefore ſent away to their aſſiſtance Archidamus and Eupolemus, both of them Ætolians, and two Roman Tribunes, at the head of two thouſand foot and five hundred horſe. On the arrival of theſe forces, the face of the action ſoon was changed. The Romans, encouraged

couraged by this new ſtrength, continued the fight with double ardour. The Macedonians on the other hand, though they defended themſelves with the greateſt bravery, yet being now preſſed in their turn, and incumbered with their heavy armour, were forced to retreat back again to the ſummit of the hills, and from thence ſent and deſired aſſiſtance alſo from their king. Philip, who, for the reaſons already mentioned, had formed no expectation of engaging upon this day in a general battle, had ſent out a great part of his troops to forage. But being now informed of what had happened, and as the darkneſs alſo was beginning to be diſperſed, he ordered Heraclides of Gyrtone, who led the Theſſalian cavalry, Leon who commanded that of Macedon, and Athenagoras who was at the head of all the mercenaries except thoſe of Thrace, to go and ſupport the combatants. The Macedonians, reinforced by ſo conſiderable a ſtrength, attacked the Romans with new vigour; drove them down back again from the ſummit of the hills; and would have totally diſperſed them; if the reſiſtance chiefly of the Ætolian cavalry, who maintained the fight with an aſtoniſhing impetuoſity and courage, had not prevented the diſorder from being complete. For as much as the infantry of this country, on account both of their arms and of the manner in which they are ranged in the field, falls below that of the reſt of Greece in all general battles; ſo much on the other hand is their cavalry ſuperior to all other, when they engage in ſeparate actions, or man againſt man. At this time therefore they oppoſed with ſuch ſucceſs the efforts of the enemy, that the Romans were not driven quite into the plain; but turned their faces again, and ſtopped their flight at a little diſtance from it. Flaminius, perceiving not only that the cavalry and the light-armed forces were in this manner routed, but that their flight had

ſpread a conſternation alſo through the reſt of the troops, drew his whole army out of the intrenchments, and ranged them in order of battle near the foot of the hills.

While the Romans were thus driven back, meſſenger after meſſenger, leaving the detachment upon the hills, came running to Philip, and cried aloud: "The enemies, O king, are flying; loſe not the opportunity. The barbarians cannot ſtand before us. The day is now your own: the very moment of victory is in your hands." Theſe vehement cries forced the king out to engage; though he altogether was diſſatisfied with the nature of the ground. For the hills, of which we are ſpeaking, are called Cynoſcephalæ, from the reſemblance which they bear to the head of a dog: being parted, round the ſummit, into ragged clifts, and ſtretched upwards to a conſiderable height. Philip therefore, who well knew that ſuch a ground would be very diſadvantageous to his troops, had not made from the beginning any diſpoſition for a general battle. But being now ſo urged and animated by the exceſſive confidence of thoſe who brought the news of this firſt ſucceſs, he at laſt gave orders to lead the whole army out of the intrenchments.

Flaminius alſo, having drawn up all his forces, as we have mentioned, in order of battle, and being now ready to ſupport the detachment that was engaged upon the hills, at the ſame time went through all the ranks to encourage his men. The words which he employed were few, but very forcible, and ſuch as the troops might perfectly underſtand. "Are not theſe, ſaid he to the ſoldiers; as if the enemy had ſtood cloſe before their eyes; are not theſe the Macedonians, whom you attacked upon the heights of Eordæa, advancing openly up the ſides of the hills under the conduct of Sulpicius, and drove with great ſlaughter from

from their poſt? Are not theſe the Macedonians, who, when they had taken poſſeſſion of the paſſes of Epirus, which were thought impoſſible to be forced, were by your courage routed and diſperſed; and, throwing away their arms, continued their flight even to their own country? And can you have any thing now to fear in engaging the ſame enemy without any diſadvantage? Does the remembrance of thoſe ſucceſſes offer any thing dreadful to your view? Ought it not rather, on the contrary, to inſpire you with the ſtrongeſt confidence? Rouſe up then your courage, and advance boldly to the fight. For I am well aſſured, that, with the aſſiſtance of the gods, the preſent action will ſoon be terminated in the ſame glorious manner as the paſt." When he had ended this harangue, he ordered the right wing of his army to remain ſtill in their poſt, with the elephants before them: and moved ſlowly with the left wing and the light-armed forces towards the enemy. The Romans that were firſt engaged upon the hills, perceiving themſelves to be now ſupported by the legions, returned back again, and renewed the fight with vigour.

At the ſame time Philip, when he had drawn up the greateſt part of his army in order of battle before the intrenchments, putting himſelf at the head of the Peltaſtæ and the right of the Phalanx, made haſte to aſcend the hills; and ordered Nicanor, ſurnamed the Elephant, to follow him without delay with the reſt of the forces. As ſoon as the foremoſt of the troops had reached the ſummit, he began to form the right of his line, upon the ground near to the top, which was now open and deſerted. For the detachment from the Macedonian army, that was firſt engaged, had driven down the Romans to the loweſt part of the hills. But while the king was ſtill forming his right,

the mercenaries that were in that detachment came running towards him in diſorder, being driven back again by the Romans in their turn. For the latter, as ſoon as they were followed by the legionary troops, which were brought up, as we have ſaid, to ſupport them, were ſo ſtrengthened by that new weight, that they preſſed heavily upon their enemies, and deſtroyed great numbers of them. Philip therefore, who, at his firſt arrival upon the hills, had beheld with pleaſure that the place of the action was at no great diſtance from the Roman camp, now ſeeing his troops forced back again, and flying towards him for ſupport, was compelled by this accident to advance, and engage in a general action; though the greateſt part of his phalanx was ſtill in march, and had not yet reached the ſummit of the hills. Having received then the troops that were forced back, he collected them all together, and placed them, both infantry and cavalry, upon his right wing; and gave orders to the Peltaſtæ and the ſoldiers of the phalanx, to double their files and cloſe their ranks upon the right. When this was done, and the Romans now were near, he commanded the phalanx to level their ſpears and advance; and the light-armed forces to extend themſelves, and attack the enemy in their flank.

Flaminius alſo, having received into the intervals of his army the troops that had been engaged, at the ſame time advanced againſt the enemy. The firſt ſhock, which was on both ſides violent, was attended likewiſe with a very great and unuſual noiſe. For both bodies ſhouted at once together. The cries alſo of the reſt that were at a diſtance were joined to thoſe of the combatants; and filled all around with aſtoniſhment and horror. The right wing however of Philip had from the firſt onſet very clearly the advantage. The higher ground from which they fought, the

weight of their diſpoſition, and the nature of their arms, well ſuited to the preſent action, all joined to give them a manifeſt ſuperiority over the Romans. But with regard to the reſt of the Macedonian army, the troops that were next in the line to the right ſtood at a diſtance from the enemy; and thoſe of the left wing were not yet arrived, having but juſt now begun to appear upon the tops of the hills. When Flaminius therefore perceived, that his troops were not able to maintain their ground againſt the phalanx, that great numbers were already killed, and the reſt beginning to retreat; he went in haſte, and joined the right wing of his army, which was now his only reſource; and, having remarked the diviſion and diſorder of the Macedonians; that the next in the line to the troops that were engaged remained inactive and at a diſtance; that ſome were juſt coming down from the tops of the hills; and others ſtanding upon the ſummit; he placed the elephants at the head of this wing, and advanced againſt theſe ſeveral bodies. The Macedonians, not having any leader from whom they might receive the command, and being unable to form themſelves into a phalanx, both on account of the inequality of the ground, and becauſe, as they were advancing towards that part of their army that was engaged, they were ſtill rather in the order of a march, than in any order of battle, waited not to be attacked by the Romans, but were broken at once by the elephants, and immediately diſperſed. The Romans purſued them with the greateſt part of their forces, and ſlaughtered them as they fled. But one of the Tribunes, at the head of no more than twenty companies, took at this time a meaſure which the occaſion ſuggeſted to him, and which was chiefly the cauſe that rendered the victory complete. Obſerving that Philip had advanced far beyond the reſt of his army; and that he continued to

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preſs the left wing of the Romans with a weight which they were wholly unable to ſuſtain; he quitted the right, where the ſucceſs was clear and unconteſted, and making a circuit to one ſide, fell in behind the combatants, and charged the Macedonians in their rear. Now ſuch is the diſpoſition of the phalanx, that the ſoldiers never can turn, or engage ſingly man with man. The Tribune therefore went on, killing thoſe that were before him, till the Macedonians, having no power to defend themſelves, threw away their arms, and were forced to ſeek their ſafety in flight. For the Romans alſo, who had before begun to retreat, now turned again, and charged them at the ſame time in front. When Philip, who from his firſt ſucceſs, had flattered himſelf, as we have ſaid, with the expectation of a perfect victory, now ſaw his troops throwing away their arms, and the enemy attacking them in their rear, he retired, with a ſmall body of infantry and cavalry, to a little diſtance from the place of the action, and ſurveyed the whole ſtate of the battle. And when he perceived, that the Romans, who were purſuing his left wing likewiſe, had almoſt reached the ſummit of the hills, he collected together as many of the Thracians and the Macedonians as the time would allow, and reſolved to leave the field. Flaminius, as he arrived upon the tops of the hills, ſaw ſome troops of the left wing of the Macedonian army, which were juſt now alſo aſcending to the ſummit from the oppoſite ſide. He was preparing to attack them, but ſtopped when he obſerved that they held their ſpears erect. This is the cuſtom of the Macedonians, when they either ſurrender themſelves, or paſs over to the ſide of the enemy. The Roman General therefore, as ſoon as he was informed of the intention of this ſignal, held back his troops from advancing, and determined to ſpare the men who had not courage to

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reſiſt him. But, in the inſtant when he was forming this reſolution, ſome of his foremoſt ranks ruſhed down upon them, and killed a great part of them, while a very ſmall number only threw away their arms, and eſcaped by flight.

The battle being now ended, and the Romans victorious in every part, Philip directed his flight towards Tempe. Having reſted the firſt evening in the place that is called the Tower of Alexander, he arrived on the next day at Gonni, which is ſituated in the entrance of the valley of Tempe. In this place he halted, in order to receive all thoſe that had eſcaped after the action. The Romans, having for ſome time purſued the fugitives, began ſome of them to ſtrip the dead, and ſome to bring together their priſoners. But the greateſt part ran to pillage the camp of the enemy. On their arrival there, they found that the Ætolians had already pillaged it. Suppoſing themſelves therefore to have been defrauded of their juſt rights, they vented bitter complaints againſt that people, and even loaded their own General with reproaches. "You expoſe us, ſaid they, to the dangers of the war: but the booty you allot to others." They returned back however to their camp, and there paſſed the night: and on the following day, having collected together the priſoners and the reſt of the ſpoil, they continued their march towards Lariſſa. The Romans loſt in this action about ſeven hundred men. On the ſide of the Macedonians, eight thouſand were killed; and not fewer than five thouſand taken priſoners. Such was the end of the battle of Cynoſcephalæ in Theſſaly, between king Philip and the Romans.

CHAP.

CHAP. II.

HAVING left an aſſurance with my readers, in the ſixth book of this work, that I would chooſe ſome proper time to compare together the arms and the orders of battle of the Macedonians and the Romans, and to ſhew in what reſpects they ſeverally have the advantage, or are inferior each to the other, I ſhall here take the occaſion which the action now deſcribed has offered, and ſhall endeavour to diſcharge my promiſe. For as the order of battle of the Macedonian armies was found, in the experience of former ages, to be ſuperior to that of the Aſiaticks and the Greeks, and the Roman order of battle in the ſame manner ſurpaſſed that of the Africans and all the weſtern parts of Europe; and as, in later times, theſe two ſeveral orders have been often ſet in oppoſition each to the other; it muſt be uſeful as well as curious, to trace out the difference that is between them, and to explain the advantages that turned the victory to the ſide of the Romans in theſe engagements. From ſuch a view, inſtead of having recourſe to chance, and blindly applauding, like men of ſuperficial underſtanding, the good fortune of the conquerours, we ſhall be able to remark with certainty the true cauſes of their ſucceſs, and to ground our admiration upon the principles of ſound ſenſe and reaſon.

With regard to the battles that were fought by Annibal, and the victories which he obtained againſt the Romans, there is no need upon this occaſion to enter into a long diſcuſſion of them. For it was not his arms, or his order of battle, which rendered that General ſuperior to the Romans; but his dexterity alone, and his admirable ſkill.

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In the accounts that were given by us of thoſe engagements, we have very clearly ſhewn that this was the cauſe of his ſucceſs. And this remark is ſtill more ſtrongly confirmed, in the firſt place, by the final iſſue of the war. For as ſoon as the Romans had obtained a General, whoſe ability was equal to that of Annibal, they immediately became the conquerours. Add to this, that Annibal himſelf rejected the armour which he firſt had uſed; and having furniſhed the African troops with the arms that were taken from the Romans in the firſt battle, uſed afterwards no other. In the ſame manner alſo Pyrrhus employed, not only the arms, but the troops of Italy; and ranged in alternate order a company of thoſe troops, and a cohort diſpoſed in the manner of the phalanx, in all his battles with the Romans. And yet, even with the advantage of this precaution, he was never able to obtain any clear or deciſive victory againſt them. It was neceſſary to premiſe theſe obſervations for the ſake of preventing any objection that might be made to the truth of what we ſhall hereafter ſay. Let us now return to the compariſon that was propoſed.

It is eaſy then to demonſtrate by many reaſons, that while the phalanx retains its proper form and full power of action, no force is able to ſtand againſt it in front, or ſupport the violence of its attack. When the ranks are cloſed in order to engage, each ſoldier, as he ſtands with his arms, occupies a ſpace of three feet. The ſpears, in their moſt ancient form, contained ſeventeen cubits in length. But, for the ſake of rendering them more commodious in action, they have ſince been reduced to fourteen. Of theſe, four cubits are contained between the part which the ſoldier graſps in his hands, and the lower end of the ſpear behind, which ſerves as a counterpoiſe to the part that is extended before him: and the length of this laſt part from the body

of the ſoldier, when the ſpear is puſhed forwards with both hands againſt the enemy, is by conſequence ten cubits. From hence it follows, that when the phalanx is cloſed in its proper form, and every ſoldier preſſed within the neceſſary diſtance with reſpect to the man that is before him and upon his ſide, the ſpears of the fifth rank are extended to the length of two cubits, and thoſe of the ſecond, third, and fourth to a ſtill greater length, beyond the foremoſt rank. The manner in which the men are crouded together in this method is marked by Homer in the following lines.

> Shield ſtuck to ſhield, to helmet helmet join'd,
> And man to man; and at each nod that bow'd
> High waving on their heads the glittering cones,
> Rattled the hair-crown'd caſques: ſo thick they ſtood. *

This deſcription is not leſs exact than beautiful. It is manifeſt then, that five ſeveral ſpears, differing each from the other in the length of two cubits, are extended before every man in the foremoſt rank. And when it is conſidered likewiſe, that the phalanx is formed by ſixteen in depth, it will be eaſy to conceive, what muſt be the weight and violence of the intire body, and how great the force of its attack. In the ranks indeed that are behind the fifth, the ſpears cannot reach ſo far as to be employed againſt the enemy. In theſe ranks therefore, the ſoldiers, inſtead of extending their ſpears forwards, reſt them upon the ſhoulders of the men that are before them, with their points ſlanting upwards; and in this manner they form a kind of rampart which covers their heads, and ſecures them againſt thoſe darts, which may be carried in their flight beyond

* Iliad. XIII. 131.

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the firſt ranks, and fall upon thoſe that are behind. But when the whole body advances to charge the enemy, even theſe hindmoſt ranks are of no ſmall uſe and moment. For as they preſs continually upon thoſe that are before them, they add by their weight alone great force to the attack, and deprive alſo the foremoſt ranks of the power of drawing themſelves backwards or retreating. Such then is the diſpoſition of the phalanx, with regard both to the whole and the ſeveral parts. Let us now conſider the arms, and the order of battle, of the Romans; that we may ſee by the compariſon in what reſpects they are different from thoſe of the Macedonians.

To each of the Roman ſoldiers, as he ſtands in arms, is allotted the ſame ſpace likewiſe of three feet. But as every ſoldier in the time of action is conſtantly in motion; being forced to ſhift his ſhield continually, that he may cover any part of his body againſt which a ſtroke is aimed; and to vary the poſition of his ſword, ſo as either to puſh, or to make a falling ſtroke; there muſt alſo be a diſtance of three feet, the leaſt that can be allowed for performing theſe motions with advantage, between each ſoldier and the man that ſtands next to him, both upon his ſide and behind him. In charging therefore againſt the phalanx, every ſingle Roman, as he has two Macedonians oppoſite to him, has alſo ten ſpears, which he is forced to encounter. But it is not poſſible for a ſingle man to cut down theſe ſpears with his ſword, before they can take their effect againſt him. Nor is it eaſy on the other hand to force his way through them. For the men that are behind add no weight to the preſſure, nor any ſtrength to the ſwords, of thoſe that are in the foremoſt rank. It will be eaſy therefore to conceive, that, while the phalanx retains its own proper poſition and ſtrength, no troops, as I before obſerved, can

ever ſupport the attack of it in front. To what cauſe then is it to be aſcribed, that the Roman armies are victorious; and thoſe defeated that employ the phalanx? The cauſe is this. In war, the times and the places of action are various and indefinite. But there is only one time and place, one fixed and determinate manner of action, that is ſuited to the phalanx. In the caſe then of a general action, if an enemy be forced to encounter with the phalanx in the very time and place which the latter requires, it is probable in the higheſt degree, from the reaſons that have been mentioned, that the phalanx always muſt obtain the victory. But if it be poſſible to avoid an engagement in ſuch circumſtances; and indeed it is eaſy to do it; there is then nothing to be dreaded from this order of battle. It is a well known and an acknowledged truth, that the phalanx requires a ground that is plain and naked, and free likewiſe from obſtacles of every kind; ſuch as trenches, breaks, obliquities, the brows of hills, or the channels of rivers; and that any of theſe are ſufficient to impede it, and to diſſolve the order in which it is formed. On the other hand again, it muſt as readily be allowed, that, if it be not altogether impoſſible, it is at leaſt extremely rare, to find a ground containing twenty ſtadia, or more, in its extent, and free from all theſe obſtacles. But let it however be ſuppoſed, that ſuch a ground may perhaps be found. If the enemy, inſtead of coming down upon it, ſhould lead their army through the country, plundering the cities, and ravaging the lands, of what uſe then will be the phalanx? As long as it remains in this convenient poſt, it not only has no power to ſuccour its friends, but cannot even preſerve itſelf from ruin. For the troops that are maſters of the whole country without reſiſtance will eaſily cut off from it all ſupplies. And if, on the other hand, it ſhould relinquiſh

quiſh its own proper ground, and endeavour to engage in action, the advantage is then ſo great againſt it, that it ſoon becomes an eaſy prey to the enemy.

But farther; let it be ſuppoſed that the enemy will come down into this plain. Yet, if he brings not his whole army at once to receive the attack of the phalanx; or if, in the inſtant of the charge, he withdraws himſelf a little from the action; it is eaſy to determine what will be the conſeqūence, from the preſent practice of the Romans. For we now draw not our diſcourſe from bare reaſoning only, but from facts which have lately happened. When the Romans attack the phalanx in front, they never employ all their forces, ſo as to make their line equal to that of the enemy; but lead on a part only of their troops, and keep the reſt of the army in reſerve. Now, whether the troops of the phalanx break the line that is oppoſed to them, or whether themſelves are broken, the order peculiar to the phalanx is alike diſſolved. For if they purſue the fugitives, or if, on the other hand, they retreat and are purſued, in either caſe they are ſeparated from the reſt of their own body. And thus there is left ſome interval or ſpace, which the reſerve of the Roman army takes care to ſeize, and then charges the remaining part of the phalanx, not in front, but in flank, or in the rear. As it is eaſy then to avoid the times and circumſtances that are advantageous to the phalanx; and as thoſe, on the contrary, that are diſadvantageous to it can never be avoided; it is certain that this difference alone muſt carry with it a deciſive weight in the time of action.

To this it may be added, that the troops of the phalanx alſo are, like others, forced to march, and to incamp, in every kind of place: to be the firſt to ſeize the advantageous poſts; to inveſt an enemy, or be inveſted; and to engage

engage alſo in ſudden actions, without knowing that an enemy was near. Theſe things all happen in war; and either tend greatly to promote, or ſometimes wholly determine the victory. But, at all ſuch times, the Macedonian order of battle either cannot be employed, or is employed in a manner that is altogether uſeleſs. For the troops of the phalanx loſe all their ſtrength, when they engage in ſeparate companies, or man with man. The Roman order, on the contrary, is never attended, even upon ſuch occaſions, with any diſadvantage. Among the Romans, every ſingle ſoldier, when he is once armed and ready for ſervice, is alike fitted to engage in any time and place, or upon any appearance of the enemy: and preſerves always the ſame power, and the ſame capacity of action, whether he engages with the whole of the army, or only with a part; whether in ſeparate companies, or ſingly man againſt man. As the parts therefore, in the Roman order of battle, are ſo much better contrived for uſe, than thoſe in the other; ſo the ſucceſs alſo in action muſt, in the ſame proportion, be greater in the one than the other. If I have been long in examining this ſubject, it was becauſe many of the Greeks, at the time when the Macedonians were defeated, regarded that event as a thing ſurpaſſing all belief: and becauſe many others alſo may hereafter wiſh to know, from what reaſons, and in what particular reſpects, the order of the phalanx is excelled by the arms and the order of battle of the Romans. I now return from my digreſſion.

Philip, when he had done all that was poſſible in the battle, and had ſuffered an intire defeat, collected together as many of the troops as were able to eſcape, and directed his retreat through Tempe towards Macedon: but firſt ſent away one of his guards to Lariſſa, in the very night that

followed the action, with orders to deſtroy and burn all the royal papers. This attention which he ſhewed, even in the very moment of his diſtreſs, not to leave ſo neceſſary a duty unperformed, was indeed highly worthy of a king. For he knew that if theſe papers ſhould fall into the hands of the Romans, they would afford many pretences that might be employed againſt himſelf and his friends. There are others perhaps to be found, who have not born the power of proſperous fortune like men; but have ſtood firm under the preſſure of adverſity, and ſupported themſelves by their caution and prudence. But this was very peculiarly the character of Philip: as it will be ſeen in the following parts of this work. For as we gave a diſtinct account of the happy diſpoſition and virtuous tendency of this prince in the beginning of his reign; and ſhewed afterwards, from what cauſes, and in what time and manner he changed his conduct, and purſued a different courſe of action; it will be no leſs our duty alſo to ſhew, in what manner he returned again to a better mind, and by what wiſe management, when his misfortunes had inſpired him with different ſentiments, he adjuſted all his meaſures to that neceſſity, which the times, in which he found himſelf, impoſed. The Roman General, when he had made the neceſſary diſpoſition of the priſoners and the reſt of the ſpoil, continued his march with the army towards Lariſſa.

EXTRACT the FOURTH.

Men who are moſt practiſed in deceit, are often deceived through want of caution.

IT is manifeſt then from this example, that, though we are all ſo liable to be deceived, both by the ſame arts and the ſame inſtruments alſo of fraud, yet we are never ſufficiently upon our guard againſt them. For this very artifice has been practiſed upon many occaſions, and by many perſons. It is not ſtrange perhaps, that mankind in general ſhould ſo often fall into the ſnare. But that thoſe men, who are as we may ſay the very ſource of all deceit, ſhould be themſelves deceived, may reaſonably be thought aſtoniſhing. But indeed this only happens to them, becauſe they do not recollect upon ſuch occaſions the wiſe admonition of Epicharmus. "Be ſober, and diſtruſtful: theſe are the nerves of the mind."

EXTRACT the FIFTH.

The conference at Lyſimachia between Antiochus and the Roman deputies.

ABOUT this time, with the reſt of the ten Roman deputies, came Publius Lentulus from Bargylia, and Lucius Terentius and Publius Vilius from Thaſſus: and within a few days afterwards, notice of their arrival having been immediately conveyed to the king, they all aſſembled together at Lyſimachia. Hegeſianax alſo and Lyſias, who had been deputed from Antiochus to Flaminius, were at the ſame time preſent. In the private interviews that paſſed between the Romans and the king, nothing was to be ſeen but frankneſs and civility. But when they were afterwards all aſſembled together, and brought their buſineſs into debate, the aſpect of things was not ſo friendly. For Lucius Cornelius, as he deſired the king to deliver up thoſe cities in Aſia, which he had torn from the dominions of Ptolemy, at the ſame time preſſed him alſo in the moſt peremptory terms to relinquiſh thoſe that had belonged to Philip: ſince nothing, as he ſaid, could be more abſurd, than that, when the Romans had maintained a war againſt that prince, Antiochus ſhould come afterwards and carry away the ſpoils. He exhorted him likewiſe not to aſſume any power over the cities that were free: and then added; that, upon the whole, he could not but wonder, what deſign had induced him to paſs into Europe with ſo powerful a fleet and army. That, if the thing were to be well conſidered, no other motive

could indeed be aſſigned for ſuch an expedition, but an intention to make war upon the Romans.

The king replied to this diſcourſe: "That he knew not upon what grounds of reaſon his poſſeſſion of the cities of Aſia was now conteſted; and that the Romans, of all others, had certainly no right to bring his title into diſpute. That he wiſhed that they would abſtain from meddling with the affairs of Aſia; as much as he was careful, not to meddle at any time with thoſe of Italy. That his deſign in paſſing into Europe was ro recover the Cherſoneſus, and the cities of Thrace, which were properly a part of his own dominions. That thoſe places had belonged originally to Lyſimachus: and, when that prince was attacked and vanquiſhed by Seleucus, they had paſſed, with the reſt of his kingdom, to the conquerour, by the juſt rights of war. That in ſucceeding times, while the attention of his anceſtors was drawn away to other objects, Ptolemy had firſt uſurped ſome parts of the dominions that were ſo acquired, and Philip afterwards the reſt. That he did not therefore now poſſeſs them, as taking an advantage from the misfortunes of Philip; but only as improving an opportunity which was fair to himſelf, and favourable for the recovery of his own proper right. That in bringing back the inhabitants of Lyſimachia, when they had been driven out by the Thracians, and reſtoring the city to its former ſtate, he had done no injury to the Romans, nor ſhewed any intention to attack them; but deſigned only to make the place a ſeat of reſidence for his ſon Seleucus. That, with reſpect to the cities of Aſia that were free, it was fit that they ſhould owe their liberty to his grace and favour, and not to the command of the Romans. And laſtly, with regard alſo to Ptolemy, that he ſhould be ready, without the interpoſition of others, to adjuſt

adjuſt all diſputes in the manner which himſelf ſhould deſire: for he had reſolved, not only to live in friendſhip, but even to contract likewiſe an affinity with that prince."

It was then propoſed by Lucius, that the Lampſacenians and Smyrnæans ſhould be called in, and heard; and this accordingly was done. On the part of the former appeared Parmenio and Pythodorus; and on that of the latter, Cœranus. But as they were beginning to harangue with great boldneſs and freedom, Antiochus, being uneaſy that he ſhould in this manner ſeem to give an account of his conduct before the Romans, ſtopped Parmenio from proceeding in his diſcourſe, and ſaid; that it was not the Romans, but the Rhodians, that were the proper judges of the matter in diſpute. Upon this, the conference was immediately broken up; and the parties all retired, being alike diſſatisfied with each other.

EXTRACT the SIXTH.

The death of Scopas the Ætolian at Alexandria.

THOUGH there are many indeed who would wiſh to draw glory from hazardous actions, there are but few who have the courage to undertake them. And yet Scopas had advantages far greater than Cleomenes, if he had been willing to try the fortune of ſome bold and deſperate attempt. For the latter had been unexpectedly prevented by his enemies; and had no hope left, except in the aſſiſtance of his domeſticks and his friends. He reſolved however to make trial of that hope, and choſe rather to die with honour, than to ſurvive with diſgrace. But Scopas on the contrary, though he had a ſtrong force ready to ſupport him, and though the infancy of the king rendered the opportunity alſo highly favourable, was prevented merely through his own irreſolution and delay. For Ariſtomenes, having received notice that he had aſſembled his friends together at his houſe, and was holding a conſultation with them, ſent ſome of the guards, to require him to attend the royal council. On receiving this meſſage, Scopas was ſtruck with ſuch confuſion, that he had neither courage to carry any thing into execution, nor reſolution to obey the orders of the king. This was ſenſeleſs in the higheſt degree. Ariſtomenes therefore, being informed of his folly, ſurrounded the houſe with ſome troops and elephants, and at the ſame time ſent Ptolemy the ſon of Eumenes with a body of young ſoldiers, to conduct him to the council, if he was willing to come, or otherwiſe to bring

bring him by force. When Ptolemy entered the houſe, and told him, that the king commanded his attendance, Scopas ſeemed not at firſt to pay any regard to what he ſaid; but, fixing his eyes ſtedfaſtly upon him, for ſome time continued to ſurvey him with a threatening air, as if he had been aſtoniſhed at his boldneſs. The other, coming nearer, roughly ſeized him by his mantle: and Scopas then called upon his friends to help him. But as many of the ſoldiers were now come in, and ſome perſon alſo informed him that the houſe was ſurrounded by troops, he was forced to yield to the neceſſity, and followed Ptolemy, together with his friends. As ſoon as he appeared before the council, the charge againſt him, having been opened in few words by the king, was then continued by Polycrates, who had lately arrived at Cyprus, and afterwards by Ariſtomenes. The chief heads of the accuſation were the facts which have before been mentioned. To theſe only were added, the ſecret meetings which he had held with his friends, and his refuſal to obey the orders of the king. Upon theſe facts he was condemned, not only by the council, but by the embaſſadours alſo that were preſent. For Ariſtomenes had called together upon this occaſion, beſides many other illuſtrious men from Greece, the embaſſadours likewiſe that had been ſent by the Ætolians to negotiate a peace. Among theſe was Dorimachus the ſon of Nicoſtratus. When the accuſers had ended, Scopas attempted indeed to ſay ſomething in his own defence: but the guilt of his actions was ſo manifeſt, that what he urged made no impreſſion. He was conveyed therefore to priſon with his friends: and in the following night, by the orders of Ariſtomenes, ended his life by poiſon, together with his friends. But Dicæarchus, by the ſame orders, after he had firſt been tortured, was whipped to death with rods: and thus

ſuffered

ſuffered the puniſhment that was both ſuitable to his crimes, and due likewiſe to the common vengeance of all Greece. For this was the ſame Dicæarchus, who, when Philip had reſolved, in contempt of treaties, to invade the Cyclade iſlands and the cities of the Helleſpont, was appointed by that prince the commander of all his fleet, and chief leader of the whole expedition. Employed in a deſign ſo manifeſtly impious, he was ſo far from being ſhocked at the injuſtice of his undertaking, that he endeavoured, by an action of the moſt abandoned profligacy, to ſtrike both the Gods and men with horror. For, when he had brought his fleet to anchor, he erected two altars, one to Impiety, and the other to Injuſtice; offered ſacrifices upon them; and adored thoſe vices, as if they had been divinities. It ſeems therefore, that both the Gods and men concurred to inflict upon him a moſt proper puniſhment. For it was reaſonable that a man, whoſe life had been ſo contrary to nature, ſhould die alſo a death that was unnatural. The reſt of the Ætolians, who were willing to return to their own country, were diſmiſſed by the king, and allowed to carry with them all their goods. With regard to Scopas, that paſſion for acquiring wealth, in which he was known during his life to ſurpaſs all other men, appeared ſtill more conſpicuouſly after his death, from the great quantity of money and of valuable goods that was found in his houſe. His cuſtom was, to employ the debauched and profligate as the miniſters of his rapine: and, with the help of ſuch aſſociates, he forced his way into the ſtrongeſt places through all the kingdom, and ranſacked them in ſearch of treaſure.

When this diſorder was ſo happily compoſed, the miniſters of the court reſolved to celebrate the Anacleteria, or proclamation of the king. For though this prince

had not yet arrived at the cuſtomary age, it was thought that, if he ſhould now ſeem to take the ſupreme authority into his own hands, the affairs of the kingdom would acquire a more ſettled form, and might be again brought back into a better train. The preparations upon this occaſion were very ſumptuous; and the ceremony performed with a magnificence that was worthy of ſuch a ſovereign. It was ſuppoſed that Polycrates was the perſon, by whoſe means chiefly this meaſure was carried into execution. This Polycrates, under the reign of the father of the preſent prince, though he was then very young, had rendered himſelf, both by his ſervices and his fidelity, one of the moſt diſtinguiſhed perſons of the court. Nor was the credit leſs, which he had acquired in the preſent reign. For having been intruſted with the government of Cyprus, and the care of collecting the revenues of that country, in moſt difficult and unſettled times, he not only had preſerved the iſland for the infant king, but amaſſed likewiſe a very large treaſure; and now brought it with him to Alexandria, after he had firſt reſigned his government to Ptolemy of Megalopolis. On account of this important ſervice, he was received with great applauſe, and became afterwards very powerful. And yet this man, as he advanced in age, ſtarted aſide from this honourable courſe, and plunged himſelf into a life of vice and profligacy. The ſame diſhonour is ſaid alſo to have attended the old age of Ptolemy the ſon of Ageſander. When we arrive at the proper time, we ſhall take care to give ſome account of the ſcandalous actions which they committed, after they had raiſed themſelves into power.

THE END OF THE SECOND VOLUME.

AN

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TO THE

SECOND VOLUME.

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